Release v1.30.0

- **Regel-Analyse: Bereinigung (nur Ansicht):** Auf **Regelwerk › Regel-Analyse** gibt es den Tab **Bereinigung** (`?tab=cleanup`). Er listet je Firewall die
  Regeln, die einen Blick wert sind: **ungenutzt** (OPNexus hat in 7/30/90/180 Tagen keinen Treffer gesehen), **verdeckt** (eine frühere Quick-Regel
  trifft schon alles, was sie trifft), **doppelt** und **lange deaktiviert**. Jeder Befund trägt eine Sicherheit (**sicher / vermutlich / unbekannt**, Tooltip mit
  dem Grund): „sicher“ gibt es nur mit vollständigen, frischen Belegen, bei einer Regel mit Zeitplan, ohne geladenen pf-Regelsatz oder bei Aliasen bleibt es
  höchstens „vermutlich“. Die Tabelle zeigt auch den letzten Treffer und ob die Regel entfernbar wäre (nicht: automatische Regeln, Regeln im Altformat, von OPNexus
  verwaltete Regeln – die entfernt man über die Regelseite). Es wird nur gelesen; **Entfernen folgt in einer späteren Version**. Die Sicherheitslage verlinkt ihre
  Befunde „ungenutzt/verdeckt/doppelt“ direkt dorthin; per API `GET /api/hosts/{id}/rule-analysis/cleanup?unused_days=30`, per MCP `rule_cleanup_candidates`.
- **Änderungsverlauf je Regel:** OPNexus liest alle 15 Minuten die Regeln jeder Firewall und merkt sich, was sich geändert hat – auch bei Regeln, die nicht von OPNexus
  stammen: angelegt, geändert (mit Vorher/Nachher), aktiviert, deaktiviert, entfernt, jeweils mit der Herkunft „über OPNexus“ (passender Audit-Eintrag) oder „extern“.
  Auf der Live-Regel-Ansicht (Regelwerk › Live über alle Hosts) öffnet die Zeilenaktion **Verlauf** die Ereignisse zusammen mit den gespeicherten Fassungen und dem Audit der
  verwalteten Regel. Die erste Beobachtung speichert nur den Ausgangszustand; der Verlauf wird 365 Tage aufbewahrt (`GET /api/hosts/{id}/live-rules/{uuid}/history`).
  Eine Umsortierung (andere Reihenfolge oder Gruppe) gilt als „verschoben“, nicht als Änderung. Eine leere oder unvollständige Antwort der Firewall (ohne
  automatische Regeln) wird verworfen; verschwinden mehr als die Hälfte der Regeln auf einmal, zählt erst die zweite gleiche Beobachtung. Die Herkunft „über OPNexus“
  erklärt nur Audit-Einträge seit der vorherigen Beobachtung, und jeder Eintrag nur eine Änderung.
  Schemaänderungen 0027 und 0028 (Tabellen und ein Feld für den Beobachtungszeitraum) laufen beim Start.
- **Regelnutzung genauer:** Die Zähler kommen jetzt aus `ruleStats` (von der Firewall schon je Regel summiert; ältere Versionen weiterhin über den pf-Regelsatz) und werden alle
  15 Minuten statt alle 6 Stunden gelesen. Regeln im Altformat (noch nicht migriert) werden ebenfalls erfasst. Das Beobachtungsfenster für „ungenutzt“ beginnt neu, wenn eine Regel eingeschaltet oder geändert wird, und nach einem pf-Neuladen mit langer Lücke bei den Zählern.
- **Verdeckt/doppelt in der Sicherheitslage genauer:** Der Vergleich kennt jetzt die echte Reihenfolge (Floating vor Interface-Gruppen vor Interface-Regeln), Netze und
  Portbereiche als Mengen (z. B. 10.1.0.0/16 liegt in 10.0.0.0/8), `inet46` und `tcp/udp`, und übergeht Regeln mit Zeitplan, Markierung oder Limits. Es findet dadurch
  mehr verdeckte Regeln als bisher, nie weniger belegte.

.env.example

@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=false
 # User-Agent "OPNexus/<Version>". Admins sehen bei einer neueren Version einen
 # Hinweis; aktualisiert wird nie automatisch, sondern mit `opnexus update` oder
 # (optional, siehe unten) per Klick im Webinterface.
+# Einfacher: im Webinterface unter Einstellungen › OPNexus aktualisieren einschalten.
+# Ein Wert hier hat Vorrang und sperrt den Schalter dort.
 # UPDATE_CHECK_URL=https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json
 # UPDATE_CHECK_INTERVAL_HOURS=12
 
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=false
 # Startet den Updater-Container, mit dem Admins unter Einstellungen › „OPNexus
 # aktualisieren“ ein Update auslösen können. Er ist der einzige Container mit
 # Docker-Socket-Zugriff (= root-gleiche Rechte auf diesem Host) und standardmäßig
-# AUS. Benötigt außerdem UPDATE_CHECK_URL (oben). Siehe Handbuch, "Updates per Klick".
+# AUS. Braucht außerdem die Versionsprüfung (Webinterface oder UPDATE_CHECK_URL, oben). Siehe Handbuch, "Updates per Klick".
 # COMPOSE_PROFILES=updater
 
 # ── Transportsicherheit (nur ändern, wenn nötig) ──────────────────────
@@ -98,3 +100,26 @@ TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=false
 # Zum Aktivieren (Handbuch „Firewalls hinter NAT“): COMPOSE_PROFILES=overlay
 # und den UDP-Port aus dem Internet erreichbar machen.
 #OVERLAY_PORT=51820
+
+# ── GUI-Fernzugriff auf verwaltete Firewalls (optional, Standard AUS) ──
+# Öffnet die Weboberfläche einer Firewall über OPNexus, auch hinter NAT
+# (Management-Tunnel), jeweils in einem eigenen Browser-Ursprung (Slot-Port).
+# Dreifach aus, bis alles hier gesetzt ist UND ein Admin den Schalter unter
+# Einstellungen einschaltet. Voraussetzungen: HTTPS über den Proxy und
+# COOKIE_SECURE=true. Siehe Handbuch, „Firewall-Oberfläche über OPNexus“.
+# 1. Profil aktivieren (mit anderen Profilen kommagetrennt, z. B. overlay,gui):
+# COMPOSE_PROFILES=gui
+# 2. Slot-Ursprünge: dieselbe Adresse wie in OPNEXUS_SITES, je Slot ein Port
+#    aus GUI_PORTS. Darf NICHT in FRONTEND_ORIGIN stehen (Start wird sonst verweigert).
+# OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES=https://10.0.0.5:9441, https://10.0.0.5:9442, https://10.0.0.5:9443, https://10.0.0.5:9444
+# 3. Gemeinsames Geheimnis Backend <-> Gateway, mind. 32 Zeichen, z. B.
+#    `openssl rand -hex 32`:
+# GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN=
+# 4. Wo die Slot-Ports lauschen. Standard nur lokal (127.0.0.1); für den
+#    Zugriff aus dem Netz die Adresse dieses Hosts eintragen (wie bei
+#    PROXY_BIND_ADDRESS). GUI_PORTS ist ein Bereich, Host- und Container-Port
+#    sind gleich. GUI_PORTS zum Einschalten SETZEN: ohne den Eintrag nimmt
+#    Docker zufällige freie Ports (damit ein Update nie an belegten Ports wie
+#    9443 scheitert), und die Slot-Adressen oben wären nicht erreichbar.
+# GUI_BIND_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1
+# GUI_PORTS=9441-9444

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -31,6 +31,262 @@ den Einstellungen.
 Nächste Codenamen (der Reihe nach, wenn die jeweils nächste MINOR-Version
 ansteht): Merlin …
 
+## [1.30.0] "Owl" — 2026-10-22
+
+- **Regel-Analyse: Bereinigung (nur Ansicht):** Auf **Regelwerk › Regel-Analyse** gibt es den Tab **Bereinigung** (`?tab=cleanup`). Er listet je Firewall die
+  Regeln, die einen Blick wert sind: **ungenutzt** (OPNexus hat in 7/30/90/180 Tagen keinen Treffer gesehen), **verdeckt** (eine frühere Quick-Regel
+  trifft schon alles, was sie trifft), **doppelt** und **lange deaktiviert**. Jeder Befund trägt eine Sicherheit (**sicher / vermutlich / unbekannt**, Tooltip mit
+  dem Grund): „sicher“ gibt es nur mit vollständigen, frischen Belegen, bei einer Regel mit Zeitplan, ohne geladenen pf-Regelsatz oder bei Aliasen bleibt es
+  höchstens „vermutlich“. Die Tabelle zeigt auch den letzten Treffer und ob die Regel entfernbar wäre (nicht: automatische Regeln, Regeln im Altformat, von OPNexus
+  verwaltete Regeln – die entfernt man über die Regelseite). Es wird nur gelesen; **Entfernen folgt in einer späteren Version**. Die Sicherheitslage verlinkt ihre
+  Befunde „ungenutzt/verdeckt/doppelt“ direkt dorthin; per API `GET /api/hosts/{id}/rule-analysis/cleanup?unused_days=30`, per MCP `rule_cleanup_candidates`.
+- **Änderungsverlauf je Regel:** OPNexus liest alle 15 Minuten die Regeln jeder Firewall und merkt sich, was sich geändert hat – auch bei Regeln, die nicht von OPNexus
+  stammen: angelegt, geändert (mit Vorher/Nachher), aktiviert, deaktiviert, entfernt, jeweils mit der Herkunft „über OPNexus“ (passender Audit-Eintrag) oder „extern“.
+  Auf der Live-Regel-Ansicht (Regelwerk › Live über alle Hosts) öffnet die Zeilenaktion **Verlauf** die Ereignisse zusammen mit den gespeicherten Fassungen und dem Audit der
+  verwalteten Regel. Die erste Beobachtung speichert nur den Ausgangszustand; der Verlauf wird 365 Tage aufbewahrt (`GET /api/hosts/{id}/live-rules/{uuid}/history`).
+  Eine Umsortierung (andere Reihenfolge oder Gruppe) gilt als „verschoben“, nicht als Änderung. Eine leere oder unvollständige Antwort der Firewall (ohne
+  automatische Regeln) wird verworfen; verschwinden mehr als die Hälfte der Regeln auf einmal, zählt erst die zweite gleiche Beobachtung. Die Herkunft „über OPNexus“
+  erklärt nur Audit-Einträge seit der vorherigen Beobachtung, und jeder Eintrag nur eine Änderung.
+  Schemaänderungen 0027 und 0028 (Tabellen und ein Feld für den Beobachtungszeitraum) laufen beim Start.
+- **Regelnutzung genauer:** Die Zähler kommen jetzt aus `ruleStats` (von der Firewall schon je Regel summiert; ältere Versionen weiterhin über den pf-Regelsatz) und werden alle
+  15 Minuten statt alle 6 Stunden gelesen. Regeln im Altformat (noch nicht migriert) werden ebenfalls erfasst. Das Beobachtungsfenster für „ungenutzt“ beginnt neu, wenn eine Regel eingeschaltet oder geändert wird, und nach einem pf-Neuladen mit langer Lücke bei den Zählern.
+- **Verdeckt/doppelt in der Sicherheitslage genauer:** Der Vergleich kennt jetzt die echte Reihenfolge (Floating vor Interface-Gruppen vor Interface-Regeln), Netze und
+  Portbereiche als Mengen (z. B. 10.1.0.0/16 liegt in 10.0.0.0/8), `inet46` und `tcp/udp`, und übergeht Regeln mit Zeitplan, Markierung oder Limits. Es findet dadurch
+  mehr verdeckte Regeln als bisher, nie weniger belegte.
+
+## [1.29.0] "Caracara" — 2026-10-22
+
+- **Fehlende API-Rechte werden sichtbar:** Darf der API-Schlüssel einer Firewall den Gateway- oder Dienststatus nicht lesen (OPNsense antwortet
+  mit 403), fiel das bisher niemandem auf, und der standardmäßig aktive Gateway-Alarm konnte nie auslösen. Jetzt zeigen die Host-Seite
+  (Abschnitt „Gateways“) und die Dashboard-Karte „Fleet-/CARP-Gesundheit“ ein Warn-Badge „API-Rechte fehlen: Gateways, Dienste“; der Tooltip nennt die
+  OPNsense-Berechtigung, die beim Benutzer oder bei der Gruppe fehlt (System: Gateways, Status: Services, Lobby: Dashboard). Zusätzlich gibt es
+  den neuen Alarm **API-Rechte fehlen** (standardmäßig an, abschaltbar unter Einstellungen › Benachrichtigungen, gleiche Entprellung wie die
+  anderen Messungs-Alarme) und die Prometheus-Metrik `opnexus_host_api_rights_missing{host,read}`. Nur eine ausdrückliche Ablehnung zählt;
+  Zeitüberschreitungen oder Serverfehler bleiben „unbekannt“.
+- **Gateway-Alarm pro Gateway abschaltbar:** In der Gateway-Liste der Host-Seite schaltet eine Glocke den Alarm für ein einzelnes Gateway aus
+  (z. B. ruhendes Zweit-WAN oder tote IPv6-Gateways); ein „Alarm aus“-Badge zeigt es an. Ein offener Alarm dieses Gateways löst sich dabei
+  auf. Nur Administratoren, die Änderung steht im Audit-Log. Das Dashboard zeigt bei mehr als acht Gateways „+ N weitere“.
+- **Firewall-Oberfläche (GUI-Zugriff) härter:** Ein frei gewordener Platz wird für eine **andere** Firewall erst 5 Minuten nach dem Ende der letzten
+  Sitzung vergeben (Schutz, falls dort noch ein Tab offen ist, der die Cookies des Platzes teilt); dieselbe Firewall bekommt ihn sofort wieder.
+  Sind alle Plätze belegt oder noch in der Abkühlzeit, nennt die Meldung den Grund. Ändern sich Adresse, festgesetztes Zertifikat oder Tunnelweg
+  einer Firewall, während ihre Oberfläche offen ist, endet die Sitzung spätestens nach 20 Sekunden. Das Limit von 64 gleichzeitigen Sitzungen
+  verdrängt keine laufende Sitzung mehr: eine neue wird abgelehnt (mit Meldung), bis eine endet. **Hinweis:** Das GUI-Gateway-Image muss zur
+  Backend-Version passen (wie bisher beim Update beider Container).
+- **Anmeldung (Cookies) härter:** Das alte Sitzungs-Cookie `opnexus-session` wird bei HTTPS **nicht mehr akzeptiert**. **Alle, die sich seit der
+  Umstellung auf 1.27 nicht neu angemeldet haben, müssen sich einmal neu anmelden**; Skripte mit rohem Sitzungs-Cookie brauchen den Namen
+  `__Host-opnexus-session` (API-Tokens sind nicht betroffen, ohne HTTPS bleibt `opnexus-session` der normale Name). Beim Abmelden wird ein altes
+  Cookie weiterhin gelöscht. Das Cookie, das die SSO-Anmeldung an den Browser bindet, heißt bei HTTPS jetzt `__Host-opnexus-oidc-state`; der
+  Rückweg vom Anbieter wird nur noch als Seitenaufruf (Navigation) von einer fremden Seite zugelassen, und ohne dieses Cookie scheitert er immer.
+- **Webhook, Benachrichtigungskanäle und SSO-Anbieter: Schutz vor DNS-Rebinding:** Bisher prüfte OPNexus die Adresse, auf die ein Name zeigt, und
+  der HTTP-Client löste den Namen danach noch einmal auf; ein Server unter Fremdkontrolle konnte beim zweiten Mal eine interne Adresse liefern. Jetzt
+  verbindet OPNexus genau zu der geprüften Adresse (Host-Name, TLS-Zertifikatsprüfung und Anfrage bleiben beim Namen); zeigt eine Antwort auch nur
+  teilweise auf Loopback, Link-Local oder einen Cloud-Metadaten-Dienst (auch AWS-IPv6 und Alibaba), kommt keine Verbindung zustande und die Zustellung meldet „Zieladresse nicht
+  erlaubt“. Private Netze bleiben erlaubt (eigener ntfy, Gotify, Matrix). Proxy-Umgebungsvariablen werden für diese Aufrufe nicht mehr beachtet.
+- **Benachrichtigungen parallel zugestellt:** Webhook, E-Mail und alle Kanäle werden gleichzeitig bedient, jeder mit eigener Zeitgrenze (20 Sekunden),
+  und ein Prüfdurchlauf sendet insgesamt höchstens 90 Sekunden. Ein hängender Kanal verzögert weder die anderen noch die nächsten Prüfungen; im Log
+  steht dann „timed out“ (ohne Adresse oder Token). Wie bisher wird einmal je Ereignis zugestellt, ohne Wiederholung, **außer** der Durchlauf war so voll, dass
+  für ein Ereignis noch gar kein Versuch stattfand: es wird im nächsten Durchlauf zugestellt. Die Zustellung beginnt jetzt nach allen Prüfungen
+  eines Durchlaufs statt mitten darin.
+- **Rollouts: Fingerabdruck, verantwortliche Person, überlappende Termine:** Der Fingerabdruck eines aktivierten Plans umfasst jetzt auch die
+  ausgelassenen und verschobenen Termine seines Fensters: **wer einen Termin auslässt oder verschiebt, muss einen automatischen Plan danach neu
+  aktivieren** (ohne solche Ausnahmen bleiben bestehende Aktivierungen gültig; **Pläne, deren Fenster schon Ausnahmen haben, nach dem Update
+  einmal neu aktivieren**, sonst meldet der Plan „Plan geändert“ und startet nicht automatisch). Die verantwortliche Person (Aktivierende, Startende, Freigebende)
+  wird zusätzlich als Konto-ID gespeichert (Migration 0026, bestehende Einträge werden über den Namen zugeordnet): ein gelöschtes und unter gleichem
+  Namen neu angelegtes Konto gilt nicht mehr als dieselbe Person, der Lauf pausiert bzw. der automatische Start unterbleibt mit „Person darf nicht mehr
+  ausrollen“. Angezeigt wird weiter der Benutzername. Überlappen sich zwei Termine eines Wartungsfensters, zählt der zuletzt begonnene (bisher der
+  früheste), sodass ein älterer, längst abgeschnittener Termin keinen neuen Start mehr blockiert.
+- **Kleinigkeiten:** Ressourcen-Alarme zeigen bei fehlendem Messwert keine Zahl mehr („None %“ entfällt). Der Dialog „Von Firewall übernehmen“ zeigt ohne aktive
+  Firewall einen Hinweis statt dauerhaft „Lädt…“. Fehlermeldungen beim Übernehmen und Verknüpfen nennen die Gründe in Klartext (Deutsch/Englisch) statt
+  roher Codes wie `name_exists`; dasselbe gilt für „GUI-Zugriff nicht eingerichtet“ und blockierte Netzwerkänderungen. Der Test-Knopf der
+  Benachrichtigungskanäle ist für Nicht-Admins ausgeblendet (der Server verweigert den Test ohnehin). Der Tooltip der aktiven Plätze nennt keine
+  Umgebungsvariable mehr. Eine Gateway-Sitzung, die der Gateway-Container nicht mehr bestätigt (Absturz), zählt für die Abkühlzeit der Plätze als
+  beendet.
+- **Grafana-Dashboard erweitert:** neue Felder für Gateways (erreichbar, Paketverlust, Latenz), Swap, gestoppte Dienste, fehlende API-Rechte und
+  Rollouts nach Status; dazu die Metrik `opnexus_rollout_runs{status}`.
+
+## [1.28.0] "Sparrowhawk" — 2026-10-21
+
+- **Übernehmen: mit vorhandenem zentralem Objekt verknüpfen:** Dieselbe von Hand angelegte Regel, derselbe Alias oder dieselbe NAT-Regel auf mehreren
+  Firewalls (z. B. beide HA-Knoten) wird nicht mehr als zweites Objekt übernommen. Im Dialog „Von Firewall übernehmen“ erscheint bei exakter
+  Übereinstimmung (nach Einsetzen der Host-Variablen, bei Aliasen inkl. Verweisen) die Aktion **Verknüpfen**: die Firewall wird weiteres Ziel des
+  vorhandenen Objekts, die Vorschau zeigt „keine Änderung“, und der nächste Rollout aktualisiert alle Firewalls an einem Objekt. Auf der Firewall wird
+  dabei nichts geändert. Unterscheidet sich ein gleichnamiges Objekt, zeigt der Dialog die abweichenden Felder; verknüpft wird dann nie. „Alle
+  übernehmbaren“ fragt vorher nach („3 verknüpfen, 2 neu übernehmen, 1 nicht übernehmbar“). Aliase, die bisher wegen „Name existiert“ abgelehnt wurden,
+  lassen sich so übernehmen.
+  Wartet das vorhandene Objekt gerade auf eine Bestätigung, wird nicht verknüpft; „Alle übernehmbaren“ lässt den Eintrag dann aus. Verknüpfen
+  macht ein gerade geöffnetes Bearbeiten-Formular des Objekts ungültig, damit die neue Firewall nicht versehentlich wieder aus den Zielen fällt.
+
+- **Tooltips überarbeitet:** Der deaktivierte Button „Oberfläche öffnen“ nennt jetzt den Grund im Klartext samt nächstem Schritt (statt nur einer
+  Variablen wie `GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN`); dasselbe gilt für ausgeschaltete Funktion, deaktivierte Firewall, Nicht-HTTPS-Adresse und ausgeschaltete
+  Zertifikatsprüfung. Texte durchgehend in Du-Form, kürzere VPN-Einleitungen, verständlichere Hinweise bei gesperrten Buttons (Zertifikate, Benutzer,
+  Dienste). Icon-Buttons (Bearbeiten, Löschen, Schließen, Reihenfolge) zeigen beim Darüberfahren ihren Namen.
+
+## [1.27.2] "Buzzard" — 2026-10-21
+
+- **`opnexus update` prüft den Proxy vor dem Wechsel:** Nach dem Ziehen der Images validiert das Werkzeug die Caddy-Konfiguration des neuen
+  Proxy-Images mit den Umgebungsvariablen *dieser* Installation. Ist sie ungültig, bricht das Update ab, bevor etwas gewechselt wurde.
+  Der Fall aus 1.27.0 (Compose-Datei mit leerem `OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES`) wird dabei automatisch repariert: Das Werkzeug trägt den Platzhalter
+  `OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES=https://localhost:9441` in die `.env` ein und sagt es. Installationen, die noch die Compose-Datei aus 1.27.0 haben,
+  müssen also nur einmal `opnexus update` ausführen.
+- **`opnexus update` erkennt einen abstürzenden Proxy:** Ein Dienst ohne Healthcheck (der Proxy) gilt jetzt erst nach 10 Sekunden
+  durchgehender Laufzeit als gesund. Bisher meldete das Update „Fertig“, obwohl der Proxy in einer Neustart-Schleife hing, und das
+  automatische Zurückrollen griff nicht.
+
+## [1.27.1] "Buzzard" — 2026-10-21
+
+- **Fix (1.27.1): Proxy startete mit der neuen Compose-Datei nicht.** Mit der `docker-compose.yml` aus 1.27.0 gab Compose die Variable
+  `OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES` als leeren Text an den Proxy weiter; Caddy nutzt seinen Standardwert aber nur bei *nicht gesetzter* Variable und
+  brach mit „server block without any key“ ab, OPNexus war dann nicht mehr erreichbar. Die Compose-Datei setzt jetzt einen gültigen
+  Platzhalter als Standard. Betroffen waren nur Installationen, die die neue Compose-Datei aus 1.27.0 übernommen hatten (ohne
+  `OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES` in der `.env`); wer nur die Images aktualisiert hatte, war nicht betroffen. Sofort-Abhilfe ohne Update:
+  `OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES=https://localhost:9441` in die `.env` eintragen und `docker compose up -d proxy` ausführen.
+
+## [1.27.0] "Buzzard" — 2026-10-21
+
+Vorgesehen als MINOR-Release **1.27.0** „Firewall-Oberfläche über OPNexus“.
+
+- **Firewall-Oberfläche über OPNexus:** Auf der Host-Seite öffnet **Oberfläche öffnen** die Weboberfläche der Firewall
+  in einem neuen Tab, auch bei Firewalls hinter NAT im Management-Tunnel. Nur für Admins; jede Firewall läuft in einer
+  eigenen Browser-Origin (Platz = Port), Cookies bleiben auf dem Server, das Ticket gilt einmalig 30 Sekunden,
+  Inaktivitäts- und Gesamtlimit sind einstellbar, Ticket, Start und Ende stehen im Audit (Art „GUI-Zugriff“).
+  Standardmäßig **aus**: braucht das Compose-Profil `gui`, `OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES`, `GUI_PORTS`, `GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN`,
+  `COOKIE_SECURE=true` und den Schalter unter Einstellungen (Handbuch, „Firewall-Oberfläche über OPNexus“).
+  Live getestet auf OPNsense 26.7.
+- **Einschränkungen:** kein WebSocket, keine automatische Anmeldung, höchstens 4 Plätze gleichzeitig. OPNexus-Adresse
+  vorher in die Whitelist des Anmeldeschutzes (sshguard) der Firewall eintragen, sonst können Fehlanmeldungen die
+  API-Zugriffe von OPNexus aussperren. Nach einem Neustart des wg-hub braucht der Tunnel 2 bis 4 Minuten.
+- **Hinweis für Betreiber mit eigenen Skripten:** Bei HTTPS heißt das Sitzungs-Cookie jetzt `__Host-opnexus-session`
+  (bestehende Sitzungen werden ohne Abmelden übernommen), und Cookie-Anfragen an `/api` mit `Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site/cross-site`
+  werden abgelehnt. Zugriffe mit API-Token sind nicht betroffen.
+
+## [1.26.0] "Kite" — 2026-10-21
+
+Geplant als MINOR-Release **1.26.0** (Regel-Analyse). Backend, MCP und Oberfläche.
+
+- **Regel-Analyse „Welche Regel greift?“ (API):** `GET /api/hosts/{id}/rule-analysis/match` und
+  `GET /api/rule-analysis/match` (ganze Flotte, Auswahl oder Gerätegruppe) beantworten für Quelle, Ziel, Protokoll
+  und Port, ob eine Firewall das erste Paket einer neuen Verbindung durchlässt oder blockiert, welche Regel das
+  entscheidet und warum (Prüfprotokoll Regel für Regel). Grundlage ist der tatsächlich geladene pf-Regelsatz
+  inklusive automatischer Regeln, Floating- und Gruppenregeln, `quick`/letzter Treffer, Negation, verschachtelter
+  Aliase (pf-Tabellentest der Firewall), Port-Aliase und Adressfamilien. Jede Antwort trägt eine ehrliche
+  Konfidenz **sicher / vermutlich / unbekannt** mit Begründungscodes; was nicht belegbar ist (z. B. `tagged`,
+  nicht auflösbare Aliase, geratenes Interface, NAT in der Nähe), wird nie als „sicher“ gemeldet. Nur lesend,
+  auch mit `read`-Token nutzbar; es wird nichts gespeichert und nichts an der Firewall geändert.
+- **MCP:** neues Werkzeug `rule_match` für KI-Assistenten (gleiche Abfrage, ohne Prüfprotokoll).
+- **Seite „Regel-Analyse“ (Regelwerk):** Formular für Hosts oder Gerätegruppe, Quell-/Ziel-IP, Protokoll, Ports,
+  Eingangs-Interface („automatisch“ oder Liste) und optional die Ausgangsseite. Die Abfrage steht in der Adresszeile
+  (teilbar, wird beim Öffnen sofort ausgeführt). Je Firewall eine Karte mit Erlaubt/Blockiert/Abgewiesen, Sicherheit
+  des Urteils, entscheidender Regel und Hinweisen; ein „unbekannt“-Ergebnis erscheint bewusst nicht als Urteil.
+  Aufklappbares „Warum?“ zeigt jede geprüfte Regel mit ✓/✗/? je Feld, überstimmte Regeln durchgestrichen. Auch mit
+  Nur-Lesen-Rolle nutzbar.
+
+## [1.25.0] "Goshawk" — 2026-10-21
+
+Geplant als MINOR-Release **1.25.0** (Flotten-Rollout).
+
+- **Rollouts in Wellen (System › Rollouts):** Firmware-Updates für die ganze Flotte in Ringen, z. B. erst
+  `ring-canary`, dann `ring-pilot`, dann `ring-prod` (Wellen aus Gerätegruppen). Jeder Host läuft über die
+  bestehende geplante Wartung (Backup vor dem Update, CARP-Übergabe für den MASTER, Audit), immer nur ein Host
+  gleichzeitig und nur ein Rollout zur selben Zeit; im Cluster zuerst der BACKUP, dann der MASTER. Nach jeder Welle
+  folgen eine Beobachtungszeit und eine **Gesundheitsprüfung** (erreichbar, Zielversion installiert, CARP je VHID,
+  Gateways und Dienste wie vorher, keine offenen Sperren, optional Sicherheits-Score). Rot hält den Rollout an
+  (nach einer Nachprüfung zwei Minuten später) und meldet sich. Anhalten, Fortsetzen (prüft zuerst alles bisher
+  Aktualisierte erneut), Welle freigeben, Host überspringen und Abbrechen auf der Lauf-Seite; die Seite zeigt
+  Wellen, Hosts (Version vorher → nachher, aktueller Schritt) und die Prüfmatrix.
+- **Sicherheitsnetz:** Weicht die angebotene Version in einem späteren Ring von der des ersten Rings ab, hält der
+  Rollout an (OPNsense installiert immer die neueste). Ein Host ohne Update wird übersprungen, ein fehlgeschlagener
+  nie von selbst wiederholt. Angehalten wird auch, wenn die verantwortliche Person das Recht zum Ausrollen verliert,
+  eine fremde Wartung im Cluster länger als 15 Minuten offen ist, der MASTER ohne Übergabe dran wäre oder ein Lauf
+  älter als 14 Tage ist. Höchstens 10 Wellen und 100 Hosts je Plan.
+- **Wiederkehrende Wartungsfenster:** wöchentlich oder monatlich (n-ter Wochentag, letzter, fester Tag) in einer
+  Zeitzone, mit Sommerzeit-Regel, Abschneidezeit („neue Hosts nur in den ersten N Minuten“) und einzelnen Terminen
+  zum Auslassen oder Verschieben. Ein Plan mit Fenster startet neue Hosts nur darin; mit **automatischem Start**
+  (nur stabile Updates) beginnt er zu jedem Termin von selbst, aber nur, solange Plan, Gruppen und Fenster seit
+  der Aktivierung unverändert sind. Jede Änderung deaktiviert ihn.
+- **Geplante Wartung prüft sich selbst:** Neue Option „Ergebnis automatisch prüfen und abschließen“ (im Dialog
+  vorausgewählt, bei Rollouts immer an). Nach dem Auftrag prüft OPNexus, ob die Firmware wieder bereit ist, der
+  erwartete Neustart stattfand und die Version lesbar ist, und schließt die Wartung dann selbst ab. Bisher blieb
+  sie auf „übergeben“ und sperrte Host und Cluster, bis jemand sie von Hand abschloss.
+- **Benachrichtigungen:** „Rollout angehalten“ und „Rollout nicht automatisch gestartet“ (ein Schalter, standardmäßig an).
+- **Rechte:** Rollout starten/aktivieren/fortsetzen/freigeben/überspringen/abbrechen und Wartungsfenster ändern
+  gelten als Ausrollen (Aufgabentrennung); **Anhalten** darf jeder mit Schreibrecht. Update Center: Hosts im
+  laufenden Rollout sind für manuelle Firmware-Aktionen gesperrt. Ein OPNexus-Update während eines Rollouts ist
+  sicher, wird aber angekündigt.
+- **Getestet:** live auf den Test-Firewalls (OPNsense 26.7): automatischer Start im Fenster, Canary-Update
+  26.7.1_1 → 26.7.7, absichtlich gestoppter Dienst → Gate rot → angehalten (zweiter Ring unberührt,
+  Benachrichtigung), Fortsetzen, Pilot-Update 26.7.6 → 26.7.7 auf dem damaligen MASTER mit CARP-Übergabe und einem
+  Neustart des OPNexus-Backends mitten im Auftrag (genau ein Update-Auftrag), Freigabe, Host ohne Update
+  übersprungen, Anhalten/Fortsetzen/Abbrechen von Hand, Termin auslassen. **Nur gemockt:** Major-Upgrade als
+  Rollout, ein Cluster in *einer* Welle, Cluster-Prüfung vor dem zweiten Knoten, abweichende Zielversion,
+  Zeitüberschreitungen, Rechteverlust, Fenster schließt mitten im Lauf; die Sommerzeit-Regeln sind Rechentests.
+
+## [1.24.0] "Merlin" — 2026-10-21
+
+- **Alarme für Gateways, Ressourcen und Dienste:** Neue Ereignisse in Einstellungen › Benachrichtigungen.
+  **Gateway gestört** (standardmäßig **an**) meldet ein Gateway, das OPNsense als „down“ führt oder dessen Paketverlust (ab 20 %) bzw.
+  Latenz (ab 500 ms) über der Schwelle liegt; bewusst abgeschaltete und nicht überwachte Gateways bleiben still. **Ressourcen-Schwelle**
+  (standardmäßig aus) prüft Festplatte (ab 90 %), Arbeitsspeicher (ab 95 %), Swap (ab 50 %) und CPU-Last (ab 2 pro Thread), **Dienst ausgefallen**
+  (standardmäßig aus) eine einstellbare Liste (Unbound, Dnsmasq, DHCP, NTP, OpenVPN, WireGuard, IPsec …) und meldet nur Dienste, die zuvor
+  liefen. Alle drei stützen sich auf die Minutenmessung und lösen erst aus, wenn die letzten 3 (Ressourcen: 5) Messungen übereinstimmen, und
+  enden erst, wenn alle wieder in Ordnung sind: Einzelspitzen und flackernde Verbindungen schicken nichts. Der Gateway-Status (Verlust, Latenz,
+  Abweichung) steht außerdem auf der Host-Seite, als Kachel auf dem Dashboard und als Prometheus-Metriken (`opnexus_host_gateway_*`,
+  `opnexus_host_swap_used_percent`, `opnexus_host_service_running`). Die Messung speichert dafür zusätzlich Swap, CPU-Threads, Gateways
+  und Dienste in der vorhandenen Messreihe (keine neue Tabelle).
+- **Weitere Benachrichtigungskanäle:** ntfy, Gotify, Telegram, Microsoft Teams (Workflows-/Incoming-Webhook) und Matrix, beliebig viele
+  je Typ, mit „Testen“-Knopf pro Kanal. Zugangsdaten (Tokens, die Teams-Adresse) liegen wie das SMTP-Passwort in der Geheimnis-Ablage, nie
+  in der Datenbank oder in Antworten, und tauchen nicht in Fehlermeldungen oder Logs auf. Webhook und neue Kanäle prüfen die Zieladresse:
+  nur http(s), keine Zugangsdaten in der Adresse, keine lokalen/Link-Local-/Metadaten-Adressen; Weiterleitungen werden nicht verfolgt.
+  Betrifft die bestehende Webhook-Adresse: `localhost`, Loopback, 169.254.x.x und Zugangsdaten in der Adresse (`https://user:pass@…`)
+  werden jetzt abgelehnt. Eine solche gespeicherte Adresse wird nicht mehr beliefert (nur ein Log-Eintrag), und die
+  Benachrichtigungs-Einstellungen lassen sich erst wieder speichern, wenn sie korrigiert oder geleert ist (die Meldung nennt den Grund).
+  Neue Einstellungen kommen mit Migration 0020.
+
+- **Bestand übernehmen für Aliase und NAT:** Auf den Seiten Aliase und NAT (Port Forward, 1:1, Outbound) gibt es jetzt **Von Firewall übernehmen**
+  wie bei den Regeln. Der Dialog zeigt, was von Hand in OPNsense angelegt wurde, einzeln zum Übernehmen oder mit „Alle übernehmbaren“ in einem Schritt;
+  verschachtelte Aliase werden in der richtigen Reihenfolge übernommen. Die Übernahme schreibt nichts auf die Firewall: Die Vorschau zeigt direkt
+  danach „keine Änderung“, der nächste Rollout aktualisiert dasselbe Objekt (kein Duplikat). Nicht übernommen werden OPNsense-eigene Aliase,
+  Typen, die OPNexus nicht kennt (z. B. URL, GeoIP), Aliase mit Verweis auf nicht übernommene Aliase sowie NAT-Regeln, die das Modell verfälschen würden
+  (z. B. „Kein Redirect“, verknüpfte Filterregel, mehrere Schnittstellen, „Kein NAT“); die Oberfläche nennt den Grund je Objekt.
+  Outbound-NAT lässt sich nur übernehmen, wenn der Modus der Firewall Hybrid oder Manuell ist. Einstellungen, die OPNexus nicht verwaltet (Protokollierung,
+  Pool-Optionen, Tags, Kategorien), bleiben unverändert und werden angezeigt.
+
+- **Images für ARM:** Alle Release-Images (backend, frontend, proxy, updater) gibt es jetzt für `linux/amd64` und `linux/arm64`
+  (Raspberry Pi 4/5, ARM-Server, Apple-Silicon-Docker).
+
+## [1.23.11] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
+
+- **Updates per Klick prüfen jetzt ebenfalls die Signatur:** Der Updater-Container enthält `cosign` (feste Version, Prüfsumme beim Bau
+  geprüft) und verifiziert die neuen Images vor dem Wechsel, wenn `cosign.pub` im Projektverzeichnis liegt. Das Image wird dadurch größer
+  (rund 266 statt 123 MB).
+
+## [1.23.10] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
+
+- **Signierte Release-Images:** Die Images (backend, frontend, proxy, updater) werden mit cosign signiert, beginnend mit 1.23.9. Der öffentliche
+  Schlüssel liegt als `cosign.pub` im Repository und im Release-Bundle. `opnexus update` prüft die Signaturen vor dem Wechsel, wenn `cosign`
+  installiert ist. Anleitung: Handbuch, „Images prüfen“.
+
+## [1.23.9] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
+
+- Update-Karte: Der Hinweis für Installationen ohne Release-Images nennt jetzt die tatsächliche Ursache („OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO ist nicht gesetzt“)
+  statt „baut aus dem Quellcode“.
+- `cosign.pub`: öffentlicher Schlüssel für die Signaturen der Release-Images (das Release-Skript kann Images jetzt signieren).
+
+## [1.23.8] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
+
+- **Einstellungen › OPNexus aktualisieren:** Auf einer Installation, die aus dem Quellcode gebaut wird (kein `OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO`), erscheint nicht mehr
+  die Anleitung zum Aktivieren des Updaters – Updates per Klick gibt es dort ohnehin nicht –, sondern nur der Hinweis auf `git pull` und
+  `docker compose up -d --build`. Das Backend erkennt den Modus jetzt selbst (neue Umgebungsvariable im Compose-File).
+
+## [1.23.7] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
+
+- Hinweistext der Versionsprüfung verweist auf den Schalter „oben“ statt „unten“.
+
+## [1.23.6] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
+
+- **Versionsprüfung im Webinterface:** Unter Einstellungen › OPNexus aktualisieren lässt sich die Prüfung auf neue Versionen jetzt per Schalter
+  und Feed-Adresse einstellen – kein Eingriff in die `.env` mehr nötig (Migration `0019`). Standardmäßig bleibt sie aus. Ein gesetztes
+  `UPDATE_CHECK_URL` in der `.env` hat weiter Vorrang und sperrt den Schalter (mit Hinweis).
+
 ## [1.23.5] "Harrier" — 2026-10-20
 
 - **Fix (Ursache des Vorfalls vom 20.10. in 1.23.4):** OPNsense merkt ein CARP-VIP zum Löschen vor, wenn eine Änderung kein `interface` mitschickt,

README.de.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Zentrale Verwaltung mehrerer [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org)-Firewalls: Regeln,
 
 ![Zentrale Firewall-Regeln](docs/screenshots/readme-rules-de.webp)
 
-> **Stand:** `1.23.5` ist die aktuelle stabile Version. Entwickelt und getestet wurde gegen echte OPNsense-Instanzen; eine frische Installation aus dem Release-Bundle sowie Updates und Rollbacks sind durchgängig geprüft. Ecken und Kanten bitte melden.
+> **Stand:** `1.30.0` ist die aktuelle stabile Version. Entwickelt und getestet wurde gegen echte OPNsense-Instanzen; eine frische Installation aus dem Release-Bundle sowie Updates und Rollbacks sind durchgängig geprüft. Ecken und Kanten bitte melden.
 
 ## Funktionen
 
@@ -16,14 +16,17 @@ Zentrale Verwaltung mehrerer [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org)-Firewalls: Regeln,
 - **Sichere Änderungen** — jede Änderung läuft *Prüfen → Ausrollen → Bestätigen*; bleibt die Bestätigung im Zeitfenster aus, rollt OPNexus zurück.
 - **Hierarchische Policies** — Pre-/Post-Rulebases mit Vererbung über Gruppenbäume.
 - **VPN** — IPsec-Site-to-Site, OpenVPN und WireGuard, einmal definiert und ausgerollt.
-- **Netzwerk** — Schnittstellen, VLANs, virtuelle IPs, Gateways, Routen, LAGG/Bridge/GRE, DNS und DHCP je Firewall, dazu Tunables, Cron, Syslog, Snapshots und Diagnose (Ping, Traceroute, Port-Prüfung, DNS), ein Abgleich der Cluster-Knoten, mit Diff-Vorschau, Backup vor jeder Änderung und Schutz davor, die eigene Verbindung zu kappen; von Hand angelegte Regeln lassen sich übernehmen.
+- **Netzwerk** — Schnittstellen, VLANs, virtuelle IPs, Gateways, Routen, LAGG/Bridge/GRE, DNS und DHCP je Firewall, dazu Tunables, Cron, Syslog, Snapshots und Diagnose (Ping, Traceroute, Port-Prüfung, DNS), ein Abgleich der Cluster-Knoten, mit Diff-Vorschau, Backup vor jeder Änderung und Schutz davor, die eigene Verbindung zu kappen; von Hand angelegte Regeln, Aliase und NAT-Regeln lassen sich übernehmen.
 - **Zertifikate** — Trust-Store für alle Firewalls und Ausstellung per ACME / Let's Encrypt.
+- **Alarme** — Gateway-/WAN-Ausfall (down, Paketverlust, Latenz), Schwellen für Platte, Speicher, Swap und CPU sowie ausgefallene Dienste; über mehrere Messungen entprellt, damit Einzelspitzen und flackernde Verbindungen schweigen. Zustellung per E-Mail, Webhook, ntfy, Gotify, Telegram, Microsoft Teams oder Matrix, jedes Ereignis einzeln schaltbar.
+- **Firewall-Oberfläche über OPNexus** — die Weboberfläche einer Firewall in einem eigenen Browser-Tab über OPNexus öffnen, auch hinter NAT; nur für Admins, Einmal-Ticket, eigene Origin, Zeitlimits und Audit (standardmäßig aus).
 - **Logs & Audit** — zentrale Log-Suche mit Korrelation, Dashboards und lückenloser Deploy-Verlauf.
-- **Update-Center** — Firmware-Updates für die Flotte, mit Blick auf HA-Reihenfolge und Wartungsmodus.
+- **Update-Center und Rollouts** — Firmware-Updates für die Flotte, mit Blick auf HA-Reihenfolge und Wartungsmodus; Rollouts in Wellen (Canary → Pilot → Prod) mit wiederkehrenden Wartungsfenstern, Gesundheitsprüfung zwischen den Wellen und automatischem Halt bei jeder Auffälligkeit.
 - **Einrichtungsassistent** — geführter Erststart nach der Installation: eigenes Passwort, Zwei-Faktor und die erste Firewall verbinden.
 - **Selbst-Update** — OPNexus aktualisiert sich auf Wunsch aus der eigenen Oberfläche, mit Fortschritt und automatischem Rollback (optional).
 - **Automatisierung** — persönliche API-Tokens (Lesen / Ausrollen / Admin), Prometheus-Metriken, ein nur lesender MCP-Endpunkt für KI-Assistenten und ein OpenAPI-Schema.
 - **Sicherheitslage** — ein Wert von 0 bis 100 je Firewall aus Härtungs- und Regel-Hygiene-Prüfungen (offene WAN-Regeln, schwaches SSH/SNMP, verdeckte Regeln, alte Backups …), nur lesend.
+- **Regel-Analyse** — „Welche Regel trifft?“ für Quelle, Ziel, Protokoll und Port: die entscheidende Regel je Firewall (oder Flotte/Gruppe) mit ehrlicher Sicherheit (sicher / vermutlich / unbekannt) und Prüfprotokoll Regel für Regel, nur lesend. Eine Bereinigungsliste nennt ungenutzte, verdeckte, doppelte und lange deaktivierte Regeln (jeweils mit Sicherheit), und jede Regel hat einen Änderungsverlauf – auch für Änderungen außerhalb von OPNexus.
 - **Backups & Wiederherstellung** — geplante Konfigurationssicherungen mit Aufbewahrung, verschlüsselte Offsite-Kopie auf S3-kompatiblen Speicher, Änderungsansicht zwischen Sicherungen und eine vollständige verschlüsselte Sicherung von OPNexus selbst (`opnexus backup --full`).
 - **Single Sign-on** — Anmeldung über deinen Identitätsanbieter (OIDC); die Rolle kommt bei jeder Anmeldung aus dessen Gruppen.
 - **Zugang** — HTTPS mit gepinnten Firewall-Zertifikaten, optionale Zwei-Faktor-Anmeldung, Rollen (Admin / Operator / Nur-Lesen), Tastaturbedienung, Dark Mode, Oberfläche auf Deutsch und Englisch.
@@ -58,11 +61,11 @@ Nach der ersten Anmeldung öffnet sich von selbst ein kurzer **Einrichtungsassis
 
 Für den Zugriff von anderen Rechnern und den Produktivbetrieb mit TLS (mitgelieferter Caddy-Proxy) siehe das [Handbuch](docs/HANDBUCH.md#zugriff-aus-dem-netz-und-tls).
 
-**Fertige Images** (amd64) liegen in der Registry dieses Gitea. In der `.env`:
+**Fertige Images** (amd64 und arm64) liegen in der Registry dieses Gitea. In der `.env`:
 
 ```bash
 OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO=git.opnexus.dev/opnexus
-OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.23.5
+OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.30.0
 ```
 
 ```bash
@@ -73,7 +76,7 @@ Aktualisiert wird danach mit `scripts/opnexus update` / `rollback` (erst ziehen,
 
 ## Datenschutz
 
-OPNexus wird selbst betrieben und hat keine Telemetrie. Es verbindet sich nur mit deinen Firewalls und mit Benachrichtigungszielen, die du selbst einrichtest. Der optionale Hinweis auf neue Versionen (`UPDATE_CHECK_URL=https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json`) ist **aus**, solange du ihn nicht setzt; eingeschaltet geht höchstens alle 12 Stunden ein einfaches `GET` mit dem User-Agent `OPNexus/<Version>` hinaus — ohne Instanz- oder Nutzerdaten.
+OPNexus wird selbst betrieben und hat keine Telemetrie. Es verbindet sich nur mit deinen Firewalls und mit Benachrichtigungszielen, die du selbst einrichtest. Der optionale Hinweis auf neue Versionen (Schalter unter Einstellungen › OPNexus aktualisieren, oder `UPDATE_CHECK_URL` in der `.env`) ist **aus**, solange du ihn nicht einschaltest; eingeschaltet geht höchstens alle 12 Stunden ein einfaches `GET` mit dem User-Agent `OPNexus/<Version>` hinaus — ohne Instanz- oder Nutzerdaten.
 
 ## Lizenz
 

README.md

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ Central management for multiple [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org) firewalls: rule
 
 ![Central firewall rules](docs/screenshots/readme-rules-en.webp)
 
-> **Status:** `1.23.5` is the current stable release. It has been developed and tested against real OPNsense instances; a clean install from the release bundle, updates and rollbacks have been verified end to end. Please report rough edges.
+> **Status:** `1.30.0` is the current stable release. It has been developed and tested against real OPNsense instances; a clean install from the release bundle, updates and rollbacks have been verified end to end. Please report rough edges.
 
 ## What it does
 
@@ -16,14 +16,17 @@ Central management for multiple [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org) firewalls: rule
 - **Safe changes** — every change goes *preview → deploy → confirm*; without your confirmation inside the time window OPNexus rolls it back.
 - **Hierarchical policies** — pre/post rulebases with inheritance across group trees.
 - **VPN** — IPsec site-to-site, OpenVPN and WireGuard, defined once and rolled out.
-- **Network** — interfaces, VLANs, virtual IPs, gateways, routes, LAGG/bridge/GRE, DNS and DHCP per firewall, plus tunables, cron, syslog, snapshots and diagnostics (ping, traceroute, port check, DNS), a comparison of cluster nodes, with a diff preview, a backup before every change and a guard against cutting your own connection; rules created by hand on a firewall can be adopted.
+- **Network** — interfaces, VLANs, virtual IPs, gateways, routes, LAGG/bridge/GRE, DNS and DHCP per firewall, plus tunables, cron, syslog, snapshots and diagnostics (ping, traceroute, port check, DNS), a comparison of cluster nodes, with a diff preview, a backup before every change and a guard against cutting your own connection; rules, aliases and NAT rules created by hand on a firewall can be adopted.
 - **Certificates** — trust store for all firewalls and ACME / Let's Encrypt issuance.
+- **Alerts** — gateway/WAN outage (down, packet loss, latency), disk/memory/swap/CPU thresholds and stopped services, debounced over several measurements so spikes and flapping links stay quiet; delivered by email, webhook, ntfy, Gotify, Telegram, Microsoft Teams or Matrix, all switchable per event.
+- **Firewall interface through OPNexus** — open a firewall's own web interface in a separate browser tab through OPNexus, even behind NAT; admins only, one-time ticket, isolated origin, time limits and audit (off by default).
 - **Logs & audit** — central log search with correlation, dashboards and a complete deploy audit trail.
-- **Update center** — firmware updates for the fleet, aware of HA order and maintenance mode.
+- **Update center & rollouts** — firmware updates for the fleet, aware of HA order and maintenance mode; rollouts in waves (canary → pilot → prod) with recurring maintenance windows, a health gate between the waves and an automatic stop on anything unusual.
 - **Setup assistant** — a guided first run after installation: your own password, two-factor, and connecting the first firewall.
 - **Self-update** — OPNexus can update itself from its web interface, with progress and automatic rollback (opt-in).
 - **Automation** — personal API tokens (read / deploy / admin), Prometheus metrics, a read-only MCP endpoint for AI assistants and an OpenAPI schema.
 - **Security posture** — a 0–100 score per firewall from hardening and rule-hygiene checks (open WAN rules, weak SSH/SNMP, shadowed rules, stale backups …), read-only.
+- **Rule analysis** — "Which rule matches?" for a source, destination, protocol and port: the deciding rule per firewall (or fleet/group) with an honest confidence (sure / probable / unknown) and a rule-by-rule trace, read-only. A cleanup list names unused, shadowed, duplicate and long-disabled rules (each with its confidence) and every rule has a change history, including changes made outside OPNexus.
 - **Backups & recovery** — scheduled config backups with retention, an encrypted offsite copy to S3-compatible storage, a redacted change view between backups, and a full encrypted backup/restore of OPNexus itself (`opnexus backup --full`).
 - **Single sign-on** — sign in with your identity provider (OIDC); roles come from its groups at every login.
 - **Access** — HTTPS with pinned firewall certificates, optional two-factor sign-in, roles (admin / operator / read-only), keyboard operation, dark mode, German and English UI.
@@ -60,11 +63,11 @@ After the first sign-in a short **setup assistant** opens on its own: set your o
 
 For access from other machines and for production use with TLS (bundled Caddy proxy), see the [handbook](docs/HANDBUCH.md#zugriff-aus-dem-netz-und-tls) (German).
 
-**Prebuilt images** (amd64) are published to this Gitea's registry. In `.env`:
+**Prebuilt images** (amd64 and arm64) are published to this Gitea's registry. In `.env`:
 
 ```bash
 OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO=git.opnexus.dev/opnexus
-OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.23.5
+OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.30.0
 ```
 
 ```bash
@@ -77,7 +80,7 @@ docker compose pull && docker compose up -d --no-build
 
 ## Privacy
 
-OPNexus is self-hosted and has no telemetry. It only connects to your firewalls and to notification targets you configure yourself. The optional new-version notice (`UPDATE_CHECK_URL=https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json`) is **off** unless you set it; when on, it makes one plain `GET` at most every 12 hours with the user agent `OPNexus/<version>` — no instance or user data.
+OPNexus is self-hosted and has no telemetry. It only connects to your firewalls and to notification targets you configure yourself. The optional new-version notice (switch under Settings › Update OPNexus, or `UPDATE_CHECK_URL` in the `.env`) is **off** unless you turn it on; when on, it makes one plain `GET` at most every 12 hours with the user agent `OPNexus/<version>` — no instance or user data.
 
 ## License
 

backend/app/auth_middleware.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
 
 from app.database import SessionLocal
 from app.errors import ErrorCode
-from app.routers.auth import COOKIE_NAME
+from app.routers.auth import session_token
 from app.routers import governance
 from app.routers.auth import client_ip
 from app.services import api_token_service, auth_service
@@ -56,9 +56,9 @@ _READ_ONLY_ALLOWED_WRITES = {
 _SECURITY_KINDS = {
     "ipsec": "ipsec_tunnel", "openvpn": "openvpn_instance", "wireguard": "wireguard_tunnel",
     "certificates": "certificate", "acme": "acme", "notifications": "notification", "auth": "auth",
-    "tokens": "api_token",
+    "tokens": "api_token", "rollouts": "rollout",
 }
-_COLLECTIONS = {"tunnels", "instances", "managed", "accounts", "certificates", "settings"}
+_COLLECTIONS = {"tunnels", "instances", "managed", "accounts", "certificates", "settings", "plans", "runs"}
 
 
 def _is_uuid(value: str) -> bool:
@@ -94,10 +94,14 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
     async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
         if request.url.path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
             return await call_next(request)
+        if request.url.path.startswith("/internal/gui/"):
+            # GUI gateway only: never routed by the proxy, authenticated by the
+            # shared gateway token inside routers/gui_access.py.
+            return await call_next(request)
 
         api_token = None
         bearer = api_token_service.bearer_from_header(request.headers.get("authorization", ""))
-        token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, "")
+        token = session_token(request)
         if bearer is not None:
             # An API token wins over a cookie; a bad one never falls back to it.
             async with SessionLocal() as db:
@@ -117,7 +121,7 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
                 )
             if user is not None:
                 parts = request.url.path.strip("/").split("/")
-                kinds = {"rules": "rule", "aliases": "alias", "port-forward": "port_forward", "one-to-one": "one_to_one", "outbound-nat": "outbound_nat", "hosts": "host", "users": "user", "system": "system", "backups": "backup"}
+                kinds = {"rules": "rule", "aliases": "alias", "port-forward": "port_forward", "one-to-one": "one_to_one", "outbound-nat": "outbound_nat", "hosts": "host", "users": "user", "system": "system", "backups": "backup", "maintenance-windows": "maintenance_window"}
                 writing = request.method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE")
                 if len(parts) > 1 and parts[1] in _SECURITY_KINDS:
                     event = {**_security_event(parts, request.method), "details": {"method": request.method, "path": request.url.path}}

backend/app/config.py

@@ -6,6 +6,17 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     def allowed_origins(self) -> list[str]:
         return [o.strip().rstrip("/") for o in self.frontend_origin.split(",") if o.strip()]
 
+    @property
+    def gui_site_origins(self) -> list[str]:
+        return [o.strip().rstrip("/") for o in self.opnexus_gui_sites.split(",") if o.strip()]
+
+    def gui_origin_conflicts(self) -> list[str]:
+        """Slot origins of the GUI gateway that are also listed in FRONTEND_ORIGIN.
+        Such an origin would get CORS with credentials and pass the Sec-Fetch-Site
+        exception — a firewall GUI could then read OPNexus' API. Startup is refused."""
+        allowed = {o.lower() for o in self.allowed_origins}
+        return [o for o in self.gui_site_origins if o.lower() in allowed]
+
     database_url: str = (
         "postgresql+asyncpg://opnexus:opnexus@postgres:5432/opnexus"
     )
@@ -27,6 +38,9 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # keine Instanz- oder Nutzerdaten.
     update_check_url: str = ""
     update_check_interval_hours: int = 12
+    # Registry der Release-Images (OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO). Leer = OPNexus wird lokal aus dem
+    # Quellcode gebaut; dann gibt es keine Updates per Klick (nur der Hinweis in den Einstellungen).
+    opnexus_image_repo: str = ""
 
     # ── Updates aus dem Webinterface (app/services/updater_client.py) ─────
     # Optionaler Updater-Container (Compose-Profil "updater"). Das Backend hat
@@ -89,6 +103,14 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # per-IP lockout entirely.
     trust_proxy_headers: bool = False
 
+    # ── GUI gateway (1.27, optional container "gui-gateway") ─────────
+    # Slot origins the gateway is served on, comma-separated, e.g.
+    # "https://192.0.2.10:9441,https://192.0.2.10:9442". Empty = feature unavailable.
+    opnexus_gui_sites: str = ""
+    # Shared secret between backend and gateway for /internal/gui/* (at least
+    # 32 characters). Empty = the internal endpoints answer 404.
+    gui_gateway_token: str = ""
+
     # ── Deploy lockout protection ────────────────────────────────────
     deploy_confirm_window_seconds: int = 180
 
@@ -138,6 +160,13 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # wireguard_key_store.py.
     wireguard_key_secret_dir: str = "/data/wireguard-key-secrets"
 
+    # ── Rule observation (usage counters + change history of the live rules) ─
+    # Two read-only GETs per enabled firewall per cycle (searchRule, ruleStats). The interval is an operator
+    # setting (env RULE_OBSERVE_INTERVAL_SECONDS); it can not go below the floor, which keeps a typo from
+    # polling every firewall in a tight loop.
+    rule_observe_interval_seconds: int = 900
+    rule_observe_min_interval_seconds: int = 60
+
     # ── Resource monitoring ──────────────────────────────────────────────
     # Fixed interval, no admin-editable settings row/UI for this — v1
     # deliberately kept minimal (see resource_monitor_service.py).

backend/app/errors.py

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     UPDATER_REJECTED = "UPDATER_REJECTED"
     UPDATE_NOT_OFFERED = "UPDATE_NOT_OFFERED"
     UPDATE_MAJOR_CHANGE = "UPDATE_MAJOR_CHANGE"
+    UPDATE_CHECK_MANAGED_BY_SERVER = "UPDATE_CHECK_MANAGED_BY_SERVER"
+    UPDATE_CHECK_URL_INVALID = "UPDATE_CHECK_URL_INVALID"
     ADMIN_REQUIRED = "ADMIN_REQUIRED"
     BACKUP_EMPTY = "BACKUP_EMPTY"
     BACKUP_INVALID_XML = "BACKUP_INVALID_XML"
@@ -85,6 +87,15 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     MINDESTENS_EIN_ADMIN_ACCOUNT_MUSS_BESTEHEN_BLEIBEN = "MINDESTENS_EIN_ADMIN_ACCOUNT_MUSS_BESTEHEN_BLEIBEN"
     NICHT_AUTHENTIFIZIERT = "NICHT_AUTHENTIFIZIERT"
     CROSS_ORIGIN_BLOCKED = "CROSS_ORIGIN_BLOCKED"
+    CROSS_SITE_REQUEST_BLOCKED = "CROSS_SITE_REQUEST_BLOCKED"
+    GUI_SESSION_REQUIRED = "GUI_SESSION_REQUIRED"
+    GUI_GATEWAY_NOT_CONFIGURED = "GUI_GATEWAY_NOT_CONFIGURED"
+    GUI_REQUIRES_HTTPS = "GUI_REQUIRES_HTTPS"
+    GUI_ACCESS_DISABLED = "GUI_ACCESS_DISABLED"
+    GUI_HOST_NOT_ELIGIBLE = "GUI_HOST_NOT_ELIGIBLE"
+    GUI_NO_FREE_SLOT = "GUI_NO_FREE_SLOT"
+    GUI_SLOT_COOLING_DOWN = "GUI_SLOT_COOLING_DOWN"
+    GUI_TOO_MANY_SESSIONS = "GUI_TOO_MANY_SESSIONS"
     TLS_PROBE_FAILED = "TLS_PROBE_FAILED"
     TLS_PEM_INVALID = "TLS_PEM_INVALID"
     TLS_PIN_MISMATCH = "TLS_PIN_MISMATCH"
@@ -114,6 +125,13 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID = "NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID"
     NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND = "NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND"
     RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE = "RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE"
+    OBJECT_NOT_ADOPTABLE = "OBJECT_NOT_ADOPTABLE"
+    ADOPT_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND = "ADOPT_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND"
+    OUTBOUND_MODE_BLOCKS_ADOPT = "OUTBOUND_MODE_BLOCKS_ADOPT"
+    ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_NOT_FOUND = "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_NOT_FOUND"
+    ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED = "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED"
+    ADOPT_LINK_HOST_HAS_OBJECT = "ADOPT_LINK_HOST_HAS_OBJECT"
+    ADOPT_LINK_BUSY = "ADOPT_LINK_BUSY"
     REGEL_WURDE_INZWISCHEN_GEAENDERT_NEU_LADEN_UND_AENDERUNGEN_BF51B6B0 = "REGEL_WURDE_INZWISCHEN_GEAENDERT_NEU_LADEN_UND_AENDERUNGEN_BF51B6B0"
     RESTORE_VORGANG_NICHT_GEFUNDEN = "RESTORE_VORGANG_NICHT_GEFUNDEN"
     ROLLBACK_ERNEUT_FEHLGESCHLAGEN_PRUEFE_DIE_ERREICHBARKEIT_DER_FIREWALL = "ROLLBACK_ERNEUT_FEHLGESCHLAGEN_PRUEFE_DIE_ERREICHBARKEIT_DER_FIREWALL"
@@ -129,6 +147,10 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     UEBERGEORDNETE_GRUPPE_NICHT_GEFUNDEN = "UEBERGEORDNETE_GRUPPE_NICHT_GEFUNDEN"
     UNGUELTIGER_BENUTZERNAME_ODER_PASSWORT = "UNGUELTIGER_BENUTZERNAME_ODER_PASSWORT"
     UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED = "UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED"
+    API_RIGHTS_MISSING = "API_RIGHTS_MISSING"
+    GATEWAY_NAME_INVALID = "GATEWAY_NAME_INVALID"
+    GATEWAY_UNKNOWN = "GATEWAY_UNKNOWN"
+    GATEWAY_MUTE_LIMIT = "GATEWAY_MUTE_LIMIT"
     VERKNUEPFTER_ACME_ACCOUNT_NICHT_GEFUNDEN = "VERKNUEPFTER_ACME_ACCOUNT_NICHT_GEFUNDEN"
     VORGANG_KANN_NICHT_MEHR_ABGEBROCHEN_WERDEN = "VORGANG_KANN_NICHT_MEHR_ABGEBROCHEN_WERDEN"
     VORSCHAU_ABGELAUFEN_BITTE_ERNEUT_OEFFNEN = "VORSCHAU_ABGELAUFEN_BITTE_ERNEUT_OEFFNEN"
@@ -160,6 +182,11 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     VARIABLES_MISSING = "VARIABLES_MISSING"
     VARIABLE_INVALID = "VARIABLE_INVALID"
     OVERLAY_INVALID = "OVERLAY_INVALID"
+    NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_INVALID = "NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_INVALID"
+    NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND = "NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND"
+    NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NAME_TAKEN = "NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NAME_TAKEN"
+    NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_TEST_FAILED = "NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_TEST_FAILED"
+    NOTIFICATION_WEBHOOK_URL_INVALID = "NOTIFICATION_WEBHOOK_URL_INVALID"
     OVERLAY_SUBNET_LOCKED = "OVERLAY_SUBNET_LOCKED"
     OVERLAY_NAME_TAKEN = "OVERLAY_NAME_TAKEN"
     OVERLAY_PEER_NOT_FOUND = "OVERLAY_PEER_NOT_FOUND"
@@ -169,6 +196,32 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     API_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND = "API_TOKEN_NOT_FOUND"
     API_TOKEN_SCOPE_FORBIDDEN = "API_TOKEN_SCOPE_FORBIDDEN"
     API_TOKEN_SCOPE_TOO_HIGH = "API_TOKEN_SCOPE_TOO_HIGH"
+    WINDOW_NOT_FOUND = "WINDOW_NOT_FOUND"
+    WINDOW_INVALID = "WINDOW_INVALID"
+    WINDOW_NAME_TAKEN = "WINDOW_NAME_TAKEN"
+    WINDOW_IN_USE = "WINDOW_IN_USE"
+    WINDOW_EXCEPTION_INVALID = "WINDOW_EXCEPTION_INVALID"
+    WINDOW_EXCEPTION_EXISTS = "WINDOW_EXCEPTION_EXISTS"
+    WINDOW_EXCEPTION_NOT_FOUND = "WINDOW_EXCEPTION_NOT_FOUND"
+    ROLLOUT_PLAN_NOT_FOUND = "ROLLOUT_PLAN_NOT_FOUND"
+    ROLLOUT_INVALID = "ROLLOUT_INVALID"
+    ROLLOUT_NAME_TAKEN = "ROLLOUT_NAME_TAKEN"
+    ROLLOUT_PLAN_INVALID = "ROLLOUT_PLAN_INVALID"
+    ROLLOUT_PREVIEW_STALE = "ROLLOUT_PREVIEW_STALE"
+    ROLLOUT_PLAN_BUSY = "ROLLOUT_PLAN_BUSY"
+    ROLLOUT_GROUP_IN_USE = "ROLLOUT_GROUP_IN_USE"
+    ROLLOUT_RUN_NOT_FOUND = "ROLLOUT_RUN_NOT_FOUND"
+    ROLLOUT_ALREADY_ACTIVE = "ROLLOUT_ALREADY_ACTIVE"
+    ROLLOUT_CONFIRM_NAME = "ROLLOUT_CONFIRM_NAME"
+    ROLLOUT_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED = "ROLLOUT_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED"
+    ROLLOUT_HOST_NOT_IN_RUN = "ROLLOUT_HOST_NOT_IN_RUN"
+    ROLLOUT_HOST_RUNNING = "ROLLOUT_HOST_RUNNING"
+    ROLLOUT_HOST_FAILED = "ROLLOUT_HOST_FAILED"
+    ANALYSE_ADRESSE_UNGUELTIG = "ANALYSE_ADRESSE_UNGUELTIG"
+    ANALYSE_FAMILIEN_MISCHUNG = "ANALYSE_FAMILIEN_MISCHUNG"
+    ANALYSE_INTERFACE_UNBEKANNT = "ANALYSE_INTERFACE_UNBEKANNT"
+    ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG = "ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG"
+    ANALYSE_FIREWALL_NICHT_LESBAR = "ANALYSE_FIREWALL_NICHT_LESBAR"
 
 
 def api_error(status_code: int, code: ErrorCode, **params: Any) -> HTTPException:

backend/app/gui_gateway.py

@@ -0,0 +1,609 @@
+"""The ``gui-gateway`` container: firewall web interfaces in their own browser origin (1.27).
+
+Runs from the backend image (``python -m app.gui_gateway``) behind the proxy, which terminates TLS for the
+slot ports and sets ``X-Onx-Slot`` (overwriting any client value). It never touches the database or the
+secret stores; it only talks to the backend's internal API (``/internal/gui/*``, shared GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN)
+and, per gateway session, to exactly one firewall.
+
+Security model (see the 1.27 design):
+* Every slot port is its own origin. The firewall GUI therefore never runs in the OPNexus origin.
+* Cookies never cross: the browser's ``Cookie`` header is not forwarded (it carries the OPNexus session),
+  and the firewall's ``Set-Cookie`` never reaches the browser — a server-side jar per gateway session
+  (memory only) holds them. The browser only gets ``__Host-onx-gw-<slot>``.
+* Each upstream request is built from scratch: method, path and query from the browser, a small header
+  allow-list, the jar's cookies; target origin, pinned certificate and overlay proxy from the backend.
+  Absolute-form targets, CONNECT/TRACE, ``Upgrade`` and service-worker script requests are refused.
+* ``Sec-Fetch-Site`` must be same-origin/none (same-site only for the redeem step), fail-closed;
+  non-GET/HEAD requests also need the slot's own ``Origin``.
+* ``Location`` pointing anywhere but the firewall is dropped; responses get CSP, X-Frame-Options DENY,
+  ``Cache-Control: no-store``.
+* At most 3 failed GUI logins per firewall in 5 minutes (protects OPNexus' API access from the firewall's
+  login lockout, which would see all attempts coming from OPNexus).
+* Idle and absolute limits; every 20 s the backend re-checks the session (OPNexus session, admin role,
+  switch, host, and that the firewall's address, pinned certificate and overlay route are still the ones the
+  session started with).
+* At most MAX_SESSIONS sessions at once: expired ones are cleared first, a new session is refused otherwise —
+  a running session is never evicted by a newer one. Logs carry method, path (no query), status and duration only.
+
+OPNsense behaviour this relies on (opnsense/core, src/www/authgui.inc, master as of 2026-10-21):
+* session_auth(): a login is ``isset($_POST['login']) && !empty($_POST['usernamefld']) &&
+  !empty($_POST['passwordfld'])`` posted to the current URL (login form has no action). Success sends a
+  ``Location:`` header and exits (302); a failure re-renders the login form (200) with "Wrong username or
+  password." and an auth_log entry.
+* check_security_http_referer_enforcement() only runs when HTTP_REFERER is set, and wants the firewall's
+  own host name/IP — so the gateway sends no Referer (and no Origin) upstream at all.
+* check_security_dns_rebind() accepts an IP address or the configured host name as Host — the gateway
+  sends the Host of the host record's base URL (httpx derives it from the URL).
+"""
+import asyncio
+import hashlib
+import logging
+import os
+import secrets
+import ssl
+import time
+from collections import deque
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from http.cookies import CookieError, SimpleCookie
+from typing import Awaitable, Callable
+from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit
+
+import httpx
+
+logger = logging.getLogger("gui_gateway")
+# httpx/httpcore log full request URLs (query strings) at INFO/DEBUG: never in this process.
+for _noisy in ("httpx", "httpcore"):
+    logging.getLogger(_noisy).setLevel(logging.WARNING)
+
+LISTEN_PORT = 8080
+COOKIE_PREFIX = "__Host-onx-gw-"
+OPNEXUS_SESSION_COOKIE = "__Host-opnexus-session"
+BODY_LIMIT = 64 * 1024 * 1024  # config restore uploads
+LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT = 3
+LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW = 300.0
+UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT = 60.0
+MAX_SESSIONS = 64
+
+# Request headers copied from the browser; everything else (Cookie, Authorization, Origin, Referer,
+# X-Forwarded-*, hop-by-hop, Sec-*, ...) is dropped.
+_FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS = {
+    "accept", "accept-language", "content-type", "user-agent", "x-requested-with", "x-csrftoken", "range",
+}
+# Response headers copied from the firewall. Set-Cookie goes to the jar, Location is rewritten.
+_FORWARD_RESPONSE_HEADERS = {
+    "content-type", "content-length", "content-encoding", "content-disposition", "content-language",
+    "content-range", "accept-ranges", "content-security-policy",
+}
+_GATEWAY_CSP = ("connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; "
+                "object-src 'none'; worker-src 'none'")
+_SECURITY_HEADERS = [
+    (b"content-security-policy", _GATEWAY_CSP.encode()),
+    (b"x-frame-options", b"DENY"),
+    (b"x-content-type-options", b"nosniff"),
+    (b"cache-control", b"no-store"),
+    (b"pragma", b"no-cache"),
+    (b"referrer-policy", b"same-origin"),
+    (b"cross-origin-opener-policy", b"same-origin"),
+    (b"cross-origin-resource-policy", b"same-origin"),
+    (b"permissions-policy", b"camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"),
+]
+
+
+def _sha(value: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(value.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _origin_of(url: str) -> str | None:
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(url)
+        port = parts.port
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parts.hostname:
+        return None
+    default = 443 if parts.scheme == "https" else 80
+    host = parts.hostname.lower()
+    if ":" in host:
+        host = f"[{host}]"
+    return f"{parts.scheme}://{host}" + (f":{port}" if port and port != default else "")
+
+
+def slot_origins_from(sites: str) -> dict[int, set[str]]:
+    """OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES -> {port: {normalised origins}} (https only, explicit port)."""
+    slots: dict[int, set[str]] = {}
+    for raw in sites.split(","):
+        raw = raw.strip().rstrip("/")
+        try:
+            parts = urlsplit(raw)
+            port = parts.port
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        if parts.scheme == "https" and parts.hostname and port:
+            slots.setdefault(port, set()).add(_origin_of(raw))
+    return slots
+
+
+@dataclass
+class GatewaySession:
+    gui_session_id: str
+    session_hash: str
+    slot: int
+    upstream_origin: str
+    ca_pem: str | None
+    proxy_url: str | None
+    idle_timeout: float
+    absolute_deadline: float
+    revalidate_every: float
+    target_fp: str | None = None
+    last_activity: float = field(default_factory=time.monotonic)
+    next_check: float = 0.0
+    jar: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None
+
+
+class BackendClient:
+    """The backend's internal GUI API. Raises httpx.HTTPError when the backend is unreachable."""
+
+    def __init__(self, base_url: str, token: str, transport: httpx.AsyncBaseTransport | None = None):
+        self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(base_url=base_url, headers={"X-Onx-Gateway-Token": token},
+                                         timeout=10.0, transport=transport)
+
+    async def redeem(self, ticket_hash: str, session_hash: str, slot: int, client_ip: str | None) -> dict:
+        resp = await self._client.post("/internal/gui/redeem", json={
+            "ticket_hash": ticket_hash, "session_hash": session_hash, "slot": slot, "client_ip": client_ip})
+        if resp.status_code == 200:
+            return resp.json()
+        if resp.status_code == 403:
+            return {"ok": False, "reason": (resp.json().get("detail") or {}).get("reason", "denied")}
+        resp.raise_for_status()
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": f"http_{resp.status_code}"}
+
+    async def revalidate(self, gs: GatewaySession) -> dict:
+        resp = await self._client.post("/internal/gui/revalidate",
+                                       json={"gui_session_id": gs.gui_session_id, "session_hash": gs.session_hash,
+                                                    "target_fp": gs.target_fp})
+        resp.raise_for_status()
+        return resp.json()
+
+    async def end(self, gs: GatewaySession, reason: str) -> None:
+        try:
+            await self._client.post("/internal/gui/end", json={
+                "gui_session_id": gs.gui_session_id, "session_hash": gs.session_hash, "reason": reason})
+        except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
+            logger.warning("Could not report the end of a GUI session (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+
+    async def aclose(self) -> None:
+        await self._client.aclose()
+
+
+def build_upstream_client(gs: GatewaySession) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
+    """Same transport rules as opnsense_client._client: pinned certificate (or system CAs), overlay proxy."""
+    verify: ssl.SSLContext | bool
+    if gs.ca_pem:
+        from app.services.tls_pin_service import pinned_context  # no database layer behind this import
+        verify = pinned_context(gs.ca_pem)
+    else:
+        verify = True
+    return httpx.AsyncClient(verify=verify, proxy=gs.proxy_url, timeout=UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT,
+                             follow_redirects=False, trust_env=False)
+
+
+class LoginLimiter:
+    """At most LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT failed GUI logins per firewall within LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW seconds."""
+
+    def __init__(self, clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic):
+        self._failures: dict[str, deque] = {}
+        self._clock = clock
+
+    def _recent(self, key: str) -> deque:
+        now = self._clock()
+        q = self._failures.setdefault(key, deque())
+        while q and now - q[0] > LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW:
+            q.popleft()
+        return q
+
+    def blocked(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        return len(self._recent(key)) >= LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT
+
+    def record_failure(self, key: str) -> None:
+        self._recent(key).append(self._clock())
+
+
+def is_login_attempt(method: str, content_type: str, body: bytes) -> bool:
+    if method != "POST":
+        return False
+    if content_type.lower().startswith("multipart/form-data"):
+        # PHP fills $_POST from multipart bodies too, so authgui.inc accepts a login posted this way.
+        return all(f'name="{field}"'.encode() in body for field in ("login", "usernamefld", "passwordfld"))
+    if not content_type.lower().startswith("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"):
+        return False
+    try:
+        form = parse_qs(body.decode("latin-1"), keep_blank_values=True)
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+    return "login" in form and bool(form.get("usernamefld", [""])[0]) and bool(form.get("passwordfld", [""])[0])
+
+
+def rewrite_location(location: str, upstream_origin: str) -> str | None:
+    """Relative target for the browser, or None when the redirect leaves the firewall."""
+    location = location.strip()
+    if not location or "\\" in location or any(ord(c) < 0x20 for c in location):
+        return None
+    if location.startswith("//"):
+        location = "https:" + location
+    parts = urlsplit(location)
+    if parts.scheme or parts.netloc:
+        if _origin_of(location) != _origin_of(upstream_origin):
+            return None
+        path = parts.path or "/"
+        return path + (f"?{parts.query}" if parts.query else "") + (f"#{parts.fragment}" if parts.fragment else "")
+    return location
+
+
+def _page(title: str, text_de: str, text_en: str) -> bytes:
+    return (f"<!doctype html><html lang=\"de\"><head><meta charset=\"utf-8\"><title>{title}</title></head>"
+            f"<body style=\"font-family:sans-serif;max-width:40rem;margin:3rem auto\"><h1>{title}</h1>"
+            f"<p>{text_de}</p><p lang=\"en\">{text_en}</p></body></html>").encode()
+
+
+_SESSION_GONE = _page("OPNexus", "Diese Sitzung ist abgelaufen oder ungültig. Öffne die Oberfläche erneut aus OPNexus.",
+                      "This session has expired or is invalid. Open the interface again from OPNexus.")
+_FORBIDDEN = _page("OPNexus", "Diese Anfrage wurde vom GUI-Gateway abgelehnt.", "This request was refused by the GUI gateway.")
+_BAD_REDIRECT = _page("OPNexus", "Die Firewall wollte auf eine fremde Adresse umleiten; die Umleitung wurde verworfen.",
+                      "The firewall tried to redirect to a foreign address; the redirect was dropped.")
+_LOGIN_LOCKED = _page("OPNexus", "Zu viele fehlgeschlagene Anmeldungen an dieser Firewall. Bitte warte 5 Minuten.",
+                      "Too many failed sign-ins at this firewall. Please wait 5 minutes.")
+_UNAVAILABLE = _page("OPNexus", "Die Firewall oder OPNexus ist gerade nicht erreichbar.",
+                     "The firewall or OPNexus is not reachable right now.")
+_TOO_MANY = _page("OPNexus", "Es laufen schon zu viele Firewall-Oberflächen gleichzeitig. Versuche es später erneut.",
+                  "Too many firewall interfaces are open at the same time. Try again later.")
+_REDEEMED = (b"<!doctype html><html><head><meta charset=\"utf-8\"><meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=/\">"
+             b"<title>OPNexus</title></head><body><a href=\"/\">&rarr;</a></body></html>")
+
+
+class GuiGateway:
+    def __init__(self, *, backend: BackendClient, slot_origins: dict[int, set[str]],
+                 upstream_factory: Callable[[GatewaySession], httpx.AsyncClient] = build_upstream_client,
+                 clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic, wall_clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time):
+        self.backend = backend
+        self.slot_origins = slot_origins
+        self.upstream_factory = upstream_factory
+        self.clock = clock
+        self.wall_clock = wall_clock
+        self.sessions: dict[str, GatewaySession] = {}  # sha256(gateway cookie) -> session
+        self.limiter = LoginLimiter(clock)
+        self._loop_task: asyncio.Task | None = None
+
+    # ── ASGI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
+        if scope["type"] == "lifespan":
+            await self._lifespan(receive, send)
+            return
+        if scope["type"] != "http":
+            # WebSocket and anything else: not supported (design: no WebSocket).
+            if scope["type"] == "websocket":
+                await send({"type": "websocket.close", "code": 1008})
+            return
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        status = await self._handle(scope, receive, send)
+        # Method, path and status only: never the query string, headers or bodies.
+        logger.info("%s %s %d %.0fms", scope.get("method", "?"), scope.get("path", "?")[:200], status,
+                    (time.monotonic() - started) * 1000)
+
+    async def _lifespan(self, receive, send):
+        while True:
+            message = await receive()
+            if message["type"] == "lifespan.startup":
+                self._loop_task = asyncio.create_task(self._revalidate_loop())
+                await send({"type": "lifespan.startup.complete"})
+            elif message["type"] == "lifespan.shutdown":
+                if self._loop_task:
+                    self._loop_task.cancel()
+                for key in list(self.sessions):
+                    await self._drop(key, "shutdown")
+                await self.backend.aclose()
+                await send({"type": "lifespan.shutdown.complete"})
+                return
+
+    async def _revalidate_loop(self):
+        while True:
+            await asyncio.sleep(10)
+            try:
+                await self.sweep()
+            except Exception:  # never let the loop die
+                logger.exception("GUI session sweep failed")
+
+    async def sweep(self) -> None:
+        """Idle/absolute limits and the periodic backend re-check for every gateway session."""
+        for key, gs in list(self.sessions.items()):
+            reason = self._expired(gs)
+            if reason:
+                await self._drop(key, reason)
+            elif self.clock() >= gs.next_check:
+                await self._recheck(key, gs)
+
+    # ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    @staticmethod
+    def _headers(scope) -> dict[str, str]:
+        result: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for k, v in scope.get("headers", []):
+            name = k.decode("latin-1").lower()
+            value = v.decode("latin-1")
+            if name in result:
+                value = f"{result[name]}{'; ' if name == 'cookie' else ', '}{value}"
+            result[name] = value
+        return result
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _cookies(header: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+        cookies: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for part in header.split(";"):
+            name, sep, value = part.strip().partition("=")
+            if sep and name and name not in cookies:
+                cookies[name] = value
+        return cookies
+
+    async def _respond(self, send, status: int, body: bytes = b"", headers: list | None = None,
+                       content_type: bytes = b"text/html; charset=utf-8") -> int:
+        out = [(b"content-type", content_type), (b"content-length", str(len(body)).encode())]
+        out += list(headers or []) + _SECURITY_HEADERS
+        await send({"type": "http.response.start", "status": status, "headers": out})
+        await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": body})
+        return status
+
+    def _expired(self, gs: GatewaySession) -> str | None:
+        if self.wall_clock() >= gs.absolute_deadline:
+            return "absolute"
+        if self.clock() - gs.last_activity >= gs.idle_timeout:
+            return "idle"
+        return None
+
+    async def _drop(self, key: str, reason: str, *, report: bool = True) -> None:
+        gs = self.sessions.pop(key, None)
+        if gs is None:
+            return
+        gs.jar.clear()
+        if gs.client is not None:
+            await gs.client.aclose()
+        if report:
+            await self.backend.end(gs, reason)
+
+    async def _recheck(self, key: str, gs: GatewaySession) -> bool | None:
+        """True = still valid, False = ended (dropped), None = backend unreachable (fail closed, keep for retry)."""
+        try:
+            result = await self.backend.revalidate(gs)
+        except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
+            logger.warning("GUI session re-check failed (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+            return None
+        if not result.get("ok"):
+            await self._drop(key, str(result.get("reason", "revoked")), report=False)  # backend already ended it
+            return False
+        gs.absolute_deadline = min(gs.absolute_deadline, float(result.get("absolute_deadline", gs.absolute_deadline)))
+        gs.idle_timeout = float(result.get("idle_timeout_seconds", gs.idle_timeout))
+        gs.next_check = self.clock() + gs.revalidate_every
+        return True
+
+    async def _clear_expired(self) -> None:
+        for key, gs in list(self.sessions.items()):
+            reason = self._expired(gs)
+            if reason:
+                await self._drop(key, reason)
+
+    def _has_room(self, browser_hash: str, slot: int) -> bool:
+        """Room for one more session; the one this redeem would replace (same browser session and slot) does not count."""
+        replaced = sum(1 for g in self.sessions.values() if g.slot == slot and g.session_hash == browser_hash)
+        return len(self.sessions) - replaced < MAX_SESSIONS
+
+    # ── request handling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+    async def _handle(self, scope, receive, send) -> int:
+        method = scope.get("method", "")
+        path = scope.get("path", "")
+        raw_path = scope.get("raw_path") or path.encode()
+        headers = self._headers(scope)
+
+        if method in ("CONNECT", "TRACE"):
+            return await self._respond(send, 501, _FORBIDDEN)
+        # Origin-form only: "GET http://elsewhere/ HTTP/1.1" (absolute-form) or "//host" never reach upstream.
+        if not path.startswith("/") or path.startswith("//") or not raw_path.startswith(b"/") \
+                or raw_path.startswith(b"//") or "\\" in path:
+            return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)
+        if "upgrade" in headers or "upgrade" in headers.get("connection", "").lower():
+            return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)
+        if headers.get("service-worker", "").lower() == "script":
+            return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)
+
+        try:
+            slot = int(headers.get("x-onx-slot", ""))
+        except ValueError:
+            slot = 0
+        own_origins = self.slot_origins.get(slot)
+        if not own_origins:
+            return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)  # not coming through the proxy's slot block
+
+        site = headers.get("sec-fetch-site", "").strip().lower()
+        if path == "/__onx/redeem":
+            if method != "GET" or site not in ("same-site", "same-origin", "none"):
+                return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)
+            return await self._redeem(scope, headers, slot, send)
+        if site not in ("same-origin", "none"):
+            return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)  # missing header = old/odd client: fail closed
+        if method not in ("GET", "HEAD"):
+            origin = headers.get("origin", "")
+            if _origin_of(origin) not in own_origins:
+                return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)
+        if path.startswith("/__onx/"):
+            return await self._respond(send, 404, _FORBIDDEN)
+
+        cookies = self._cookies(headers.get("cookie", ""))
+        token = cookies.get(f"{COOKIE_PREFIX}{slot}", "")
+        key = _sha(token) if token else ""
+        gs = self.sessions.get(key) if key else None
+        if gs is None or gs.slot != slot:
+            return await self._respond(send, 401, _SESSION_GONE)
+        reason = self._expired(gs)
+        if reason:
+            await self._drop(key, reason)
+            return await self._respond(send, 401, _SESSION_GONE)
+        if self.clock() >= gs.next_check:
+            state = await self._recheck(key, gs)
+            if state is False:
+                return await self._respond(send, 401, _SESSION_GONE)
+            if state is None:
+                return await self._respond(send, 503, _UNAVAILABLE)
+        gs.last_activity = self.clock()
+        return await self._proxy(scope, receive, send, headers, gs)
+
+    async def _redeem(self, scope, headers, slot: int, send) -> int:
+        query = parse_qs(scope.get("query_string", b"").decode("latin-1"))
+        ticket = (query.get("t") or [""])[0]
+        browser_session = self._cookies(headers.get("cookie", "")).get(OPNEXUS_SESSION_COOKIE, "")
+        if not ticket or len(ticket) > 128 or not browser_session:
+            return await self._respond(send, 403, _SESSION_GONE)
+        client_ip = (headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "").split(",")[0].strip() or None)
+        # Room first, before the ticket is burned: expired sessions go, running ones are never evicted.
+        await self._clear_expired()
+        if not self._has_room(_sha(browser_session), slot):
+            return await self._respond(send, 503, _TOO_MANY)
+        try:
+            result = await self.backend.redeem(_sha(ticket), _sha(browser_session), slot, client_ip and client_ip[:45])
+        except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
+            logger.warning("Ticket redeem failed (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+            return await self._respond(send, 503, _UNAVAILABLE)
+        if not result.get("ok"):
+            return await self._respond(send, 403, _SESSION_GONE)
+        # One browser session, one gateway session per slot: an older one in this slot is replaced.
+        for old_key, old in list(self.sessions.items()):
+            if old.slot == slot and old.session_hash == _sha(browser_session):
+                await self._drop(old_key, "superseded", report=False)
+        value = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        gs = GatewaySession(
+            gui_session_id=result["gui_session_id"], session_hash=_sha(browser_session), slot=slot,
+            upstream_origin=result["upstream_origin"], ca_pem=result.get("ca_pem"), proxy_url=result.get("proxy_url"),
+            idle_timeout=float(result["idle_timeout_seconds"]), absolute_deadline=float(result["absolute_deadline"]),
+            revalidate_every=float(result.get("revalidate_seconds", 20)), target_fp=result.get("target_fp"),
+        )
+        if len(self.sessions) >= MAX_SESSIONS:  # filled up while the backend was answering
+            await self.backend.end(gs, "revoked")
+            return await self._respond(send, 503, _TOO_MANY)
+        gs.last_activity = self.clock()
+        gs.next_check = gs.last_activity + gs.revalidate_every
+        self.sessions[_sha(value)] = gs
+        cookie = f"{COOKIE_PREFIX}{slot}={value}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict"
+        # 200 + meta refresh instead of a 303: the follow-up request then starts in this origin
+        # (Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin) and the ticket leaves the address bar.
+        return await self._respond(send, 200, _REDEEMED, headers=[
+            (b"set-cookie", cookie.encode()), (b"clear-site-data", b'"cache", "storage"'),
+        ])
+
+    async def _read_body(self, receive) -> bytes | None:
+        chunks, size = [], 0
+        while True:
+            message = await receive()
+            if message["type"] == "http.disconnect":
+                return None
+            chunk = message.get("body", b"")
+            size += len(chunk)
+            if size > BODY_LIMIT:
+                return None
+            chunks.append(chunk)
+            if not message.get("more_body"):
+                return b"".join(chunks)
+
+    def _store_cookies(self, gs: GatewaySession, response: httpx.Response) -> None:
+        for header in response.headers.get_list("set-cookie"):
+            jar = SimpleCookie()
+            try:
+                jar.load(header)
+            except CookieError:
+                continue
+            for name, morsel in jar.items():
+                expired = morsel["max-age"] in ("0",) or morsel.value in ("", "deleted")
+                if not expired and morsel["expires"]:
+                    try:
+                        from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
+                        expired = parsedate_to_datetime(morsel["expires"]).timestamp() <= self.wall_clock()
+                    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                        pass
+                if expired:
+                    gs.jar.pop(name, None)
+                else:
+                    gs.jar[name] = morsel.value
+
+    async def _proxy(self, scope, receive, send, headers: dict, gs: GatewaySession) -> int:
+        length = headers.get("content-length", "")
+        if length.isdigit() and int(length) > BODY_LIMIT:
+            return await self._respond(send, 413, _FORBIDDEN)
+        body = await self._read_body(receive)
+        if body is None:
+            return await self._respond(send, 413, _FORBIDDEN)
+        method = scope["method"]
+        login = is_login_attempt(method, headers.get("content-type", ""), body)
+        if login and self.limiter.blocked(gs.upstream_origin):
+            return await self._respond(send, 429, _LOGIN_LOCKED)
+
+        out_headers = {k: v for k, v in headers.items() if k in _FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS}
+        out_headers["accept-encoding"] = "identity"
+        if gs.jar:
+            out_headers["cookie"] = "; ".join(f"{k}={v}" for k, v in gs.jar.items())
+        query = scope.get("query_string", b"").decode("latin-1")
+        # The path exactly as the browser sent it (still percent-encoded): the decoded scope["path"] would
+        # turn %3F/%23 into query/fragment, %2F into a separator and decode %25xx a second time upstream.
+        raw_path = (scope.get("raw_path") or scope["path"].encode()).split(b"?", 1)[0].decode("latin-1")
+        url = gs.upstream_origin + raw_path + (f"?{query}" if query else "")
+        if gs.client is None:
+            gs.client = self.upstream_factory(gs)
+        try:
+            request = gs.client.build_request(method, url, headers=out_headers, content=body)
+        except httpx.InvalidURL:
+            return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)  # e.g. control characters in the path
+        try:
+            response = await gs.client.send(request, stream=True)
+        except (httpx.HTTPError, ssl.SSLError, OSError) as exc:
+            logger.warning("Upstream request failed (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
+            return await self._respond(send, 502, _UNAVAILABLE)
+        try:
+            self._store_cookies(gs, response)
+            if login and not (300 <= response.status_code < 400):
+                self.limiter.record_failure(gs.upstream_origin)
+            out = []
+            for name, value in response.headers.multi_items():
+                lname = name.lower()
+                if lname in _FORWARD_RESPONSE_HEADERS:
+                    out.append((lname.encode("latin-1"), value.encode("latin-1")))
+            if "location" in response.headers:
+                target = rewrite_location(response.headers["location"], gs.upstream_origin)
+                if target is None:
+                    await response.aclose()
+                    return await self._respond(send, 502, _BAD_REDIRECT)
+                out.append((b"location", target.encode("latin-1")))
+            await send({"type": "http.response.start", "status": response.status_code, "headers": out + _SECURITY_HEADERS})
+            async for chunk in response.aiter_raw():
+                await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": chunk, "more_body": True})
+            await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": b""})
+            return response.status_code
+        finally:
+            await response.aclose()
+
+
+def create_app(transport: httpx.AsyncBaseTransport | None = None) -> GuiGateway:
+    token = os.environ.get("GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN", "")
+    if len(token) < 32:
+        raise SystemExit("GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN (at least 32 characters) is required")
+    slots = slot_origins_from(os.environ.get("OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES", ""))
+    if not slots:
+        raise SystemExit("OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES must list the https slot origins")
+    backend = BackendClient(os.environ.get("GUI_BACKEND_URL", "http://backend:8000"), token, transport)
+    return GuiGateway(backend=backend, slot_origins=slots)
+
+
+def main() -> None:
+    import uvicorn
+    logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(asctime)s %(name)s %(levelname)s %(message)s")
+    # h11: an absolute-form target stays visible in scope["path"] (and is refused); access_log off because
+    # uvicorn's access log would contain query strings (the redeem ticket).
+    uvicorn.run(create_app(), host="0.0.0.0", port=LISTEN_PORT, http="h11", ws="none", access_log=False,
+                server_header=False, date_header=False, proxy_headers=False, lifespan="on", log_config=None)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

backend/app/main.py

@@ -46,15 +46,22 @@ from app.version import APP_VERSION
 from app.routers import dashboard as dashboard_router
 from app.routers import cluster as cluster_router
 from app.routers import services as services_router
+from app.routers import gateways as gateways_router
 from app.routers import resource_samples as resource_samples_router
 from app.services import resource_monitor_service
 from app.routers import scheduled_maintenance as scheduled_maintenance_router
+from app.routers import maintenance_windows as maintenance_windows_router
+from app.routers import rollouts as rollouts_router
+from app.routers import rule_analysis as rule_analysis_router
+from app.routers import gui_access as gui_access_router
 from app.services import scheduled_maintenance_service
+from app.services import rollout_engine
 from app.services import compliance_service
 from app.services import audit_export_service
 from app.services import overlay_service, variables_service
 from app.services import backup_schedule_service
 from app.services import carp_event_service, carp_maintenance_window_service
+from app.services import rule_history_service
 
 # Without this, Python's root logger defaults to WARNING with no handler,
 # so every logger.info() call in the 5 background loops below (CARP role
@@ -228,6 +235,9 @@ async def _resource_poll_loop():
                     deleted = await resource_monitor_service.prune_old_samples(db, settings.resource_sample_retention_days)
                     if deleted:
                         logger.info("Resource-Sample-Retention: %d alte Einträge gelöscht", deleted)
+                    pruned = await rule_history_service.prune(db)
+                    if pruned:
+                        logger.info("Regelverlauf-Retention: %d alte Einträge gelöscht", pruned)
         except Exception:
             logger.exception("Resource-Poll fehlgeschlagen")
         await asyncio.sleep(settings.resource_poll_interval_seconds)
@@ -254,6 +264,12 @@ async def _scheduled_maintenance_poll_loop():
         except Exception:
             logger.exception("Geplante-Wartung-Poll fehlgeschlagen")
             in_progress = 0
+        # Firmware rollouts (1.25) only ever create schedules; the next tick of the lines above fires them.
+        try:
+            async with SessionLocal() as db:
+                in_progress += await rollout_engine.advance_runs(db)
+        except Exception:
+            logger.exception("Rollout-Poll fehlgeschlagen")
         # A handover run is stepped quickly (the partner should take over within a minute or two);
         # otherwise the relaxed cadence is plenty.
         await asyncio.sleep(_RUNNING_MAINTENANCE_POLL_SECONDS if in_progress else _SCHEDULED_MAINTENANCE_POLL_SECONDS)
@@ -310,8 +326,31 @@ async def _backup_poll_loop():
         await asyncio.sleep(_BACKUP_POLL_SECONDS)
 
 
+_RULE_OBSERVE_FIRST_RUN_SECONDS = 150
+
+
+async def _rule_observe_loop():
+    """Ninth background loop: reads the rules and their counters of every enabled firewall (two GETs each),
+    keeps the usage sampling current and records what changed since the last look (services/rule_history_service.py).
+    Writes only to the database. The first look at a firewall only stores the starting point."""
+    await asyncio.sleep(_RULE_OBSERVE_FIRST_RUN_SECONDS)
+    while True:
+        try:
+            async with SessionLocal() as db:
+                result = await rule_history_service.observe_all(db)
+            if result["events"] or result["failed"]:
+                logger.info("Regelverlauf: %s", result)
+        except Exception:
+            logger.exception("Regelverlauf fehlgeschlagen")
+        await asyncio.sleep(max(settings.rule_observe_interval_seconds, settings.rule_observe_min_interval_seconds))
+
+
 @asynccontextmanager
 async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
+    conflicts = settings.gui_origin_conflicts()
+    if conflicts:
+        # A GUI-gateway slot must never be a trusted OPNexus origin (CORS with credentials).
+        raise RuntimeError(f"OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES overlaps FRONTEND_ORIGIN: {', '.join(conflicts)} — refusing to start")
     await migrate.run()
     async with SessionLocal() as db:
         await auth_service.bootstrap_admin(db)
@@ -335,6 +374,7 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     compliance_task = asyncio.create_task(_compliance_poll_loop())
     audit_export_task = asyncio.create_task(_audit_export_poll_loop())
     backup_task = asyncio.create_task(_backup_poll_loop())
+    rule_observe_task = asyncio.create_task(_rule_observe_loop())
     try:
         yield
     finally:
@@ -346,7 +386,8 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
         compliance_task.cancel()
         audit_export_task.cancel()
         backup_task.cancel()
-        for task in (sweep_task, notification_task, log_ingest_task, resource_task, scheduled_maintenance_task, compliance_task, audit_export_task, backup_task):
+        rule_observe_task.cancel()
+        for task in (sweep_task, notification_task, log_ingest_task, resource_task, scheduled_maintenance_task, compliance_task, audit_export_task, backup_task, rule_observe_task):
             try:
                 await task
             except asyncio.CancelledError:
@@ -510,9 +551,15 @@ app.include_router(restore_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(dashboard_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(cluster_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(services_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(gateways_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(network_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(snapshots_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(network_drift_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(diagnostics_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(resource_samples_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(scheduled_maintenance_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(maintenance_windows_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(rollouts_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(rule_analysis_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(gui_access_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(gui_access_router.internal_router)

backend/app/models/__init__.py

@@ -93,3 +93,15 @@ __all__ += ["HostResourceSample"]
 
 from app.models.scheduled_maintenance import ScheduledMaintenance
 __all__ += ["ScheduledMaintenance"]
+
+from app.models.maintenance_window import MaintenanceWindow, MaintenanceWindowException
+__all__ += ["MaintenanceWindow", "MaintenanceWindowException"]
+
+from app.models.rollout import RolloutPlan, RolloutPlanWave, RolloutRun, RolloutRunHost, RolloutRunWave, rollout_wave_groups
+__all__ += ["RolloutPlan", "RolloutPlanWave", "RolloutRun", "RolloutRunHost", "RolloutRunWave", "rollout_wave_groups"]
+
+from app.models.gui_access import GuiAccessSettings, GuiSession, GuiTicket
+__all__ += ["GuiAccessSettings", "GuiSession", "GuiTicket"]
+
+from app.models.rule_history import LiveRuleState, RuleChangeEvent
+__all__ += ["LiveRuleState", "RuleChangeEvent"]

backend/app/models/gui_access.py

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+"""GUI access to managed firewalls through the separate gui-gateway container (1.27).
+
+Settings are a singleton row (id fixed at 1), off by default. Tickets and gateway
+sessions only ever store hashes: the raw ticket travels once through the browser,
+the OPNexus session is referenced by the same SHA-256 that `sessions.token_hash` holds.
+"""
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime
+
+from sqlalchemy import Boolean, DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.database import Base
+
+
+class GuiAccessSettings(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "gui_access_settings"
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, primary_key=True)
+    enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    idle_timeout_minutes: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=15, server_default="15")
+    absolute_timeout_minutes: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=60, server_default="60")
+    slot_count: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=4, server_default="4")
+    updated_by: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(150), nullable=True)
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+
+
+class GuiTicket(Base):
+    """One-time, 30-second ticket, bound to the OPNexus session, host and slot."""
+    __tablename__ = "gui_tickets"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    ticket_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=False, unique=True)
+    session_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=False, index=True)
+    user_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("admin_users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    host_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("opnsense_hosts.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    slot: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False)
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    expires_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    redeemed_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+
+
+class GuiSession(Base):
+    """A redeemed ticket: one firewall GUI open in one slot of one browser session."""
+    __tablename__ = "gui_sessions"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    session_hash: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=False, index=True)
+    user_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("admin_users.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    host_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("opnsense_hosts.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False, index=True
+    )
+    slot: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False)
+    client_ip: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(45), nullable=True)
+    started_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    last_checked_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    ended_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    end_reason: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(32), nullable=True)

backend/app/models/maintenance_window.py

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+"""Recurring maintenance windows (1.25): "every Sunday 02:00-05:00 Europe/Berlin",
+"first Tuesday of the month 22:00 for 3 h". A window on its own changes nothing on any
+firewall; rollout plans (models/rollout.py) use it to decide WHEN they may start work on a host.
+
+Times are wall-clock times in the window's own IANA time zone, so a window stays at 02:00
+local time across daylight-saving changes (see services/window_service.py for the rules).
+"""
+import uuid
+from datetime import date, datetime, time, timezone
+
+from sqlalchemy import JSON, Boolean, Date, DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String, Time, UniqueConstraint
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column, relationship
+
+from app.database import Base
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+class MaintenanceWindow(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "maintenance_windows"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(120), unique=True)
+    timezone: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64))
+    recurrence: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16))  # weekly | monthly
+    # weekly: weekdays 0 (Monday) .. 6 (Sunday). JSON columns get a Python default only (Alembic gotcha, see 0007).
+    weekdays: Mapped[list] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False, default=list)
+    # monthly: "nth_weekday" (month_nth 1-4 or -1 = last, month_weekday 0-6) or "day" (month_day 1-28)
+    month_mode: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(16), nullable=True)
+    month_nth: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=True)
+    month_weekday: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=True)
+    month_day: Mapped[int | None] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=True)
+    start_time: Mapped[time] = mapped_column(Time)
+    duration_minutes: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    # After this many minutes into the window no NEW host action starts (running ones finish).
+    start_cutoff_minutes: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=60, server_default="60")
+    enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
+    created_by: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(150))
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now)
+
+    exceptions: Mapped[list["MaintenanceWindowException"]] = relationship(
+        "MaintenanceWindowException", cascade="all, delete-orphan", passive_deletes=True, lazy="selectin",
+        order_by="MaintenanceWindowException.occurrence_date",
+    )
+
+
+class MaintenanceWindowException(Base):
+    """One occurrence skipped or moved. Keyed by the occurrence's LOCAL date."""
+
+    __tablename__ = "maintenance_window_exceptions"
+    __table_args__ = (UniqueConstraint("window_id", "occurrence_date", name="uq_window_exception_date"),)
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    window_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("maintenance_windows.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), index=True
+    )
+    occurrence_date: Mapped[date] = mapped_column(Date)
+    kind: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(8))  # skip | move
+    moved_start: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    reason: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(300), default="")
+    actor: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(150))
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now)

backend/app/models/notification.py

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ OPNsense API secrets stay off the database entirely.
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
-from sqlalchemy import JSON, Boolean, DateTime, Integer, String, UniqueConstraint
+from sqlalchemy import JSON, Boolean, DateTime, Float, Integer, String, UniqueConstraint
 from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
 
@@ -17,6 +17,13 @@ def _now() -> datetime:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
 
+DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST = (
+    "unbound", "dnsmasq", "dhcpd", "dhcpd6", "kea-dhcp4", "kea-dhcp6", "ntpd", "openvpn", "wireguard", "strongswan",
+)
+
+CHANNEL_TYPES = ("ntfy", "gotify", "telegram", "teams", "matrix")
+
+
 class NotificationSettings(Base):
     """Single row, id fixed at 1 — see notification_settings_service.get_settings
     for the get-or-create helper. The only admin-editable operational config
@@ -55,6 +62,34 @@ class NotificationSettings(Base):
     # Off by default: switching it on for an existing fleet reports every long-standing finding at once.
     compliance_alerts_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
 
+    # Monitoring alerts (1.24). The gateway alert is on by default (a WAN outage is the one thing every
+    # operator wants to hear about); resource thresholds and service checks are off, like compliance alerts:
+    # switching them on for an existing fleet may report long-standing conditions all at once.
+    gateway_down_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
+    resource_threshold_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    service_down_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    # An API key that cannot read gateway / service state makes those alerts silently blind (1.29): say so.
+    api_rights_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
+    # Gateways whose alert is switched off, "<host_id>:<gateway name>" (1.29), e.g. an idle second WAN.
+    gateway_alert_muted: Mapped[list] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False, default=list)
+    # Rollouts (1.25): a run paused (gate, failure, window...) or an automatic start did not happen.
+    rollout_problems_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
+    # Gateway: OPNsense' own verdict (down / loss / delay) decides "offline"; these two add an
+    # OPNexus threshold on the measured values (0 = off).
+    gateway_loss_threshold_pct: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=20, server_default="20")
+    gateway_delay_threshold_ms: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=500, server_default="500")
+    # Resources (0 = that threshold is off). Load is per CPU thread.
+    disk_threshold_pct: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=90, server_default="90")
+    memory_threshold_pct: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=95, server_default="95")
+    swap_threshold_pct: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=50, server_default="50")
+    load_per_cpu_threshold: Mapped[float] = mapped_column(Float, nullable=False, default=2.0, server_default="2.0")
+    # Debouncing: consecutive 60 s resource samples that must agree before a problem opens or closes.
+    alert_confirm_samples: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=3, server_default="3")
+    resource_confirm_samples: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=5, server_default="5")
+    # OPNsense service names that are reported when they stop (the API cannot tell a crash from a stop on purpose).
+    # NULL = the default list (an old row never got one).
+    service_watchlist: Mapped[list | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True, default=lambda: list(DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST))
+
     poll_interval_seconds: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=300)
     updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now, onupdate=_now)
 
@@ -85,3 +120,21 @@ class NotificationProblem(Base):
     resolved_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
     last_notified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
     resolved_notified_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+
+
+class NotificationChannel(Base):
+    """An additional delivery channel (ntfy, Gotify, Telegram, Microsoft Teams, Matrix) next to the SMTP
+    and generic-webhook settings above. Several channels of one type are allowed. ``config`` holds only
+    non-secret parameters (server URL, topic, chat id, room id); the credential — token, or the whole
+    webhook URL for Teams — lives in notification_secret_store under ``channel_<id>``, never here."""
+
+    __tablename__ = "notification_channels"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(100), unique=True)
+    channel_type: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16))
+    enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
+    config: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False, default=dict)
+    secret_set: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now)
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now, onupdate=_now)

backend/app/models/rollout.py

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+"""Firmware rollouts in waves (1.25): plans (what, in which order, when) and runs (what happened).
+
+A plan's waves point at device groups ("rings": canary -> pilot -> prod). A run freezes the plan
+(``plan_snapshot``) and the resolved hosts (``RolloutRunHost``) when it starts, so later edits of
+the plan or of a group never change a run that is under way. The run never fires firmware actions
+itself: every host step is an ordinary ScheduledMaintenance row (origin="rollout",
+auto_verify=True) linked from ``RolloutRunHost.scheduled_maintenance_id`` — see
+services/rollout_service.py.
+"""
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+from sqlalchemy import (JSON, Boolean, Column, DateTime, ForeignKey, Integer, String, Table, Text,
+                        UniqueConstraint)
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column, relationship
+
+from app.database import Base
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+rollout_wave_groups = Table(
+    "rollout_wave_groups", Base.metadata,
+    Column("wave_id", PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("rollout_plan_waves.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), primary_key=True),
+    Column("group_id", PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("device_groups.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), primary_key=True),
+)
+
+
+class RolloutPlan(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "rollout_plans"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(120), unique=True)
+    description: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(Text, default="")
+    action: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16))  # update | major_update
+    window_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("maintenance_windows.id", ondelete="SET NULL"), nullable=True, index=True)
+    # Start a run by itself at every occurrence of the window. Only for "update" and only while the plan
+    # is activated AND unchanged since (activated_fingerprint).
+    auto_start: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    gate_checks: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False, default=dict)
+    compliance_mode: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(8), nullable=False, default="warn", server_default="warn")
+    activated_by: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(150), nullable=True)
+    # Stable id of that account (1.29, no foreign key on purpose: a deleted account stays gone, a new one with the same name is someone else).
+    activated_by_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)
+    activated_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    activated_fingerprint: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=True)
+    # Why the last automatic start did not happen: {"occurrence", "code", "params", "at"} (notification source).
+    auto_start_error: Mapped[dict | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    created_by: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(150))
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now)
+    updated_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now, onupdate=_now)
+
+    waves: Mapped[list["RolloutPlanWave"]] = relationship(
+        "RolloutPlanWave", cascade="all, delete-orphan", passive_deletes=True, lazy="selectin",
+        order_by="RolloutPlanWave.position")
+
+
+class RolloutPlanWave(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "rollout_plan_waves"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    plan_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("rollout_plans.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), index=True)
+    position: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    label: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(60))
+    soak_minutes: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=30)
+    carp_handover: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    # Wait for a human "release" before this wave starts (not used for the first wave: starting is the release).
+    require_approval: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+
+    groups: Mapped[list["DeviceGroup"]] = relationship("DeviceGroup", secondary=rollout_wave_groups, lazy="selectin")  # noqa: F821
+
+
+class RolloutRun(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "rollout_runs"
+    __table_args__ = (UniqueConstraint("plan_id", "window_occurrence", name="uq_rollout_run_occurrence"),)
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    plan_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("rollout_plans.id", ondelete="SET NULL"), nullable=True, index=True)
+    plan_name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(120))
+    plan_snapshot: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False, default=dict)
+    action: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16))
+    # waiting_window | preflight | wave_running | soaking | gate | awaiting_approval | resuming | paused
+    # | succeeded | cancelled
+    status: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), index=True)
+    paused_from: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(20), nullable=True)
+    current_wave: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=0)
+    target_version: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(40), nullable=True)
+    pause_reason: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(40), nullable=True)
+    pause_detail: Mapped[dict | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    started_by: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(150))
+    started_by_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)  # see activated_by_id
+    trigger: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(8))  # manual | window
+    window_occurrence: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    # Optimistic lock: every state change bumps it; an engine step computed on an older revision is dropped.
+    revision: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0, server_default="0")
+    progress: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False, default=dict)
+    step_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), default=_now)
+    finished_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+
+    waves: Mapped[list["RolloutRunWave"]] = relationship(
+        "RolloutRunWave", cascade="all, delete-orphan", passive_deletes=True, lazy="selectin", order_by="RolloutRunWave.index")
+    hosts: Mapped[list["RolloutRunHost"]] = relationship(
+        "RolloutRunHost", cascade="all, delete-orphan", passive_deletes=True, lazy="selectin",
+        order_by=lambda: [RolloutRunHost.wave_index, RolloutRunHost.order])
+
+
+class RolloutRunWave(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "rollout_run_waves"
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    run_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("rollout_runs.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), index=True)
+    index: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    label: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(60))
+    # pending | awaiting_approval | preflight | running | soaking | gate | passed | skipped | cancelled
+    status: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(20), default="pending")
+    baseline: Mapped[dict | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    gate_result: Mapped[dict | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    soak_until: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    gate_attempts: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=0, server_default="0")
+    approved_by: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(150), nullable=True)
+    started_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    finished_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+
+
+class RolloutRunHost(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "rollout_run_hosts"
+    __table_args__ = (UniqueConstraint("run_id", "host_id", name="uq_rollout_run_host"),)
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    run_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("rollout_runs.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), index=True)
+    wave_index: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer)
+    host_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("opnsense_hosts.id", ondelete="SET NULL"), nullable=True, index=True)
+    host_name: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(120))
+    cluster_name: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(120), nullable=True)
+    order: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=0)
+    # queued | running | verifying | succeeded | skipped | failed | blocked | cancelled
+    status: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16), default="queued")
+    scheduled_maintenance_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("scheduled_maintenance.id", ondelete="SET NULL"), nullable=True, index=True)
+    version_before: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(40), nullable=True)
+    version_after: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(40), nullable=True)
+    # {"code": ..., "params": {...}} — translated in the UI (rollouts.hostNote.*)
+    detail: Mapped[dict | None] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    started_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)
+    finished_at: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)

backend/app/models/rule_history.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"""Change history of the rules that are live on a firewall (all rules, also hand-made ones).
+
+``live_rule_states`` is the last observed state per rule (a fingerprint plus the row itself), maintained by the
+``rule_observe`` loop; ``rule_change_events`` is what changed between two observations. See
+services/rule_history_service.py. Neither table holds anything the firewall itself would not show on its rule page.
+"""
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime
+from typing import Optional
+
+from sqlalchemy import JSON, Boolean, DateTime, ForeignKey, Index, Integer, String, UniqueConstraint
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.database import Base
+
+
+class LiveRuleState(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "live_rule_states"
+
+    host_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("opnsense_hosts.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), primary_key=True)
+    # The rule's UUID/label on the firewall; BASELINE_KEY marks "this host has been observed once".
+    rule_uuid: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), primary_key=True)
+    fingerprint: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=False)
+    row: Mapped[dict] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=False)
+    # False = the rule is gone (kept as a marker so a returning UUID continues the numbering).
+    present: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True)
+    # Counts the observed changes of this rule; the event of a change gets the new number, which makes the
+    # observation idempotent when two processes see the same change.
+    version: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False, default=1)
+    first_seen_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    changed_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+    last_seen_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False)
+
+
+class RuleChangeEvent(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "rule_change_events"
+    __table_args__ = (
+        UniqueConstraint("host_id", "rule_uuid", "seq", name="uq_rule_change_event"),
+        Index("ix_rule_change_events_rule", "host_id", "rule_uuid", "observed_at"),
+    )
+
+    id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), primary_key=True, default=uuid.uuid4)
+    host_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(
+        PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey("opnsense_hosts.id", ondelete="CASCADE"), nullable=False)
+    rule_uuid: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(64), nullable=False)
+    seq: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, nullable=False)
+    observed_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False, index=True)
+    kind: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16), nullable=False)       # added | changed | removed | enabled | disabled
+    before: Mapped[Optional[dict]] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    after: Mapped[Optional[dict]] = mapped_column(JSON, nullable=True)
+    origin: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16), nullable=False)     # opnexus | external
+    actor: Mapped[Optional[str]] = mapped_column(String(150), nullable=True)
+    # The audit entry that explains an OPNexus-made change; no foreign key, the audit trail outlives everything.
+    audit_id: Mapped[Optional[uuid.UUID]] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)
+    # Start of the time since the previous observation of the host: only audit entries from then on can explain
+    # this change (a later reconcile must not reach back to an older deployment).
+    window_start: Mapped[Optional[datetime]] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)

backend/app/models/scheduled_maintenance.py

@@ -42,7 +42,12 @@ class ScheduledMaintenance(Base):
     host_operation_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID | None] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=True)
     # Opt-in: hand the traffic over to the CARP partner first, run the action, then switch back.
     carp_handover: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
-    # Only while status == "running" with a handover: handover_wait | job_wait | leave | leave_wait.
+    # 1.25: check the result automatically (job_wait -> verify) and close the operation, instead of
+    # leaving it "submitted" for a human. Every rollout step sets it; off for existing plans.
+    auto_verify: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    # manual | rollout (created by a rollout run, see models/rollout.py RolloutRunHost.scheduled_maintenance_id)
+    origin: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(16), nullable=False, default="manual", server_default="manual")
+    # Only while status == "running" with a handover or auto_verify: handover_wait | job_wait | verify | leave | leave_wait.
     # State lives here, not in memory, so a backend restart in the middle of a run resumes cleanly.
     phase: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(16), nullable=True)
     phase_since: Mapped[datetime | None] = mapped_column(DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True)

backend/app/models/update_check_settings.py

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+"""Version check configured in the web UI (singleton row, id fixed at 1).
+
+Off by default: OPNexus makes no outgoing request until an admin switches it on. An
+UPDATE_CHECK_URL in the server's .env still wins over this row (server-managed)."""
+from sqlalchemy import Boolean, Integer, String
+from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
+
+from app.database import Base
+
+DEFAULT_FEED_URL = "https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json"
+
+
+class UpdateCheckSettings(Base):
+    __tablename__ = "update_check_settings"
+
+    id: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, primary_key=True)
+    enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default="false")
+    feed_url: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(500), nullable=False, default=DEFAULT_FEED_URL, server_default=DEFAULT_FEED_URL)

backend/app/routers/adopt_routes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""The three "take over what exists on the firewall" endpoints that aliases, port forwards, 1:1 NAT and
+outbound NAT share (services/object_adopt_service.py has the logic and the evidence):
+
+  GET  <prefix>/unmanaged?host_id=…   candidates found live on the host, with reasons for the refused ones
+  POST <prefix>/adopt                 take over one object {host_id, uuid}; returns the new central object
+  POST <prefix>/adopt-all             take over everything adoptable {host_id}; returns adopted + skipped
+
+Like rule adoption this only creates central records; nothing is written to the firewall."""
+import json
+import uuid
+from typing import Callable
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.schemas.adopt import AdoptAllRequest, AdoptAllResult, AdoptObjectRequest, UnmanagedObject
+from app.services import object_adopt_service
+from app.services.adopt_common import LINK_ERRORS, link_api_error
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.policy_hierarchy_target_service import hydrate_hierarchy_targets
+from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+
+
+async def _host(db: AsyncSession, host_id: uuid.UUID) -> OpnsenseHost:
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    return host
+
+
+def add_adopt_routes(router: APIRouter, *, kind: str, model, load_options: Callable, to_read: Callable, read_model) -> None:
+    @router.get("/unmanaged", response_model=list[UnmanagedObject])
+    async def list_unmanaged(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+        host = await _host(db, host_id)
+        try:
+            return await object_adopt_service.list_unmanaged(db, kind, host)
+        except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+            raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+
+    @router.post("/adopt", response_model=read_model, status_code=201)
+    async def adopt(payload: AdoptObjectRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+        await policy_lock(db)
+        host = await _host(db, payload.host_id)
+        try:
+            created = await object_adopt_service.adopt(db, kind, host, payload.uuid, link_to=payload.link_to)
+        except object_adopt_service.NotFoundOnHost as exc:
+            raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.ADOPT_OBJECT_NOT_FOUND) from exc
+        except object_adopt_service.NotAdoptable as exc:
+            raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.OBJECT_NOT_ADOPTABLE, reasons=", ".join(exc.reasons),
+                            reason_details=json.dumps(exc.details, ensure_ascii=False)) from exc
+        except LINK_ERRORS as exc:
+            raise link_api_error(exc) from exc
+        except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+            raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+        await db.commit()
+        # The new object sits in the session without its relationships loaded; db.get() would return it as-is.
+        created = (await db.execute(
+            select(model).where(model.id == created.id).options(*load_options())
+            .execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+        )).scalar_one()
+        await hydrate_hierarchy_targets(db, [created])
+        return to_read(created, created.targets, created.deployments)
+
+    @router.post("/adopt-all", response_model=AdoptAllResult)
+    async def adopt_all(payload: AdoptAllRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+        await policy_lock(db)
+        host = await _host(db, payload.host_id)
+        try:
+            result = await object_adopt_service.adopt_all(db, kind, host, link_existing=payload.link_existing)
+        except LINK_ERRORS as exc:
+            raise link_api_error(exc) from exc
+        except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+            raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+        await db.commit()
+        return result

backend/app/routers/aliases.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from app.schemas.alias import DeploymentResult, AliasCreate, AliasRead, AliasEdi
 from app.services.alias_deploy_service import confirm_alias, deploy_alias, undeploy_alias, revert_alias_deployment
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.policy_hierarchy_target_service import hydrate_hierarchy_targets, validate_hierarchy_group
+from app.routers.adopt_routes import add_adopt_routes
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/aliases", tags=["aliases"])
 
@@ -70,6 +71,9 @@ def _to_read(alias: FirewallAlias, hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], deployments: list[
     )
 
 
+add_adopt_routes(router, kind="alias", model=FirewallAlias, load_options=_load_options, to_read=_to_read, read_model=AliasRead)
+
+
 @router.get("", response_model=list[AliasRead])
 async def list_aliases(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     result = await db.execute(select(FirewallAlias).options(*_load_options()))

backend/app/routers/auth.py

@@ -15,7 +15,31 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/auth", tags=["auth"])
 
+# Plain name: the session cookie of HTTP-only (lab) deployments. On HTTPS deployments it is NOT accepted any
+# more (1.29): it is only still deleted (login, logout) so that a pre-1.27 cookie does not linger.
 COOKIE_NAME = "opnexus-session"
+# HTTPS deployments: the __Host- prefix makes the browser refuse any cookie of
+# this name that is not Secure, has a Domain attribute or a Path other than
+# "/". A page on another port of the same host (the GUI gateway slots, any
+# other service on that machine) therefore cannot toss a narrower-path cookie
+# that shadows the real session, and cannot overwrite it from script (HttpOnly).
+SECURE_COOKIE_NAME = "__Host-opnexus-session"
+
+
+def session_cookie_name() -> str:
+    return SECURE_COOKIE_NAME if settings.cookie_secure else COOKIE_NAME
+
+
+def session_token(request: Request) -> str:
+    """The session token the browser sent: the __Host- cookie on HTTPS deployments, the plain one otherwise.
+    Never the other name (1.29): a plain-name cookie can be planted by any plain-HTTP or sibling-subdomain page and
+    must not be able to carry a session on an HTTPS deployment (the __Host- prefix does not separate PORTS, see
+    BACKLOG S8)."""
+    return request.cookies.get(session_cookie_name(), "")
+
+
+def has_session_cookie(request: Request) -> bool:
+    return bool(request.cookies.get(SECURE_COOKIE_NAME) or request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME))
 
 
 def client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
@@ -32,7 +56,7 @@ def client_ip(request: Request) -> str:
 
 def _set_session_cookie(response: Response, token: str, max_age: int | None = None) -> None:
     response.set_cookie(
-        key=COOKIE_NAME,
+        key=session_cookie_name(),
         value=token,
         max_age=max_age or settings.session_lifetime,
         httponly=True,
@@ -40,10 +64,15 @@ def _set_session_cookie(response: Response, token: str, max_age: int | None = No
         secure=settings.cookie_secure,
         path="/",
     )
+    if settings.cookie_secure:
+        # A pre-1.27 plain-name cookie must not linger next to the new one.
+        response.delete_cookie(key=COOKIE_NAME, path="/", secure=True, httponly=True, samesite="lax")
 
 
 def _clear_session_cookie(response: Response) -> None:
-    response.delete_cookie(key=COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
+    response.delete_cookie(key=COOKIE_NAME, path="/", secure=settings.cookie_secure, httponly=True, samesite="lax")
+    if settings.cookie_secure:
+        response.delete_cookie(key=SECURE_COOKIE_NAME, path="/", secure=True, httponly=True, samesite="lax")
 
 
 def _check_account_budget(user: AdminUser, action: str) -> None:
@@ -71,7 +100,7 @@ async def resolve_user(request: Request, db: AsyncSession) -> AdminUser:
         user = await db.get(AdminUser, resolved.id)
         if user is not None:
             return user
-    token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, "")
+    token = session_token(request)
     user = await auth_service.resolve_session(db, token)
     if user is None:
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.NICHT_AUTHENTIFIZIERT)
@@ -229,7 +258,7 @@ async def totp_enable(
     user.totp_last_step = step
     user.totp_recovery_hashes = hashes
     # Other sessions were established without the second factor — end them.
-    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, keep_token=request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, ""), commit=False)
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, keep_token=session_token(request), commit=False)
     await db.commit()
     logger.info("Two-factor enabled for '%s'", user.username)
     return {"enabled": True, "recovery_codes": plain}
@@ -254,7 +283,7 @@ async def totp_disable(
     user.totp_enabled = False
     user.totp_recovery_hashes = None
     user.totp_last_step = 0
-    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, keep_token=request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, ""), commit=False)
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, keep_token=session_token(request), commit=False)
     await db.commit()
     logger.info("Two-factor disabled for '%s'", user.username)
     return {"enabled": False}
@@ -262,14 +291,17 @@ async def totp_disable(
 
 @router.post("/logout")
 async def logout(request: Request, response: Response, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
-    token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, "")
+    token = session_token(request)
     await auth_service.revoke_session(db, token)
+    legacy = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, "")
+    if settings.cookie_secure and legacy and legacy != token:
+        await auth_service.revoke_session(db, legacy)  # an old plain-name cookie ends with the logout too
     _clear_session_cookie(response)
     return {"authenticated": False}
 
 
 @router.get("/me")
-async def me(request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+async def me(request: Request, response: Response, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     raw = api_token_service.bearer_from_header(request.headers.get("authorization", ""))
     if raw is not None:
         resolved = await api_token_service.resolve(db, raw, client_ip(request))
@@ -278,7 +310,7 @@ async def me(request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
         user, api_token = resolved
         return {"authenticated": True, "username": user.username, "role": user.role,
                 "via": "token", "scope": api_token.scope, "token_name": api_token.name}
-    token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, "")
+    token = session_token(request)
     user = await auth_service.resolve_session(db, token)
     if user is None:
         return {"authenticated": False}

backend/app/routers/dashboard.py

@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ locks are deliberately NOT included here (no fleet-wide list endpoint
 exists for those, only per-host, and it's a rarely-triggered flow) —
 a documented v1 gap, not an oversight.
 """
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
@@ -46,7 +48,10 @@ from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
 from app.models.wireguard_tunnel import WireguardTunnel
 from app.models.wireguard_tunnel_deployment import WireguardTunnelDeployment
 from app.schemas.dashboard import ActivityItem, DashboardHost, DashboardSummary, PendingAction
+from app.models.resource_sample import HostResourceSample
+from app.services import gateway_health_service, notification_settings_service
 from app.services.host_status_service import get_statuses
+from app.services.monitor_checks import STALE_AFTER
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/dashboard", tags=["dashboard"])
 
@@ -202,14 +207,43 @@ async def collect_pending_actions(db: AsyncSession) -> list[PendingAction]:
     return pending_actions
 
 
+async def _sample_readings_by_host(db: AsyncSession, hosts, muted: set[str]) -> tuple[dict, dict]:
+    """(gateways, missing API rights) from each host's newest resource sample; hosts without a fresh sample are left out."""
+    gateways: dict = {}
+    denied: dict = {}
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    for host in hosts:
+        row = (
+            await db.execute(
+                select(HostResourceSample.sampled_at, HostResourceSample.raw["gateways"].as_json(), HostResourceSample.raw["denied"].as_json())
+                .where(HostResourceSample.host_id == host.id)
+                .order_by(HostResourceSample.sampled_at.desc())
+                .limit(1)
+            )
+        ).first()
+        if row is None or now - row[0] > STALE_AFTER:
+            continue
+        if row[1] is not None:
+            gateways[host.id] = [
+                g.model_copy(update={"alert_enabled": f"{host.id}:{g.name}" not in muted})
+                for g in gateway_health_service.from_compact(row[1])
+            ]
+        if isinstance(row[2], list):
+            denied[host.id] = [str(x) for x in row[2]]
+    return gateways, denied
+
+
 @router.get("", response_model=DashboardSummary)
 async def summary(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     hosts = (await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).order_by(OpnsenseHost.name))).all()
     statuses = await get_statuses(hosts)
+    muted = set((await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)).gateway_alert_muted or [])
+    gateways, denied = await _sample_readings_by_host(db, hosts, muted)
     host_summaries = [
         DashboardHost(
             id=host.id, name=host.name, status=statuses.get(host.id, {}).get("status", "offline"),
             carp_status=statuses.get(host.id, {}).get("carp_status"), cluster_name=host.cluster_name,
+            gateways=gateways.get(host.id), api_rights_missing=denied.get(host.id),
         )
         for host in hosts
     ]

backend/app/routers/gateways.py

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+import re
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.resource_sample import HostResourceSample
+from app.schemas.gateway import ApiRightsState, GatewayAlertState, GatewayAlertUpdate, GatewayHealth
+from app.services import audit_service, gateway_health_service, notification_settings_service
+from app.services.monitor_checks import STALE_AFTER
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError, OpnsenseForbiddenError
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/hosts/{host_id}/gateways", tags=["host-gateways"])
+
+# OPNsense gateway names are letters, digits and underscores (WAN_GW, WAN_DHCP6); a little more is allowed.
+_GATEWAY_NAME = re.compile(r"[A-Za-z0-9_.-]{1,64}")
+MAX_MUTED_GATEWAYS = 200
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=list[GatewayHealth])
+async def list_gateways(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Live gateway state (loss, delay, deviation, OPNsense' verdict) of one firewall."""
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    try:
+        gateways = await gateway_health_service.get_gateway_health(host)
+    except OpnsenseForbiddenError as exc:
+        # The API key may not read the gateway state: say so instead of a generic upstream failure.
+        raise api_error(403, ErrorCode.API_RIGHTS_MISSING) from exc
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+    muted = set((await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)).gateway_alert_muted or [])
+    return [g.model_copy(update={"alert_enabled": f"{host.id}:{g.name}" not in muted}) for g in gateways]
+
+
+@router.get("/api-rights", response_model=ApiRightsState)
+async def api_rights(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Side readings the newest FRESH resource sample could not take because the API key lacks the right
+    (null = no fresh sample, so nothing is known). Stored data only: no call to the firewall."""
+    if await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id) is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    row = (
+        await db.execute(
+            select(HostResourceSample.sampled_at, HostResourceSample.raw["denied"].as_json())
+            .where(HostResourceSample.host_id == host_id)
+            .order_by(HostResourceSample.sampled_at.desc())
+            .limit(1)
+        )
+    ).first()
+    if row is None or datetime.now(timezone.utc) - row[0] > STALE_AFTER or not isinstance(row[1], list):
+        return ApiRightsState(missing=None)
+    return ApiRightsState(missing=[str(x) for x in row[1]])
+
+
+@router.put("/{name}/alert", response_model=GatewayAlertState)
+async def set_gateway_alert(host_id: uuid.UUID, name: str, payload: GatewayAlertUpdate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Switch the gateway-down alert on or off for ONE gateway (admins only, see api_token_service)."""
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    if not _GATEWAY_NAME.fullmatch(name):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.GATEWAY_NAME_INVALID)
+    if not payload.enabled:
+        # Only a gateway the firewall really reported can be muted ("wan_gw" vs "WAN_GW" would silently do nothing).
+        # Without a usable sample nothing is known, so the request goes through.
+        known = (
+            await db.execute(
+                select(HostResourceSample.raw["gateways"].as_json())
+                .where(HostResourceSample.host_id == host_id)
+                .order_by(HostResourceSample.sampled_at.desc())
+                .limit(1)
+            )
+        ).scalar()
+        if isinstance(known, list) and name not in {g.get("name") for g in known if isinstance(g, dict)}:
+            raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.GATEWAY_UNKNOWN)
+    row = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    await db.refresh(row, with_for_update=True)
+    muted = list(row.gateway_alert_muted or [])
+    key = f"{host.id}:{name}"
+    if payload.enabled:
+        muted = [m for m in muted if m != key]
+    elif key not in muted:
+        if len(muted) >= MAX_MUTED_GATEWAYS:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.GATEWAY_MUTE_LIMIT, limit=str(MAX_MUTED_GATEWAYS))
+        muted.append(key)
+    row.gateway_alert_muted = muted  # a new list, so the JSON column notices the change
+    await db.commit()
+    # The request middleware logs the call itself; this entry says what it did (only the validated name goes in).
+    await audit_service.persist(
+        kind="host", action="gateway_alert_on" if payload.enabled else "gateway_alert_off", entity_id=str(host.id),
+        host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name, status="accepted", message=f"Gateway {name}",
+    )
+    return GatewayAlertState(name=name, alert_enabled=payload.enabled)

backend/app/routers/groups.py

@@ -99,6 +99,9 @@ async def delete_group(group_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     for assignment in (port_forward_groups, one_to_one_groups, outbound_nat_groups):
         if await db.scalar(select(assignment.c.group_id).where(assignment.c.group_id == group_id).limit(1)):
             raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.GRUPPE_WIRD_NOCH_VON_NAT_REGELN_VERWENDET)
+    from app.models.rollout import rollout_wave_groups
+    if await db.scalar(select(rollout_wave_groups.c.group_id).where(rollout_wave_groups.c.group_id == group_id).limit(1)):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_GROUP_IN_USE)
     await db.delete(group)
     await db.commit()
 

backend/app/routers/gui_access.py

@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+"""Firewall GUI access through the gui-gateway container (1.27).
+
+Public API (session cookie, admin only, never API tokens):
+* POST /api/hosts/{id}/gui-ticket — one-time ticket + the slot URL the browser opens (noopener).
+* GET/PUT /api/settings/gui-access — switch, idle/absolute timeout, number of slots.
+
+Internal API for the gateway only (NOT under /api, so the proxy never forwards it; shared secret
+GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN in the X-Onx-Gateway-Token header, compared in constant time):
+* POST /internal/gui/redeem, /internal/gui/revalidate, /internal/gui/end.
+The answers never contain firewall credentials: only the firewall origin, its pinned (public) CA
+certificate, the overlay proxy address and the timeouts.
+"""
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Literal
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Header, HTTPException, Request, status
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field, model_validator
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.user import AdminUser
+from app.routers.auth import SECURE_COOKIE_NAME, current_user
+from app.services import api_token_service, gui_ticket_service as svc
+
+router = APIRouter(tags=["gui-access"])
+internal_router = APIRouter(prefix="/internal/gui", include_in_schema=False)
+
+
+def _require_admin_session(request: Request, user: AdminUser) -> None:
+    if getattr(request.state, "api_token", None) is not None or api_token_service.bearer_from_header(
+        request.headers.get("authorization", "")
+    ) is not None:
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, ErrorCode.GUI_SESSION_REQUIRED)
+    if user.role != "admin":
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, ErrorCode.ADMIN_REQUIRED)
+
+
+class GuiTicketRead(BaseModel):
+    url: str
+    slot: int
+    expires_in: int
+
+
+@router.post("/hosts/{host_id}/gui-ticket", response_model=GuiTicketRead)
+async def create_ticket(host_id: uuid.UUID, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+                        user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    _require_admin_session(request, user)
+    if not svc.gateway_configured():
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.GUI_GATEWAY_NOT_CONFIGURED)
+    session_cookie = request.cookies.get(SECURE_COOKIE_NAME, "")
+    if not settings.cookie_secure or not session_cookie:
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.GUI_REQUIRES_HTTPS)
+    row = await svc.get_settings(db)
+    if not row.enabled:
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.GUI_ACCESS_DISABLED)
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    refusal = svc.host_refusal(host)
+    if refusal:
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.GUI_HOST_NOT_ELIGIBLE, reason=refusal)
+    try:
+        return await svc.issue_ticket(db, user=user, session_token=session_cookie, host=host,
+                                      request_host=request.headers.get("host", ""))
+    except svc.GuiAccessError as exc:
+        raise api_error(exc.status, exc.code, **exc.params)
+
+
+class GuiAccessSettingsRead(BaseModel):
+    enabled: bool
+    idle_timeout_minutes: int
+    absolute_timeout_minutes: int
+    slot_count: int
+    available: bool
+    unavailable_reasons: list[str]
+    slots: list[int]
+    updated_by: str | None
+    updated_at: datetime | None
+
+
+class GuiAccessSettingsUpdate(BaseModel):
+    enabled: bool
+    idle_timeout_minutes: int = Field(ge=1, le=240)
+    absolute_timeout_minutes: int = Field(ge=5, le=720)
+    slot_count: int = Field(ge=1, le=svc.MAX_SLOTS)
+
+    @model_validator(mode="after")
+    def _idle_within_absolute(self):
+        if self.idle_timeout_minutes > self.absolute_timeout_minutes:
+            raise ValueError("idle_timeout_minutes must not exceed absolute_timeout_minutes")
+        return self
+
+
+def _settings_read(row) -> dict:
+    reasons = svc.unavailable_reasons()
+    return {"enabled": row.enabled, "idle_timeout_minutes": row.idle_timeout_minutes,
+            "absolute_timeout_minutes": row.absolute_timeout_minutes, "slot_count": row.slot_count,
+            "available": not reasons, "unavailable_reasons": reasons, "slots": svc.active_slots(row),
+            "updated_by": row.updated_by, "updated_at": row.updated_at}
+
+
+@router.get("/settings/gui-access", response_model=GuiAccessSettingsRead)
+async def read_settings(request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    _require_admin_session(request, user)
+    row = await svc.get_settings(db)
+    await db.commit()
+    return _settings_read(row)
+
+
+@router.put("/settings/gui-access", response_model=GuiAccessSettingsRead)
+async def update_settings(payload: GuiAccessSettingsUpdate, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+                          user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    _require_admin_session(request, user)
+    if payload.enabled and svc.unavailable_reasons():
+        # Never switchable on without HTTPS cookies and a configured gateway.
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.GUI_GATEWAY_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+                        reasons=", ".join(svc.unavailable_reasons()))
+    row = await svc.get_settings(db)
+    row.enabled = payload.enabled
+    row.idle_timeout_minutes = payload.idle_timeout_minutes
+    row.absolute_timeout_minutes = payload.absolute_timeout_minutes
+    row.slot_count = payload.slot_count
+    row.updated_by = user.username
+    row.updated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    if not payload.enabled:
+        await svc.end_all(db, "disabled")
+    await db.commit()
+    return _settings_read(row)
+
+
+# ── internal: gateway only ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _gateway_auth(x_onx_gateway_token: str = Header(default="")) -> None:
+    expected = settings.gui_gateway_token
+    if len(expected) < svc.MIN_GATEWAY_TOKEN_LENGTH:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404)
+    # Fixed-length digests: the comparison time does not depend on the presented value.
+    if not hmac.compare_digest(hashlib.sha256(x_onx_gateway_token.encode()).digest(),
+                               hashlib.sha256(expected.encode()).digest()):
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=401)
+
+
+_HEX64 = r"^[0-9a-f]{64}$"
+
+
+class RedeemRequest(BaseModel):
+    ticket_hash: str = Field(pattern=_HEX64)
+    session_hash: str = Field(pattern=_HEX64)
+    slot: int = Field(ge=1, le=65535)
+    client_ip: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=45)
+
+
+class RevalidateRequest(BaseModel):
+    gui_session_id: uuid.UUID
+    session_hash: str = Field(pattern=_HEX64)
+    # Fingerprint of the target as handed out at redeem time (optional: an older gateway image omits it).
+    target_fp: str | None = Field(default=None, pattern=_HEX64)
+
+
+class EndRequest(BaseModel):
+    gui_session_id: uuid.UUID
+    session_hash: str = Field(pattern=_HEX64)
+    reason: Literal["idle", "absolute", "logout", "revoked", "superseded", "shutdown"]
+
+
+@internal_router.post("/redeem", dependencies=[Depends(_gateway_auth)])
+async def internal_redeem(payload: RedeemRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    result = await svc.redeem(db, ticket_hash=payload.ticket_hash, session_hash=payload.session_hash,
+                              slot=payload.slot, client_ip=payload.client_ip)
+    if not result["ok"]:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail={"ok": False, "reason": result["reason"]})
+    return result
+
+
+@internal_router.post("/revalidate", dependencies=[Depends(_gateway_auth)])
+async def internal_revalidate(payload: RevalidateRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await svc.revalidate(db, gui_session_id=payload.gui_session_id, session_hash=payload.session_hash,
+                                 target_fp=payload.target_fp)
+
+
+@internal_router.post("/end", dependencies=[Depends(_gateway_auth)])
+async def internal_end(payload: EndRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return {"ok": await svc.end(db, gui_session_id=payload.gui_session_id, session_hash=payload.session_hash,
+                                reason=payload.reason)}

backend/app/routers/hosts.py

@@ -226,6 +226,12 @@ async def delete_host(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     draft_certs = (await db.scalars(select(ManagedCertificate.id).where(ManagedCertificate.host_id == host_id))).all()
     draft_accounts = (await db.scalars(select(AcmeAccount.id).where(AcmeAccount.host_id == host_id))).all()
     await db.delete(host)
+    # Gateway alert switches of this host would otherwise stay in the settings forever (and count against the limit).
+    from app.services import notification_settings_service
+    settings_row = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    prefix = f"{host_id}:"
+    if any(str(m).startswith(prefix) for m in settings_row.gateway_alert_muted or []):
+        settings_row.gateway_alert_muted = [m for m in settings_row.gateway_alert_muted if not str(m).startswith(prefix)]
     await db.commit()
     opnsense_secret_store.delete_secret(host_id)
     for cert_id in draft_certs:

backend/app/routers/maintenance_windows.py

@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+"""Recurring maintenance windows and their exceptions (1.25).
+
+Every write here counts as a rollout action (api_token_service.is_rollout): a window decides WHEN
+unattended firmware actions may run, so an operator needs the same right as for deploying.
+"""
+import re
+import uuid
+from datetime import date, datetime, time, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Literal
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Query, Request
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.maintenance_window import MaintenanceWindow, MaintenanceWindowException
+from app.services import audit_service, window_service
+from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/maintenance-windows", tags=["maintenance-windows"])
+
+_TIME = re.compile(r"^([01]\d|2[0-3]):([0-5]\d)$")
+
+
+class WindowIn(BaseModel):
+    name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    timezone: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+    recurrence: Literal["weekly", "monthly"]
+    weekdays: list[int] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=7)
+    month_mode: Literal["nth_weekday", "day"] | None = None
+    month_nth: int | None = None
+    month_weekday: int | None = None
+    month_day: int | None = None
+    start_time: str
+    duration_minutes: int = Field(ge=15, le=window_service.MAX_DURATION_MINUTES)
+    start_cutoff_minutes: int = Field(default=60, ge=5, le=window_service.MAX_DURATION_MINUTES)
+    enabled: bool = True
+
+
+class ExceptionIn(BaseModel):
+    occurrence_date: date
+    kind: Literal["skip", "move"]
+    moved_start: datetime | None = None
+    reason: str = Field(default="", max_length=300)
+
+
+def _invalid(field: str):
+    return api_error(422, ErrorCode.WINDOW_INVALID, field=field)
+
+
+def _validated(payload: WindowIn) -> dict:
+    name = payload.name.strip()
+    if not name:
+        raise _invalid("name")
+    if not window_service.valid_timezone(payload.timezone):
+        raise _invalid("timezone")
+    match = _TIME.match(payload.start_time)
+    if not match:
+        raise _invalid("start_time")
+    values = {
+        "name": name, "timezone": payload.timezone, "recurrence": payload.recurrence,
+        "weekdays": [], "month_mode": None, "month_nth": None, "month_weekday": None, "month_day": None,
+        "start_time": time(int(match.group(1)), int(match.group(2))),
+        "duration_minutes": payload.duration_minutes,
+        "start_cutoff_minutes": min(payload.start_cutoff_minutes, payload.duration_minutes),
+        "enabled": payload.enabled,
+    }
+    if payload.recurrence == "weekly":
+        days = sorted(set(payload.weekdays))
+        if not days or any(d < 0 or d > 6 for d in days):
+            raise _invalid("weekdays")
+        values["weekdays"] = days
+    elif payload.month_mode == "day":
+        if payload.month_day is None or not 1 <= payload.month_day <= 28:
+            raise _invalid("month_day")
+        values.update(month_mode="day", month_day=payload.month_day)
+    elif payload.month_mode == "nth_weekday":
+        if payload.month_nth not in (1, 2, 3, 4, -1):
+            raise _invalid("month_nth")
+        if payload.month_weekday is None or not 0 <= payload.month_weekday <= 6:
+            raise _invalid("month_weekday")
+        values.update(month_mode="nth_weekday", month_nth=payload.month_nth, month_weekday=payload.month_weekday)
+    else:
+        raise _invalid("month_mode")
+    return values
+
+
+async def _plans_using(db: AsyncSession, window_id) -> list[dict]:
+    from app.models.rollout import RolloutPlan
+    rows = (await db.scalars(select(RolloutPlan).where(RolloutPlan.window_id == window_id).order_by(RolloutPlan.name))).all()
+    return [{"id": str(p.id), "name": p.name, "auto_start": p.auto_start, "active": p.activated_at is not None} for p in rows]
+
+
+def read_window(window: MaintenanceWindow, *, now: datetime | None = None, count: int = 5) -> dict:
+    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    return {
+        "id": str(window.id), "name": window.name, "timezone": window.timezone, "recurrence": window.recurrence,
+        "weekdays": window.weekdays or [], "month_mode": window.month_mode, "month_nth": window.month_nth,
+        "month_weekday": window.month_weekday, "month_day": window.month_day,
+        "start_time": window.start_time.strftime("%H:%M"), "duration_minutes": window.duration_minutes,
+        "start_cutoff_minutes": window.start_cutoff_minutes, "enabled": window.enabled,
+        "created_by": window.created_by, "created_at": window.created_at,
+        "open_now": window_service.current(window, now) is not None,
+        "next": [o.as_dict() for o in window_service.occurrences(window, now, count, with_skipped=True)] if window.enabled else [],
+        "exceptions": [
+            {"id": str(e.id), "occurrence_date": e.occurrence_date.isoformat(), "kind": e.kind,
+             "moved_start": e.moved_start, "reason": e.reason, "actor": e.actor, "created_at": e.created_at}
+            for e in window.exceptions
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+async def _window_or_404(db: AsyncSession, window_id: uuid.UUID) -> MaintenanceWindow:
+    window = await db.get(MaintenanceWindow, window_id)
+    if window is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.WINDOW_NOT_FOUND)
+    return window
+
+
+async def _name_taken(db: AsyncSession, name: str, own_id=None) -> bool:
+    other = await db.scalar(select(MaintenanceWindow.id).where(MaintenanceWindow.name == name))
+    return other is not None and other != own_id
+
+
+@router.get("")
+async def list_windows(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    rows = (await db.scalars(select(MaintenanceWindow).order_by(MaintenanceWindow.name))).all()
+    result = []
+    for w in rows:
+        item = read_window(w)
+        item["used_by"] = await _plans_using(db, w.id)
+        result.append(item)
+    return result
+
+
+@router.post("", status_code=201)
+async def create_window(payload: WindowIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    values = _validated(payload)
+    if await _name_taken(db, values["name"]):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.WINDOW_NAME_TAKEN)
+    window = MaintenanceWindow(**values, created_by=request.state.user.username, created_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+    window.exceptions = []
+    db.add(window)
+    await db.commit()
+    item = read_window(await _window_or_404(db, window.id))
+    item["used_by"] = []
+    return item
+
+
+@router.get("/{window_id}")
+async def get_window(window_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    item = read_window(await _window_or_404(db, window_id))
+    item["used_by"] = await _plans_using(db, window_id)
+    return item
+
+
+@router.put("/{window_id}")
+async def update_window(window_id: uuid.UUID, payload: WindowIn, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Changing a window changes the fingerprint of every plan that uses it, so an activated
+    automatic start stops until the plan is activated again (see rollout_service.fingerprint)."""
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    window = await _window_or_404(db, window_id)
+    values = _validated(payload)
+    if await _name_taken(db, values["name"], window.id):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.WINDOW_NAME_TAKEN)
+    for key, value in values.items():
+        setattr(window, key, value)
+    await db.commit()
+    item = read_window(await _window_or_404(db, window_id))
+    item["used_by"] = await _plans_using(db, window_id)
+    return item
+
+
+@router.delete("/{window_id}", status_code=204)
+async def delete_window(window_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    window = await _window_or_404(db, window_id)
+    # A plan without a window means "no time limit": deleting its window must never turn it into one.
+    if await _plans_using(db, window_id):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.WINDOW_IN_USE)
+    await db.delete(window)
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+@router.get("/{window_id}/occurrences")
+async def window_occurrences(window_id: uuid.UUID, count: int = Query(10, ge=1, le=50), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    window = await _window_or_404(db, window_id)
+    return [o.as_dict() for o in window_service.occurrences(window, datetime.now(timezone.utc), count, with_skipped=True)]
+
+
+@router.post("/{window_id}/exceptions", status_code=201)
+async def add_exception(window_id: uuid.UUID, payload: ExceptionIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    window = await _window_or_404(db, window_id)
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    if not window_service.is_occurrence_date(window, payload.occurrence_date):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_INVALID, field="occurrence_date")
+    # Only future occurrences (or the one open now) can be changed; history stays as it was.
+    if window_service.local_start(window, payload.occurrence_date) + timedelta(minutes=window.duration_minutes) <= now:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_INVALID, field="occurrence_date")
+    moved = None
+    if payload.kind == "move":
+        if payload.moved_start is None:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_INVALID, field="moved_start")
+        moved = payload.moved_start if payload.moved_start.tzinfo else payload.moved_start.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+        if moved <= now:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_INVALID, field="moved_start")
+    if any(e.occurrence_date == payload.occurrence_date for e in window.exceptions):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_EXISTS)
+    exc = MaintenanceWindowException(
+        window_id=window.id, occurrence_date=payload.occurrence_date, kind=payload.kind, moved_start=moved,
+        reason=payload.reason.strip(), actor=request.state.user.username, created_at=now,
+    )
+    db.add(exc)
+    try:
+        await db.commit()
+    except IntegrityError:
+        await db.rollback()
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_EXISTS)
+    await audit_service.persist(
+        kind="maintenance_window", action=f"exception_{payload.kind}", status="saved", entity_id=str(window.id),
+        entity_name=window.name, details={"occurrence_date": payload.occurrence_date.isoformat(),
+                                          "moved_start": moved.isoformat() if moved else None, "reason": exc.reason},
+    )
+    db.expire_all()
+    return read_window(await _window_or_404(db, window_id))
+
+
+@router.delete("/{window_id}/exceptions/{exception_id}")
+async def delete_exception(window_id: uuid.UUID, exception_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    window = await _window_or_404(db, window_id)
+    exc = await db.get(MaintenanceWindowException, exception_id)
+    if exc is None or exc.window_id != window.id:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.WINDOW_EXCEPTION_NOT_FOUND)
+    await db.delete(exc)
+    await db.commit()
+    db.expire_all()
+    return read_window(await _window_or_404(db, window_id))
+

backend/app/routers/mcp.py

@@ -88,6 +88,48 @@ TOOLS = [
         "path": "/api/search",
         "query": ("q",),
     },
+    {
+        "name": "rule_match",
+        "description": "Which firewall rule decides a packet (first packet of a new connection), per firewall, "
+                       "with the verdict (pass/block/reject), the deciding rule and an honest confidence "
+                       "(sure/probable/unknown plus reason codes). Reads only; nothing is changed.",
+        "inputSchema": {
+            "type": "object", "required": ["src", "dst"],
+            "properties": {
+                "src": {"type": "string", "description": "source IP address"},
+                "dst": {"type": "string", "description": "destination IP address"},
+                "proto": {"type": "string", "description": "tcp, udp, icmp, ipv6-icmp or a protocol number", "default": "tcp"},
+                "dport": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 65535},
+                "sport": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 65535, "description": "default: any ephemeral port"},
+                "icmptype": {"type": "string", "description": "e.g. echoreq or 8"},
+                "iface": {"type": "string", "description": "ingress interface identifier (e.g. lan); default: guessed per firewall"},
+                "egress": {"type": "string", "description": "also check the outgoing side: auto or an interface identifier"},
+                "host_ids": {"type": "string", "description": "comma separated firewall ids (default: all)"},
+                "group_id": {"type": "string", "description": "device group id instead of host_ids"},
+            },
+        },
+        "path": "/api/rule-analysis/match",
+        "query": ("src", "dst", "proto", "dport", "sport", "icmptype", "iface", "egress", "host_ids", "group_id"),
+        # The per-rule trace is for the UI; the verdict, deciding rule and reasons are what matters here.
+        "drop": ("trace",),
+    },
+    {
+        "name": "rule_cleanup_candidates",
+        "description": "Cleanup candidates of one firewall: rules that are unused (no hit for N days), shadowed or "
+                       "duplicate (an earlier quick rule already decides everything they match), or disabled for a "
+                       "long time. Each with its confidence (sure/probable/unknown), the last observed hit and "
+                       "whether it could be removed (not for automatic, legacy or OPNexus-managed rules). Reads only.",
+        "inputSchema": {
+            "type": "object", "required": ["host_id"],
+            "properties": {
+                "host_id": {"type": "string", "description": "Firewall id from list_hosts"},
+                "unused_days": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 3650, "default": 30,
+                                "description": "observation window for unused / disabled rules"},
+            },
+        },
+        "path": "/api/hosts/{host_id}/rule-analysis/cleanup",
+        "query": ("unused_days",),
+    },
     {
         "name": "api_get",
         "description": "Read any other OPNexus API endpoint (GET only), e.g. /api/rules, /api/aliases, /api/logs. "

backend/app/routers/notifications.py

@@ -1,21 +1,26 @@
+import uuid
 from urllib.parse import urlsplit
 
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Query
 from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
 from app.database import get_db
 from app.models.user import AdminUser
 from app.routers.auth import current_user
-from app.models.notification import NotificationProblem
+from app.models.notification import NotificationChannel, NotificationProblem
 from app.schemas.notification import (
+    NotificationChannelCreate,
+    NotificationChannelRead,
+    NotificationChannelUpdate,
     NotificationProblemRead,
     NotificationSettingsRead,
     NotificationSettingsUpdate,
     TestNotificationRequest,
 )
-from app.services import notification_delivery, notification_settings_service
+from app.services import notification_channels, notification_delivery, notification_secret_store, notification_settings_service, url_guard
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/notifications", tags=["notifications"])
 
@@ -43,6 +48,11 @@ async def read_settings(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = De
 
 @router.put("/settings", response_model=NotificationSettingsRead)
 async def update_settings(payload: NotificationSettingsUpdate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    if payload.webhook_url:
+        try:
+            payload.webhook_url = url_guard.validate_url(payload.webhook_url)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NOTIFICATION_WEBHOOK_URL_INVALID, reason=str(exc)) from None
     return await notification_settings_service.update_settings(db, payload)
 
 
@@ -79,3 +89,103 @@ async def test_notification(payload: TestNotificationRequest, db: AsyncSession =
     except notification_delivery.NotificationDeliveryError as exc:
         raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
     return {"success": True}
+
+
+# ── Additional channels (ntfy, Gotify, Telegram, Teams, Matrix) ────────────────
+
+def _channel_read(row: NotificationChannel, user: AdminUser) -> NotificationChannelRead:
+    read = NotificationChannelRead.model_validate(row)
+    # An ntfy topic or a chat id is as good as a password for whoever knows it: only admins see the settings.
+    return read if user.role == "admin" else read.model_copy(update={"config": {}})
+
+
+async def _get_channel(db: AsyncSession, channel_id: uuid.UUID) -> NotificationChannel:
+    row = await db.get(NotificationChannel, channel_id)
+    if row is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NOT_FOUND)
+    return row
+
+
+def _invalid(exc: ValueError):
+    return api_error(422, ErrorCode.NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_INVALID, reason=str(exc))
+
+
+@router.get("/channels", response_model=list[NotificationChannelRead])
+async def list_channels(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    rows = await db.scalars(select(NotificationChannel).order_by(NotificationChannel.name))
+    return [_channel_read(r, user) for r in rows.all()]
+
+
+@router.post("/channels", response_model=NotificationChannelRead, status_code=201)
+async def create_channel(payload: NotificationChannelCreate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    try:
+        config = notification_channels.clean_config(payload.channel_type, payload.config)
+        secret = notification_channels.clean_secret(payload.channel_type, payload.secret) if payload.secret else None
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise _invalid(exc) from None
+    row = NotificationChannel(
+        name=payload.name.strip(), channel_type=payload.channel_type, enabled=payload.enabled, config=config,
+        secret_set=secret is not None,
+    )
+    row.id = uuid.uuid4()
+    if secret is None and notification_channels.missing_requirements(row) == "Zugangsdaten fehlen":
+        raise _invalid(ValueError("Zugangsdaten fehlen"))
+    db.add(row)
+    try:
+        await db.flush()
+    except IntegrityError:
+        await db.rollback()
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NAME_TAKEN) from None
+    if secret is not None:
+        notification_secret_store.save_secret(notification_channels.secret_name(row.id), secret)
+    await db.commit()
+    return _channel_read(row, user)
+
+
+@router.put("/channels/{channel_id}", response_model=NotificationChannelRead)
+async def update_channel(
+    channel_id: uuid.UUID, payload: NotificationChannelUpdate,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user),
+):
+    row = await _get_channel(db, channel_id)
+    try:
+        if payload.config is not None:
+            row.config = notification_channels.clean_config(row.channel_type, payload.config)
+        new_secret = notification_channels.clean_secret(row.channel_type, payload.secret) if payload.secret else None
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise _invalid(exc) from None
+    if payload.name is not None:
+        row.name = payload.name.strip()
+    if payload.enabled is not None:
+        row.enabled = payload.enabled
+    if payload.clear_secret:
+        notification_secret_store.delete_secret(notification_channels.secret_name(row.id))
+        row.secret_set = False
+    elif new_secret is not None:
+        notification_secret_store.save_secret(notification_channels.secret_name(row.id), new_secret)
+        row.secret_set = True
+    try:
+        await db.commit()
+    except IntegrityError:
+        await db.rollback()
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_NAME_TAKEN) from None
+    return _channel_read(row, user)
+
+
+@router.delete("/channels/{channel_id}", status_code=204)
+async def delete_channel(channel_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    row = await _get_channel(db, channel_id)
+    notification_secret_store.delete_secret(notification_channels.secret_name(row.id))
+    await db.delete(row)
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+@router.post("/channels/{channel_id}/test")
+async def test_channel(channel_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    row = await _get_channel(db, channel_id)
+    try:
+        await notification_channels.send_test(row)
+    except notification_delivery.NotificationDeliveryError as exc:
+        # The text names the channel and the HTTP status; it never contains a URL or a token.
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.NOTIFICATION_CHANNEL_TEST_FAILED, reason=str(exc)) from None
+    return {"success": True}

backend/app/routers/oidc.py

@@ -22,6 +22,28 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 router = APIRouter(tags=["oidc"])
 CALLBACK_PATH = "/api/auth/oidc/callback"
 STATE_COOKIE = "opnexus-oidc-state"
+# HTTPS deployments (1.29): __Host- (Secure, no Domain, Path=/) so that no sibling SUBDOMAIN or plain-HTTP page can
+# plant a state cookie of its own (login CSRF with the attacker's own authorisation). Known limit: cookies are not
+# separated by PORT, so script in a firewall GUI shown on a gateway slot port of the same host could still set it
+# (BACKLOG S8, accepted: needs a compromised firewall GUI and a mapped IdP account; the real fix is one hostname
+# per slot). The browser only accepts the prefix with Path=/, so the cookie travels with every request for its
+# 10 minutes; plain-HTTP labs keep the narrow path.
+SECURE_STATE_COOKIE = "__Host-opnexus-oidc-state"
+STATE_COOKIE_PATH = "/api/auth/oidc"
+
+
+def state_cookie_name() -> str:
+    return SECURE_STATE_COOKIE if settings.cookie_secure else STATE_COOKIE
+
+
+def _state_cookie_path() -> str:
+    return "/" if settings.cookie_secure else STATE_COOKIE_PATH
+
+
+def _clear_state_cookie(response) -> None:
+    response.delete_cookie(state_cookie_name(), path=_state_cookie_path(), secure=settings.cookie_secure, httponly=True, samesite="lax")
+    if settings.cookie_secure:  # a plain-name cookie of an earlier version
+        response.delete_cookie(STATE_COOKIE, path=STATE_COOKIE_PATH, secure=True, httponly=True, samesite="lax")
 # SSO sessions are short: the provider's group membership is only re-checked at login, so a removed person
 # must not keep a 30-day session.
 SSO_SESSION_SECONDS = 12 * 3600
@@ -29,7 +51,7 @@ SSO_SESSION_SECONDS = 12 * 3600
 
 def _login_error(code: str) -> RedirectResponse:
     response = RedirectResponse(f"/login?sso_error={code}", status_code=302)
-    response.delete_cookie(STATE_COOKIE, path="/api/auth/oidc")
+    _clear_state_cookie(response)
     return response
 
 
@@ -63,7 +85,8 @@ async def start(request: Request, origin: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db
     response = RedirectResponse(url, status_code=302)
     # Binds the attempt to THIS browser: a callback URL handed to somebody else (login CSRF) or a captured
     # code+state pair is useless without the cookie.
-    response.set_cookie(STATE_COOKIE, state, max_age=600, httponly=True, samesite="lax", secure=settings.cookie_secure, path="/api/auth/oidc")
+    response.set_cookie(state_cookie_name(), state, max_age=600, httponly=True, samesite="lax", secure=settings.cookie_secure,
+                        path=_state_cookie_path())
     return response
 
 
@@ -78,7 +101,9 @@ async def callback(request: Request, code: str = "", state: str = "", error: str
     try:
         if error or not code or not state:
             raise oidc_service.OidcError("provider", "Anbieter meldet " + (_printable(error) if error else "keinen Code"))
-        if not secrets.compare_digest(request.cookies.get(STATE_COOKIE, ""), state):
+        # Only the cookie name of this deployment counts (on HTTPS never the plain one); no cookie never matches.
+        bound = request.cookies.get(state_cookie_name(), "")
+        if not bound or not secrets.compare_digest(bound.encode(), state.encode()):
             raise oidc_service.OidcError("state", "Der Anmeldeversuch gehört nicht zu diesem Browser")
         user = await oidc_service.complete(db, cfg, code, state)
     except oidc_service.OidcError as exc:
@@ -92,7 +117,7 @@ async def callback(request: Request, code: str = "", state: str = "", error: str
     )
     response = RedirectResponse("/dashboard", status_code=302)
     _set_session_cookie(response, token, max_age=SSO_SESSION_SECONDS)
-    response.delete_cookie(STATE_COOKIE, path="/api/auth/oidc")
+    _clear_state_cookie(response)
     logger.info("SSO-Anmeldung von '%s' (%s) aus %s", user.username, user.role, ip)
     return response
 

backend/app/routers/one_to_one.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ from app.services.interface_service import check_interface_consistency
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.one_to_one_deploy_service import confirm_one_to_one, deploy_one_to_one, undeploy_one_to_one, revert_deployment
 from app.services.policy_hierarchy_target_service import hydrate_hierarchy_targets, validate_hierarchy_group
+from app.routers.adopt_routes import add_adopt_routes
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/one-to-one", tags=["one-to-one"])
 
@@ -79,6 +80,9 @@ def _to_read(rule: OneToOneRule, hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], deployments: list[On
     )
 
 
+add_adopt_routes(router, kind="one_to_one", model=OneToOneRule, load_options=_load_options, to_read=_to_read, read_model=OneToOneRead)
+
+
 @router.get("", response_model=list[OneToOneRead])
 async def list_one_to_one_rules(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     result = await db.execute(select(OneToOneRule).options(*_load_options()))

backend/app/routers/outbound_nat.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from app.services.interface_service import check_interface_consistency
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.outbound_nat_deploy_service import confirm_outbound_nat, deploy_outbound_nat, undeploy_outbound_nat, revert_deployment
 from app.services.policy_hierarchy_target_service import hydrate_hierarchy_targets, validate_hierarchy_group
+from app.routers.adopt_routes import add_adopt_routes
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/outbound-nat", tags=["outbound-nat"])
 
@@ -82,6 +83,9 @@ def _to_read(rule: OutboundNatRule, hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], deployments: list
     )
 
 
+add_adopt_routes(router, kind="outbound_nat", model=OutboundNatRule, load_options=_load_options, to_read=_to_read, read_model=OutboundNatRead)
+
+
 @router.get("", response_model=list[OutboundNatRead])
 async def list_outbound_nat_rules(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     result = await db.execute(select(OutboundNatRule).options(*_load_options()))

backend/app/routers/port_forward.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ from app.services.interface_service import check_interface_consistency
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.port_forward_deploy_service import confirm_port_forward, deploy_port_forward, undeploy_port_forward, revert_deployment
 from app.services.policy_hierarchy_target_service import hydrate_hierarchy_targets, validate_hierarchy_group
+from app.routers.adopt_routes import add_adopt_routes
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/port-forward", tags=["port-forward"])
 
@@ -80,6 +81,9 @@ def _to_read(rule: PortForwardRule, hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], deployments: list
     )
 
 
+add_adopt_routes(router, kind="port_forward", model=PortForwardRule, load_options=_load_options, to_read=_to_read, read_model=PortForwardRead)
+
+
 @router.get("", response_model=list[PortForwardRead])
 async def list_port_forward_rules(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     result = await db.execute(select(PortForwardRule).options(*_load_options()))

backend/app/routers/rollouts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+"""Firmware rollouts in waves (1.25): plans and runs.
+
+Roles (enforced in AuthMiddleware, see api_token_service.is_rollout): everybody signed in reads;
+operators prepare plans; starting/activating a plan and resuming/approving/skipping/aborting a run
+need the deploy right (admin, or operator while operators may deploy). Pausing is deliberately NOT
+a rollout action: anybody who may write at all may always brake.
+"""
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Literal
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.maintenance_window import MaintenanceWindow
+from app.models.policy import DeviceGroup
+from app.models.rollout import RolloutPlan, RolloutPlanWave, RolloutRun
+from app.models.scheduled_maintenance import ScheduledMaintenance
+from app.services import audit_service, rollout_engine, rollout_health, rollout_service
+from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/rollouts", tags=["rollouts"])
+
+ACTIVE_RUN = rollout_engine.ACTIVE
+
+
+class WaveIn(BaseModel):
+    label: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=60)
+    group_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(min_length=1, max_length=20)
+    soak_minutes: int = Field(default=30, ge=0, le=rollout_service.MAX_SOAK_MINUTES)
+    carp_handover: bool = False
+    require_approval: bool = False
+
+
+class PlanIn(BaseModel):
+    name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    description: str = Field(default="", max_length=2000)
+    action: Literal["update", "major_update"] = "update"
+    window_id: uuid.UUID | None = None
+    auto_start: bool = False
+    gate_checks: dict[str, bool] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+    compliance_mode: Literal["warn", "fail"] = "warn"
+    waves: list[WaveIn] = Field(min_length=1, max_length=rollout_service.MAX_WAVES)
+
+
+class TokenIn(BaseModel):
+    preview_token: str = Field(min_length=64, max_length=64)
+
+
+async def _plan_or_404(db: AsyncSession, plan_id: uuid.UUID) -> RolloutPlan:
+    plan = await rollout_service.load_plan(db, plan_id)
+    if plan is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_PLAN_NOT_FOUND)
+    return plan
+
+
+async def read_plan(db: AsyncSession, plan: RolloutPlan, resolved: dict | None = None) -> dict:
+    resolved = resolved or await rollout_service.resolve(db, plan)
+    active = plan.activated_at is not None
+    last_run = await db.scalar(select(RolloutRun).where(RolloutRun.plan_id == plan.id).order_by(RolloutRun.created_at.desc()).limit(1))
+    return {
+        **rollout_service.definition(plan),
+        "description": plan.description,
+        "waves": [{"id": str(w.id), "position": w.position, "label": w.label, "soak_minutes": w.soak_minutes,
+                   "carp_handover": w.carp_handover, "require_approval": w.require_approval,
+                   "group_ids": [str(g.id) for g in w.groups], "groups": [g.name for g in w.groups],
+                   "host_count": len(resolved["waves"][i]["hosts"]) if i < len(resolved["waves"]) else 0}
+                  for i, w in enumerate(plan.waves)],
+        "active": active, "activated_by": plan.activated_by, "activated_at": plan.activated_at,
+        # Activated but the plan, its groups or its window changed since: the automatic start is held back.
+        "fingerprint_ok": (not active) or plan.activated_fingerprint == rollout_service.fingerprint(plan, resolved),
+        "auto_start_error": plan.auto_start_error,
+        "window": resolved["window"], "errors": resolved["errors"], "warnings": resolved["warnings"],
+        "host_count": sum(len(w["hosts"]) for w in resolved["waves"]),
+        "last_run": {"id": str(last_run.id), "status": last_run.status, "created_at": last_run.created_at} if last_run else None,
+        "created_by": plan.created_by, "created_at": plan.created_at, "updated_at": plan.updated_at,
+    }
+
+
+async def _apply(db: AsyncSession, plan: RolloutPlan, payload: PlanIn) -> None:
+    name = payload.name.strip()
+    if not name:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_INVALID, field="name")
+    other = await db.scalar(select(RolloutPlan.id).where(RolloutPlan.name == name))
+    if other is not None and other != plan.id:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_NAME_TAKEN)
+    if payload.window_id is not None and await db.get(MaintenanceWindow, payload.window_id) is None:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_INVALID, field="window_id")
+    if any(k not in rollout_health.CHECKS for k in payload.gate_checks):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_INVALID, field="gate_checks")
+    wanted = {g for w in payload.waves for g in w.group_ids}
+    groups = {g.id: g for g in (await db.scalars(select(DeviceGroup).where(DeviceGroup.id.in_(wanted)))).all()}
+    if len(groups) != len(wanted):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_INVALID, field="group_ids")
+    plan.name, plan.description, plan.action = name, payload.description.strip(), payload.action
+    plan.window_id, plan.auto_start = payload.window_id, payload.auto_start
+    plan.gate_checks = {k: bool(v) for k, v in payload.gate_checks.items()}
+    plan.compliance_mode = payload.compliance_mode
+    plan.waves = [
+        RolloutPlanWave(position=i, label=w.label.strip() or f"{i + 1}", soak_minutes=w.soak_minutes, carp_handover=w.carp_handover,
+                        require_approval=w.require_approval, groups=[groups[g] for g in dict.fromkeys(w.group_ids)])
+        for i, w in enumerate(payload.waves)
+    ]
+    # Any edit disarms the automatic start: an operator cannot quietly change what an admin activated.
+    plan.activated_at = plan.activated_by = plan.activated_by_id = plan.activated_fingerprint = None
+    plan.auto_start_error = None
+
+
+@router.get("/plans")
+async def list_plans(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    plans = (await db.scalars(select(RolloutPlan).order_by(RolloutPlan.name))).all()
+    return [await read_plan(db, p) for p in plans]
+
+
+@router.post("/plans", status_code=201)
+async def create_plan(payload: PlanIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    plan = RolloutPlan(created_by=request.state.user.username, created_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc), waves=[])
+    await _apply(db, plan, payload)
+    db.add(plan)
+    await db.commit()
+    return await read_plan(db, await _plan_or_404(db, plan.id))
+
+
+@router.get("/plans/{plan_id}")
+async def get_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await read_plan(db, await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id))
+
+
+@router.put("/plans/{plan_id}")
+async def update_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, payload: PlanIn, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    plan = await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id)
+    was_active = plan.activated_at is not None
+    await _apply(db, plan, payload)
+    await db.commit()
+    if was_active:
+        await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action="deactivate", status="completed", entity_id=str(plan.id),
+                                    entity_name=plan.name, message="Plan geändert: automatischer Start deaktiviert")
+    return await read_plan(db, await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id))
+
+
+@router.delete("/plans/{plan_id}", status_code=204)
+async def delete_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    plan = await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id)
+    if await db.scalar(select(RolloutRun.id).where(RolloutRun.plan_id == plan.id, RolloutRun.status.in_(ACTIVE_RUN)).limit(1)):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_PLAN_BUSY)
+    await db.delete(plan)
+    await db.commit()
+
+
+@router.post("/plans/{plan_id}/preview")
+async def preview_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    plan = await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id)
+    resolved = await rollout_service.resolve(db, plan)
+    return {**resolved, "preview_token": rollout_service.fingerprint(plan, resolved),
+            "can_start": not resolved["errors"], "plan": await read_plan(db, plan, resolved)}
+
+
+async def _checked_token(db: AsyncSession, plan: RolloutPlan, token: str) -> tuple[dict, str]:
+    resolved = await rollout_service.resolve(db, plan)
+    current = rollout_service.fingerprint(plan, resolved)
+    if token != current:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_PREVIEW_STALE)
+    if resolved["errors"]:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_PLAN_INVALID, reason=resolved["errors"][0]["code"])
+    return resolved, current
+
+
+@router.post("/plans/{plan_id}/activate")
+async def activate_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, payload: TokenIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    plan = await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id)
+    if not plan.auto_start:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_INVALID, field="auto_start")
+    _resolved, current = await _checked_token(db, plan, payload.preview_token)
+    plan.activated_by, plan.activated_at, plan.activated_fingerprint = request.state.user.username, datetime.now(timezone.utc), current
+    plan.activated_by_id = request.state.user.id
+    plan.auto_start_error = None
+    await db.commit()
+    await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action="activate", status="completed", entity_id=str(plan.id),
+                                entity_name=plan.name, details={"fingerprint": current})
+    return await read_plan(db, await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id))
+
+
+@router.post("/plans/{plan_id}/deactivate")
+async def deactivate_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    plan = await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id)
+    plan.activated_by = plan.activated_by_id = plan.activated_at = plan.activated_fingerprint = None
+    await db.commit()
+    await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action="deactivate", status="completed", entity_id=str(plan.id), entity_name=plan.name)
+    return await read_plan(db, await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id))
+
+
+# ── runs ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+class StartIn(TokenIn):
+    confirm_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    acknowledge_unattended: Literal[True]
+
+
+class ReasonIn(BaseModel):
+    reason: str = Field(default="", max_length=500)
+
+
+class SkipIn(BaseModel):
+    host_id: uuid.UUID
+    reason: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=500)
+
+
+class AbortIn(BaseModel):
+    reason: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=500)
+    confirm_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
+
+
+def _read_run_summary(run: RolloutRun) -> dict:
+    counts: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for h in run.hosts:
+        counts[h.status] = counts.get(h.status, 0) + 1
+    return {
+        "id": str(run.id), "plan_id": str(run.plan_id) if run.plan_id else None, "plan_name": run.plan_name,
+        "action": run.action, "status": run.status, "paused_from": run.paused_from, "current_wave": run.current_wave,
+        "wave_count": len(run.waves), "current_wave_label": next((w.label for w in run.waves if w.index == run.current_wave), None),
+        "target_version": run.target_version, "pause_reason": run.pause_reason, "pause_detail": run.pause_detail,
+        "started_by": run.started_by, "trigger": run.trigger, "window_occurrence": run.window_occurrence,
+        "created_at": run.created_at, "finished_at": run.finished_at, "step_at": run.step_at, "host_counts": counts,
+        "active": run.status in rollout_engine.ACTIVE,
+    }
+
+
+async def read_run(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> dict:
+    scheds = {}
+    ids = [h.scheduled_maintenance_id for h in run.hosts if h.scheduled_maintenance_id]
+    if ids:
+        scheds = {s.id: s for s in (await db.scalars(select(ScheduledMaintenance).where(ScheduledMaintenance.id.in_(ids)))).all()}
+    soak_until = next((w.soak_until for w in run.waves if w.index == run.current_wave), None)
+    return {
+        **_read_run_summary(run),
+        "soak_until": soak_until, "progress": {k: v for k, v in (run.progress or {}).items()
+                                               if k in ("gate_recheck_at", "cluster_recheck_at", "blocked_since", "resume_gate",
+                                                        "cluster_gate", "preflight_started", "resume_recheck_at")},
+        "snapshot": run.plan_snapshot,
+        "waves": [{"index": w.index, "label": w.label, "status": w.status, "gate_result": w.gate_result,
+                   "gate_attempts": w.gate_attempts, "soak_until": w.soak_until, "approved_by": w.approved_by,
+                   "started_at": w.started_at, "finished_at": w.finished_at,
+                   "spec": run.plan_snapshot["waves"][w.index] if w.index < len(run.plan_snapshot.get("waves", [])) else None}
+                  for w in run.waves],
+        "hosts": [{"id": str(h.id), "host_id": str(h.host_id) if h.host_id else None, "host_name": h.host_name,
+                   "cluster_name": h.cluster_name, "wave_index": h.wave_index, "order": h.order, "status": h.status,
+                   "version_before": h.version_before, "version_after": h.version_after, "detail": h.detail,
+                   "started_at": h.started_at, "finished_at": h.finished_at,
+                   "schedule": ({"id": str(s.id), "status": s.status, "phase": s.phase, "carp_handover": s.carp_handover,
+                                 "host_operation_id": str(s.host_operation_id) if s.host_operation_id else None}
+                                if (s := scheds.get(h.scheduled_maintenance_id)) else None)}
+                  for h in sorted(run.hosts, key=lambda h: (h.wave_index, h.order, h.host_name))],
+    }
+
+
+async def _cancel_if_pending(db: AsyncSession, sched_id) -> bool:
+    """Cancel a host's schedule only if it has not fired. Locked: the poll loop may be firing it right now
+    (fire_due holds the row), and a blind write would turn a running action into "cancelled"."""
+    if sched_id is None:
+        return False
+    sched = await db.scalar(select(ScheduledMaintenance).where(ScheduledMaintenance.id == sched_id)
+                            .with_for_update().execution_options(populate_existing=True))
+    if sched is not None and sched.status == "pending":
+        sched.status = "cancelled"
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+async def _run_or_404(db: AsyncSession, run_id: uuid.UUID, *, lock: bool = False) -> RolloutRun:
+    stmt = select(RolloutRun).where(RolloutRun.id == run_id).execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+    if lock:
+        stmt = stmt.with_for_update()
+    run = await db.scalar(stmt)
+    if run is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_RUN_NOT_FOUND)
+    return run
+
+
+def _not_now(run: RolloutRun):
+    return api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_ACTION_NOT_ALLOWED, status=run.status)
+
+
+async def _done(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun, action: str, status: str, request: Request, **details) -> dict:
+    run.revision += 1
+    await db.commit()
+    await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action=action, status=status, entity_id=str(run.id), entity_name=run.plan_name,
+                                details={"wave": run.current_wave, **details})
+    return await read_run(db, await _run_or_404(db, run.id))
+
+
+@router.post("/plans/{plan_id}/start", status_code=201)
+async def start_plan(plan_id: uuid.UUID, payload: StartIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    plan = await _plan_or_404(db, plan_id)
+    if payload.confirm_name != plan.name:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_CONFIRM_NAME)
+    resolved, _token = await _checked_token(db, plan, payload.preview_token)
+    if (other := await rollout_engine.active_run(db)) is not None:
+        # One run at a time: two runs could otherwise touch the same cluster at once.
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_ALREADY_ACTIVE, plan=other.plan_name)
+    run = await rollout_engine.create_run(db, plan, resolved, started_by=request.state.user.username,
+                                          started_by_id=request.state.user.id, trigger="manual")
+    await db.commit()
+    await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action="start", status="started", entity_id=str(run.id), entity_name=plan.name,
+                                details={"trigger": "manual", "hosts": sum(len(w["hosts"]) for w in resolved["waves"]),
+                                         "waves": [w["label"] for w in resolved["waves"]]})
+    return await read_run(db, await _run_or_404(db, run.id))
+
+
+@router.get("/runs")
+async def list_runs(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    runs = (await db.scalars(select(RolloutRun).order_by(RolloutRun.created_at.desc()).limit(50))).all()
+    return [_read_run_summary(r) for r in runs]
+
+
+@router.get("/status")
+async def rollout_status(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """For /updates and the host pages: the active run and the hosts it still owns."""
+    run = await rollout_engine.active_run(db)
+    if run is None:
+        return {"active": None, "host_ids": [], "current_host_ids": []}
+    return {
+        "active": _read_run_summary(run),
+        "host_ids": [str(h.host_id) for h in run.hosts if h.host_id and h.status in ("queued", "blocked", "running", "verifying", "failed")],
+        "current_host_ids": [str(h.host_id) for h in run.hosts if h.host_id and h.wave_index == run.current_wave
+                             and h.status in ("queued", "blocked", "running", "verifying", "failed")],
+    }
+
+
+@router.get("/runs/{run_id}")
+async def get_run(run_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await read_run(db, await _run_or_404(db, run_id))
+
+
+@router.post("/runs/{run_id}/pause")
+async def pause_run(run_id: uuid.UUID, payload: ReasonIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    run = await _run_or_404(db, run_id, lock=True)
+    if run.status not in rollout_engine.ACTIVE or run.status == "paused":
+        raise _not_now(run)
+    # A brake that lets the next host fire anyway is no brake: a step not fired yet goes back to the queue.
+    requeued = [h.host_name for h in run.hosts if await rollout_engine.requeue_if_pending(db, h)]
+    rollout_engine.pause(run, "manual", by=request.state.user.username, text=payload.reason.strip()[:300])
+    return await _done(db, run, "pause", "paused", request, reason="manual", text=payload.reason.strip()[:300], requeued=requeued)
+
+
+@router.post("/runs/{run_id}/resume")
+async def resume_run(run_id: uuid.UUID, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    run = await _run_or_404(db, run_id, lock=True)
+    if run.status != "paused":
+        raise _not_now(run)
+    failed = [h.host_name for h in run.hosts if h.status == "failed"]
+    if failed:
+        # A failed host is never retried by itself: check it, then skip it explicitly.
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_HOST_FAILED, hosts=", ".join(failed))
+    previous = run.started_by
+    # Whoever resumes takes over the responsibility (and the permission check) from here on.
+    run.started_by, run.started_by_id = request.state.user.username, request.state.user.id
+    run.status = "resuming"
+    run.pause_reason = run.pause_detail = None
+    run.progress = {**(run.progress or {}), "resume_attempts": 0, "resume_recheck_at": None, "paused_at": None}
+    return await _done(db, run, "resume", "resuming", request, previous_owner=previous)
+
+
+@router.post("/runs/{run_id}/approve")
+async def approve_wave(run_id: uuid.UUID, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    run = await _run_or_404(db, run_id, lock=True)
+    if run.status != "awaiting_approval":
+        raise _not_now(run)
+    wave = rollout_engine.wave_row(run, run.current_wave)
+    wave.approved_by, wave.status = request.state.user.username, "preflight"
+    run.started_by, run.started_by_id = request.state.user.username, request.state.user.id
+    run.status = "preflight"
+    run.progress = {**(run.progress or {}), "preflight_started": None, "preflight_requested_at": None}
+    return await _done(db, run, "approve", "approved", request, wave_label=wave.label)
+
+
+@router.post("/runs/{run_id}/skip-host")
+async def skip_host(run_id: uuid.UUID, payload: SkipIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    run = await _run_or_404(db, run_id, lock=True)
+    if run.status not in rollout_engine.ACTIVE:
+        raise _not_now(run)
+    host = next((h for h in run.hosts if h.host_id == payload.host_id), None)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_HOST_NOT_IN_RUN)
+    if host.status in ("running", "verifying"):
+        if not await _cancel_if_pending(db, host.scheduled_maintenance_id):
+            raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_HOST_RUNNING, host=host.host_name)
+        # not fired yet: nothing happened on the firewall
+    elif host.status not in ("queued", "blocked", "failed"):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_HOST_RUNNING, host=host.host_name)
+    host.status = "skipped"
+    host.detail = {"code": "skipped_by", "params": {"user": request.state.user.username, "reason": payload.reason.strip()[:300]}}
+    host.finished_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    return await _done(db, run, "skip_host", "skipped", request, host=host.host_name, reason=payload.reason.strip()[:300])
+
+
+@router.post("/runs/{run_id}/abort")
+async def abort_run(run_id: uuid.UUID, payload: AbortIn, request: Request, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    run = await _run_or_404(db, run_id, lock=True)
+    if run.status not in rollout_engine.ACTIVE:
+        raise _not_now(run)
+    if payload.confirm_name != run.plan_name:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ROLLOUT_CONFIRM_NAME)
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    still_running = []
+    for host in run.hosts:
+        if host.status in ("running", "verifying") and host.scheduled_maintenance_id:
+            if await _cancel_if_pending(db, host.scheduled_maintenance_id):
+                host.status, host.finished_at = "cancelled", now
+            else:
+                still_running.append(host.host_name)  # an action already on the firewall is finished in a controlled way
+        elif host.status in ("queued", "blocked"):
+            host.status, host.finished_at = "cancelled", now
+    for wave in run.waves:
+        if wave.status not in ("passed", "skipped"):
+            wave.status = "cancelled"
+    run.status, run.finished_at = "cancelled", now
+    run.pause_reason, run.pause_detail = "aborted", {"by": request.state.user.username, "reason": payload.reason.strip()[:300],
+                                                     "still_running": still_running}
+    return await _done(db, run, "abort", "cancelled", request, reason=payload.reason.strip()[:300], still_running=still_running)

backend/app/routers/rule_analysis.py

@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+"""Rule analysis: which rule decides a packet (read-only, GET so ``read`` tokens and MCP can use it).
+
+Nothing is stored and nothing is written to a firewall; every request reads the rules, the
+loaded pf ruleset and the interfaces (cached for 60 s per firewall, ``refresh=true`` skips
+the cache) and evaluates them with services/rule_analysis/engine.py.
+"""
+import asyncio
+import logging
+import uuid
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, Query
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.policy import DeviceGroup
+from app.models.rule_history import LiveRuleState
+from app.services import rule_history_service
+from app.services.rule_analysis import service
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+router = APIRouter(tags=["rule-analysis"])
+_PARALLEL = 5
+
+
+def _query(src: str, dst: str, proto: str, sport: str | None, dport: str | None, icmptype: str | None,
+           iface: str | None, direction: str, egress: str | None):
+    return service.build_query(src=src, dst=dst, proto=proto, sport=sport, dport=dport, icmptype=icmptype,
+                               iface=iface, direction=direction, egress=egress)
+
+
+async def _run(host: OpnsenseHost, q, refresh: bool) -> dict:
+    head = {"host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name, "cluster_name": host.cluster_name}
+    try:
+        return {**head, **await service.analyze_host(host, q, refresh=refresh), "error": None}
+    except HTTPException as exc:
+        return {**head, "error": exc.detail}
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - one unreachable firewall must not fail the fleet answer
+        logger.info("rule analysis failed for %s: %s", host.name, exc)
+        return {**head, "error": {"code": ErrorCode.ANALYSE_FIREWALL_NICHT_LESBAR.value, "params": {}}}
+
+
+@router.get("/hosts/{host_id}/rule-analysis/match")
+async def host_match(
+    host_id: uuid.UUID, src: str, dst: str, proto: str = "tcp", sport: str | None = None, dport: str | None = None,
+    icmptype: str | None = None, iface: str | None = None, direction: str = "in", egress: str | None = None,
+    refresh: bool = False, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+):
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    q = _query(src, dst, proto, sport, dport, icmptype, iface, direction, egress)
+    result = await _run(host, q, refresh)
+    error = result.get("error")
+    if error:
+        status = 422 if error.get("code") == ErrorCode.ANALYSE_INTERFACE_UNBEKANNT.value else 502
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status, detail=error)
+    return result
+
+
+@router.get("/rule-analysis/match")
+async def fleet_match(
+    src: str, dst: str, proto: str = "tcp", sport: str | None = None, dport: str | None = None,
+    icmptype: str | None = None, iface: str | None = None, direction: str = "in", egress: str | None = None,
+    host_ids: str | None = Query(None, description="comma separated host ids; default: all enabled hosts"),
+    group_id: uuid.UUID | None = None, refresh: bool = False, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+):
+    q = _query(src, dst, proto, sport, dport, icmptype, iface, direction, egress)
+    if group_id is not None:
+        group = await db.scalar(select(DeviceGroup).options(selectinload(DeviceGroup.hosts)).where(DeviceGroup.id == group_id))
+        if group is None:
+            raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.GRUPPE_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+        hosts = sorted(group.hosts, key=lambda h: h.name)
+    elif host_ids:
+        try:
+            ids = [uuid.UUID(part.strip()) for part in host_ids.split(",") if part.strip()]
+        except ValueError:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG, field="host_ids", value=host_ids[:64]) from None
+        hosts = list((await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).where(OpnsenseHost.id.in_(ids)).order_by(OpnsenseHost.name))).all())
+        if len(hosts) != len(set(ids)):
+            raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    else:
+        hosts = list((await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).where(OpnsenseHost.enabled.is_(True)).order_by(OpnsenseHost.name))).all())
+    gate = asyncio.Semaphore(_PARALLEL)
+
+    async def one(host):
+        async with gate:
+            return await _run(host, q, refresh)
+
+    return list(await asyncio.gather(*(one(h) for h in hosts)))
+
+
+@router.get("/hosts/{host_id}/rule-analysis/cleanup")
+async def host_cleanup(
+    host_id: uuid.UUID, unused_days: int = Query(30, ge=1, le=3650, description="observation window for 'unused' / 'disabled for a long time'"),
+    refresh: bool = False, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+):
+    """Cleanup candidates (unused, shadowed, duplicate, disabled for a long time) with confidence and whether
+    each rule could be offered for removal. Read-only; removal is not part of this endpoint."""
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    try:
+        return await service.cleanup_candidates(db, host, unused_days=unused_days, refresh=refresh)
+    except HTTPException:
+        raise
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - an unreachable firewall is a 502, not a crash
+        logger.info("cleanup candidates failed for %s: %s", host.name, exc)
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_FIREWALL_NICHT_LESBAR) from exc
+
+
+@router.get("/hosts/{host_id}/live-rules/{rule_uuid}/history")
+async def live_rule_history(host_id: uuid.UUID, rule_uuid: str, limit: int = Query(100, ge=1, le=500),
+                            db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """What happened to one rule on one firewall: observed changes (also hand-made ones), saved revisions of
+    rules OPNexus manages and the audit entries, newest first. Reads the database only."""
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    baseline = await db.get(LiveRuleState, (host_id, rule_history_service.BASELINE_KEY))
+    return {
+        "host_id": str(host.id), "rule_uuid": rule_uuid.lower()[:64],
+        "watching_since": baseline.first_seen_at if baseline else None,
+        "events": await rule_history_service.rule_timeline(db, host, rule_uuid, limit),
+    }

backend/app/routers/rules.py

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import json
 import uuid
 
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Body
@@ -18,6 +19,7 @@ from app.services.interface_service import check_interface_consistency
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.rule_deploy_service import confirm_rule, deploy_rule, undeploy_rule, revert_deployment
 from app.services import rule_adopt_service
+from app.services.adopt_common import LINK_ERRORS, link_api_error
 from app.schemas.rule import AdoptRequest, UnmanagedRule
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/rules", tags=["rules"])
@@ -107,11 +109,14 @@ async def adopt_rule(payload: AdoptRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     if not host:
         raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
     try:
-        rule = await rule_adopt_service.adopt(db, host, payload.rule_uuid)
+        rule = await rule_adopt_service.adopt(db, host, payload.rule_uuid, link_to=payload.link_to)
     except rule_adopt_service.RuleNotFoundOnHost as exc:
         raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.REGEL_NICHT_GEFUNDEN) from exc
     except rule_adopt_service.NotAdoptable as exc:
-        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE, reasons=", ".join(exc.reasons)) from exc
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE, reasons=", ".join(exc.reasons),
+                        reason_details=json.dumps(exc.details, ensure_ascii=False)) from exc
+    except LINK_ERRORS as exc:
+        raise link_api_error(exc) from exc
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
         raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
     await db.commit()

backend/app/routers/scheduled_maintenance.py

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ class Schedule(BaseModel):
     acknowledge_unattended: Literal[True]
     # Hand the traffic over to the CARP partner first and switch back afterwards (cluster nodes only).
     carp_handover: bool = False
+    # Check the result automatically afterwards and close the operation (no manual "Wartung abschließen").
+    auto_verify: bool = False
 
 
 def _read(sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> dict:
@@ -32,6 +34,8 @@ def _read(sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> dict:
         "status": sched.status, "actor": sched.actor, "created_at": sched.created_at,
         "result": sched.result, "host_operation_id": sched.host_operation_id,
         "carp_handover": sched.carp_handover, "phase": sched.phase,
+        "auto_verify": sched.auto_verify, "origin": sched.origin,
+        "rollout_run_id": ((sched.progress or {}).get("rollout") or {}).get("run_id"),
     }
 
 
@@ -80,6 +84,7 @@ async def create_scheduled(host_id: uuid.UUID, payload: Schedule, request: Reque
     sched = ScheduledMaintenance(
         host_id=host.id, host_name=host.name, action=payload.action, run_at=run_at,
         actor=request.state.user.username, created_at=now, carp_handover=payload.carp_handover,
+        auto_verify=payload.auto_verify,
     )
     db.add(sched)
     await db.commit()
@@ -90,7 +95,9 @@ async def create_scheduled(host_id: uuid.UUID, payload: Schedule, request: Reque
 async def cancel_scheduled(host_id: uuid.UUID, schedule_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     await policy_lock(db)
     await _host_or_404(db, host_id)
-    sched = await db.get(ScheduledMaintenance, schedule_id)
+    # Locked and re-read: the poll loop may be firing this very row right now (it holds the lock meanwhile).
+    sched = await db.scalar(select(ScheduledMaintenance).where(ScheduledMaintenance.id == schedule_id)
+                            .with_for_update().execution_options(populate_existing=True))
     if not sched or sched.host_id != host_id:
         raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.GEPLANTE_WARTUNG_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
     if sched.status != "pending":

backend/app/routers/system.py

@@ -1,19 +1,23 @@
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
+from app.config import settings
+from app.database import get_db
 from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
 from app.models.user import AdminUser
 from app.routers.auth import current_user
+from app.services import rollout_engine
 from app.services import update_check_service, updater_client
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/system", tags=["system"])
 
 
 @router.get("/version-check")
-async def version_check() -> dict:
+async def version_check(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)) -> dict:
     """Ist eine neuere OPNexus-Version veröffentlicht? Aus, solange
     UPDATE_CHECK_URL nicht gesetzt ist (dann ohne ausgehende Anfrage)."""
-    return await update_check_service.check()
+    return await update_check_service.check(db)
 
 
 def _admin(user: AdminUser) -> AdminUser:
@@ -31,16 +35,63 @@ def _major(version: str | None) -> int | None:
         return None
 
 
+class UpdateCheckRead(BaseModel):
+    enabled: bool
+    feed_url: str
+    managed_by_server: bool
+
+
+class UpdateCheckUpdate(BaseModel):
+    enabled: bool | None = None
+    feed_url: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=500)
+
+
+async def _update_check_settings(db: AsyncSession) -> UpdateCheckRead:
+    row = await update_check_service.get_settings(db)
+    managed = update_check_service.managed_by_server()
+    return UpdateCheckRead(
+        enabled=True if managed else row.enabled,
+        feed_url=settings.update_check_url.strip() if managed else row.feed_url,
+        managed_by_server=managed,
+    )
+
+
+@router.get("/update-check", response_model=UpdateCheckRead)
+async def read_update_check(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    """Versionsprüfung für „Einstellungen › OPNexus aktualisieren“ (nur Admins)."""
+    _admin(user)
+    return await _update_check_settings(db)
+
+
+@router.put("/update-check", response_model=UpdateCheckRead)
+async def update_update_check(payload: UpdateCheckUpdate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+                              user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+    _admin(user)
+    if update_check_service.managed_by_server():
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.UPDATE_CHECK_MANAGED_BY_SERVER)
+    row = await update_check_service.get_settings(db)
+    if payload.feed_url is not None:
+        url = payload.feed_url.strip()
+        if not update_check_service.valid_feed_url(url):
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.UPDATE_CHECK_URL_INVALID)
+        row.feed_url = url
+    if payload.enabled is not None:
+        row.enabled = payload.enabled
+    await db.commit()
+    update_check_service.reset_cache()
+    return await _update_check_settings(db)
+
+
 class UpdateRequest(BaseModel):
     version: str = Field(min_length=5, max_length=20)
 
 
 @router.get("/updater")
-async def updater_status(user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
+async def updater_status(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
     """Zustand für den Abschnitt "OPNexus aktualisieren" in den Einstellungen:
     Versionshinweis des Release-Feeds plus (falls aktiviert) der Updater."""
     _admin(user)
-    check = await update_check_service.check()
+    check = await update_check_service.check(db)
     result: dict = {
         "available": False, "reason": None, "mode": None,
         "current": check["current"], "latest": check["latest"], "update_available": check["update_available"],
@@ -49,11 +100,17 @@ async def updater_status(user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
         "can_update": False, "major_change": False,
         "job": None, "phases": [], "log": [], "services": {},
         "rollback_available": False, "rollback_loses_data": False, "rollback_version": None,
+        # A restart in the middle of a firmware rollout is safe (its state is in the database), but the
+        # UI warns: the run pauses its 15-second steps for as long as OPNexus is down.
+        "active_rollouts": await rollout_engine.count_active(db),
     }
     try:
         updater = await updater_client.status()
     except updater_client.UpdaterUnavailable as exc:
         result["reason"] = str(exc)
+        # Without the updater the install mode is still known from the image registry setting; the UI uses it
+        # to not offer enabling the updater on an install that builds from source (it could not update anyway).
+        result["mode"] = "release" if settings.opnexus_image_repo.strip() else "local"
         return result
     except updater_client.UpdaterRejected:
         result["reason"] = "unreachable"
@@ -77,11 +134,12 @@ async def updater_status(user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
 
 
 @router.post("/updater/update", status_code=202)
-async def updater_update(payload: UpdateRequest, user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
+async def updater_update(payload: UpdateRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
+                         user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
     """Aktualisiert OPNexus auf die vom Release-Feed gemeldete neueste stabile
     Version. Beliebige Versionen werden bewusst nicht angenommen."""
     _admin(user)
-    check = await update_check_service.check()
+    check = await update_check_service.check(db)
     if not check["update_available"] or payload.version.lstrip("v") != check["latest"]:
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.UPDATE_NOT_OFFERED)
     if _major(check["latest"]) != _major(check["current"]):

backend/app/schemas/adopt.py

@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+import uuid
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+
+
+class AdoptObjectRequest(BaseModel):
+    host_id: uuid.UUID
+    # Link to this existing central object instead of creating a new one (services/adopt_link_service.py).
+    # Declared before `uuid`: that field's name shadows the module inside the class body.
+    link_to: uuid.UUID | None = None
+    uuid: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)  # the object's UUID on the firewall
+
+
+class AdoptAllRequest(BaseModel):
+    host_id: uuid.UUID
+    # Link entries that have exactly one exact central twin instead of creating a duplicate.
+    link_existing: bool = False
+
+
+class LinkDiff(BaseModel):
+    field: str  # model field ("content", "destination_port", ...) or "variables" (a {{VARIABLE}} has no value on this host)
+    central: str
+    live: str
+
+
+class LinkTarget(BaseModel):
+    """An existing central object that a live object could be linked to (exact match) or is similar to."""
+
+    id: uuid.UUID
+    name: str
+    targets: list[str]  # names of the hosts it is deployed to
+    diff: list[LinkDiff] = Field(default_factory=list)  # empty for an exact match
+
+
+class UnmanagedObject(BaseModel):
+    """An alias / NAT rule found on a host that OPNexus does not manage yet (see object_adopt_service.py)."""
+
+    uuid: str
+    title: str
+    enabled: bool
+    adoptable: bool  # can be adopted on its own right now
+    # Adoptable in the same "adopt all" run although not on its own (an alias whose referenced aliases come first).
+    bulk_adoptable: bool
+    # Codes such as "unsupported_type" or "no_target"; the UI turns them into text.
+    reasons: list[str]
+    reason_details: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)  # code -> extra text (alias names, type, ...)
+    # Settings OPNexus does not manage that stay untouched on the firewall (log, pool options, tags, ...).
+    kept: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    # Facts for display, depend on the object type.
+    info: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+    # Central objects whose content, resolved for this host, equals the live object exactly (first = preferred).
+    matches: list[LinkTarget] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    # Objects with the same name/description but different content: a hint with the differing fields, never linked.
+    similar: list[LinkTarget] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    linkable: bool = False  # can be linked to `matches[0]` (or another match) on its own
+    # What "adopt all" would do: "link" | "new" | "skip" (None only on the adopt-all result).
+    bulk_action: str | None = None
+
+
+class AdoptedObject(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    title: str
+    id: uuid.UUID
+    linked: bool = False  # linked to an existing central object instead of newly created
+
+
+class SkippedObject(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    title: str
+    reasons: list[str]
+    reason_details: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class AdoptAllResult(BaseModel):
+    adopted: list[AdoptedObject]
+    skipped: list[SkippedObject]

backend/app/schemas/dashboard.py

@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ from datetime import datetime
 
 from pydantic import BaseModel
 
+from app.schemas.gateway import GatewayHealth
+
 
 class DashboardHost(BaseModel):
     id: uuid.UUID
@@ -10,6 +12,11 @@ class DashboardHost(BaseModel):
     status: str
     carp_status: str | None
     cluster_name: str | None
+    # From the last resource sample (no live call); None when there is no sample from the last 3 minutes.
+    gateways: list[GatewayHealth] | None = None
+    # Readings the newest fresh sample could not take because the API key lacks the right (gateways, services, ...);
+    # None = no fresh sample (or one from before this existed), [] = nothing missing.
+    api_rights_missing: list[str] | None = None
 
 
 class PendingAction(BaseModel):

backend/app/schemas/gateway.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+from typing import Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel
+
+# online: all fine · degraded: OPNsense flags loss and/or latency above the gateway's own limits ·
+# offline: down · forced_down: switched off by the admin on purpose · unknown: nothing measured
+# (monitoring disabled) or the verdict is still pending.
+GatewayState = Literal["online", "degraded", "offline", "forced_down", "unknown"]
+
+
+class GatewayHealth(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    address: str | None = None
+    status: str                  # OPNsense' raw verdict: none | down | force_down | delay | loss | delay+loss | …
+    state: GatewayState
+    loss: float | None = None    # percent
+    delay: float | None = None   # milliseconds
+    stddev: float | None = None  # milliseconds
+    monitor: str | None = None   # the monitored address
+    alert_enabled: bool = True   # False: the gateway alert is switched off for this gateway (Settings, 1.29)
+
+
+class GatewayAlertUpdate(BaseModel):
+    enabled: bool
+
+
+class GatewayAlertState(BaseModel):
+    name: str
+    alert_enabled: bool
+
+
+class ApiRightsState(BaseModel):
+    missing: list[str] | None = None  # names of the refused readings (gateways, services, swap, cpu); None = unknown

backend/app/schemas/notification.py

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
+import re
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
 from typing import Literal
 
-from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.models.notification import DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST
 
 SmtpSecurity = Literal["none", "starttls", "ssl"]
 ProblemType = Literal[
@@ -14,7 +16,10 @@ ProblemType = Literal[
     "backup_stale",
     "backup_offsite_failed",
     "compliance_finding",
+    "gateway_down", "resource_threshold", "service_down", "api_rights_missing",
+    "rollout_paused", "rollout_start_failed",
 ]
+ChannelType = Literal["ntfy", "gotify", "telegram", "teams", "matrix"]
 
 
 class NotificationSettingsRead(BaseModel):
@@ -45,10 +50,30 @@ class NotificationSettingsRead(BaseModel):
     scheduled_maintenance_failed_enabled: bool = True
     backup_failed_enabled: bool = True
     compliance_alerts_enabled: bool = False
+    gateway_down_enabled: bool = True
+    resource_threshold_enabled: bool = False
+    service_down_enabled: bool = False
+    rollout_problems_enabled: bool = True
+    api_rights_enabled: bool = True
+    gateway_alert_muted: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    gateway_loss_threshold_pct: int = 20
+    gateway_delay_threshold_ms: int = 500
+    disk_threshold_pct: int = 90
+    memory_threshold_pct: int = 95
+    swap_threshold_pct: int = 50
+    load_per_cpu_threshold: float = 2.0
+    alert_confirm_samples: int = 3
+    resource_confirm_samples: int = 5
+    service_watchlist: list[str] = Field(default_factory=lambda: list(DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST))
 
     poll_interval_seconds: int
     updated_at: datetime
 
+    @field_validator("service_watchlist", mode="before")
+    @classmethod
+    def _default_watchlist(cls, value):
+        return list(DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST) if value is None else value
+
 
 class NotificationSettingsUpdate(BaseModel):
     """Partial update — everything optional, only provided fields change.
@@ -84,6 +109,35 @@ class NotificationSettingsUpdate(BaseModel):
     scheduled_maintenance_failed_enabled: bool | None = None
     backup_failed_enabled: bool | None = None
     compliance_alerts_enabled: bool | None = None
+    gateway_down_enabled: bool | None = None
+    resource_threshold_enabled: bool | None = None
+    service_down_enabled: bool | None = None
+    rollout_problems_enabled: bool | None = None
+    api_rights_enabled: bool | None = None
+    # 0 switches that single threshold off.
+    gateway_loss_threshold_pct: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=100)
+    gateway_delay_threshold_ms: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=60000)
+    disk_threshold_pct: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=100)
+    memory_threshold_pct: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=100)
+    swap_threshold_pct: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=100)
+    load_per_cpu_threshold: float | None = Field(default=None, ge=0, le=1000)
+    alert_confirm_samples: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=60)
+    resource_confirm_samples: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=60)
+    service_watchlist: list[str] | None = Field(default=None, max_length=100)
+
+    @field_validator("service_watchlist")
+    @classmethod
+    def _clean_watchlist(cls, value):
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        names = []
+        for raw in value:
+            name = str(raw).strip()
+            if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9._+-]{1,64}", name):
+                raise ValueError("Dienstnamen bestehen aus Buchstaben, Ziffern und . _ + -")
+            if name not in names:
+                names.append(name)
+        return names
 
     poll_interval_seconds: int | None = Field(
         default=None, ge=settings.notification_poll_min_interval_seconds
@@ -106,3 +160,55 @@ class NotificationProblemRead(BaseModel):
 
 class TestNotificationRequest(BaseModel):
     channel: Literal["webhook", "email"]
+
+
+class NotificationChannelRead(BaseModel):
+    """Never carries the credential; ``config`` is withheld from non-admins (an ntfy topic is a password)."""
+
+    model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
+
+    id: uuid.UUID
+    name: str
+    channel_type: ChannelType
+    enabled: bool
+    config: dict
+    secret_set: bool
+    created_at: datetime
+    updated_at: datetime
+
+
+def _channel_name(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    if not value.strip():
+        raise ValueError("Name darf nicht leer sein")
+    return value.strip()
+
+
+class NotificationChannelCreate(BaseModel):
+    name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=100)
+    channel_type: ChannelType
+    enabled: bool = True
+    config: dict = Field(default_factory=dict)
+    # Token, or for Teams the webhook address. Write-only.
+    secret: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=2100)
+
+    @field_validator("name")
+    @classmethod
+    def _clean_name(cls, value):
+        return _channel_name(value)
+
+
+class NotificationChannelUpdate(BaseModel):
+    """Partial: omitted fields stay. ``secret`` replaces the credential, ``clear_secret`` removes it."""
+
+    name: str | None = Field(default=None, min_length=1, max_length=100)
+    enabled: bool | None = None
+    config: dict | None = None
+    secret: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=2100)
+    clear_secret: bool = False
+
+    @field_validator("name")
+    @classmethod
+    def _clean_name(cls, value):
+        return _channel_name(value)

backend/app/schemas/rule.py

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ from typing import Literal
 
 from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator
 
+from app.schemas.adopt import LinkTarget
+
 
 class RuleCreate(BaseModel):
     description: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=255)
@@ -78,6 +80,8 @@ class DeployApproval(BaseModel):
 
 class AdoptRequest(BaseModel):
     host_id: uuid.UUID
+    # Link to this existing central rule instead of creating a new one (services/adopt_link_service.py).
+    link_to: uuid.UUID | None = None
     rule_uuid: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
 
 
@@ -98,3 +102,7 @@ class UnmanagedRule(BaseModel):
     adoptable: bool
     # Codes such as "negated_source" or "not_quick"; the UI turns them into text.
     reasons: list[str]
+    # Central rules equal to this one (resolved for the host), same-description rules that differ, link possible.
+    matches: list[LinkTarget] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    similar: list[LinkTarget] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    linkable: bool = False

backend/app/security_middleware.py

@@ -7,9 +7,19 @@ how the proxy setup works for IP *and* name access) nor an explicitly allowed
 origin. Requests without either header (curl, scripts) are not browsers, so
 they cannot be riding on a victim's cookie and pass through to normal auth.
 
+Sec-Fetch-Site (1.27): a page on another port of the same host (e.g. a
+firewall GUI behind the GUI gateway) is *same-site* to OPNexus, so the
+browser attaches the session cookie to its requests and SameSite=Lax does
+not help. Cookie-carrying /api requests that the browser itself marks as
+same-site or cross-site are therefore refused — unless the Origin is an
+explicitly configured frontend origin (development setup with the frontend
+on its own port). Clients that send no Sec-Fetch-Site header (curl,
+scripts, API tokens) are not browsers and stay unaffected.
+
 SecurityHeadersMiddleware: API responses must never be cached by browsers or
 proxies and must not be sniffed or framed.
 """
+import re
 from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
@@ -18,6 +28,7 @@ from starlette.responses import JSONResponse
 
 from app.config import settings
 from app.errors import ErrorCode
+from app.routers.auth import has_session_cookie
 
 _SAFE_METHODS = {"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"}
 
@@ -35,8 +46,53 @@ def _origin_allowed(origin: str, host_header: str) -> bool:
     return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}".lower() in {o.lower() for o in settings.allowed_origins}
 
 
+# The SSO provider sends the browser back here by a cross-site navigation;
+# the endpoint authenticates by its own state cookie and creates the session.
+# The exemption is only for exactly that: a top-level GET navigation (a script, image or fetch from another site
+# is still blocked, whatever it carries) — and the callback fails without the matching state cookie anyway.
+_SEC_FETCH_EXEMPT = {"/api/auth/oidc/callback"}
+
+
+def _is_top_level_navigation(request: Request) -> bool:
+    if request.method != "GET":
+        return False
+    mode = request.headers.get("sec-fetch-mode", "").strip().lower()
+    dest = request.headers.get("sec-fetch-dest", "").strip().lower()
+    return mode in ("", "navigate") and dest in ("", "document")
+
+
+def _explicit_frontend_origin(origin: str) -> bool:
+    origin = origin.rstrip("/").lower()
+    if not origin or origin == "null":
+        return False
+    if settings.allowed_origins:
+        return origin in {o.lower() for o in settings.allowed_origins}
+    return re.fullmatch(settings.cors_origin_regex, origin) is not None
+
+
+def sec_fetch_blocked(request: Request) -> bool:
+    path = request.url.path
+    if not (path == "/api" or path.startswith("/api/")):
+        return False
+    if path in _SEC_FETCH_EXEMPT and _is_top_level_navigation(request):
+        return False
+    if not has_session_cookie(request):
+        return False
+    site = request.headers.get("sec-fetch-site", "").strip().lower()
+    if site == "cross-site":
+        return True
+    if site == "same-site":
+        return not _explicit_frontend_origin(request.headers.get("origin", ""))
+    return False  # same-origin, none (typed URL/bookmark) or no header (not a browser)
+
+
 class OriginCheckMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
     async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
+        if sec_fetch_blocked(request):
+            return JSONResponse(
+                status_code=403,
+                content={"detail": {"code": ErrorCode.CROSS_SITE_REQUEST_BLOCKED.value, "params": {}}},
+            )
         if request.method not in _SAFE_METHODS:
             source = request.headers.get("origin") or request.headers.get("referer")
             if source and source != "null" and not _origin_allowed(source, request.headers.get("host", "")):

backend/app/services/adopt_common.py

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+"""Small pieces shared by every "take over what was made by hand on a firewall" feature
+(rule_adopt_service.py for filter rules, object_adopt_service.py for aliases and NAT)."""
+
+
+class NotAdoptable(Exception):
+    """The object exists on the host but cannot be described without distortion.
+
+    `reasons` are machine-readable codes (the UI translates them); `details` maps a code to
+    extra text the translation can show (e.g. the alias names a reference points to)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, reasons: list[str], details: dict[str, str] | None = None):
+        super().__init__(", ".join(reasons))
+        self.reasons = reasons
+        self.details = details or {}
+
+
+class NotFoundOnHost(Exception):
+    """The UUID is not (or no longer) present in the host's live configuration."""
+
+
+def on(value) -> bool:
+    """OPNsense booleans arrive as "1"/"0" strings, sometimes as real booleans."""
+    return value in ("1", 1, True)
+
+
+def clean(value) -> str:
+    return "" if value is None else str(value).strip()
+
+
+class LinkTargetNotFound(Exception):
+    """The central object chosen to link to was deleted in the meantime."""
+
+
+class LinkTargetChanged(Exception):
+    """The central object no longer equals what is live on the host. `diff` lists the differing fields."""
+
+    def __init__(self, diff: list[dict]):
+        super().__init__(", ".join(d["field"] for d in diff))
+        self.diff = diff
+
+
+class HostAlreadyHasObject(Exception):
+    """The central object is already deployed to / managed on this host under another UUID."""
+
+
+class LinkTargetBusy(Exception):
+    """The central object has an unconfirmed deployment or a failed rollback; linking waits until it is settled."""
+
+
+LINK_ERRORS = (LinkTargetNotFound, LinkTargetChanged, HostAlreadyHasObject, LinkTargetBusy)
+
+
+def link_api_error(exc: Exception):
+    """The HTTP error for a failed link (shared by the rule and the object endpoints)."""
+    from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+
+    if isinstance(exc, LinkTargetNotFound):
+        return api_error(404, ErrorCode.ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_NOT_FOUND)
+    if isinstance(exc, LinkTargetChanged):
+        return api_error(409, ErrorCode.ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED, fields=", ".join(d["field"] for d in exc.diff))
+    if isinstance(exc, HostAlreadyHasObject):
+        return api_error(409, ErrorCode.ADOPT_LINK_HOST_HAS_OBJECT)
+    return api_error(409, ErrorCode.ADOPT_LINK_BUSY)

backend/app/services/adopt_link_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+"""Links a hand-made object that was found on a firewall to a central object that already exists, instead
+of creating a second central object for it ("Mit vorhandenem zentralem Objekt verknüpfen").
+
+Typical case: the same rule/alias/NAT entry was made by hand on several firewalls (or on both nodes of an HA
+pair). The first adoption creates the central object; every further firewall is LINKED to it: the host
+becomes another target of that object and gets a deployment row holding the live UUID (remote_uuid) and
+the payload OPNexus would send. Like adopting, linking writes NOTHING to the firewall. The live state is
+read fresh from the host at link time (the browser only names the central object), so the preview right
+afterwards says "unchanged" and a later rollout updates the one object on every host without a duplicate.
+
+A central object is an EXACT match when every field OPNexus manages is equal after the object's
+{{VARIABLE}} placeholders are replaced with this host's values (variables_service.resolve). An object with
+the same identity (alias name / rule description) but different content is only shown as a hint with the
+differing fields and is NEVER linked automatically.
+
+Callers hold policy_lock (same serialisation as adopting), which also makes a repeated link idempotent.
+"""
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.policy import DeviceGroup
+from app.services import variables_service
+from app.services.adopt_common import HostAlreadyHasObject, LinkTargetBusy, LinkTargetChanged, LinkTargetNotFound
+from app.services.policy_hierarchy_target_service import hydrate_hierarchy_targets
+from app.services.policy_service import effective_hosts
+
+LINK_MESSAGE = "Mit vorhandenem Objekt verknüpft"
+BUSY_STATUSES = ("pending", "revert_failed")  # the central object waits for a confirmation / failed to roll back
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class LinkSpec:
+    model: type
+    deployment: type
+    fk: str  # deployment column pointing at the central object
+    uuid_attr: str  # deployment column holding the OPNsense UUID (remote_uuid)
+    identity: str  # attribute naming the object: "name" (alias) or "description"
+    payload: Callable[[Any, OpnsenseHost], dict]
+    revision: Callable
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Match:
+    obj: Any
+    diff: list[dict]  # empty = exact match
+    busy: bool = False  # the central object waits for a confirmation: linking is refused until that is settled
+
+
+def _norm(value) -> Any:
+    if value is None:
+        return ""
+    return value if isinstance(value, bool) else str(value)
+
+
+def _show(value) -> str:
+    return ("true" if value else "false") if isinstance(value, bool) else ("" if value is None else str(value))
+
+
+def diff_fields(obj, values: dict, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    """Fields in which the central object (resolved for `host`) differs from the live `values`."""
+    raw = {key: getattr(obj, key) for key in values}
+    try:
+        central = variables_service.resolve(raw, host)
+    except variables_service.MissingVariables as exc:
+        # Cannot be compared (and could not be deployed to this host either): report, never match.
+        return [{"field": "variables", "central": ", ".join(exc.missing[host.name]), "live": ""}]
+    return [{"field": key, "central": _show(central[key]), "live": _show(values[key])}
+            for key in values if _norm(central[key]) != _norm(values[key])]
+
+
+def _options(spec: LinkSpec):
+    return [
+        selectinload(spec.model.targets),
+        selectinload(spec.model.groups).selectinload(DeviceGroup.hosts),
+        selectinload(spec.model.deployments),
+    ]
+
+
+async def load_central(db: AsyncSession, spec: LinkSpec) -> list:
+    objs = list((await db.scalars(select(spec.model).options(*_options(spec)))).unique().all())
+    await hydrate_hierarchy_targets(db, objs)
+    return objs
+
+
+def find(objs: list, spec: LinkSpec, host: OpnsenseHost, values: dict) -> tuple[list[Match], list[Match]]:
+    """(exact matches, same-identity objects that differ). Objects that already have a deployment on
+    this host are not candidates: linking would collide with that deployment."""
+    exact: list[Match] = []
+    similar: list[Match] = []
+    for obj in objs:
+        if any(d.host_id == host.id for d in obj.deployments):
+            continue
+        if _norm(getattr(obj, spec.identity)) != _norm(values[spec.identity]):
+            continue
+        d = diff_fields(obj, values, host)
+        busy = any(dep.status in BUSY_STATUSES for dep in obj.deployments)
+        (similar if d else exact).append(Match(obj, d, busy))
+    # prefer the object that already reaches the most hosts (the "real" one), then a stable order
+    exact.sort(key=lambda m: (-len(effective_hosts(m.obj)), str(m.obj.id)))
+    return exact, similar
+
+
+def describe(spec: LinkSpec, match: Match) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": match.obj.id,
+        "name": getattr(match.obj, spec.identity),
+        "targets": [h.name for h in effective_hosts(match.obj)],
+        "diff": match.diff,
+    }
+
+
+async def link(db: AsyncSession, spec: LinkSpec, host: OpnsenseHost, object_id, remote_uuid: str, values: dict):
+    """Links the live object `remote_uuid` (whose normalised fields are `values`, read fresh by the caller)
+    to the central object `object_id`. Returns it; a repeated call for the same pair changes nothing."""
+    obj = (await db.execute(
+        select(spec.model).where(spec.model.id == object_id).options(*_options(spec))
+        .execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+    )).unique().scalar_one_or_none()
+    if obj is None:
+        raise LinkTargetNotFound(str(object_id))
+    await hydrate_hierarchy_targets(db, [obj])
+
+    existing = next((d for d in obj.deployments if d.host_id == host.id), None)
+    if existing is not None:
+        if getattr(existing, spec.uuid_attr) == remote_uuid:
+            return obj  # already linked: nothing to do
+        raise HostAlreadyHasObject(str(object_id))
+    if any(d.status in BUSY_STATUSES for d in obj.deployments):
+        raise LinkTargetBusy(str(object_id))
+    changed = diff_fields(obj, values, host)
+    if changed:
+        raise LinkTargetChanged(changed)
+
+    if host.id not in {h.id for h in effective_hosts(obj)}:
+        obj.targets.append(host)
+    # an association-only change does not touch the row; stale edit forms must still be refused (see edit_rule)
+    obj.updated_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    await db.flush()
+    spec.revision(db, obj, f"Mit {host.name} verknüpft")
+    db.add(spec.deployment(**{
+        spec.fk: obj.id, "host_id": host.id, "status": "success", "message": LINK_MESSAGE,
+        spec.uuid_attr: remote_uuid, "last_payload": spec.payload(obj, host), "previous_payload": None,
+    }))
+    await db.flush()
+    return obj

backend/app/services/api_token_service.py

@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ MAX_TOKENS_PER_USER = 50
 _LAST_USED_GRANULARITY = timedelta(minutes=1)
 
 _SAFE_METHODS = ("GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS")
-_SESSION_ONLY = re.compile(r"^/api/(tokens|auth)(/|$)")
+# GUI tickets open a firewall's web interface in the browser: an interactive admin session only.
+_SESSION_ONLY = re.compile(r"^/api/(tokens|auth)(/|$)|^/api/hosts/[^/]+/gui-ticket$")
 # Reads that expose secrets (config.xml holds password hashes and VPN keys, the
 # notification settings the webhook URL/SMTP data): admin scope only.
 _ADMIN_SCOPE_READS = re.compile(r"^/api/hosts/[^/]+/backups/[^/]+$|^/api/notifications(/|$)|^/api/settings/|^/api/overlay/peers/[^/]+/instructions$")
@@ -48,6 +49,9 @@ _ADMIN_ONLY_WRITES = re.compile(
     r"^/api/(users|settings|system|notifications|overlay)(/|$)"
     r"|^/api/logs/settings$"
     r"|^/api/hosts(/tls-probe|/[^/]+)?$"
+    r"|^/api/hosts/[^/]+/gui-ticket$"
+    # The per-gateway alert switch is a notification setting (same rights as PUT /api/notifications/settings).
+    r"|^/api/hosts/[^/]+/gateways/[^/]+/alert$"
 )
 
 
@@ -90,7 +94,10 @@ _ROLLOUT_POST = re.compile(
     r"|deployments/[^/]+/(remove|retry-rollback)"
     r"|maintenance/(execute|carp-execute|schedule)"
     r"|network/changes"
-    r"|services/[^/]+/(start|stop|restart))$"
+    r"|services/[^/]+/(start|stop|restart)"
+    # Firmware rollouts (1.25): starting/arming a plan and moving a run forward. Pausing is deliberately absent.
+    r"|rollouts/plans/[^/]+/(start|activate)"
+    r"|rollouts/runs/[^/]+/(resume|approve|skip-host|abort))$"
 )
 _ROLLOUT_DELETE = re.compile(
     r"^/api/(rules|aliases|port-forward|one-to-one|outbound-nat|policy-hierarchy/rules|ipsec/tunnels|openvpn/instances"
@@ -99,7 +106,13 @@ _ROLLOUT_DELETE = re.compile(
 )
 
 
+# Recurring maintenance windows decide WHEN unattended firmware actions run (1.25): every write counts.
+_ROLLOUT_ANY_WRITE = re.compile(r"^/api/maintenance-windows(/|$)")
+
+
 def is_rollout(method: str, path: str) -> bool:
+    if method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE") and _ROLLOUT_ANY_WRITE.match(path):
+        return True
     if method == "POST":
         return bool(_ROLLOUT_POST.search(path))
     return method == "DELETE" and bool(_ROLLOUT_DELETE.match(path))

backend/app/services/compliance_service.py

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
 from app.services import backup_store, rule_hit_service
 from app.services import opnsense_client as client
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.rule_analysis import coverage
 
 MAX_CONFIG_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024
 BACKUP_MAX_AGE_DAYS = 7
@@ -83,10 +84,15 @@ def _mvc_rule(rule: Element) -> dict:
         "sport": _text(rule, "source_port"),
         "dst": _text(rule, "destination_net") or "any", "dst_not": _text(rule, "destination_not") == "1",
         "dport": _text(rule, "destination_port"),
-        "floating": False,
+        "if_not": _text(rule, "interfacenot") == "1",
+        "floating": False,  # decided in extract_rules (needs the list of interfaces)
         "quick": _text(rule, "quick") != "0",
         "descr": _text(rule, "description") or "",
         "order": int(_text(rule, "sequence") or 0),
+        "sched": _text(rule, "sched") or "", "tagged": _text(rule, "tagged") or "",
+        "received_on": _text(rule, "received-on") or "",
+        "icmptype": ",".join(filter(None, [_text(rule, "icmptype"), _text(rule, "icmp6type")])),
+        "limited": any(_text(rule, tag) for tag in ("max-src-conn-rate", "max-pkt-rate-number", "overload", "tcpflags1")),
     }
 
 
@@ -101,17 +107,29 @@ def _legacy_rule(rule: Element, index: int) -> dict:
         "ipprotocol": _text(rule, "ipprotocol") or "inet",
         "protocol": (_text(rule, "protocol") or "any").lower(),
         "src": src, "src_not": src_not, "sport": sport, "dst": dst, "dst_not": dst_not, "dport": dport,
+        "if_not": rule.find("interfacenot") is not None,
         "floating": _text(rule, "floating") == "yes",
-        "quick": _text(rule, "quick") != "0",
+        # Legacy rules: an interface rule is always evaluated "quick"; only a floating rule has the option,
+        # and it is off unless <quick> says yes.
+        "quick": _text(rule, "floating") != "yes" or (_text(rule, "quick") or "").lower() in ("yes", "1"),
         "descr": _text(rule, "descr") or "",
         "order": index,
+        "sched": _text(rule, "sched") or "", "tagged": _text(rule, "tagged") or "",
+        "received_on": _text(rule, "received-on") or "", "icmptype": _text(rule, "icmptype") or "",
+        "limited": any(_text(rule, tag) for tag in ("max-src-conn-rate", "max-pkt-rate-number", "overload", "tcpflags1")),
     }
 
 
 def extract_rules(root: Element) -> list[list[dict]]:
     """Rule lists in evaluation order, one per source (MVC, legacy)."""
-    mvc = sorted((_mvc_rule(r) for r in root.findall("OPNsense/Firewall/Filter/rules/rule")), key=lambda r: r["order"])
+    mvc = [_mvc_rule(r) for r in root.findall("OPNsense/Firewall/Filter/rules/rule")]
+    known = {node.tag for node in root.findall("interfaces/*")}
+    for rule in mvc:  # same rule as OPNsense: not exactly one interface (or "not") = floating
+        rule["floating"] = len(rule["interfaces"]) != 1 or rule["if_not"]
+        rule["group"] = not rule["floating"] and rule["interfaces"][0] not in known
+    mvc.sort(key=coverage.config_order)
     legacy = [_legacy_rule(r, i) for i, r in enumerate(root.findall("filter/rule"))]
+    legacy.sort(key=coverage.config_order)
     return [group for group in (mvc, legacy) if group]
 
 
@@ -133,41 +151,22 @@ def _is_any_any(rule: dict) -> bool:
 
 
 
-def _covers(a: dict, b: dict) -> bool:
-    """Every packet matched by rule b is already matched by the earlier rule a.
-    Only exact-or-any comparisons, so it never claims coverage it cannot prove."""
-    if not (a["enabled"] and b["enabled"]) or a["floating"] or b["floating"] or not a["quick"]:
-        return False
-    if not a["interfaces"] or not set(b["interfaces"]) <= set(a["interfaces"]):
-        return False
-    if a["direction"] != b["direction"] or a["ipprotocol"] != b["ipprotocol"]:
-        return False
-    if a["protocol"] != "any" and a["protocol"] != b["protocol"]:
-        return False
-    for side in ("src", "dst"):
-        if a[side + "_not"] or b[side + "_not"]:
-            if (a[side], a[side + "_not"]) != (b[side], b[side + "_not"]):
-                return False
-        elif a[side] != "any" and a[side] != b[side]:
-            return False
-    for port in ("sport", "dport"):
-        if a[port] and a[port] != b[port]:
-            return False
-    return True
-
-
 def _label(rule: dict) -> str:
     return rule["descr"] or f"{rule['action']} {rule['src']} → {rule['dst']}"
 
 
 def analyse_rules(groups: list[list[dict]]) -> dict:
+    """Shadowed and duplicate rules. The coverage logic lives in rule_analysis/coverage.py (shared with the
+    cleanup candidates); the rules of one list are compared in evaluation order."""
     shadowed, duplicates = [], []
     for rules in groups:
-        for j, later in enumerate(rules):
-            for earlier in rules[:j]:
-                if _covers(earlier, later):
-                    (duplicates if earlier["action"] == later["action"] and _covers(later, earlier) else shadowed).append(_label(later))
-                    break
+        ordered = sorted(rules, key=coverage.config_order)
+        norm = [coverage.from_config_rule(rule) for rule in ordered]
+        by_identity = {id(n): r for n, r in zip(norm, ordered)}
+        for overlap in coverage.analyse(norm):
+            if overlap.by.order == overlap.rule.order:
+                continue  # equal position in config.xml: the real order is unknown, claim nothing
+            (duplicates if overlap.kind == "duplicate" else shadowed).append(_label(by_identity[id(overlap.rule)]))
     return {"shadowed": shadowed, "duplicates": duplicates}
 
 

backend/app/services/gateway_health_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"""Gateway health of a firewall (dpinger numbers, as OPNsense reports them).
+
+``get_gateway_health(host)`` is the one reusable entry point: a live read of
+/routes/gateway/status, one :class:`GatewayHealth` per gateway. The notification
+engine, the host page and the metrics read the SAME numbers from the periodic
+resource sample (``compact`` / ``from_compact``), so a scrape or a page view never
+fans out to the firewalls; the 1.25 health gate can call ``get_gateway_health``
+directly. Parsing is lenient on purpose: "~" means "nothing measured", never zero.
+"""
+import re
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.schemas.gateway import GatewayHealth, GatewayState
+from app.services import opnsense_client as client
+
+_NUMBER = re.compile(r"-?\d+(?:\.\d+)?")
+_DEGRADED = {"delay", "loss", "delay+loss"}
+
+
+def _number(value) -> float | None:
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    match = _NUMBER.search(str(value))
+    return float(match.group()) if match else None
+
+
+def _state(status: str, measured: bool) -> GatewayState:
+    if status == "down":
+        return "offline"
+    if status == "force_down":
+        return "forced_down"
+    if status in _DEGRADED:
+        return "degraded"
+    if status == "none":
+        # "none" is also what a gateway without monitoring reports; only numbers make it "online".
+        return "online" if measured else "unknown"
+    return "unknown"
+
+
+def parse_gateway_status(payload) -> list[GatewayHealth]:
+    items = payload.get("items") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
+    result: list[GatewayHealth] = []
+    for item in items or []:
+        if not isinstance(item, dict) or not item.get("name"):
+            continue
+        status = str(item.get("status") or "").lower()
+        loss, delay, stddev = _number(item.get("loss")), _number(item.get("delay")), _number(item.get("stddev"))
+        if loss is not None and loss >= 100:
+            delay = stddev = None  # dpinger prints 0.0 ms when nothing answers: no round trip, not a fast one
+        measured = loss is not None or delay is not None
+        address = item.get("address")
+        monitor = item.get("monitor")
+        result.append(GatewayHealth(
+            name=str(item["name"]),
+            address=None if address in (None, "", "~") else str(address),
+            status=status or "unknown",
+            state=_state(status, measured),
+            loss=loss, delay=delay, stddev=stddev,
+            monitor=None if monitor in (None, "", "~") else str(monitor),
+        ))
+    return result
+
+
+async def get_gateway_health(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[GatewayHealth]:
+    """Live gateway state of ``host``. Raises OpnsenseAPIError if the firewall cannot be asked."""
+    return parse_gateway_status(await client.get_gateway_status(host))
+
+
+def compact(gateways: list[GatewayHealth]) -> list[dict]:
+    """What the resource sampler stores per sample (small, no addresses)."""
+    return [
+        {"name": g.name, "status": g.status, "state": g.state, "loss": g.loss, "delay": g.delay, "stddev": g.stddev}
+        for g in gateways
+    ]
+
+
+def from_compact(rows) -> list[GatewayHealth]:
+    return [
+        GatewayHealth(
+            name=r["name"], status=r.get("status") or "unknown", state=r.get("state") or "unknown",
+            loss=r.get("loss"), delay=r.get("delay"), stddev=r.get("stddev"),
+        )
+        for r in rows or [] if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("name")
+    ]
+
+
+def is_bad(gateway: GatewayHealth, loss_threshold_pct: float = 0, delay_threshold_ms: float = 0) -> bool:
+    """Alarm-worthy: down, or (when the thresholds are on) measured loss / latency beyond them.
+    A gateway forced down by the admin and one that is not measured are not alarms."""
+    if gateway.state == "offline":
+        return True
+    if loss_threshold_pct and gateway.loss is not None and gateway.loss >= loss_threshold_pct:
+        return True
+    if delay_threshold_ms and gateway.delay is not None and gateway.delay >= delay_threshold_ms:
+        return True
+    return False
+

backend/app/services/gui_ticket_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
+"""Tickets and gateway sessions for the firewall GUI access (1.27, gui-gateway container).
+
+Flow (see docs in routers/gui_access.py):
+* An admin asks for a ticket (POST /api/hosts/{id}/gui-ticket). 32 random bytes, valid 30 s, single use;
+  only its SHA-256 is stored, bound to the OPNexus session (same hash as sessions.token_hash), the user,
+  the host and a slot (gateway port = its own browser origin).
+* The gateway redeems it through /internal/gui/redeem and gets what it needs to reach the firewall —
+  base URL, pinned CA, overlay proxy, timeouts. Never the API key or secret.
+* Every 20 s the gateway re-checks the gateway session (/internal/gui/revalidate): OPNexus session still
+  valid, user still admin, switch still on, host still eligible, absolute limit not reached.
+
+A slot stays assigned to one firewall for as long as that browser session has the firewall open; another
+firewall gets another slot (another origin), so two firewall GUIs never share an origin at the same time.
+After the last gateway session of a slot ended, the slot goes to a DIFFERENT firewall only after SLOT_COOLDOWN
+(1.29, S1): a popup of a possibly compromised firewall GUI may still be open and its cookies belong to that
+origin. The same firewall may take the slot again at once.
+
+The target the gateway talks to (origin, pinned CA, overlay proxy) is fingerprinted at redeem time; every
+re-check compares it with the host's current configuration and ends the session when it changed (S4).
+"""
+import hashlib
+import secrets
+import uuid
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from sqlalchemy import delete, func, select, update
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.errors import ErrorCode
+from app.models.gui_access import GuiAccessSettings, GuiSession, GuiTicket
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.user import AdminUser, Session
+from app.services import audit_service, firewall_url, overlay_service
+
+TICKET_TTL = timedelta(seconds=30)
+# 20 s: a switch-off, logout or role change must end a gateway session within 30 s of the change, and
+# the last re-check can lie up to one interval before it (live test 2026-10-21: 30 s gave 31 s).
+REVALIDATE_SECONDS = 20
+# A gateway session nobody re-checked for this long is treated as ended (gateway crashed without telling us).
+SESSION_STALE_AFTER = timedelta(seconds=REVALIDATE_SECONDS * 3)
+MAX_SLOTS = 4
+# A slot freed by firewall A goes to firewall B no earlier than this long after A's session ended.
+SLOT_COOLDOWN = timedelta(minutes=5)
+# Open gateway sessions at once (the gateway container enforces the same number; test_gui_access checks they match).
+MAX_GATEWAY_SESSIONS = 64
+MIN_GATEWAY_TOKEN_LENGTH = 32
+AUDIT_KIND = "gui_access"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class GuiAccessError(Exception):
+    status: int
+    code: ErrorCode
+    params: dict
+
+
+def hash_value(raw: str) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(raw.encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+# ── configuration ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def slot_sites() -> dict[int, list[str]]:
+    """Slot port -> configured https origins with that port (OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES)."""
+    sites: dict[int, list[str]] = {}
+    for origin in settings.gui_site_origins:
+        try:
+            parts = urlsplit(origin)
+            port = parts.port
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        if parts.scheme != "https" or not parts.hostname or not port or parts.path not in ("", "/"):
+            continue
+        sites.setdefault(port, []).append(f"https://{parts.netloc}")
+    return sites
+
+
+def gateway_configured() -> bool:
+    return len(settings.gui_gateway_token) >= MIN_GATEWAY_TOKEN_LENGTH and bool(slot_sites())
+
+
+def unavailable_reasons() -> list[str]:
+    reasons = []
+    if not settings.cookie_secure:
+        reasons.append("cookie_secure")
+    if len(settings.gui_gateway_token) < MIN_GATEWAY_TOKEN_LENGTH:
+        reasons.append("gateway_token")
+    if not slot_sites():
+        reasons.append("gui_sites")
+    return reasons
+
+
+def active_slots(row: GuiAccessSettings) -> list[int]:
+    return sorted(slot_sites())[: max(1, min(row.slot_count, MAX_SLOTS))]
+
+
+async def get_settings(db: AsyncSession) -> GuiAccessSettings:
+    row = await db.get(GuiAccessSettings, 1)
+    if row is None:
+        row = GuiAccessSettings(id=1, enabled=False, idle_timeout_minutes=15, absolute_timeout_minutes=60, slot_count=MAX_SLOTS)
+        db.add(row)
+        await db.flush()
+    return row
+
+
+def host_refusal(host: OpnsenseHost) -> str | None:
+    """Why this firewall must not be opened through the gateway (None = eligible)."""
+    if not host.enabled:
+        return "disabled"
+    if urlsplit(host.base_url.strip()).scheme != "https" or firewall_url.check_base_url(host.base_url):
+        return "https"
+    if not host.verify_tls:
+        return "tls"
+    return None
+
+
+def firewall_origin(base_url: str) -> str:
+    parts = urlsplit(base_url.strip())
+    return f"https://{parts.netloc.rsplit('@', 1)[-1]}"
+
+
+def target_fingerprint(host: OpnsenseHost) -> str:
+    """What a gateway session talks to: origin, pinned CA and overlay route. Changes -> the session must end."""
+    material = "\n".join([firewall_origin(host.base_url), host.tls_ca_pem or "", overlay_service.proxy_for(host.base_url) or "",
+                          "verify" if host.verify_tls else "noverify"])
+    return hash_value(material)
+
+
+# ── audit ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def _audit(actor: str, *, action: str, status: str, host: OpnsenseHost | None = None,
+                 host_id=None, entity_id=None, message: str | None = None, details: dict | None = None) -> None:
+    token = audit_service.context.set({"actor": actor, "id": str(uuid.uuid4()), "action": action})
+    try:
+        await audit_service.persist(
+            kind=AUDIT_KIND, action=action, status=status, entity_id=str(entity_id) if entity_id else None,
+            host_id=str(host.id) if host is not None else (str(host_id) if host_id else None),
+            host_name=host.name if host is not None else None, message=message, details=details or {},
+        )
+    finally:
+        audit_service.context.reset(token)
+
+
+# ── tickets ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _redeem_origin(slot: int, request_host: str) -> str:
+    candidates = slot_sites().get(slot, [])
+    wanted = (urlsplit(f"//{request_host}").hostname or "").lower()
+    for origin in candidates:
+        if (urlsplit(origin).hostname or "").lower() == wanted:
+            return origin
+    return candidates[0]
+
+
+async def _pick_slot(db: AsyncSession, row: GuiAccessSettings, session_hash: str, user_id, host_id) -> int:
+    now = _now()
+    slots = active_slots(row)
+    absolute = timedelta(minutes=row.absolute_timeout_minutes)
+    in_use: dict[int, uuid.UUID] = {}
+    open_sessions = await db.scalars(select(GuiSession).where(
+        GuiSession.session_hash == session_hash, GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None), GuiSession.started_at > now - absolute))
+    for gs in open_sessions:
+        in_use[gs.slot] = gs.host_id
+    pending = await db.scalars(select(GuiTicket).where(
+        GuiTicket.session_hash == session_hash, GuiTicket.redeemed_at.is_(None), GuiTicket.expires_at > now))
+    for ticket in pending:
+        in_use.setdefault(ticket.slot, ticket.host_id)
+    for slot in slots:
+        if in_use.get(slot) == host_id:
+            return slot  # this firewall is already open in this browser session: same origin again
+    free = [s for s in slots if s not in in_use]
+    if not free:
+        raise GuiAccessError(409, ErrorCode.GUI_NO_FREE_SLOT, {"slots": str(len(slots))})
+    # S1: a slot this user's browser may still have a window of ANOTHER firewall on stays closed to this
+    # firewall — while a gateway session of the user is open there (any browser session) and for SLOT_COOLDOWN
+    # after the last one ended. The same firewall may take it again at once.
+    held = (await db.execute(
+        select(GuiSession.slot, GuiSession.host_id, GuiSession.ended_at, GuiSession.last_checked_at).where(
+            GuiSession.user_id == user_id,
+            ((GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None)) & ((GuiSession.started_at > now - absolute) | (GuiSession.last_checked_at > now - SLOT_COOLDOWN)))
+            | (GuiSession.ended_at > now - SLOT_COOLDOWN)))).all()
+    cooling: dict[int, datetime] = {}  # slot -> when it may go to another firewall
+    for slot, h_id, ended_at, checked_at in held:
+        if h_id == host_id or slot not in free:
+            continue
+        if ended_at is None and checked_at is not None and now - checked_at > SESSION_STALE_AFTER:
+            ended_at = checked_at  # the gateway stopped re-checking it (crash, kill): it ended when it was last seen
+        release = (ended_at + SLOT_COOLDOWN) if ended_at is not None else now + SLOT_COOLDOWN
+        if release <= now:
+            continue  # cooled down long ago (a session that stopped answering a while back)
+        cooling[slot] = max(cooling.get(slot, release), release)
+    usable = [s for s in free if s not in cooling]
+    if not usable:
+        wait = min(cooling.values()) - now
+        raise GuiAccessError(409, ErrorCode.GUI_SLOT_COOLING_DOWN,
+                             {"minutes": str(max(1, -(-int(wait.total_seconds()) // 60)))})
+    free = usable
+    # Prefer the slot this user had this firewall on before, then the slot the user used least recently
+    # (an old tab of another firewall on a reused origin is the documented residual risk).
+    history = (await db.execute(
+        select(GuiSession.slot, GuiSession.host_id, func.max(GuiSession.started_at))
+        .where(GuiSession.user_id == user_id).group_by(GuiSession.slot, GuiSession.host_id)
+    )).all()
+    for slot, h_id, _ in sorted(history, key=lambda r: r[2], reverse=True):
+        if h_id == host_id and slot in free:
+            return slot
+    last_used = {}
+    for slot, _, started in history:
+        last_used[slot] = max(last_used.get(slot, started), started)
+    epoch = datetime.min.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return min(free, key=lambda s: (last_used.get(s, epoch), s))
+
+
+async def issue_ticket(db: AsyncSession, *, user: AdminUser, session_token: str, host: OpnsenseHost,
+                       request_host: str) -> dict:
+    row = await get_settings(db)
+    now = _now()
+    await db.execute(delete(GuiTicket).where(GuiTicket.expires_at < now - timedelta(hours=1)))
+    session_hash = hash_value(session_token)
+    slot = await _pick_slot(db, row, session_hash, user.id, host.id)
+    # Reopening a slot in the same browser session replaces its earlier gateway session, so that one does not count.
+    open_count = await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(GuiSession).where(
+        GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None),
+        GuiSession.started_at > now - timedelta(minutes=row.absolute_timeout_minutes),
+        ~((GuiSession.session_hash == session_hash) & (GuiSession.slot == slot))))
+    if (open_count or 0) >= MAX_GATEWAY_SESSIONS:
+        raise GuiAccessError(409, ErrorCode.GUI_TOO_MANY_SESSIONS, {"max": str(MAX_GATEWAY_SESSIONS)})
+    raw = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+    db.add(GuiTicket(ticket_hash=hash_value(raw), session_hash=session_hash, user_id=user.id, host_id=host.id,
+                     slot=slot, created_at=now, expires_at=now + TICKET_TTL))
+    await db.commit()
+    await _audit(user.username, action="ticket", status="accepted", host=host, details={"slot": slot})
+    return {"url": f"{_redeem_origin(slot, request_host)}/__onx/redeem?t={raw}", "slot": slot,
+            "expires_in": int(TICKET_TTL.total_seconds())}
+
+
+# ── gateway side (internal endpoints) ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def _live_check(db: AsyncSession, row: GuiAccessSettings, session_hash: str, user_id, host_id,
+                      slot: int) -> tuple[str | None, AdminUser | None, OpnsenseHost | None]:
+    session = await db.scalar(select(Session).where(Session.token_hash == session_hash))
+    if session is None or session.expires_at <= _now() or session.user_id != user_id:
+        return "session", None, None
+    user = await db.get(AdminUser, user_id)
+    if user is None or user.role != "admin":
+        return "role", user, None
+    if not row.enabled:
+        return "disabled", user, None
+    if not settings.cookie_secure or not gateway_configured():
+        return "config", user, None
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if host is None or host_refusal(host):
+        return "host", user, host
+    if slot not in active_slots(row):
+        return "slot", user, host
+    return None, user, host
+
+
+def _timing(row: GuiAccessSettings, started_at: datetime) -> dict:
+    deadline = started_at + timedelta(minutes=row.absolute_timeout_minutes)
+    return {"idle_timeout_seconds": row.idle_timeout_minutes * 60,
+            "absolute_deadline": int(deadline.timestamp()),
+            "revalidate_seconds": REVALIDATE_SECONDS}
+
+
+async def redeem(db: AsyncSession, *, ticket_hash: str, session_hash: str, slot: int, client_ip: str | None) -> dict:
+    """{'ok': True, ...upstream data...} or {'ok': False, 'reason': ...}. Any attempt burns the ticket."""
+    now = _now()
+    ticket = await db.scalar(select(GuiTicket).where(GuiTicket.ticket_hash == ticket_hash).with_for_update())
+    if ticket is None:
+        await db.rollback()
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": "unknown"}
+    replayed = ticket.redeemed_at is not None
+    ticket.redeemed_at = ticket.redeemed_at or now
+    row = await get_settings(db)
+    reason = None
+    if replayed:
+        reason = "replayed"
+    elif ticket.expires_at <= now:
+        reason = "expired"
+    elif not secrets.compare_digest(ticket.session_hash, session_hash):
+        reason = "session"
+    elif ticket.slot != slot:
+        reason = "slot"
+    user = host = None
+    if reason is None:
+        reason, user, host = await _live_check(db, row, ticket.session_hash, ticket.user_id, ticket.host_id, slot)
+    if user is None:
+        user = await db.get(AdminUser, ticket.user_id)
+    if host is None:
+        host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, ticket.host_id)
+    actor = user.username if user is not None else "unknown"
+    if reason is not None:
+        await db.commit()
+        await _audit(actor, action="redeem", status="denied", host=host, host_id=ticket.host_id,
+                     message=reason, details={"slot": slot, "client_ip": client_ip, "reason": reason})
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": reason}
+    # The same browser session reopening this slot replaces the earlier gateway session there.
+    superseded = (await db.scalars(select(GuiSession).where(
+        GuiSession.session_hash == session_hash, GuiSession.slot == slot, GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None)))).all()
+    if any(old.host_id != host.id for old in superseded):
+        # Two quick tickets both saw the slot free: the second must not take over another firewall's origin
+        # without the cooling-down time (S1).
+        await db.commit()
+        await _audit(actor, action="redeem", status="denied", host=host, host_id=ticket.host_id,
+                     message="slot", details={"slot": slot, "client_ip": client_ip, "reason": "slot"})
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": "slot"}
+    for old in superseded:
+        old.ended_at, old.end_reason = now, "superseded"
+    gs = GuiSession(session_hash=session_hash, user_id=user.id, host_id=host.id, slot=slot,
+                    client_ip=(client_ip or None) and client_ip[:45], started_at=now, last_checked_at=now)
+    db.add(gs)
+    await db.commit()
+    await _audit(actor, action="redeem", status="accepted", host=host, entity_id=gs.id,
+                 details={"slot": slot, "client_ip": client_ip})
+    return {
+        "ok": True, "gui_session_id": str(gs.id), "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name,
+        "upstream_origin": firewall_origin(host.base_url),
+        "ca_pem": host.tls_ca_pem or None,  # public certificate (pin); None = system trust store
+        "proxy_url": overlay_service.proxy_for(host.base_url),
+        "target_fp": target_fingerprint(host),
+        **_timing(row, now),
+    }
+
+
+async def _finish(db: AsyncSession, gs: GuiSession, reason: str) -> None:
+    now = _now()
+    if gs.ended_at is None:
+        gs.ended_at, gs.end_reason = now, reason[:32]
+    await db.commit()
+    user = await db.get(AdminUser, gs.user_id)
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, gs.host_id)
+    await _audit(user.username if user else "unknown", action="end", status="accepted", host=host,
+                 host_id=gs.host_id, entity_id=gs.id, message=reason,
+                 details={"slot": gs.slot, "client_ip": gs.client_ip, "reason": reason,
+                          "duration_seconds": int((gs.ended_at - gs.started_at).total_seconds())})
+
+
+async def revalidate(db: AsyncSession, *, gui_session_id: uuid.UUID, session_hash: str,
+                     target_fp: str | None = None) -> dict:
+    gs = await db.get(GuiSession, gui_session_id)
+    if gs is None or not secrets.compare_digest(gs.session_hash, session_hash):
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": "unknown"}
+    if gs.ended_at is not None:
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": gs.end_reason or "ended"}
+    row = await get_settings(db)
+    if _now() >= gs.started_at + timedelta(minutes=row.absolute_timeout_minutes):
+        await _finish(db, gs, "absolute")
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": "absolute"}
+    reason, _, host = await _live_check(db, row, gs.session_hash, gs.user_id, gs.host_id, gs.slot)
+    # S4: the gateway presents the fingerprint it got at redeem time. Firewall address, pinned certificate or
+    # overlay route changed since -> the session (and the upstream connection it holds) ends now.
+    if reason is None and target_fp is not None and host is not None \
+            and not secrets.compare_digest(target_fp, target_fingerprint(host)):
+        reason = "target"
+    if reason is not None:
+        await _finish(db, gs, reason)
+        return {"ok": False, "reason": reason}
+    gs.last_checked_at = _now()
+    await db.commit()
+    return {"ok": True, **_timing(row, gs.started_at)}
+
+
+async def end(db: AsyncSession, *, gui_session_id: uuid.UUID, session_hash: str, reason: str) -> bool:
+    gs = await db.get(GuiSession, gui_session_id)
+    if gs is None or not secrets.compare_digest(gs.session_hash, session_hash):
+        return False
+    if gs.ended_at is None:
+        await _finish(db, gs, reason)
+    return True
+
+
+async def end_all(db: AsyncSession, reason: str) -> int:
+    """Switch turned off: mark every open gateway session ended (the gateway drops them on its next check)."""
+    result = await db.execute(update(GuiSession).where(GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None))
+                              .values(ended_at=_now(), end_reason=reason[:32]))
+    return result.rowcount or 0

backend/app/services/metrics_service.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ fan out live calls to every firewall (an offline host would stall it past the
 scraper's timeout and a 15 s scrape interval would hammer the fleet). The
 inputs are what OPNexus' own pollers already store:
 
-* host reachability and resources — the 60 s resource sampler (a host that
+* host reachability, resources, gateway health and service state — the 60 s resource sampler (a host that
   produced no sample for ``STALE_AFTER`` is reported down),
 * CARP role — the latest observed transition (carp_events),
 * open problems — the notification engine's problem table,
@@ -19,11 +19,12 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from app.models.carp_event import CarpEvent
 from app.models.compliance_result import ComplianceResult
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
-from app.models.notification import NotificationProblem
+from app.models.notification import DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST, NotificationProblem
 from app.models.resource_sample import HostResourceSample
+from app.models.rollout import RolloutRun
 from app.models.scheduled_maintenance import ScheduledMaintenance
 from app.routers.dashboard import collect_pending_actions
-from app.services import compliance_service
+from app.services import compliance_service, gateway_health_service, notification_settings_service
 from app.version import APP_VERSION
 
 CONTENT_TYPE = "text/plain; version=0.0.4; charset=utf-8"
@@ -99,6 +100,15 @@ async def render(db: AsyncSession) -> str:
     out.family("opnexus_host_memory_used_percent", "Memory in use, percent (last sample).")
     out.family("opnexus_host_load1", "1-minute load average (last sample).")
     out.family("opnexus_host_disk_used_percent", "Fullest disk, percent (last sample).")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_swap_used_percent", "Swap in use, percent (last sample; absent without swap).")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_gateway_up", "1 if the gateway is not down (online, degraded or not monitored), 0 if OPNsense reports it down.")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_gateway_loss_percent", "Packet loss to the gateway monitor address, percent (last sample).")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_gateway_delay_seconds", "Round-trip time to the gateway monitor address (last sample).")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_gateway_stddev_seconds", "Round-trip time deviation to the gateway monitor address (last sample).")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_service_running", "1 if a watched service (Settings > Notifications) runs, 0 if it is stopped (last sample).")
+    out.family("opnexus_host_api_rights_missing", "1 if the firewall refused a side reading (read=gateways, services, swap, cpu) because the API key lacks the right (last sample); absent otherwise.")
+    configured = (await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)).service_watchlist
+    watchlist = set(DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST if configured is None else configured)
     out.family("opnexus_host_carp_master", "1 if the host's last observed CARP role is MASTER, 0 if BACKUP; absent if unknown.")
     for host in hosts:
         labels = {"host": host.name, "cluster": host.cluster_name or ""}
@@ -115,6 +125,24 @@ async def render(db: AsyncSession) -> str:
             ):
                 if value is not None:
                     out.sample(name, value, **labels)
+        if sample is not None:
+            raw = sample.raw or {}
+            if raw.get("swap_used_pct") is not None:
+                out.sample("opnexus_host_swap_used_percent", raw["swap_used_pct"], **labels)
+            for gw in gateway_health_service.from_compact(raw.get("gateways")):
+                gw_labels = {**labels, "gateway": gw.name}
+                out.sample("opnexus_host_gateway_up", 0 if gw.state == "offline" else 1, **gw_labels)
+                for name, value, factor in (
+                    ("opnexus_host_gateway_loss_percent", gw.loss, 1), ("opnexus_host_gateway_delay_seconds", gw.delay, 0.001),
+                    ("opnexus_host_gateway_stddev_seconds", gw.stddev, 0.001),
+                ):
+                    if value is not None:
+                        out.sample(name, round(value * factor, 6), **gw_labels)
+            for read in sorted(str(r) for r in raw.get("denied") or []):
+                out.sample("opnexus_host_api_rights_missing", 1, **labels, read=read)
+            for key, running in sorted((raw.get("services") or {}).items()):
+                if key.split("/")[0] in watchlist:
+                    out.sample("opnexus_host_service_running", running, **labels, service=key.split("/")[0], instance=key.split("/", 1)[1] if "/" in key else None)
         if carp_state.get(host.id) in ("MASTER", "BACKUP"):
             out.sample("opnexus_host_carp_master", 1 if carp_state[host.id] == "MASTER" else 0, **labels)
 
@@ -152,4 +180,8 @@ async def render(db: AsyncSession) -> str:
     pending = await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(ScheduledMaintenance).where(ScheduledMaintenance.status == "pending"))
     out.sample("opnexus_scheduled_maintenance_pending", pending or 0)
 
+    out.family("opnexus_rollout_runs", "Fleet rollout runs by status (waiting_window, wave_running, paused, succeeded, ...).")
+    for status, count in sorted((await db.execute(select(RolloutRun.status, func.count()).group_by(RolloutRun.status))).all()):
+        out.sample("opnexus_rollout_runs", count, status=status)
+
     return out.text()

backend/app/services/monitor_checks.py

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+"""Monitoring alerts (1.24): gateway down, resource thresholds, stopped services.
+
+Same contract as notification_checks.py (each check returns {dedup_key: context} of what is
+bad right now), with one addition: they never judge a single reading. The inputs are the
+60-second samples the resource sampler stores (resource_monitor_service, HostResourceSample),
+and a problem needs the last N samples to agree before it opens AND before it closes again:
+
+* all N bad            -> problem,
+* all N good           -> no problem,
+* anything in between  -> keep the current state (open stays open, closed stays closed).
+
+So a single spike never alerts, a flapping link does not open and close the alert every few
+minutes, and a sample that could not be read ("unknown") neither raises nor clears anything.
+A host without a fresh sample is not judged at all (check_host_offline reports it); its open
+problems are kept.
+"""
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.notification import DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST, NotificationProblem
+from app.models.resource_sample import HostResourceSample
+from app.services import gateway_health_service, notification_settings_service
+from app.services.notification_dedup import Problems
+
+# The sampler runs every 60 s; three missed rounds mean the host is not reachable (same limit as metrics_service).
+STALE_AFTER = timedelta(seconds=180)
+# How far back a service must have been seen running before its absence is reported (samples, ~2 h at 60 s).
+SERVICE_EVIDENCE_SAMPLES = 120
+_DISK_TYPES = {"ufs", "zfs"}
+
+
+def verdict(flags: list[bool | None], confirm: int, is_open: bool) -> bool:
+    """flags: newest first; True = bad, False = good, None = unknown."""
+    window = flags[:confirm]
+    if len(window) >= confirm:
+        if all(f is True for f in window):
+            return True
+        if all(f is False for f in window):
+            return False
+    return is_open
+
+
+async def _enabled_hosts(db: AsyncSession) -> list[OpnsenseHost]:
+    return list((await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).where(OpnsenseHost.enabled.is_(True)))).all())
+
+
+async def _open_keys(db: AsyncSession, problem_type: str) -> set[str]:
+    rows = await db.scalars(
+        select(NotificationProblem.dedup_key).where(
+            NotificationProblem.problem_type == problem_type, NotificationProblem.status == "open"
+        )
+    )
+    return set(rows.all())
+
+
+async def _recent(db: AsyncSession, host_id, limit: int, *raw_keys: str) -> list[dict]:
+    """The newest ``limit`` samples of a host, newest first, with just the JSON keys asked for."""
+    columns = [HostResourceSample.sampled_at, HostResourceSample.mem_used_pct, HostResourceSample.load_avg_1m]
+    columns += [HostResourceSample.raw[key].as_json() for key in raw_keys]
+    rows = (
+        await db.execute(
+            select(*columns).where(HostResourceSample.host_id == host_id).order_by(HostResourceSample.sampled_at.desc()).limit(limit)
+        )
+    ).all()
+    return [
+        {"sampled_at": r[0], "mem_used_pct": r[1], "load_avg_1m": r[2], **{k: r[3 + i] for i, k in enumerate(raw_keys)}}
+        for r in rows
+    ]
+
+
+def _fresh(samples: list[dict]) -> bool:
+    return bool(samples) and datetime.now(timezone.utc) - samples[0]["sampled_at"] <= STALE_AFTER
+
+
+def _keys_of_host(open_keys: set[str], host: OpnsenseHost) -> set[str]:
+    prefix = f"{host.id}:"
+    return {k[len(prefix):] for k in open_keys if k.startswith(prefix)}
+
+
+# ── Gateways ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _gateway_reason(g) -> str:
+    if g.state == "offline":
+        return "Gateway offline"
+    parts = []
+    if g.loss is not None:
+        parts.append(f"Paketverlust {g.loss:g} %")
+    if g.delay is not None:
+        parts.append(f"Latenz {g.delay:g} ms")
+    return ", ".join(parts) or g.status
+
+
+async def check_gateway_down(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    cfg = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    confirm = max(1, cfg.alert_confirm_samples)
+    loss_limit, delay_limit = cfg.gateway_loss_threshold_pct, cfg.gateway_delay_threshold_ms
+    muted = set(cfg.gateway_alert_muted or [])
+    open_keys = await _open_keys(db, "gateway_down")
+    problems = Problems()
+    for host in await _enabled_hosts(db):
+        samples = await _recent(db, host.id, confirm, "gateways")
+        if not _fresh(samples):
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{host.id}:")
+            continue
+        parsed = [
+            None if s["gateways"] is None else {g.name: g for g in gateway_health_service.from_compact(s["gateways"])}
+            for s in samples
+        ]
+        names = {name for p in parsed if p for name in p} | _keys_of_host(open_keys, host)
+        for name in sorted(names):
+            if f"{host.id}:{name}" in muted:
+                continue  # alert switched off for this gateway: not judged, an open problem of it resolves
+            flags: list[bool | None] = []
+            for p in parsed:
+                if p is None:
+                    flags.append(None)
+                else:
+                    g = p.get(name)  # a gateway that no longer exists is "fine": its problem resolves
+                    flags.append(False if g is None else gateway_health_service.is_bad(g, loss_limit, delay_limit))
+            key = f"{host.id}:{name}"
+            if not verdict(flags, confirm, key in open_keys):
+                continue
+            latest = next((p[name] for p in parsed if p and name in p), None)
+            problems[key] = {
+                "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name, "gateway": name,
+                "grund": _gateway_reason(latest) if latest else "keine aktuellen Messwerte",
+                "status": latest.status if latest else None,
+                "paketverlust_prozent": latest.loss if latest else None,
+                "latenz_ms": latest.delay if latest else None,
+            }
+    return problems
+
+
+# ── API rights ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+# What the sampler reads on the side (resource_monitor_service) -> (ACL entry of the OPNsense user/group that
+# grants it, endpoint; the sample's "ok" list proves a reading went through). ACL names: opnsense/core
+# src/opnsense/mvc/app/models/OPNsense/Core/ACL/ACL.xml (page-system-gateways: api/routes/gateway/status;
+# page-status-services: api/core/service/*; page-system-login-logout "Lobby: Dashboard": api/diagnostics/cpu_usage/*
+# and api/diagnostics/system/system_swap).
+API_READS: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
+    "gateways": ("System: Gateways", "/api/routes/gateway/status"),
+    "services": ("Status: Services", "/api/core/service/search"),
+    "swap": ("Lobby: Dashboard", "/api/diagnostics/system/systemSwap"),
+    "cpu": ("Lobby: Dashboard", "/api/diagnostics/cpu_usage/getCPUType"),
+}
+
+
+async def check_api_rights_missing(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """The API key of a firewall may be refused (403) on the side readings the alerts rely on (gateway state,
+    service state): those alerts can then never fire, and nobody would notice. Only a refusal counts; a timeout
+    or an error stays "unknown"."""
+    cfg = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    confirm = max(1, cfg.alert_confirm_samples)
+    open_keys = await _open_keys(db, "api_rights_missing")
+    problems = Problems()
+    for host in await _enabled_hosts(db):
+        samples = await _recent(db, host.id, confirm, "denied", "ok")
+        if not _fresh(samples):
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{host.id}:")
+            continue
+        was_open = _keys_of_host(open_keys, host)
+        names = {n for s in samples for n in (s["denied"] or []) if n in API_READS} | (was_open & set(API_READS))
+        for name in sorted(names):
+            acl, path = API_READS[name]
+            flags: list[bool | None] = []
+            for s in samples:
+                if s["denied"] is None:
+                    flags.append(None)  # a sample from before this check existed
+                elif name in s["denied"]:
+                    flags.append(True)
+                else:
+                    # Only a reading that went through proves the right is back; a timeout or a sample from
+                    # before "ok" existed stays unknown (the problem neither opens nor closes on it).
+                    flags.append(False if s["ok"] is not None and name in s["ok"] else None)
+            if verdict(flags, confirm, name in was_open):
+                problems[f"{host.id}:{name}"] = {
+                    "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name, "lesezugriff": name, "endpunkt": path,
+                    "fehlendes_recht": acl,
+                    "hinweis": f"Dem API-Benutzer fehlt das Recht, {path} zu lesen (OPNsense-Berechtigung \"{acl}\"). "
+                               "Alarme, die darauf beruhen, können nicht auslösen.",
+                }
+    return problems
+
+
+# ── Resources ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def disk_groups(devices) -> dict[str, tuple[str, float]]:
+    """{group: (label, used %)} — one entry per ZFS pool / UFS device, the fullest dataset of a pool wins."""
+    groups: dict[str, tuple[str, float]] = {}
+    for dev in devices or []:
+        if not isinstance(dev, dict) or dev.get("type") not in _DISK_TYPES:
+            continue
+        try:
+            pct = float(dev["used_pct"])
+        except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+            continue
+        device = str(dev.get("device") or dev.get("mountpoint") or "?")
+        group = device.split("/")[0] if dev["type"] == "zfs" else device
+        label = group if dev["type"] == "zfs" else str(dev.get("mountpoint") or device)
+        if group not in groups or pct > groups[group][1]:
+            groups[group] = (label, pct)
+    return groups
+
+
+async def check_resource_threshold(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    cfg = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    confirm = max(1, cfg.resource_confirm_samples)
+    open_keys = await _open_keys(db, "resource_threshold")
+    problems = Problems()
+
+    def over(value, limit) -> bool | None:
+        if not limit or value is None:
+            return None if value is None else False
+        return value >= limit
+
+    for host in await _enabled_hosts(db):
+        samples = await _recent(db, host.id, confirm, "disk", "swap_used_pct", "cpu_threads")
+        if not _fresh(samples):
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{host.id}:")
+            continue
+        base = {"host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name}
+        was_open = _keys_of_host(open_keys, host)
+
+        # Disk: one problem per pool/device.
+        disk = [None if s["disk"] is None else disk_groups(s["disk"]) for s in samples]
+        group_names = {g for d in disk if d for g in d} | {k[5:] for k in was_open if k.startswith("disk:")}
+        for group in sorted(group_names):
+            flags = [None if d is None else (over(d[group][1], cfg.disk_threshold_pct) if group in d else False) for d in disk]
+            if verdict(flags, confirm, f"disk:{group}" in was_open):
+                label, pct = next((d[group] for d in disk if d and group in d), (group, None))
+                problems[f"{host.id}:disk:{group}"] = {
+                    **base, "ressource": f"Festplatte {label}", "wert_prozent": pct, "schwelle_prozent": cfg.disk_threshold_pct,
+                }
+
+        def simple(key: str, label: str, flags: list, value, threshold, unit: str) -> None:
+            if verdict(flags, confirm, key in was_open):
+                # An open alert stays open while the reading is unavailable: then there is no number to show (never "None %").
+                problems[f"{host.id}:{key}"] = {**base, "ressource": label, "wert": None if value is None else f"{value}{unit}",
+                                                "schwelle": f"{threshold}{unit}"}
+
+        latest = samples[0]
+        simple("memory", "Arbeitsspeicher", [over(s["mem_used_pct"], cfg.memory_threshold_pct) for s in samples],
+               latest["mem_used_pct"], cfg.memory_threshold_pct, " %")
+        simple("swap", "Swap", [over(s["swap_used_pct"], cfg.swap_threshold_pct) for s in samples],
+               latest["swap_used_pct"], cfg.swap_threshold_pct, " %")
+
+        def per_cpu(s):
+            if s["load_avg_1m"] is None or not s["cpu_threads"]:
+                return None  # thread count unknown (older firmware): the load cannot be judged
+            return s["load_avg_1m"] / s["cpu_threads"]
+
+        simple("cpu", "CPU-Last (pro Thread)", [over(per_cpu(s), cfg.load_per_cpu_threshold) for s in samples],
+               None if per_cpu(latest) is None else round(per_cpu(latest), 2), cfg.load_per_cpu_threshold, "")
+    return problems
+
+
+# ── Services ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def check_service_down(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    cfg = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    confirm = max(1, cfg.alert_confirm_samples)
+    watch = set(cfg.service_watchlist if cfg.service_watchlist is not None else DEFAULT_SERVICE_WATCHLIST)
+    open_keys = await _open_keys(db, "service_down")
+    problems = Problems()
+    for host in await _enabled_hosts(db):
+        samples = await _recent(db, host.id, confirm + SERVICE_EVIDENCE_SAMPLES, "services")
+        if not _fresh(samples):
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{host.id}:")
+            continue
+        listings = [s["services"] for s in samples]
+        was_open = _keys_of_host(open_keys, host)
+        candidates = {k for k in (listings[0] or {}) if k.split("/")[0] in watch} | was_open
+        for svc in sorted(candidates):
+            if svc.split("/")[0] not in watch:
+                continue  # taken off the watchlist: the problem resolves
+            flags = [None if sv is None else (sv[svc] == 0 if svc in sv else False) for sv in listings]
+            bad = verdict(flags, confirm, svc in was_open)
+            # Only a service that was seen running before counts: one that never ran (enabled but idle,
+            # e.g. DHCPv6 without a prefix) or was stopped on purpose long ago is not a failure.
+            if bad and svc not in was_open and not any(sv and sv.get(svc) == 1 for sv in listings[confirm:]):
+                bad = False
+            if bad:
+                problems[f"{host.id}:{svc}"] = {
+                    "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name, "dienst": svc.split("/")[0],
+                    "hinweis": "Dienst läuft nicht mehr; absichtlich gestoppt? Dann aus der Überwachungsliste nehmen.",
+                }
+    return problems

backend/app/services/notification_channels.py

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+"""Extra notification channels: ntfy, Gotify, Telegram, Microsoft Teams, Matrix.
+
+They sit beside SMTP and the generic webhook (notification_delivery.py) and reuse its message
+text. Each channel is a row in ``notification_channels`` (see models/notification.py); the
+credential never touches the database: it is stored through notification_secret_store as
+``channel_<id>`` (mode 0600 file) and read only at send time. Where the credential is part of the
+URL (a Telegram bot token, the whole Teams webhook URL) the URL is built per request, and the
+HTTP request log is muted while it is in flight (``url_guard.muted``), so neither the logs nor an
+error message ever contain it.
+
+API formats, checked against the vendors' documentation:
+
+* ntfy      — JSON publish: POST <server>/ with {"topic", "title", "message", "priority", "tags"}
+              (docs.ntfy.sh/publish, "Publish as JSON"); optional ``Authorization: Bearer <token>``.
+* Gotify    — POST <server>/message, header ``X-Gotify-Key: <app token>`` (keeps the token out of
+              the URL), JSON {"title", "message", "priority"} (gotify.net/docs/pushmsg).
+* Telegram  — POST <api>/bot<token>/sendMessage, JSON {"chat_id", "text"}; text limit 4096
+              characters; answers {"ok": true, ...} (core.telegram.org/bots/api#sendmessage).
+* Teams     — POST to the (Workflows / incoming) webhook URL with a message envelope carrying an
+              Adaptive Card (learn.microsoft.com ... add-incoming-webhook); the URL is the secret.
+* Matrix    — PUT <homeserver>/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/<roomId>/send/m.room.message/<txnId> with
+              ``Authorization: Bearer <access token>``, JSON {"msgtype": "m.text", "body"}; a fresh
+              transaction id per message (Matrix client-server API, "Sending events to a room").
+"""
+import re
+import uuid
+from urllib.parse import quote
+
+import httpx
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.models.notification import CHANNEL_TYPES, NotificationChannel, NotificationProblem
+from app.services import notification_delivery, notification_secret_store, url_guard
+from app.services.notification_delivery import NotificationDeliveryError
+
+TELEGRAM_LIMIT = 4096
+TEAMS_LIMIT = 20000
+_NTFY_TOPIC = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$")
+_MATRIX_ROOM = re.compile(r"^![^\s:]+:[^\s/]+$")
+
+# type -> (required config keys, secret required?)
+_SPEC = {
+    "ntfy": ({"topic"}, False),
+    "gotify": ({"server_url"}, True),
+    "telegram": ({"chat_id"}, True),
+    "teams": (set(), True),
+    "matrix": ({"homeserver_url", "room_id"}, True),
+}
+assert set(_SPEC) == set(CHANNEL_TYPES)
+
+
+def secret_name(channel_id) -> str:
+    return f"channel_{channel_id}"
+
+
+def clean_config(channel_type: str, config: dict) -> dict:
+    """Validates and normalises the non-secret settings of a channel. Raises ValueError (German reason)."""
+    if channel_type not in _SPEC:
+        raise ValueError("Unbekannter Kanaltyp")
+    config = dict(config or {})
+    out: dict = {}
+
+    def url(key: str, default: str | None = None) -> str | None:
+        raw = str(config.get(key) or "").strip() or default
+        if raw is None:
+            return None
+        return url_guard.validate_url(raw).rstrip("/")
+
+    def integer(key: str, low: int, high: int, default: int) -> int:
+        value = config.get(key)
+        if value in (None, ""):
+            return default
+        try:
+            number = int(value)
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            raise ValueError(f"{key}: ganze Zahl erwartet") from None
+        if not low <= number <= high:
+            raise ValueError(f"{key}: Wert zwischen {low} und {high} erwartet")
+        return number
+
+    if channel_type == "ntfy":
+        out["server_url"] = url("server_url", "https://ntfy.sh")
+        topic = str(config.get("topic") or "").strip()
+        if not _NTFY_TOPIC.match(topic):
+            raise ValueError("Thema: 1–64 Zeichen aus Buchstaben, Ziffern, _ und -")
+        out["topic"] = topic
+        out["priority"] = integer("priority", 1, 5, 4)
+    elif channel_type == "gotify":
+        out["server_url"] = url("server_url")
+        if not out["server_url"]:
+            raise ValueError("Serveradresse fehlt")
+        out["priority"] = integer("priority", 0, 10, 5)
+    elif channel_type == "telegram":
+        chat_id = str(config.get("chat_id") or "").strip()
+        if not re.match(r"^(-?\d{1,20}|@[A-Za-z0-9_]{4,64})$", chat_id):
+            raise ValueError("Chat-ID: Zahl (z. B. -1001234567890) oder @Kanalname")
+        out["chat_id"] = chat_id
+        out["api_base"] = url("api_base", "https://api.telegram.org")
+    elif channel_type == "matrix":
+        out["homeserver_url"] = url("homeserver_url")
+        if not out["homeserver_url"]:
+            raise ValueError("Homeserver-Adresse fehlt")
+        room = str(config.get("room_id") or "").strip()
+        if not _MATRIX_ROOM.match(room):
+            raise ValueError("Raum-ID: Form !abc123:example.org (nicht der Alias #raum:…)")
+        out["room_id"] = room
+    return out
+
+
+def clean_secret(channel_type: str, secret: str) -> str:
+    value = (secret or "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        raise ValueError("Zugangsdaten fehlen")
+    if channel_type == "teams":
+        value = url_guard.validate_url(value, max_length=2000)
+        if not value.startswith("https://"):
+            raise ValueError("Die Teams-Webhook-Adresse muss mit https:// beginnen")
+    elif any(c.isspace() for c in value) or len(value) > 500:
+        raise ValueError("Token: keine Leerzeichen, höchstens 500 Zeichen")
+    return value
+
+
+def missing_requirements(channel: NotificationChannel) -> str | None:
+    required, needs_secret = _SPEC[channel.channel_type]
+    if any(not channel.config.get(k) for k in required):
+        return "Konfiguration unvollständig"
+    if needs_secret and not channel.secret_set:
+        return "Zugangsdaten fehlen"
+    return None
+
+
+# ── Message formatting (one function per channel, pure — unit-testable) ───────────
+
+def _parts(problem: NotificationProblem, transition: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    """(title, details) — the title repeated at the top of render_message's body is dropped."""
+    subject, body = notification_delivery.render_message(problem, transition)
+    details = body.split("\n", 2)[2] if body.count("\n") >= 2 else ""
+    return subject, details.strip()
+
+
+def _clip(text: str, limit: int) -> str:
+    return text if len(text) <= limit else text[: limit - 1] + "…"
+
+
+def format_ntfy(config: dict, problem, transition: str) -> dict:
+    title, details = _parts(problem, transition)
+    resolved = transition == "resolved"
+    return {
+        "topic": config["topic"], "title": title, "message": details or title,
+        "priority": 3 if resolved else int(config.get("priority", 4)),
+        "tags": ["white_check_mark"] if resolved else ["warning"],
+    }
+
+
+def format_gotify(config: dict, problem, transition: str) -> dict:
+    title, details = _parts(problem, transition)
+    return {"title": title, "message": details or title, "priority": 1 if transition == "resolved" else int(config.get("priority", 5))}
+
+
+def format_telegram(config: dict, problem, transition: str) -> dict:
+    title, details = _parts(problem, transition)
+    return {
+        "chat_id": config["chat_id"], "text": _clip(f"{title}\n\n{details}".strip(), TELEGRAM_LIMIT),
+        "disable_web_page_preview": True,
+    }
+
+
+def format_teams(config: dict, problem, transition: str) -> dict:
+    title, details = _parts(problem, transition)
+    body: list[dict] = [{"type": "TextBlock", "text": title, "weight": "Bolder", "size": "Medium", "wrap": True}]
+    if details:
+        body.append({"type": "TextBlock", "text": _clip(details, TEAMS_LIMIT), "wrap": True})
+    return {
+        "type": "message",
+        "attachments": [{
+            "contentType": "application/vnd.microsoft.card.adaptive", "contentUrl": None,
+            "content": {
+                "$schema": "http://adaptivecards.io/schemas/adaptive-card.json",
+                "type": "AdaptiveCard", "version": "1.4", "body": body,
+            },
+        }],
+    }
+
+
+def format_matrix(config: dict, problem, transition: str) -> dict:
+    title, details = _parts(problem, transition)
+    return {"msgtype": "m.text", "body": f"{title}\n\n{details}".strip()}
+
+
+# ── Sending ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _request_for(channel: NotificationChannel, secret: str, problem, transition: str) -> tuple[str, str, dict, dict, str | None]:
+    """(method, url, headers, json body, expected "ok" check key)."""
+    cfg, kind = channel.config, channel.channel_type
+    if kind == "ntfy":
+        headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {secret}"} if secret else {}
+        return "POST", cfg["server_url"].rstrip("/") + "/", headers, format_ntfy(cfg, problem, transition), None
+    if kind == "gotify":
+        return "POST", cfg["server_url"].rstrip("/") + "/message", {"X-Gotify-Key": secret}, format_gotify(cfg, problem, transition), None
+    if kind == "telegram":
+        return "POST", f"{cfg['api_base'].rstrip('/')}/bot{secret}/sendMessage", {}, format_telegram(cfg, problem, transition), "ok"
+    if kind == "teams":
+        return "POST", secret, {}, format_teams(cfg, problem, transition), None
+    room = quote(cfg["room_id"], safe="")
+    url = f"{cfg['homeserver_url'].rstrip('/')}/_matrix/client/v3/rooms/{room}/send/m.room.message/{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
+    return "PUT", url, {"Authorization": f"Bearer {secret}"}, format_matrix(cfg, problem, transition), None
+
+
+async def send(channel: NotificationChannel, problem: NotificationProblem, transition: str) -> None:
+    problem_missing = missing_requirements(channel)
+    if problem_missing:
+        raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"Kanal „{channel.name}“: {problem_missing}")
+    secret = notification_secret_store.read_secret(secret_name(channel.id)) or ""
+    if channel.secret_set and not secret:
+        raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"Kanal „{channel.name}“: Zugangsdaten nicht lesbar – bitte neu setzen")
+    method, url, headers, payload, ok_key = _request_for(channel, secret, problem, transition)
+    label = f"Kanal „{channel.name}“ ({channel.channel_type})"
+    with url_guard.muted():
+        try:
+            url_guard.validate_url(url, max_length=2100)
+            await url_guard.ensure_resolved_safe(url)
+        except ValueError as exc:
+            raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"{label}: {exc}") from None
+        try:
+            async with url_guard.guarded_client(timeout=settings.opnsense_timeout, follow_redirects=False) as client:
+                resp = await client.request(method, url, json=payload, headers=headers)
+                resp.raise_for_status()
+                if ok_key and not (resp.json() or {}).get(ok_key):
+                    raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"{label}: Zustellung abgelehnt")
+        except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
+            # str(exc) names the full URL, which for Telegram/Teams is the credential itself.
+            reason = url_guard.failure_reason(exc)
+            raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"{label}: Zustellung fehlgeschlagen ({reason})") from None
+        except ValueError:
+            raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"{label}: Antwort nicht lesbar") from None
+
+
+async def send_test(channel: NotificationChannel) -> None:
+    fake = NotificationProblem(
+        problem_type="test", dedup_key="test",
+        context={"message": "Dies ist eine Testbenachrichtigung von OPNexus."},
+    )
+    await send(channel, fake, "opened")
+
+
+async def enabled_channels(db: AsyncSession) -> list[NotificationChannel]:
+    rows = await db.scalars(select(NotificationChannel).where(NotificationChannel.enabled.is_(True)).order_by(NotificationChannel.name))
+    return list(rows.all())

backend/app/services/notification_checks.py

@@ -363,3 +363,49 @@ async def check_compliance(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
                     "beispiele": ", ".join(params.get("examples", [])) or None,
                 }
     return problems
+
+
+# ── Rollouts (1.25) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _short(detail) -> str | None:
+    if not detail:
+        return None
+    parts = []
+    for key, value in detail.items():
+        if isinstance(value, list):
+            value = ", ".join(str(v) for v in value[:8])
+        parts.append(f"{key}: {value}")
+    return "; ".join(parts)[:500]
+
+
+async def check_rollout_paused(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """Open while a rollout run stands still waiting for a human (gate, failed host, window gone...)."""
+    from app.models.rollout import RolloutRun
+    problems: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for run in (await db.scalars(select(RolloutRun).where(RolloutRun.status == "paused"))).all():
+        wave = next((w.label for w in run.waves if w.index == run.current_wave), None)
+        problems[str(run.id)] = {
+            "run_id": str(run.id), "plan": run.plan_name, "grund": run.pause_reason, "welle": wave,
+            "zielversion": run.target_version, "details": _short(run.pause_detail),
+        }
+    return problems
+
+
+ROLLOUT_START_FAILURE_WINDOW = timedelta(days=3)
+
+
+async def check_rollout_start_failed(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """An automatic start at a window occurrence did not happen (event: closed without a 'resolved' notice)."""
+    from app.models.rollout import RolloutPlan
+    since = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - ROLLOUT_START_FAILURE_WINDOW
+    problems: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for plan in (await db.scalars(select(RolloutPlan).where(RolloutPlan.auto_start_error.is_not(None)))).all():
+        error = plan.auto_start_error or {}
+        at = datetime.fromisoformat(error["at"]) if error.get("at") else None
+        if at is None or at < since:
+            continue
+        problems[f"{plan.id}:{error.get('occurrence')}"] = {
+            "plan_id": str(plan.id), "plan": plan.name, "grund": error.get("code"), "termin": error.get("occurrence"),
+            "details": _short(error.get("params")),
+        }
+    return problems

backend/app/services/notification_delivery.py

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import httpx
 
 from app.config import settings
 from app.models.notification import NotificationProblem, NotificationSettings
-from app.services import notification_secret_store
+from app.services import notification_secret_store, url_guard
 
 
 class NotificationDeliveryError(Exception):
@@ -37,6 +37,13 @@ _LABELS = {
     "backup_stale": "Kein aktuelles Backup",
     "backup_offsite_failed": "Offsite-Backup fehlgeschlagen",
     "compliance_finding": "Sicherheitsbefund",
+    "gateway_down": "Gateway gestört",
+    "resource_threshold": "Ressourcen-Schwelle überschritten",
+    "service_down": "Dienst ausgefallen",
+    "api_rights_missing": "API-Rechte fehlen",
+    "rollout_paused": "Rollout angehalten",
+    "rollout_start_failed": "Rollout nicht automatisch gestartet",
+    "test": "Testbenachrichtigung",
 }
 
 
@@ -84,13 +91,20 @@ async def send_webhook(settings_row: NotificationSettings, problem: Notification
         headers["X-OPNexus-Signature"] = f"sha256={signature}"
 
     try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=settings.opnsense_timeout) as client:
-            resp = await client.post(settings_row.webhook_url, content=raw, headers=headers)
-            resp.raise_for_status()
+        url_guard.validate_url(settings_row.webhook_url)
+        await url_guard.ensure_resolved_safe(settings_row.webhook_url)
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"Webhook-Adresse nicht erlaubt: {exc}") from None
+    try:
+        # follow_redirects stays off: a redirect must not move the request to an address the check above never saw.
+        async with url_guard.guarded_client(timeout=settings.opnsense_timeout, follow_redirects=False) as client:
+            with url_guard.muted():
+                resp = await client.post(settings_row.webhook_url, content=raw, headers=headers)
+                resp.raise_for_status()
     except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
         # str(exc) names the full URL, which often is the credential itself
         # (token in path/query) — keep it out of messages and logs.
-        reason = f"HTTP {exc.response.status_code}" if isinstance(exc, httpx.HTTPStatusError) else type(exc).__name__
+        reason = url_guard.failure_reason(exc)
         raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"Webhook-Zustellung fehlgeschlagen ({reason})") from None
 
 

backend/app/services/notification_service.py

@@ -3,13 +3,15 @@ against previously open problems, and delivers on transitions. The single
 testable entry point — called directly by main.py's background loop AND
 directly by tests, same pattern as rule_deploy_service.sweep_expired_deployments.
 """
+import asyncio
 import logging
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
+from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
-from app.models.notification import NotificationProblem, NotificationSettings
-from app.services import notification_checks, notification_dedup, notification_delivery
+from app.models.notification import NotificationChannel, NotificationProblem, NotificationSettings
+from app.services import monitor_checks, notification_channels, notification_checks, notification_dedup, notification_delivery
 from app.services import notification_settings_service
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -34,41 +36,108 @@ _CHECKS = [
     ("backup_stale", "backup_failed_enabled", notification_checks.check_backup_stale),
     ("backup_offsite_failed", "backup_failed_enabled", notification_checks.check_backup_offsite),
     ("compliance_finding", "compliance_alerts_enabled", notification_checks.check_compliance),
+    ("gateway_down", "gateway_down_enabled", monitor_checks.check_gateway_down),
+    ("resource_threshold", "resource_threshold_enabled", monitor_checks.check_resource_threshold),
+    ("service_down", "service_down_enabled", monitor_checks.check_service_down),
+    ("api_rights_missing", "api_rights_enabled", monitor_checks.check_api_rights_missing),
+    ("rollout_paused", "rollout_problems_enabled", notification_checks.check_rollout_paused),
+    ("rollout_start_failed", "rollout_problems_enabled", notification_checks.check_rollout_start_failed),
 ]
 
 # Event-like problems: when they drop out of the window nothing was "fixed", so no
 # "behoben" message goes out for them.
-_NO_RESOLVED_NOTICE = {"scheduled_maintenance_failed"}
+_NO_RESOLVED_NOTICE = {"scheduled_maintenance_failed", "rollout_start_failed"}
 
 
-async def _deliver(settings_row: NotificationSettings, problem: NotificationProblem, transition: str) -> None:
+# Delivery limits (1.29): a hanging channel must neither delay the others nor hold up the check loop.
+DELIVERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20.0    # one target (webhook, e-mail, one channel) for one message
+DELIVERY_CYCLE_BUDGET_SECONDS = 90.0  # everything one check cycle sends, in total
+DELIVERY_PARALLEL = 10             # targets served at the same time within a cycle
+
+
+async def _attempt(label: str, make_call, gate: asyncio.Semaphore | None = None, started: list | None = None) -> None:
+    """One delivery target: its own timeout, its own failure — never an exception for the caller. Texts logged
+    here come from NotificationDeliveryError (names the channel and the HTTP status, never the URL or token)."""
+    try:
+        if gate is not None:
+            await gate.acquire()
+        if started is not None:
+            started.append(label)  # the target was really tried (a cancelled wait for the gate does not count)
+        try:
+            await asyncio.wait_for(make_call(), DELIVERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+        finally:
+            if gate is not None:
+                gate.release()
+    except notification_delivery.NotificationDeliveryError:
+        logger.exception("%s delivery failed", label)
+    except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+        logger.warning("%s delivery timed out after %.0f s", label, DELIVERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    except asyncio.CancelledError:
+        raise
+    except Exception as exc:  # a broken target must not take the others down
+        logger.warning("%s delivery failed unexpectedly (%s)", label, type(exc).__name__)
+
+
+async def _deliver(
+    settings_row: NotificationSettings, problem: NotificationProblem, transition: str, channels: list[NotificationChannel] = (),
+    gate: asyncio.Semaphore | None = None,
+) -> None:
     """Best-effort, not an audit trail: attempted once per transition and
     never retried, even on failure — avoids retry-storming a broken webhook
-    URL or SMTP relay every poll cycle."""
+    URL or SMTP relay every poll cycle. Webhook, e-mail and every channel are
+    served in parallel, each with its own timeout (the order has no meaning)."""
     if transition == "resolved" and problem.problem_type in _NO_RESOLVED_NOTICE:
         problem.resolved_notified_at = _now()
         return
+    where = f"{problem.problem_type}/{problem.dedup_key}"
+    calls = []
+    started: list = []
     if settings_row.webhook_enabled:
-        try:
-            await notification_delivery.send_webhook(settings_row, problem, transition)
-        except notification_delivery.NotificationDeliveryError:
-            logger.exception("Webhook delivery failed for %s/%s", problem.problem_type, problem.dedup_key)
+        calls.append(_attempt(f"Webhook for {where}", lambda: notification_delivery.send_webhook(settings_row, problem, transition), gate, started))
     if settings_row.email_enabled:
-        try:
+        async def email():
             subject, body = notification_delivery.render_message(problem, transition)
             await notification_delivery.send_email(settings_row, subject, body)
-        except notification_delivery.NotificationDeliveryError:
-            logger.exception("Email delivery failed for %s/%s", problem.problem_type, problem.dedup_key)
+        calls.append(_attempt(f"Email for {where}", email, gate, started))
+    for channel in channels:
+        calls.append(_attempt(f"Channel {channel.name} ({channel.channel_type}) for {where}",
+                              lambda channel=channel: notification_channels.send(channel, problem, transition), gate, started))
+    try:
+        await asyncio.gather(*calls, return_exceptions=True)
+    finally:
+        # "Attempted" is what is recorded (also when a target failed or timed out). A message the cycle budget
+        # cancelled before ANY target was tried stays unrecorded: an opened problem is sent again next cycle.
+        if started or not calls:
+            if transition == "resolved":
+                problem.resolved_notified_at = _now()
+            else:
+                problem.last_notified_at = _now()
 
-    if transition == "resolved":
-        problem.resolved_notified_at = _now()
-    else:
-        problem.last_notified_at = _now()
+
+async def _deliver_all(settings_row: NotificationSettings, pending: list[tuple[NotificationProblem, str]],
+                       channels: list[NotificationChannel]) -> None:
+    """Everything this cycle found, in parallel, within DELIVERY_CYCLE_BUDGET_SECONDS in total."""
+    if not pending:
+        return
+    gate = asyncio.Semaphore(DELIVERY_PARALLEL)
+    tasks = [asyncio.ensure_future(_deliver(settings_row, problem, transition, channels, gate)) for problem, transition in pending]
+    done, late = await asyncio.wait(tasks, timeout=DELIVERY_CYCLE_BUDGET_SECONDS)
+    for task in late:
+        task.cancel()
+    if late:
+        logger.warning("Notification delivery stopped after %.0f s: %d of %d messages were not completed",
+                       DELIVERY_CYCLE_BUDGET_SECONDS, len(late), len(tasks))
+        await asyncio.gather(*late, return_exceptions=True)  # let the cancelled ones record "attempted"
+    for task in done:
+        if not task.cancelled() and task.exception() is not None:
+            logger.warning("Notification delivery failed unexpectedly (%s)", type(task.exception()).__name__)
 
 
 async def run_notification_checks(db: AsyncSession) -> dict:
     settings_row = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
     result = {"opened": 0, "resolved": 0}
+    channels = await notification_channels.enabled_channels(db)
+    pending: list[tuple[NotificationProblem, str]] = []
 
     for problem_type, enabled_flag, check_fn in _CHECKS:
         if not getattr(settings_row, enabled_flag):
@@ -84,12 +153,21 @@ async def run_notification_checks(db: AsyncSession) -> dict:
             continue
 
         opened, resolved = await notification_dedup.diff_and_update(db, problem_type, current)
-        for problem in opened:
-            await _deliver(settings_row, problem, "opened")
-        for problem in resolved:
-            await _deliver(settings_row, problem, "resolved")
+        pending += [(problem, "opened") for problem in opened] + [(problem, "resolved") for problem in resolved]
         result["opened"] += len(opened)
         result["resolved"] += len(resolved)
 
+    # Open problems that no target was ever tried for (an earlier cycle ran out of time) are sent now.
+    enabled_types = [t for t, flag, _fn in _CHECKS if getattr(settings_row, flag)]
+    already = {id(problem) for problem, _transition in pending}
+    undelivered = (await db.scalars(
+        select(NotificationProblem).where(
+            NotificationProblem.status == "open", NotificationProblem.last_notified_at.is_(None),
+            NotificationProblem.problem_type.in_(enabled_types),
+        )
+    )).all() if enabled_types else []
+    pending += [(problem, "opened") for problem in undelivered if id(problem) not in already]
+    # Delivered once all checks ran (and in parallel): a slow target no longer holds up the checks after it.
+    await _deliver_all(settings_row, pending, channels)
     await db.commit()
     return result

backend/app/services/notification_settings_service.py

@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ async def update_settings(db: AsyncSession, payload: NotificationSettingsUpdate)
         "host_offline_enabled", "cert_expiring_enabled", "rule_drift_enabled",
         "revert_failed_enabled", "maintenance_unknown_enabled", "carp_health_enabled", "nat_drift_enabled",
         "network_drift_enabled", "carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled", "scheduled_maintenance_failed_enabled", "backup_failed_enabled", "compliance_alerts_enabled",
+        "gateway_down_enabled", "resource_threshold_enabled", "service_down_enabled", "rollout_problems_enabled", "api_rights_enabled",
+        "gateway_loss_threshold_pct", "gateway_delay_threshold_ms", "disk_threshold_pct", "memory_threshold_pct",
+        "swap_threshold_pct", "load_per_cpu_threshold", "alert_confirm_samples", "resource_confirm_samples",
+        "service_watchlist",
         "poll_interval_seconds",
     ]
     for field in simple_fields:

backend/app/services/object_adopt_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+"""Takes over aliases, port forwards, 1:1 NAT and outbound NAT rules that were created by hand on a
+firewall, so they can be edited, versioned and deployed from OPNexus like any other object. This is
+the generalisation of rule_adopt_service.py (filter rules keep their own module: their model has
+more special cases and the code is relied upon).
+
+Adoption itself writes NOTHING to the firewall. It records the object as it is right now (read fresh
+from the host at adoption time, never from what the browser sent) together with its OPNsense UUID
+(`remote_uuid` = the deployment's opnsense_*_uuid), and stores the payload OPNexus would send for it as
+the deployment's last_payload. So the preview directly afterwards says "unchanged", a later deploy
+updates the same object via setItem/setRule (no duplicate), and the normal preview → push →
+confirm/auto-revert flow applies from the first change on.
+
+An object that already exists centrally for another firewall is LINKED instead of adopted a second time
+(adopt_link_service.py: exact match after resolving the host's variables, never automatic for a mere
+resemblance).
+
+Only objects OPNexus can describe without distortion are adopted. Anything the model cannot express
+is refused with machine-readable reasons (the UI translates them) instead of being imported in a way
+that would silently change its meaning on the next edit. Fields OPNexus does not manage (log flag of a
+port forward, pool options, tags, categories, ...) are never sent, and OPNsense's set*/setItem only
+overwrites the posted fields (ApiMutableModelControllerBase::setBase -> setNodes), so they stay as
+they are; the candidate list shows them as `kept`.
+
+Evidence (OPNsense core master, src/opnsense/mvc/app/…, read 2026-10-20, and live against OPNsense
+26.7 on test-fw-3 on the same day with hand-made objects of every case below):
+
+* Aliases — controllers/OPNsense/Firewall/Api/AliasController.php::searchItemAction -> searchBase
+  ("aliases.alias"), model models/OPNsense/Firewall/Alias.xml. Row keys used: uuid, name, type
+  ("host", "network", "port", "networkgroup", "mac", "asn", plus the unsupported "url", "urltable",
+  "urljson", "geoip", "dynipv6host", "authgroup", and the system types "internal"/"external"),
+  enabled "1"/"0", content (entries separated by "\n", live-verified; for "authgroup" the controller
+  rewrites it to group names), description, proto (only meaningful for asn/geoip). The built-in rows
+  are bogons, bogonsv6, sshlockout, virusprot (type external) and one __<if>_network per interface
+  (type internal); they are OPNsense's own and never adoptable. A "networkgroup" lists alias NAMES;
+  host/network/port aliases may also contain alias names (nesting).
+* Port forward — controllers/OPNsense/Firewall/Api/DNatController.php::searchRuleAction merges the
+  configured rules (getFlatNodes: dotted keys "source.network", "source.port", "source.not",
+  "destination.network", "destination.port", "destination.not", plus descr, disabled, interface,
+  ipprotocol, protocol, target, local-port, natreflection, nordr, pass, log, poolopts, tag, tagged,
+  nosync, categories, sequence) with synthetic automatic rows (uuid "automatic_*"/"lockout_*",
+  is_automatic true) that setRule/delRule cannot target. models/OPNsense/Firewall/DNat.xml: interface is
+  Multiple=Y (comma separated), ipprotocol may be blank/inet/inet6/inet46, protocol blank = any,
+  `nordr` ("no redirect") requires an empty target/local-port (live: "Target must be empty when No
+  RDR is set"), `pass` ("" manual / "pass" / "rule") links an associated filter rule, natreflection is
+  ""/purenat/disable. OPNexus sends pass "" and not "0", so a rule using one of those would change
+  meaning on its first edit and is refused.
+* 1:1 NAT — OneToOneController::searchRuleAction (flat keys), model Filter.xml onetoone.rule:
+  enabled, log, interface, type (binat/nat), source_net/source_not, destination_net/destination_not,
+  external, natreflection ""/enable/disable, description. All of these are managed by OPNexus.
+* Outbound NAT — SourceNatController::searchRuleAction returns the configured rules ONLY when the
+  global mode (filter.settings.nat.snat_mode) is hybrid or advanced; in automatic/disabled mode the
+  manual rules do not show up at all, so adopting is refused up front (outbound_nat_mode.py) instead
+  of presenting an empty list. Model Filter.xml snatrules.rule: `nonat` rules ("do not NAT") are not
+  expressible and refused; staticnatport, poolopts, log, tag, tagged, nosync, endpoint-independent
+  are left alone.
+"""
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable, get_args
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.alias import FirewallAlias
+from app.models.alias_deployment import AliasDeployment
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.one_to_one import OneToOneRule
+from app.models.one_to_one_deployment import OneToOneDeployment
+from app.models.outbound_nat import OutboundNatRule
+from app.models.outbound_nat_deployment import OutboundNatDeployment
+from app.models.port_forward import PortForwardRule
+from app.models.port_forward_deployment import PortForwardDeployment
+from app.schemas.alias import AliasType
+from app.services import alias_deploy_service, alias_policy_service
+from app.services import one_to_one_deploy_service, one_to_one_policy_service
+from app.services import opnsense_client, outbound_nat_deploy_service, outbound_nat_policy_service
+from app.services import port_forward_deploy_service, port_forward_policy_service
+from app.services import adopt_link_service
+from app.services.adopt_common import NotAdoptable, NotFoundOnHost, clean, on
+from app.services.nat_live_service import split_rows
+from app.services.outbound_nat_mode import host_mode
+
+ADOPT_NOTE = "Von Firewall übernommen"
+ADOPT_MESSAGE = "Von der Firewall übernommen"
+
+ALIAS_NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9_]+$")  # schemas/alias.py AliasCreate.name
+ALIAS_TYPES = frozenset(get_args(AliasType))
+ALIAS_CONTENT_MAX = 8000  # schemas/alias.py AliasCreate.content
+# OPNsense's own aliases that are not user objects (Firewall/Alias.php: bogons & co. are `external`
+# rows created by the system, __<if>_network are `internal`).
+SYSTEM_ALIAS_NAMES = frozenset({"bogons", "bogonsv6", "sshlockout", "virusprot"})
+LINK_TOLERATED = frozenset({"name_exists", "references_unmanaged_alias"})
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Entry:
+    row: dict
+    reasons: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    details: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    bulk: bool = False  # not adoptable alone yet, but adoptable in the same run (its references come first)
+    matches: list = field(default_factory=list)  # central objects equal to the live object (link candidates)
+    similar: list = field(default_factory=list)  # same name/description but different content (hint only)
+
+    @property
+    def linkable(self) -> bool:
+        """An exact central twin exists and nothing but "the name is taken" / "its references are not
+        managed here yet" speaks against it (both are moot when the twin is linked, its content is equal)."""
+        return any(not m.busy for m in self.matches) and set(self.reasons) <= LINK_TOLERATED
+
+    @property
+    def busy_twin(self) -> bool:
+        """The one exact twin waits for a confirmation: \"adopt all\" leaves this entry alone (neither link nor duplicate)."""
+        return len(self.matches) == 1 and self.matches[0].busy
+
+    @property
+    def uuid(self) -> str:
+        return clean(self.row.get("uuid"))
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Kind:
+    key: str
+    model: type
+    deployment: type
+    fk: str  # deployment column pointing at the central object
+    uuid_attr: str  # deployment column holding the OPNsense UUID (= remote_uuid)
+    fetch: Callable[[OpnsenseHost], Awaitable[list[dict]]]
+    check: Callable[[dict, dict], tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]]
+    title: Callable[[dict], str]
+    info: Callable[[dict], dict[str, str]]
+    build: Callable[[dict], dict]
+    payload: Callable[[Any], dict]
+    revision: Callable
+    kept: Callable[[dict], list[str]] = lambda row: []
+    context: Callable[[AsyncSession, list[dict]], Awaitable[dict]] | None = None
+    refs: Callable[[dict], set[str]] | None = None
+    name: Callable[[dict], str] | None = None
+    identity: str = "description"  # attribute that names the object (the alias name for aliases)
+
+    @property
+    def link_spec(self) -> adopt_link_service.LinkSpec:
+        return adopt_link_service.LinkSpec(
+            model=self.model, deployment=self.deployment, fk=self.fk, uuid_attr=self.uuid_attr,
+            identity=self.identity, payload=self.payload, revision=self.revision,
+        )
+
+
+# ── shared helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _single_interface(row: dict) -> bool:
+    interface = clean(row.get("interface"))
+    return bool(interface) and "," not in interface
+
+
+def _too_long(kind_model: type, values: dict) -> list[str]:
+    """Columns are bounded; a live value that does not fit would fail (or be cut) on the first edit."""
+    columns = kind_model.__table__.columns
+    return [name for name, value in values.items()
+            if name in columns and getattr(columns[name].type, "length", None)
+            and isinstance(value, str) and len(value) > columns[name].type.length]
+
+
+def _port(value) -> str | None:
+    return clean(value) or None
+
+
+def _kept(row: dict, keys: tuple[str, ...]) -> list[str]:
+    return [key for key in keys if clean(row.get(key)) not in ("", "0")]
+
+
+def _fetch_nat(search) -> Callable[[OpnsenseHost], Awaitable[list[dict]]]:
+    async def fetch(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+        data = await search(host)
+        # split_rows drops automatic_*/lockout_* and is_automatic rows: they are OPNsense's own
+        return [r for r in split_rows(data)["rules"] if clean(r.get("uuid"))]
+    return fetch
+
+
+# ── aliases ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _alias_content(row: dict) -> str:
+    # same normalisation as AliasCreate.clean_content
+    return "\n".join(line.strip() for line in str(row.get("content") or "").splitlines() if line.strip())
+
+
+def _alias_is_system(row: dict) -> bool:
+    name = clean(row.get("name"))
+    return clean(row.get("type")) == "internal" or name.startswith("__") or name in SYSTEM_ALIAS_NAMES
+
+
+async def _fetch_aliases(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    data = await opnsense_client.search_aliases(host)
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict) and clean(r.get("uuid")) and clean(r.get("name"))]
+
+
+async def _alias_context(db: AsyncSession, rows: list[dict]) -> dict:
+    return {"central_names": set((await db.scalars(select(FirewallAlias.name))).all())}
+
+
+def _alias_refs(row: dict) -> set[str]:
+    return {line.lstrip("!").strip() for line in _alias_content(row).splitlines()} - {""}
+
+
+def _alias_check(row: dict, ctx: dict) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]:
+    if _alias_is_system(row):
+        return ["system"], {}
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    details: dict[str, str] = {}
+    name, type_ = clean(row.get("name")), clean(row.get("type"))
+    if type_ not in ALIAS_TYPES:
+        reasons.append("unsupported_type")
+        details["unsupported_type"] = clean(row.get("%type")) or type_
+    if not ALIAS_NAME.fullmatch(name) or len(name) > 64:
+        reasons.append("name_invalid")
+    if name in ctx["central_names"]:
+        reasons.append("name_exists")
+    if len(_alias_content(row)) > ALIAS_CONTENT_MAX:
+        reasons.append("content_too_large")
+    if type_ == "asn" and clean(row.get("proto")):
+        reasons.append("proto_set")  # OPNexus has no field for it: a deploy elsewhere would drop the restriction
+    if _too_long(FirewallAlias, {"description": clean(row.get("description"))}):
+        reasons.append("value_too_long")
+    return reasons, details
+
+
+def _alias_info(row: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    lines = _alias_content(row).splitlines()
+    return {
+        "type": clean(row.get("type")),
+        "type_label": clean(row.get("%type")) or clean(row.get("type")),
+        "description": clean(row.get("description")),
+        "content": "\n".join(lines[:6]) + ("\n…" if len(lines) > 6 else ""),
+        "entries": str(len(lines)),
+    }
+
+
+def _alias_build(row: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "name": clean(row.get("name")),
+        "type": clean(row.get("type")),
+        "content": _alias_content(row),
+        "description": clean(row.get("description")),
+        "enabled": on(row.get("enabled")),
+    }
+
+
+# ── port forward ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _pf_check(row: dict, ctx: dict) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]:
+    reasons = []
+    if not _single_interface(row):
+        reasons.append("interface_not_single")
+    if clean(row.get("ipprotocol")) not in ("inet", "inet6"):
+        reasons.append("ipprotocol_unsupported")  # blank / inet46 have no counterpart in OPNexus
+    if not clean(row.get("protocol")):
+        reasons.append("protocol_any")
+    if on(row.get("nordr")):
+        reasons.append("no_redirect")
+    elif not clean(row.get("target")):
+        reasons.append("no_target")
+    if clean(row.get("pass")):
+        reasons.append("filter_rule_linked")  # OPNexus sends pass "" (manual) and would cut the link
+    if on(row.get("source.not")):
+        reasons.append("negated_source")
+    if on(row.get("destination.not")):
+        reasons.append("negated_destination")
+    if clean(row.get("natreflection")) not in ("", "purenat", "disable"):
+        reasons.append("natreflection_unsupported")
+    if not clean(row.get("descr")):
+        reasons.append("no_description")
+    if _too_long(PortForwardRule, _pf_build(row)):
+        reasons.append("value_too_long")
+    return reasons, {}
+
+
+def _pf_build(row: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "description": clean(row.get("descr")),
+        "interface": clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "ipprotocol": clean(row.get("ipprotocol")),
+        "protocol": clean(row.get("protocol")),
+        "source_net": clean(row.get("source.network")) or "any",
+        "source_port": _port(row.get("source.port")),
+        "destination_net": clean(row.get("destination.network")) or "any",
+        "destination_port": _port(row.get("destination.port")),
+        "target": clean(row.get("target")),
+        "local_port": _port(row.get("local-port")),
+        "natreflection": clean(row.get("natreflection")),
+        "enabled": not on(row.get("disabled")),
+    }
+
+
+def _pf_info(row: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {
+        "interface_label": clean(row.get("%interface")) or clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "protocol": clean(row.get("%protocol")) or clean(row.get("protocol")) or "any",
+        "source": clean(row.get("source.network")) or "any",
+        "source_port": clean(row.get("source.port")),
+        "destination": clean(row.get("destination.network")) or "any",
+        "destination_port": clean(row.get("destination.port")),
+        "target": clean(row.get("target")),
+        "target_port": clean(row.get("local-port")),
+    }
+
+
+# ── 1:1 NAT ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _o2o_check(row: dict, ctx: dict) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]:
+    reasons = []
+    if not _single_interface(row):
+        reasons.append("interface_not_single")
+    if clean(row.get("type")) not in ("binat", "nat"):
+        reasons.append("type_unsupported")
+    if clean(row.get("natreflection")) not in ("", "enable", "disable"):
+        reasons.append("natreflection_unsupported")
+    if not clean(row.get("source_net")) or not clean(row.get("external")):
+        reasons.append("incomplete")
+    if not clean(row.get("description")):
+        reasons.append("no_description")
+    if _too_long(OneToOneRule, _o2o_build(row)):
+        reasons.append("value_too_long")
+    return reasons, {}
+
+
+def _o2o_build(row: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "description": clean(row.get("description")),
+        "interface": clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "source_net": clean(row.get("source_net")),
+        "destination_net": clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any",
+        "source_not": on(row.get("source_not")),
+        "destination_not": on(row.get("destination_not")),
+        "enabled": on(row.get("enabled")),
+        "type": clean(row.get("type")),
+        "external": clean(row.get("external")),
+        "natreflection": clean(row.get("natreflection")),
+        "log": on(row.get("log")),
+    }
+
+
+def _o2o_info(row: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {
+        "interface_label": clean(row.get("%interface")) or clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "type": clean(row.get("type")),
+        "source": ("! " if on(row.get("source_not")) else "") + clean(row.get("source_net")),
+        "destination": ("! " if on(row.get("destination_not")) else "") + (clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any"),
+        "external": clean(row.get("external")),
+    }
+
+
+# ── outbound NAT ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def _fetch_outbound(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    # In automatic/disabled mode OPNsense does not list manual rules at all (see module docstring):
+    # say so instead of showing an empty list.
+    state = await host_mode(host)
+    if not state["can_deploy"]:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.OUTBOUND_MODE_BLOCKS_ADOPT, host=host.name, mode=state["mode"])
+    return await _fetch_nat(opnsense_client.search_outbound_nat_rules)(host)
+
+
+def _snat_check(row: dict, ctx: dict) -> tuple[list[str], dict[str, str]]:
+    reasons = []
+    if not _single_interface(row):
+        reasons.append("interface_not_single")
+    if on(row.get("nonat")):
+        reasons.append("no_nat_rule")
+    if clean(row.get("ipprotocol")) not in ("inet", "inet6"):
+        reasons.append("ipprotocol_unsupported")
+    if not clean(row.get("protocol")):
+        reasons.append("protocol_missing")
+    if not clean(row.get("description")):
+        reasons.append("no_description")
+    if _too_long(OutboundNatRule, _snat_build(row)):
+        reasons.append("value_too_long")
+    return reasons, {}
+
+
+def _snat_build(row: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "description": clean(row.get("description")),
+        "interface": clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "source_net": clean(row.get("source_net")) or "any",
+        "destination_net": clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any",
+        "source_not": on(row.get("source_not")),
+        "destination_not": on(row.get("destination_not")),
+        "enabled": on(row.get("enabled")),
+        "ipprotocol": clean(row.get("ipprotocol")),
+        "protocol": clean(row.get("protocol")),
+        "source_port": _port(row.get("source_port")),
+        "destination_port": _port(row.get("destination_port")),
+        "target": clean(row.get("target")),
+        "target_port": _port(row.get("target_port")),
+    }
+
+
+def _snat_info(row: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    return {
+        "interface_label": clean(row.get("%interface")) or clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "protocol": clean(row.get("protocol")) or "any",
+        "source": ("! " if on(row.get("source_not")) else "") + (clean(row.get("source_net")) or "any"),
+        "source_port": clean(row.get("source_port")),
+        "destination": ("! " if on(row.get("destination_not")) else "") + (clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any"),
+        "destination_port": clean(row.get("destination_port")),
+        "target": clean(row.get("target")),
+        "target_port": clean(row.get("target_port")),
+    }
+
+
+KINDS: dict[str, Kind] = {
+    "alias": Kind(
+        key="alias", model=FirewallAlias, deployment=AliasDeployment, fk="alias_id",
+        uuid_attr="opnsense_alias_uuid", fetch=_fetch_aliases, check=_alias_check,
+        title=lambda row: clean(row.get("name")), info=_alias_info, build=_alias_build,
+        payload=alias_deploy_service._build_payload, revision=alias_policy_service.revision,
+        context=_alias_context, refs=_alias_refs, name=lambda row: clean(row.get("name")), identity="name",
+    ),
+    "port_forward": Kind(
+        key="port_forward", model=PortForwardRule, deployment=PortForwardDeployment, fk="port_forward_id",
+        uuid_attr="opnsense_port_forward_uuid", fetch=_fetch_nat(opnsense_client.search_port_forward_rules),
+        check=_pf_check, title=lambda row: clean(row.get("descr")), info=_pf_info, build=_pf_build,
+        payload=port_forward_deploy_service._build_payload, revision=port_forward_policy_service.revision,
+        kept=lambda row: _kept(row, ("log", "poolopts", "tag", "tagged", "nosync", "categories")),
+    ),
+    "one_to_one": Kind(
+        key="one_to_one", model=OneToOneRule, deployment=OneToOneDeployment, fk="one_to_one_id",
+        uuid_attr="opnsense_one_to_one_uuid", fetch=_fetch_nat(opnsense_client.search_one_to_one_rules),
+        check=_o2o_check, title=lambda row: clean(row.get("description")), info=_o2o_info, build=_o2o_build,
+        payload=one_to_one_deploy_service._build_payload, revision=one_to_one_policy_service.revision,
+        kept=lambda row: _kept(row, ("categories",)),
+    ),
+    "outbound_nat": Kind(
+        key="outbound_nat", model=OutboundNatRule, deployment=OutboundNatDeployment, fk="outbound_nat_id",
+        uuid_attr="opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid", fetch=_fetch_outbound,
+        check=_snat_check, title=lambda row: clean(row.get("description")), info=_snat_info, build=_snat_build,
+        payload=outbound_nat_deploy_service._build_payload, revision=outbound_nat_policy_service.revision,
+        kept=lambda row: _kept(row, ("log", "staticnatport", "poolopts", "poolopts_sourcehashkey", "tag", "tagged",
+                                      "nosync", "endpoint-independent", "categories")),
+    ),
+}
+
+
+# ── engine ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def _managed_uuids(db: AsyncSession, kind: Kind, host: OpnsenseHost) -> set[str]:
+    column = getattr(kind.deployment, kind.uuid_attr)
+    rows = await db.scalars(select(column).where(kind.deployment.host_id == host.id, column.is_not(None)))
+    return set(rows.all())
+
+
+def _resolve_references(kind: Kind, entries: list[Entry], rows: list[dict], managed: set[str], ctx: dict) -> list[Entry]:
+    """Aliases may refer to other aliases by name. A reference to a live alias OPNexus does not manage
+    (and that is not OPNsense's own) would be dangling in the central model, so the referring alias
+    waits until its target is managed. Returns the entries in an order in which they can be adopted
+    in ONE run (dependencies first); entries whose references can never be satisfied (target is a
+    url alias, a user-defined external alias, ...) keep the reason `references_unmanaged_alias`."""
+    live = {kind.name(r): r for r in rows}
+    available = set(ctx["central_names"])
+    available |= {n for n, r in live.items() if _alias_is_system(r) or clean(r.get("uuid")) in managed}
+
+    candidates = [e for e in entries if not e.reasons]
+    for entry in candidates:
+        missing = {ref for ref in kind.refs(entry.row) if ref in live and ref not in available}
+        if missing:
+            entry.reasons.append("references_unmanaged_alias")
+            entry.details["references_unmanaged_alias"] = ", ".join(sorted(missing))
+
+    order: list[Entry] = []
+    ready = set(available)
+    progress = True
+    while progress:
+        progress = False
+        for entry in candidates:
+            if entry in order:
+                continue
+            if all(ref not in live or ref in ready for ref in kind.refs(entry.row)):
+                order.append(entry)
+                ready.add(kind.name(entry.row))
+                progress = True
+    for entry in order:
+        entry.bulk = "references_unmanaged_alias" in entry.reasons
+    return order
+
+
+async def _plan(db: AsyncSession, kind: Kind, host: OpnsenseHost) -> tuple[list[Entry], list[Entry]]:
+    """(all unmanaged entries with their reasons, the ones adoptable in one run in a safe order)."""
+    rows = await kind.fetch(host)
+    managed = await _managed_uuids(db, kind, host)
+    ctx = await kind.context(db, rows) if kind.context else {}
+    central = await adopt_link_service.load_central(db, kind.link_spec)
+    entries = []
+    for row in rows:
+        if clean(row.get("uuid")) in managed:
+            continue
+        reasons, details = kind.check(row, ctx)
+        entry = Entry(row, list(reasons), dict(details))
+        if reasons != ["system"]:
+            entry.matches, entry.similar = adopt_link_service.find(central, kind.link_spec, host, kind.build(row))
+        entries.append(entry)
+    if kind.refs:
+        order = _resolve_references(kind, entries, rows, managed, ctx)
+    else:
+        order = [e for e in entries if not e.reasons]
+    return entries, order
+
+
+def _bulk_actions(entries: list[Entry], order: list[Entry], link_existing: bool) -> dict[str, tuple[str, Any]]:
+    """What "adopt all" does with each entry: ("link", central object) when exactly one central twin exists
+    (and no other entry of this run took it), ("new", None), or nothing. One function for the dialog's
+    summary and for the real run, so they cannot disagree. Several twins are never guessed between."""
+    actions: dict[str, tuple[str, Any]] = {}
+    taken: set = set()
+    if link_existing:
+        for entry in entries:
+            if entry.linkable and len(entry.matches) == 1 and entry.matches[0].obj.id not in taken:
+                actions[entry.uuid] = ("link", entry.matches[0].obj)
+                taken.add(entry.matches[0].obj.id)
+    for entry in order:
+        if link_existing and entry.busy_twin:
+            continue
+        actions.setdefault(entry.uuid, ("new", None))
+    return actions
+
+
+def _describe(kind: Kind, entry: Entry, action: str | None = None) -> dict:
+    spec = kind.link_spec
+    return {
+        "matches": [adopt_link_service.describe(spec, m) for m in entry.matches],
+        "similar": [adopt_link_service.describe(spec, m) for m in entry.similar],
+        "linkable": entry.linkable,
+        "bulk_action": action,
+        "uuid": entry.uuid,
+        "title": kind.title(entry.row),
+        "enabled": on(entry.row.get("enabled")) if "disabled" not in entry.row else not on(entry.row.get("disabled")),
+        "adoptable": not entry.reasons,
+        "bulk_adoptable": not entry.reasons or entry.bulk,
+        "reasons": entry.reasons,
+        "reason_details": entry.details,
+        "kept": kind.kept(entry.row),
+        "info": kind.info(entry.row),
+    }
+
+
+async def list_unmanaged(db: AsyncSession, kind_key: str, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    kind = KINDS[kind_key]
+    entries, order = await _plan(db, kind, host)
+    actions = _bulk_actions(entries, order, True)
+    return [_describe(kind, e, actions.get(e.uuid, ("skip", None))[0]) for e in entries]
+
+
+def _create(db: AsyncSession, kind: Kind, host: OpnsenseHost, entry: Entry):
+    obj = kind.model(**kind.build(entry.row), targets=[host], groups=[])
+    db.add(obj)
+    return obj
+
+
+async def _record(db: AsyncSession, kind: Kind, host: OpnsenseHost, obj, remote_uuid: str) -> None:
+    await db.flush()
+    kind.revision(db, obj, ADOPT_NOTE)
+    db.add(kind.deployment(**{
+        kind.fk: obj.id, "host_id": host.id, "status": "success", "message": ADOPT_MESSAGE,
+        kind.uuid_attr: remote_uuid, "last_payload": kind.payload(obj), "previous_payload": None,
+    }))
+    await db.flush()
+
+
+async def adopt(db: AsyncSession, kind_key: str, host: OpnsenseHost, remote_uuid: str, link_to=None):
+    """Takes over one object as a NEW central object, or - with `link_to` - links it to that existing
+    central object (adopt_link_service). Either way the live state is read fresh here."""
+    kind = KINDS[kind_key]
+    if link_to is not None:
+        existing = await db.scalar(select(kind.deployment).where(
+            kind.deployment.host_id == host.id, getattr(kind.deployment, kind.uuid_attr) == remote_uuid))
+        if existing is not None:
+            if getattr(existing, kind.fk) == link_to:
+                return await db.get(kind.model, link_to)  # second click: already linked, nothing to do
+            raise NotAdoptable(["already_managed"])
+    entries, _ = await _plan(db, kind, host)
+    entry = next((e for e in entries if e.uuid == remote_uuid), None)
+    if entry is None:
+        # either gone from the host or already managed
+        if remote_uuid in await _managed_uuids(db, kind, host):
+            raise NotAdoptable(["already_managed"])
+        raise NotFoundOnHost(remote_uuid)
+    if link_to is not None:
+        if not set(entry.reasons) <= LINK_TOLERATED:
+            raise NotAdoptable(entry.reasons, entry.details)
+        obj = await adopt_link_service.link(db, kind.link_spec, host, link_to, remote_uuid, kind.build(entry.row))
+        return obj
+    if entry.reasons:
+        raise NotAdoptable(entry.reasons, entry.details)
+    obj = _create(db, kind, host, entry)
+    await _record(db, kind, host, obj, remote_uuid)
+    return obj
+
+
+async def adopt_all(db: AsyncSession, kind_key: str, host: OpnsenseHost, link_existing: bool = False) -> dict:
+    """Adopts everything adoptable in one transaction (the caller commits), nested aliases in
+    dependency order. With `link_existing`, entries with exactly one exact central twin are linked to it
+    instead (see _bulk_actions). System objects are not reported; everything else that stays behind is,
+    with reasons."""
+    kind = KINDS[kind_key]
+    entries, order = await _plan(db, kind, host)
+    actions = _bulk_actions(entries, order, link_existing)
+    adopted = []
+    done: set[str] = set()
+    for entry in entries:  # linked first: their names are central already, so nested aliases can refer to them
+        action, target = actions.get(entry.uuid, ("skip", None))
+        if action == "link":
+            obj = await adopt_link_service.link(db, kind.link_spec, host, target.id, entry.uuid, kind.build(entry.row))
+            adopted.append({"uuid": entry.uuid, "title": kind.title(entry.row), "id": obj.id, "linked": True})
+            done.add(entry.uuid)
+    for entry in order:
+        if actions.get(entry.uuid, ("skip", None))[0] != "new":
+            continue
+        obj = _create(db, kind, host, entry)
+        await _record(db, kind, host, obj, entry.uuid)
+        adopted.append({"uuid": entry.uuid, "title": kind.title(entry.row), "id": obj.id, "linked": False})
+        done.add(entry.uuid)
+    skipped = [
+        {"uuid": e.uuid, "title": kind.title(e.row),
+         "reasons": e.reasons + (["twin_busy"] if link_existing and e.busy_twin else []), "reason_details": e.details}
+        for e in entries if e.uuid not in done and e.reasons != ["system"]
+    ]
+    return {"adopted": adopted, "skipped": skipped}

backend/app/services/oidc_service.py

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.models.oidc import OidcLoginState, OidcSettings
 from app.models.user import AdminUser
-from app.services import notification_secret_store
+from app.services import notification_secret_store, url_guard
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ async def _get_json(url: str, **kw) -> dict:
     if not url.startswith("https://"):
         raise OidcError("provider", "Nur https:// wird akzeptiert")
     try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10, follow_redirects=False) as client:
+        async with url_guard.guarded_client(timeout=10, follow_redirects=False) as client:
             response = await client.get(url, **kw)
             response.raise_for_status()
             data = response.json()
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ async def _exchange(cfg: OidcSettings, doc: dict, code: str, state: OidcLoginSta
         else:
             data["client_secret"] = secret
     try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15, follow_redirects=False) as client:
+        async with url_guard.guarded_client(timeout=15, follow_redirects=False) as client:
             response = await client.post(doc["token_endpoint"], data=data, auth=auth)
         if response.status_code >= 400:
             raise OidcError("token", f"Token-Endpunkt antwortet mit HTTP {response.status_code}")

backend/app/services/opnsense_client.py

@@ -33,6 +33,12 @@ class OpnsenseAmbiguousError(OpnsenseAPIError):
     outcome of a write is unknown and must be reconciled, not retried blindly."""
 
 
+class OpnsenseForbiddenError(OpnsenseAPIError):
+    """The firewall answered 403: the API key lacks the privilege for this endpoint. A refusal, not an unknown
+    outcome; callers that only read can tell "no rights" from "unreachable". 401 (wrong key or secret) stays a
+    plain OpnsenseAPIError."""
+
+
 def _client(host: OpnsenseHost) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
     # Before the secret is even read: an http:// host must never receive credentials.
     reason = firewall_url.check_base_url(host.base_url)
@@ -71,7 +77,8 @@ async def _do_request(host: OpnsenseHost, method: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> h
         except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
             # The body may reflect submitted secrets: keep only a scrubbed, bounded excerpt.
             secret = opnsense_secret_store.read_secret(host.id)
-            error = OpnsenseAmbiguousError if exc.response.status_code >= 500 else OpnsenseAPIError
+            status = exc.response.status_code
+            error = OpnsenseAmbiguousError if status >= 500 else OpnsenseForbiddenError if status == 403 else OpnsenseAPIError
             raise error(
                 f"{exc.response.status_code} {path}: {redact_text(exc.response.text, host.api_key, secret)}"
             ) from exc
@@ -145,6 +152,34 @@ async def get_interface_statistics(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
     return await _request(host, "GET", "/diagnostics/interface/getInterfaceStatistics")
 
 
+# Swap and CPU count, for the resource-threshold alert (1.24). Verified against core source
+# (Diagnostics/Api/SystemController::systemSwapAction -> configd "system show swapinfo") and live
+# (read-only GET, test-fw-3, OPNsense 26.7):
+#   systemSwap  -> {"swap": [{"device": "/dev/da0p3", "total": "8388608", "used": "0"}]}   (KiB, strings;
+#                  an empty list when the firewall has no swap)
+#   cpu_usage/getCPUType -> ["QEMU Virtual CPU version 2.5+ (6 cores, 6 threads)"]
+async def get_system_swap(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/diagnostics/system/systemSwap")
+
+
+async def get_cpu_type(host: OpnsenseHost) -> Any:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/diagnostics/cpu_usage/getCPUType")
+
+
+# Gateway health (read-only). Routes\Api\GatewayController::statusAction runs configd "interface gateways status"
+# -> scripts/routes/gateway_status.php, which merges the configured gateways with dpinger's live numbers
+# (src/etc/inc/plugins.inc.d/dpinger.inc, dpinger_status()). Live-verified on test-fw-3 (26.7):
+#   {"items": [{"name": "WAN_GW", "address": "203.0.113.1", "status": "none", "loss": "~", "delay": "~",
+#               "stddev": "~", "monitor": "~", "status_translated": "Online"}, ...], "status": "ok"}
+# "status" is the machine-readable verdict: none (fine), down, force_down (switched off by the admin), delay,
+# loss, delay+loss (thresholds of the gateway itself), anything else = pending. loss/delay/stddev are "12.3 %" /
+# "4.5 ms" strings, or "~" while nothing is measured (e.g. monitoring disabled on that gateway). "status" is
+# "failed" with no items when the firewall has no gateways. searchGateway carries the same numbers but with a
+# translated status text ("Online"), so it is not used here.
+async def get_gateway_status(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/routes/gateway/status")
+
+
 async def toggle_carp_maintenance(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
     """Toggle persistent CARP maintenance mode.
 
@@ -391,6 +426,47 @@ async def get_pf_rule_statistics(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
     return await _request(host, "GET", "/diagnostics/firewall/pfStatistics/rules")
 
 
+# ── Rule analysis (read-only) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+# Checked against opnsense/core master (2026-10-21) and live on OPNsense 26.7:
+# - Firewall/Api/FilterUtilController::ruleStatsAction runs configd `!filter rule stats` and
+#   returns {"status": "ok", "stats": {"<label>": {pf_rules, evaluations, packets, bytes, states}}};
+#   the label is the rule UUID (MVC), an md5 (automatic) or a 32-hex label (unmigrated legacy).
+# - Firewall/Api/AliasUtilController::findReferencesAction requires POST with "ip" (only hex,
+#   ":", ".", "/", "_" accepted, else {"status": "Not an IP address!"}), runs configd
+#   `filter find_table_references` (a pf table test over all aliases) and returns
+#   {"status": "ok", "matches": ["<alias>", ...]}. It changes nothing; POST is only the
+#   controller's calling convention.
+# - Firewall/Api/FilterController::getInterfaceListAction: {"floating"|"groups"|"interfaces"|"any":
+#   {"label", "items": [{"value", "label", "type"}]}} (lo0 omitted).
+# - Firewall/Api/GroupController::searchItemAction -> searchBase("ifgroupentry"): rows with
+#   ifname, members (comma separated identifiers), sequence; the built-in groups (enc0, openvpn,
+#   wireguard) appear with their name as uuid and empty members.
+async def get_rule_stats(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    """Per-label counters, already summed over every pf line of a rule. Used for the rule usage sampling
+    (rule_hit_service). Live check 2026-10-22 on all three test firewalls (26.7, one with unmigrated legacy
+    rules): HTTP 200, ``stats`` has exactly one key per label of ``pfStatistics/rules`` (30/30/25 labels,
+    including the 32-hex label of the legacy user rule on the third), and each ``packets`` equals the sum over
+    that label's pf lines (differences only by traffic between the two reads)."""
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/firewall/filter_util/ruleStats")
+
+
+async def find_alias_references(host: OpnsenseHost, ip: str) -> list[str] | None:
+    """Names of the aliases (pf tables) that contain ``ip`` right now; None when the firewall
+    could not answer (callers then treat table membership as unknown)."""
+    data = await _request(host, "POST", "/firewall/alias_util/findReferences", json={"ip": ip})
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or data.get("status") != "ok" or not isinstance(data.get("matches"), list):
+        return None
+    return [str(name) for name in data["matches"]]
+
+
+async def get_filter_interface_list(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/firewall/filter/get_interface_list")
+
+
+async def search_interface_groups(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/firewall/group/searchItem", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
 async def get_firmware_status(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
     # GET reads cached results. POST would trigger a synchronous probe.
     return await _request(host, "GET", "/core/firmware/status")

backend/app/services/resource_monitor_service.py

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ poll_all_hosts. v1 deliberately has no admin-editable poll interval (see
 config.py) — just a fixed constant, to keep this feature's first cut
 small.
 """
+import asyncio
 import logging
+import re
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 
 from sqlalchemy import delete, select
@@ -13,8 +15,9 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
 from app.models.resource_sample import HostResourceSample
+from app.services import gateway_health_service
 from app.services import opnsense_client as client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError, OpnsenseForbiddenError
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -55,11 +58,70 @@ def _disk_used_pct(disk: dict) -> float | None:
     return None
 
 
+def _swap_used_pct(swap) -> float | None:
+    """systemSwap: {"swap": [{"device", "total", "used"}]} in KiB; None when there is no swap at all."""
+    try:
+        rows = swap.get("swap") or []
+        total = sum(int(r["total"]) for r in rows)
+        used = sum(int(r["used"]) for r in rows)
+    except (AttributeError, KeyError, TypeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    return round(used / total * 100, 1) if total > 0 else None
+
+
+_CPU_THREADS = re.compile(r"(\d+)\s+threads?", re.IGNORECASE)
+_CPU_CORES = re.compile(r"(\d+)\s+cores?", re.IGNORECASE)
+
+
+def _cpu_threads(cpu_type) -> int | None:
+    """getCPUType: ["<model> (6 cores, 6 threads)"]."""
+    text = " ".join(str(x) for x in cpu_type) if isinstance(cpu_type, list) else str(cpu_type or "")
+    match = _CPU_THREADS.search(text) or _CPU_CORES.search(text)
+    return int(match.group(1)) if match else None
+
+
+def _services_compact(listing) -> dict[str, int]:
+    """{"unbound": 1, "openvpn/<uuid>": 0}: 1 = running. Only services an admin can stop (not 'locked')."""
+    result: dict[str, int] = {}
+    for row in (listing.get("rows") if isinstance(listing, dict) else None) or []:
+        if not isinstance(row, dict) or not row.get("name") or str(row.get("locked")) in ("1", "True", "true"):
+            continue
+        name, id_ = str(row["name"]), str(row.get("id") or row["name"])
+        result[name if id_ == name else f"{name}/{id_}"] = 1 if str(row.get("running")) in ("1", "True", "true") else 0
+    return result
+
+
+async def _optional(operation, name: str, denied: list[str], ok: list[str]):
+    """The extra readings must never cost the base sample (older firmware, an endpoint that is missing).
+    A refusal by the firewall (403: the API key lacks the privilege) is recorded in ``denied`` so the
+    missing right becomes visible; a reading that went through is recorded in ``ok`` (the proof that a right is
+    back, whatever the answer contains); any other failure stays "unknown" and is no finding about rights."""
+    try:
+        result = await operation
+        ok.append(name)
+        return result
+    except OpnsenseForbiddenError:
+        denied.append(name)
+        logger.debug("Optionale Messung %s: API-Recht fehlt", name)
+        return None
+    except Exception as exc:
+        logger.debug("Optionale Messung fehlgeschlagen: %s", type(exc).__name__)
+        return None
+
+
 async def sample_host(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> None:
     resources = await client.get_system_resources(host)
     system_time = await client.get_system_time(host)
     disk = await client.get_system_disk(host)
     interfaces = await client.get_interface_statistics(host)
+    denied: list[str] = []
+    ok: list[str] = []
+    swap, cpu_type, gateways, services = await asyncio.gather(
+        _optional(client.get_system_swap(host), "swap", denied, ok),
+        _optional(client.get_cpu_type(host), "cpu", denied, ok),
+        _optional(gateway_health_service.get_gateway_health(host), "gateways", denied, ok),
+        _optional(client.search_services(host), "services", denied, ok),
+    )
     db.add(
         HostResourceSample(
             host_id=host.id,
@@ -67,7 +129,17 @@ async def sample_host(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> None:
             mem_used_pct=_mem_used_pct(resources),
             load_avg_1m=_load_avg_1m(system_time),
             disk_used_pct=_disk_used_pct(disk),
-            raw={"memory": resources.get("memory"), "disk": disk.get("devices"), "interfaces": interfaces.get("statistics")},
+            raw={
+                "memory": resources.get("memory"), "disk": disk.get("devices"), "interfaces": interfaces.get("statistics"),
+                # None = not readable this round (the alert checks treat that as "unknown", not as "fine").
+                "swap_used_pct": _swap_used_pct(swap) if swap is not None else None,
+                "cpu_threads": _cpu_threads(cpu_type) if cpu_type is not None else None,
+                "gateways": gateway_health_service.compact(gateways) if gateways is not None else None,
+                "services": _services_compact(services) if services is not None else None,
+                # Readings the firewall refused (403) because the API key lacks the right; always a list.
+                "denied": sorted(denied),
+                "ok": sorted(ok),
+            },
         )
     )
 

backend/app/services/rollout_engine.py

@@ -0,0 +1,811 @@
+"""The rollout run engine (1.25): moves runs forward, one small step per poll tick.
+
+Ground rules (an unattended engine that triggers firmware updates is the riskiest thing in OPNexus):
+
+* It never calls a firmware action itself. Each host step is an ordinary ScheduledMaintenance
+  (run_at=now, origin="rollout", auto_verify=True) — locks, backup before the update, CARP handover,
+  audit and restart safety all come from that existing path.
+* Never twice: a host gets a schedule only while its ``scheduled_maintenance_id`` is empty, written
+  in the same transaction as the schedule itself, under the run's row lock.
+* Never in parallel: one host at a time per run, and only one active run at all; nodes of a cluster
+  go BACKUP first, the MASTER only with the wave's CARP handover, and before every node of an
+  already touched cluster the cluster is checked again.
+* When in doubt, stop: anything unexpected pauses the run (``pause_reason``) and notifies; nothing
+  is retried on its own. A paused run only continues when a human resumes it, and resuming first
+  checks the health of everything done so far.
+* Every step re-checks that the person responsible for the run may still roll out.
+* Hard limits: waves/hosts (rollout_service), soak time, preflight/host timeouts, run age.
+
+Concurrency: a tick (1) does DB-only bookkeeping under the run's row lock, (2) decides with the
+lock released (remote reads may take seconds), and (3) applies the decision only if the run's
+``revision`` is still the one it decided on — a pause/abort in between, or a second backend, wins.
+"""
+import logging
+import uuid
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Awaitable, Callable
+
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+from sqlalchemy import func, select
+from sqlalchemy.exc import IntegrityError
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import SessionLocal
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.maintenance_window import MaintenanceWindow
+from app.models.rollout import RolloutPlan, RolloutRun, RolloutRunHost, RolloutRunWave
+from app.models.scheduled_maintenance import ScheduledMaintenance
+from app.models.user import AdminUser
+from app.services import audit_service, rollout_health, rollout_service, window_service
+from app.services import opnsense_client as client
+from app.services.host_maintenance_service import ensure_no_maintenance, peers
+from app.services.host_status_service import get_statuses
+from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+ACTIVE = ("waiting_window", "preflight", "wave_running", "soaking", "gate", "awaiting_approval", "resuming", "paused")
+TERMINAL = ("succeeded", "cancelled")
+# Statuses in which the poll loop should tick quickly.
+BUSY = ("preflight", "wave_running", "gate", "resuming")
+HOST_OPEN = ("running", "verifying")
+
+PREFLIGHT_CHECK_DELAY = timedelta(seconds=20)  # after asking for an update check, before reading the result
+PREFLIGHT_TIMEOUT = timedelta(minutes=10)
+GATE_RECHECK = timedelta(minutes=2)  # a failed gate is looked at once more (slow start after a reboot)
+BLOCKED_PATIENCE = timedelta(minutes=15)  # someone else's maintenance in the cluster
+HOST_START_TIMEOUT = timedelta(minutes=10)  # the schedule never fired
+HOST_MAX_DURATION = timedelta(hours=4)  # backstop above the schedule's own timeouts
+MAX_RUN_AGE = timedelta(days=14)
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _iso(value: datetime | None) -> str | None:
+    return value.isoformat() if value else None
+
+
+def _ts(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
+    return datetime.fromisoformat(value) if value else None
+
+
+def _note(code: str, **params) -> dict:
+    return {"code": code, "params": params}
+
+
+# ── small helpers on a loaded run ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def wave_row(run: RolloutRun, index: int) -> RolloutRunWave:
+    return next(w for w in run.waves if w.index == index)
+
+
+def wave_spec(run: RolloutRun, index: int) -> dict:
+    return run.plan_snapshot["waves"][index]
+
+
+def hosts_of(run: RolloutRun, index: int) -> list[RolloutRunHost]:
+    return sorted((h for h in run.hosts if h.wave_index == index), key=lambda h: (h.order, h.host_name))
+
+
+def _named(run: RolloutRun, failed: list[str]) -> list[str]:
+    """"<host-id>:<check>" -> "<host name>:<check>" for pause details people read."""
+    names = {str(h.host_id): h.host_name for h in run.hosts if h.host_id}
+    return [f"{names.get(item.split(':', 1)[0], item.split(':', 1)[0])}:{item.split(':', 1)[1]}" for item in failed]
+
+
+def _progress(run: RolloutRun, **changes) -> None:
+    run.progress = {**(run.progress or {}), **changes}
+
+
+async def _audit(run: RolloutRun, action: str, status: str, message: str | None = None, **details) -> None:
+    token = audit_service.context.set({"actor": f"{run.started_by} (Rollout)"[:150], "id": str(run.id)})
+    try:
+        await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action=action, status=status, entity_id=str(run.id),
+                                    entity_name=run.plan_name, message=message,
+                                    details={"wave": run.current_wave, **details})
+    finally:
+        audit_service.context.reset(token)
+
+
+def _requeue(host: RolloutRunHost, code: str) -> None:
+    """Back to the queue: only for a host whose schedule provably never fired (cancelled under its row lock,
+    or refused by fire_due as overdue). Clearing the schedule id lets a resumed run plan it once more."""
+    host.status, host.scheduled_maintenance_id, host.started_at, host.detail = "queued", None, None, _note(code)
+
+
+async def requeue_if_pending(db: AsyncSession, host: RolloutRunHost) -> bool:
+    """Cancel a host's schedule that has not fired yet and put the host back in the queue. Locked like the
+    router's abort: fire_due holds the row while firing, and a running action is never touched."""
+    if host.status not in HOST_OPEN or host.scheduled_maintenance_id is None:
+        return False
+    sched = await db.scalar(select(ScheduledMaintenance).where(ScheduledMaintenance.id == host.scheduled_maintenance_id)
+                            .with_for_update().execution_options(populate_existing=True))
+    if sched is None or sched.status != "pending":
+        return False
+    sched.status = "cancelled"
+    sched.result = {"error": "Rollout angehalten, nicht ausgeführt", "not_fired": True}
+    _requeue(host, "not_fired")
+    return True
+
+
+def pause(run: RolloutRun, reason: str, **detail) -> None:
+    if run.status != "paused":
+        run.paused_from = run.status
+    run.status = "paused"
+    run.pause_reason = reason
+    run.pause_detail = detail
+    _progress(run, paused_at=_iso(_now()))
+
+
+async def may_roll_out(db: AsyncSession, username: str, user_id=None) -> bool:
+    """Does this account (still) have the right to roll out? Same rule as AuthMiddleware's is_rollout.
+    With the stable account id (1.29) the id decides: a deleted account that was re-created under the same name is
+    someone else. Rows from before the id existed (and still without one) are matched by name as before."""
+    if user_id is not None:
+        user = await db.get(AdminUser, user_id)
+    else:
+        user = await db.scalar(select(AdminUser).where(AdminUser.username == username))
+    if user is None:
+        return False
+    if user.role == "admin":
+        return True
+    if user.role == "operator":
+        from app.routers import governance
+        return (await governance.get_settings(db)).operators_may_deploy
+    return False
+
+
+async def _window(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> tuple[bool, MaintenanceWindow | None]:
+    """(window configured, window). Configured but gone means: stop, never 'no time limit'."""
+    window_id = run.plan_snapshot.get("window_id")
+    if not window_id:
+        return False, None
+    return True, await db.get(MaintenanceWindow, window_id)
+
+
+async def _may_start_now(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> str | None:
+    """None if new host work may start now, else the reason ('window_closed' / 'window_missing')."""
+    configured, window = await _window(db, run)
+    if not configured:
+        return None
+    if window is None:
+        return "window_missing"
+    return None if window_service.startable(window, _now()) else "window_closed"
+
+
+async def _lock(db: AsyncSession, run_id, revision: int | None = None) -> RolloutRun | None:
+    stmt = select(RolloutRun).where(RolloutRun.id == run_id)
+    if revision is not None:
+        stmt = stmt.where(RolloutRun.revision == revision)
+    return await db.scalar(stmt.with_for_update().execution_options(populate_existing=True))
+
+
+# ── creating a run ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def active_run(db: AsyncSession) -> RolloutRun | None:
+    return await db.scalar(select(RolloutRun).where(RolloutRun.status.in_(ACTIVE)).order_by(RolloutRun.created_at).limit(1))
+
+
+async def create_run(db: AsyncSession, plan: RolloutPlan, resolved: dict, *, started_by: str, trigger: str,
+                     occurrence: datetime | None = None, started_by_id=None) -> RolloutRun:
+    """Freeze the plan and its resolved hosts. The caller holds policy_lock and has checked the token."""
+    now = _now()
+    snapshot = {
+        "plan_id": str(plan.id), "name": plan.name, "action": plan.action,
+        "window_id": str(plan.window_id) if plan.window_id else None,
+        "gate_checks": rollout_service.effective_checks(plan.gate_checks), "compliance_mode": plan.compliance_mode,
+        "waves": [{k: w[k] for k in ("label", "soak_minutes", "carp_handover", "require_approval", "groups")} for w in resolved["waves"]],
+    }
+    run = RolloutRun(plan_id=plan.id, plan_name=plan.name, plan_snapshot=snapshot, action=plan.action, status="preflight",
+                     current_wave=0, started_by=started_by, started_by_id=started_by_id, trigger=trigger, window_occurrence=occurrence,
+                     progress={}, created_at=now, step_at=now, revision=0)
+    run.waves = [RolloutRunWave(index=w["index"], label=w["label"], status="preflight" if w["index"] == 0 else "pending")
+                 for w in resolved["waves"]]
+    run.hosts = [RolloutRunHost(wave_index=w["index"], host_id=uuid.UUID(h["id"]), host_name=h["name"], cluster_name=h["cluster_name"],
+                                order=i, status="queued")
+                 for w in resolved["waves"] for i, h in enumerate(w["hosts"])]
+    db.add(run)
+    await db.flush()
+    return run
+
+
+# ── the tick ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def advance_runs(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    """One step for every run. Returns how many runs want a quick next tick."""
+    try:
+        await auto_start(db)
+    except Exception:
+        logger.exception("Rollout: automatischer Start fehlgeschlagen")
+        await db.rollback()
+    ids = list((await db.scalars(select(RolloutRun.id).where(
+        (RolloutRun.status.in_(ACTIVE)) | RolloutRun.hosts.any(RolloutRunHost.status.in_(HOST_OPEN))))).all())
+    await db.commit()
+    busy = 0
+    for run_id in ids:
+        try:
+            await tick(run_id)
+        except Exception as exc:
+            logger.exception("Rollout %s: Schritt fehlgeschlagen", run_id)
+            async with SessionLocal() as s:
+                run = await _lock(s, run_id)
+                if run is not None and run.status in ACTIVE and run.status != "paused":
+                    pause(run, "internal_error", error=type(exc).__name__)
+                    run.revision += 1
+                    await s.commit()
+                    await _audit(run, "pause", "paused", "Interner Fehler: Rollout angehalten", reason="internal_error")
+        async with SessionLocal() as s:
+            status = await s.scalar(select(RolloutRun.status).where(RolloutRun.id == run_id))
+        busy += status in BUSY
+    return busy
+
+
+async def tick(run_id) -> None:
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        # (1) bookkeeping under the lock: what did the schedules do?
+        run = await _lock(db, run_id)
+        if run is None:
+            return
+        changed = await _sync_hosts(db, run)
+        if (run.status in ACTIVE and run.status != "paused" and _now() - run.created_at > MAX_RUN_AGE
+                and not any(h.status in HOST_OPEN for h in run.hosts)):
+            pause(run, "run_too_old", days=MAX_RUN_AGE.days)
+            changed = True
+        if changed:
+            run.revision += 1
+        await db.commit()
+        if changed and run.status == "paused" and run.pause_reason in ("host_failed", "host_timeout", "host_not_started", "run_too_old"):
+            await _audit(run, "pause", "paused", reason=run.pause_reason, detail=run.pause_detail)
+        if run.status not in ACTIVE or run.status in ("paused", "awaiting_approval"):
+            return
+        revision = run.revision
+        # (2) decide, without holding the lock
+        decision = await _HANDLERS[run.status](db, run)
+        await db.commit()
+        if decision is None:
+            return
+        # (3) apply only on the revision it was decided on
+        run = await _lock(db, run_id, revision)
+        if run is None:
+            await db.commit()
+            return
+        events = await decision(db, run)
+        run.revision += 1
+        run.step_at = _now()
+        await db.commit()
+        for event in events or []:
+            await _audit(run, *event[:2], **(event[2] if len(event) > 2 else {}))
+
+
+Decision = Callable[[AsyncSession, RolloutRun], Awaitable[list | None]]
+
+
+async def _sync_hosts(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> bool:
+    """Carry the outcome of each host's schedule over to the run. Returns True if anything changed."""
+    changed = False
+    now = _now()
+    for host in run.hosts:
+        if host.status not in HOST_OPEN:
+            continue
+        sched = await db.get(ScheduledMaintenance, host.scheduled_maintenance_id, populate_existing=True) \
+            if host.scheduled_maintenance_id else None
+        problem = None
+        if sched is None:
+            host.status, host.detail, host.finished_at = "failed", _note("schedule_missing"), now
+            problem = ("host_failed", {"host": host.host_name, "error": "schedule_missing"})
+        elif sched.status == "pending":
+            if host.started_at and now - host.started_at > HOST_START_TIMEOUT:
+                # Never leave it pending behind a paused run: it would fire whenever the poll loop comes back.
+                if await requeue_if_pending(db, host):
+                    problem = ("host_not_started", {"host": host.host_name})
+                    changed = True
+        elif (sched.result or {}).get("not_fired"):
+            _requeue(host, "not_fired")  # fire_due refused it as overdue: nothing happened on the firewall
+            problem = ("host_not_started", {"host": host.host_name})
+            changed = True
+        elif sched.status == "running":
+            want = "verifying" if sched.phase == "verify" else "running"
+            if host.status != want:
+                host.status = want
+                changed = True
+            if host.started_at and now - host.started_at > HOST_MAX_DURATION:
+                problem = ("host_timeout", {"host": host.host_name})
+        elif sched.status == "succeeded":
+            result = sched.result or {}
+            host.status, host.finished_at = "succeeded", now
+            host.version_after = result.get("version_after")
+            host.detail = _note("verified", version=result.get("version_after"), rebooted=bool(result.get("rebooted")))
+            changed = True
+        else:  # failed / cancelled
+            error = (sched.result or {}).get("error") or sched.status
+            host.status, host.finished_at = "failed", now
+            host.detail = _note("host_failed", error=error[:300])
+            problem = ("host_failed", {"host": host.host_name, "error": error[:300]})
+        if problem and run.status in ACTIVE and run.status != "paused":
+            pause(run, problem[0], **problem[1])
+            changed = True
+        elif problem and host.status == "failed":
+            changed = True
+    return changed
+
+
+# ── handlers: one per run status; each returns an apply-function or None ──────
+
+async def _actor_problem(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    if await may_roll_out(db, run.started_by, run.started_by_id):
+        return None
+
+    async def apply(db, run):
+        pause(run, "actor_invalid", user=run.started_by)
+        return [("pause", "paused", {"reason": "actor_invalid"})]
+    return apply
+
+
+def _to_waiting(reason: str) -> Decision:
+    async def apply(db, run):
+        if reason == "window_missing":
+            pause(run, "window_missing")
+            return [("pause", "paused", {"reason": reason})]
+        run.paused_from = run.status
+        run.status = "waiting_window"
+        return [("waiting_window", "waiting")]
+    return apply
+
+
+async def _handle_waiting_window(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    reason = await _may_start_now(db, run)
+    if reason == "window_missing":
+        return _to_waiting(reason)
+    if reason:
+        return None
+
+    async def apply(db, run):
+        _progress(run, resume_recheck_at=None, resume_attempts=0)
+        run.status = "resuming"  # the gate of everything done so far is checked again first
+        return [("window_open", "resuming")]
+    return apply
+
+
+async def _handle_resuming(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    recheck = _ts((run.progress or {}).get("resume_recheck_at"))
+    if recheck and _now() < recheck:
+        return None
+    done = [h for h in run.hosts if h.status == "succeeded" and h.host_id]
+    gate = {"hosts": {}, "verdict": "ok"}
+    if done:
+        hosts = [h for h in [await db.get(OpnsenseHost, d.host_id) for d in done] if h is not None]
+        baselines = {}
+        for w in run.waves:
+            baselines.update((w.baseline or {}))
+        gate = await rollout_health.evaluate(db, hosts, baselines, target_version=run.target_version,
+                                             checks=run.plan_snapshot.get("gate_checks"),
+                                             compliance_mode=run.plan_snapshot.get("compliance_mode", "warn"))
+
+    async def apply(db, run):
+        if gate["verdict"] == "fail":
+            attempts = (run.progress or {}).get("resume_attempts", 0) + 1
+            _progress(run, resume_gate=gate, resume_attempts=attempts)
+            if attempts < 2:
+                _progress(run, resume_recheck_at=_iso(_now() + GATE_RECHECK))
+                return [("resume_gate", "recheck", {"failed": rollout_health.failed_checks(gate)})]
+            run.paused_from = run.paused_from or "preflight"
+            _progress(run, resume_recheck_at=None)
+            run.status = "paused"
+            run.pause_reason, run.pause_detail = "gate_failed", {"failed": _named(run, rollout_health.failed_checks(gate)), "on_resume": True}
+            return [("resume_gate", "failed", {"failed": rollout_health.failed_checks(gate)})]
+        _progress(run, resume_gate=gate, resume_recheck_at=None, resume_attempts=0)
+        target = run.paused_from if run.paused_from in ("preflight", "wave_running", "soaking", "gate") else "preflight"
+        if target == "gate":
+            wave_row(run, run.current_wave).gate_attempts = 0
+            _progress(run, gate_recheck_at=None)
+        if target == "preflight":
+            _progress(run, preflight_started=None, preflight_requested_at=None)
+        run.status, run.paused_from, run.pause_reason, run.pause_detail = target, None, None, None
+        return [("resume_gate", "passed", {"continue_with": target})]
+    return apply
+
+
+def target_of(status: dict, action: str) -> str | None:
+    """The version a firmware action will install, from core/firmware/status (read after a fresh check).
+
+    Live finding (test-fw-3, 26.7.1_1, 2026-10-21): ``product.product_latest`` said 26.7.2 while the
+    ``opnsense`` core package was offered as 26.7.7 — and the package is what gets installed. So the
+    core package's new version comes first; product_latest is only a fallback."""
+    if action == "major_update":
+        return status.get("upgrade_major_version") or None
+    packages = status.get("all_packages") if isinstance(status.get("all_packages"), dict) else {}
+    core = packages.get("opnsense") if isinstance(packages.get("opnsense"), dict) else None
+    if core and core.get("new") and core.get("new") != "N/A":
+        return str(core["new"])
+    for row in status.get("upgrade_packages") or []:
+        if isinstance(row, dict) and row.get("name") == "opnsense" and row.get("new_version"):
+            return str(row["new_version"])
+    product = status.get("product") if isinstance(status.get("product"), dict) else {}
+    return product.get("product_latest") or status.get("product_latest") or None
+
+
+async def _handle_preflight(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    if problem := await _actor_problem(db, run):
+        return problem
+    reason = await _may_start_now(db, run)
+    if reason:
+        return _to_waiting(reason)
+    index = run.current_wave
+    prog = run.progress or {}
+    started = _ts(prog.get("preflight_started")) or _now()
+    requested = _ts(prog.get("preflight_requested_at"))
+    candidates = [h for h in hosts_of(run, index) if h.status in ("queued", "blocked")]
+    now = _now()
+
+    # Which hosts are usable at all?
+    usable: dict = {}
+    skips: dict = {}
+    for rh in candidates:
+        host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, rh.host_id) if rh.host_id else None
+        if host is None:
+            skips[rh.id] = _note("host_deleted")
+        elif not host.enabled:
+            skips[rh.id] = _note("host_disabled")
+        else:
+            usable[rh.id] = host
+
+    if requested is None:
+        # Step 1: ask every usable host to look for updates (a firmware *check*, changes nothing installed).
+        asked = []
+        for rh_id, host in usable.items():
+            try:
+                await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+                if (await client.get_firmware_running(host)).get("status") == "ready":
+                    await client.check_firmware_updates(host)
+                    asked.append(str(rh_id))
+            except (client.OpnsenseAPIError, HTTPException):
+                pass  # judged in step 2 (and blocked after the timeout)
+
+        async def apply(db, run):
+            _progress(run, preflight_started=_iso(started), preflight_requested_at=_iso(_now()), preflight_asked=asked)
+            w = wave_row(run, index)
+            w.status = "preflight"
+            w.started_at = w.started_at or _now()
+            return [("preflight", "started", {"hosts": len(usable)})]
+        return apply
+    if now - requested < PREFLIGHT_CHECK_DELAY:
+        return None
+
+    # Step 2: read what each host offers.
+    offers: dict = {}
+    waiting: dict = {}
+    for rh_id, host in usable.items():
+        try:
+            await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+        except HTTPException:
+            waiting[rh_id] = _note("locked")
+            continue
+        try:
+            running = (await client.get_firmware_running(host)).get("status")
+            if running != "ready":
+                waiting[rh_id] = _note("firmware_busy")
+                continue
+            status = await client.get_firmware_status(host)
+        except client.OpnsenseAPIError:
+            waiting[rh_id] = _note("offline")
+            continue
+        fw = status.get("status")
+        wanted = "upgrade" if run.action == "major_update" else "update"
+        if fw == wanted:
+            offers[rh_id] = target_of(status, run.action)
+        elif fw in ("none", "update", "upgrade"):
+            skips[rh_id] = _note("no_update_offered", status=fw)
+        else:
+            waiting[rh_id] = _note("firmware_status", status=str(fw)[:40])
+
+    if waiting:
+        if now - started < PREFLIGHT_TIMEOUT:
+            return None
+
+        async def apply_blocked(db, run):
+            names = []
+            for rh in hosts_of(run, index):
+                if rh.id in waiting:
+                    rh.status, rh.detail = "blocked", waiting[rh.id]
+                    names.append(rh.host_name)
+            pause(run, "preflight_blocked", hosts=", ".join(names))
+            _progress(run, preflight_started=None, preflight_requested_at=None)
+            return [("pause", "paused", {"reason": "preflight_blocked", "hosts": names})]
+        return apply_blocked
+
+    targets = {t for t in offers.values()}
+    expected = run.target_version
+    mismatch = None
+    if None in targets:
+        mismatch = {"offered": "?"}
+    elif expected is None and len(targets) > 1:
+        mismatch = {"offered": ", ".join(sorted(targets))}
+    elif expected is not None and targets - {expected}:
+        mismatch = {"expected": expected, "offered": ", ".join(sorted(targets - {expected}))}
+    if mismatch:
+        async def apply_mismatch(db, run):
+            # OPNsense always installs the newest offered version; a later ring must not get one the earlier ring never ran.
+            pause(run, "target_version_changed", **mismatch)
+            _progress(run, preflight_started=None, preflight_requested_at=None)
+            return [("pause", "paused", {"reason": "target_version_changed", **mismatch})]
+        return apply_mismatch
+
+    # Baselines and order (BACKUP before MASTER inside a cluster).
+    baselines = {}
+    versions = {}
+    for rh_id in offers:
+        host = usable[rh_id]
+        baselines[str(host.id)] = await rollout_health.baseline(db, host)
+        versions[rh_id] = baselines[str(host.id)].get("version")
+    roles = await get_statuses([usable[i] for i in offers])
+    rank = {"BACKUP": 0, None: 1, "MASTER": 2}
+
+    def order_key(rh_id):
+        host = usable[rh_id]
+        role = roles.get(host.id, {}).get("carp_status") if host.cluster_name else None
+        return (1 if host.cluster_name else 0, host.cluster_name or "", rank.get(role, 1), host.name)
+    ordered = sorted(offers, key=order_key)
+    target = next(iter(targets)) if targets else expected
+
+    async def apply_ready(db, run):
+        for rh in hosts_of(run, index):
+            if rh.id in skips:
+                rh.status, rh.detail = "skipped", skips[rh.id]
+            elif rh.id in offers:
+                rh.status, rh.detail = "queued", None
+                rh.order = ordered.index(rh.id)
+                rh.version_before = versions.get(rh.id)
+        w = wave_row(run, index)
+        w.baseline = baselines
+        if run.target_version is None and target:
+            run.target_version = target
+        _progress(run, preflight_started=None, preflight_requested_at=None, blocked_since=None, cluster_recheck_at=None)
+        if not offers:
+            w.status, w.finished_at = "skipped", _now()
+            events = [("wave", "skipped", {"wave": index})]
+            events += _next_wave(run)
+            return events
+        w.status = "running"
+        run.status = "wave_running"
+        return [("wave", "started", {"wave": index, "target_version": run.target_version,
+                                     "hosts": [usable[i].name for i in ordered], "skipped": len(skips)})]
+    return apply_ready
+
+
+def _next_wave(run: RolloutRun) -> list:
+    index = run.current_wave + 1
+    if index >= len(run.waves):
+        run.status, run.finished_at = "succeeded", _now()
+        return [("finish", "succeeded")]
+    run.current_wave = index
+    w = wave_row(run, index)
+    if wave_spec(run, index).get("require_approval"):
+        w.status = run.status = "awaiting_approval"
+        return [("wave", "awaiting_approval", {"wave": index})]
+    w.status, run.status = "preflight", "preflight"
+    return []
+
+
+async def _handle_wave_running(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    if any(h.status in HOST_OPEN for h in run.hosts):
+        return None  # strictly one host at a time
+    index = run.current_wave
+    queued = [h for h in hosts_of(run, index) if h.status == "queued"]
+    if not queued:
+        soak = int(wave_spec(run, index).get("soak_minutes") or 0)
+
+        async def apply_soak(db, run):
+            w = wave_row(run, index)
+            w.status, w.soak_until = "soaking", _now() + timedelta(minutes=soak)
+            run.status = "soaking"
+            return [("wave", "soaking", {"wave": index, "minutes": soak})]
+        return apply_soak
+    if problem := await _actor_problem(db, run):
+        return problem
+    reason = await _may_start_now(db, run)
+    if reason:
+        return _to_waiting(reason)
+    nxt = queued[0]
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, nxt.host_id) if nxt.host_id else None
+    if host is None or not host.enabled:
+        async def apply_skip(db, run):
+            rh = next(h for h in run.hosts if h.id == nxt.id)
+            rh.status, rh.detail = "skipped", _note("host_deleted" if host is None else "host_disabled")
+            return [("host", "skipped", {"host": nxt.host_name})]
+        return apply_skip
+    spec = wave_spec(run, index)
+    prog = run.progress or {}
+
+    if host.cluster_name:
+        fleet = await peers(db, host)
+        statuses = await get_statuses(fleet)
+        done_ids = {h.host_id for h in run.hosts if h.status == "succeeded"}
+        done_peers = [p for p in fleet if p.id in done_ids and p.id != host.id]
+        baselines = {}
+        for w in run.waves:
+            baselines.update(w.baseline or {})
+        # The cluster as a whole must be healthy before a node is touched; nodes done earlier in this run
+        # must pass their checks again (BACKUP updated -> now it may carry the traffic for the MASTER).
+        gate = await rollout_health.evaluate(
+            db, done_peers + [host], baselines, target_version=run.target_version,
+            checks={**(run.plan_snapshot.get("gate_checks") or {}), "carp": True, "compliance": False})
+        # The node itself is not updated yet: only its reachability, the cluster and the locks count for it.
+        failed = [f"{hid}:{c}" for hid, row in gate["hosts"].items() for c, r in row.items()
+                  if r["result"] == "fail" and not (hid == str(host.id) and c in ("version", "gateways", "services"))]
+        if failed:
+            recheck = _ts(prog.get("cluster_recheck_at"))
+            if recheck is None:
+                async def apply_recheck(db, run):
+                    _progress(run, cluster_recheck_at=_iso(_now() + GATE_RECHECK), cluster_gate=gate)
+                    return [("cluster_gate", "recheck", {"host": host.name, "failed": failed})]
+                return apply_recheck
+            if _now() < recheck:
+                return None
+
+            async def apply_cluster_fail(db, run):
+                pause(run, "cluster_gate_failed", cluster=host.cluster_name, host=host.name, failed=_named(run, failed))
+                _progress(run, cluster_recheck_at=None, cluster_gate=gate)
+                return [("cluster_gate", "failed", {"host": host.name, "failed": failed})]
+            return apply_cluster_fail
+        if statuses.get(host.id, {}).get("carp_status") == "MASTER" and not spec.get("carp_handover"):
+            async def apply_master(db, run):
+                pause(run, "master_needs_handover", host=host.name, cluster=host.cluster_name)
+                return [("pause", "paused", {"reason": "master_needs_handover", "host": host.name})]
+            return apply_master
+
+    try:
+        await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+    except HTTPException:
+        since = _ts(prog.get("blocked_since"))
+        if since is None:
+            async def apply_blocked_start(db, run):
+                _progress(run, blocked_since=_iso(_now()))
+                return [("host", "waiting_for_lock", {"host": host.name})]
+            return apply_blocked_start
+        if _now() - since < BLOCKED_PATIENCE:
+            return None
+
+        async def apply_blocked(db, run):
+            pause(run, "blocked_by_maintenance", host=host.name)
+            _progress(run, blocked_since=None)
+            return [("pause", "paused", {"reason": "blocked_by_maintenance", "host": host.name})]
+        return apply_blocked
+
+    async def apply_start(db, run):
+        await policy_lock(db)
+        rh = next(h for h in run.hosts if h.id == nxt.id)
+        # Idempotency guard: a host that already has a schedule never gets a second one.
+        if rh.status != "queued" or rh.scheduled_maintenance_id is not None:
+            return []
+        now = _now()
+        sched = ScheduledMaintenance(
+            host_id=host.id, host_name=host.name, action=run.action, run_at=now, status="pending",
+            actor=run.started_by, created_at=now, carp_handover=bool(spec.get("carp_handover") and host.cluster_name),
+            auto_verify=True, origin="rollout",
+            progress={"rollout": {"run_id": str(run.id), "wave": index, "plan": run.plan_name}},
+        )
+        db.add(sched)
+        await db.flush()
+        rh.scheduled_maintenance_id, rh.status, rh.started_at = sched.id, "running", now
+        _progress(run, blocked_since=None, cluster_recheck_at=None)
+        return [("host", "started", {"host": host.name, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "handover": sched.carp_handover})]
+    return apply_start
+
+
+async def _handle_soaking(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    w = wave_row(run, run.current_wave)
+    if w.soak_until and _now() < w.soak_until:
+        return None
+
+    async def apply(db, run):
+        w = wave_row(run, run.current_wave)
+        w.status, w.gate_attempts = "gate", 0
+        run.status = "gate"
+        _progress(run, gate_recheck_at=None)
+        return []
+    return apply
+
+
+async def _handle_gate(db: AsyncSession, run: RolloutRun) -> Decision | None:
+    recheck = _ts((run.progress or {}).get("gate_recheck_at"))
+    if recheck and _now() < recheck:
+        return None
+    index = run.current_wave
+    w = wave_row(run, index)
+    done = [h for h in hosts_of(run, index) if h.status == "succeeded" and h.host_id]
+    hosts = [h for h in [await db.get(OpnsenseHost, d.host_id) for d in done] if h is not None]
+    gate = await rollout_health.evaluate(db, hosts, w.baseline or {}, target_version=run.target_version,
+                                         checks=run.plan_snapshot.get("gate_checks"),
+                                         compliance_mode=run.plan_snapshot.get("compliance_mode", "warn"))
+
+    async def apply(db, run):
+        w = wave_row(run, index)
+        w.gate_result = gate
+        w.gate_attempts = (w.gate_attempts or 0) + 1
+        failed = rollout_health.failed_checks(gate)
+        events = [("gate", gate["verdict"], {"wave": index, "attempt": w.gate_attempts, "failed": failed, "result": gate})]
+        if gate["verdict"] == "fail":
+            if w.gate_attempts < 2:
+                _progress(run, gate_recheck_at=_iso(_now() + GATE_RECHECK))
+                return events
+            _progress(run, gate_recheck_at=None)
+            pause(run, "gate_failed", wave=w.label, failed=_named(run, failed))
+            return events + [("pause", "paused", {"reason": "gate_failed"})]
+        w.status, w.finished_at = "passed", _now()
+        _progress(run, gate_recheck_at=None)
+        return events + _next_wave(run)
+    return apply
+
+
+_HANDLERS = {
+    "waiting_window": _handle_waiting_window,
+    "resuming": _handle_resuming,
+    "preflight": _handle_preflight,
+    "wave_running": _handle_wave_running,
+    "soaking": _handle_soaking,
+    "gate": _handle_gate,
+}
+
+
+# ── automatic start at a window occurrence ────────────────────────────────────
+
+async def auto_start(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    started = 0
+    plans = (await db.scalars(select(RolloutPlan).where(
+        RolloutPlan.auto_start.is_(True), RolloutPlan.activated_at.is_not(None), RolloutPlan.window_id.is_not(None)))).all()
+    for plan in plans:
+        window = await db.get(MaintenanceWindow, plan.window_id)
+        occ = window_service.startable(window, _now()) if window else None
+        if occ is None:
+            continue
+        if await db.scalar(select(RolloutRun.id).where(RolloutRun.plan_id == plan.id, RolloutRun.window_occurrence == occ.start)):
+            continue
+        if (plan.auto_start_error or {}).get("occurrence") == _iso(occ.start):
+            continue  # already reported for this occurrence
+        await policy_lock(db)
+        plan = await rollout_service.load_plan(db, plan.id)
+        if await db.scalar(select(RolloutRun.id).where(RolloutRun.plan_id == plan.id, RolloutRun.window_occurrence == occ.start)):
+            continue  # another backend started it while this one waited for the lock (not a refusal)
+        resolved = await rollout_service.resolve(db, plan)
+        problem = None
+        if plan.action != "update":
+            problem = _note("auto_start_update_only")
+        elif plan.activated_fingerprint != rollout_service.fingerprint(plan, resolved):
+            problem = _note("plan_changed")  # someone changed the plan, its groups or its window since activation
+        elif not await may_roll_out(db, plan.activated_by or "", plan.activated_by_id):
+            problem = _note("actor_invalid", user=plan.activated_by)
+        elif resolved["errors"]:
+            problem = _note("plan_invalid", reason=resolved["errors"][0]["code"])
+        elif (other := await active_run(db)) is not None:
+            problem = _note("other_run_active", plan=other.plan_name)
+        if problem:
+            plan.auto_start_error = {"occurrence": _iso(occ.start), "at": _iso(_now()), **problem}
+            await db.commit()
+            token = audit_service.context.set({"actor": "system:rollout", "id": str(plan.id)})
+            try:
+                await audit_service.persist(kind="rollout", action="auto_start", status="refused", entity_id=str(plan.id),
+                                            entity_name=plan.name, details=plan.auto_start_error)
+            finally:
+                audit_service.context.reset(token)
+            continue
+        try:
+            run = await create_run(db, plan, resolved, started_by=plan.activated_by, started_by_id=plan.activated_by_id,
+                               trigger="window", occurrence=occ.start)
+            plan.auto_start_error = None
+            await db.commit()
+        except IntegrityError:
+            await db.rollback()  # another backend started it for this occurrence
+            continue
+        started += 1
+        await _audit(run, "start", "started", trigger="window", occurrence=_iso(occ.start),
+                     hosts=sum(len(w["hosts"]) for w in resolved["waves"]))
+    await db.commit()
+    return started
+
+
+# ── human actions (called by the router under policy_lock) ────────────────────
+
+async def count_active(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
+    return await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(RolloutRun).where(RolloutRun.status.in_(ACTIVE))) or 0

backend/app/services/rollout_health.py

@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+"""Health gate of a firmware rollout (1.25): is a host, after its update, as healthy as before?
+
+``baseline(db, host)`` is taken right before a wave starts, ``evaluate(...)`` after the soak time
+(and before each node of an already touched cluster, and on resume). Every check of every host
+yields ``{"result": ok|warn|fail|skip, "code": <machine code>, "params": {...}}``; the UI translates
+the code (rollouts.gate.code.*), so no German prose travels through here.
+
+What the checks look at (all read-only on the firewall, except that the compliance check downloads
+the configuration like the 6-hourly security check does):
+
+* online     — enabled, the API answers, firmware job idle (``running == ready``).
+* version    — the installed version is the rollout's target version.
+* carp       — per cluster: every node online, exactly one MASTER per VHID, no node in CARP
+               maintenance mode, no CARP auto-revert timer running.
+* gateways   — gateways that were up in the baseline are up again; a gateway that was already bad
+               before only warns (1.24 ``get_gateway_health``).
+* services   — services that ran in the baseline run again.
+* locks      — no open maintenance operation, restore or unconfirmed deployment in the host/cluster.
+* compliance — security score not lower than before: warn (default) or fail. A weak signal: an
+               update may legitimately change defaults.
+
+A reading that cannot be taken is never "ok": unreadable now but readable in the baseline fails,
+unreadable in both is "skip" (nothing to compare; e.g. an API key without that permission).
+"""
+import asyncio
+from collections import defaultdict
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.carp_maintenance_window import CarpMaintenanceWindow
+from app.models.compliance_result import ComplianceResult
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import compliance_service, gateway_health_service, opnsense_client as client
+from app.services.host_maintenance_service import _shared_change_blockers, peers
+from app.services.host_status_service import get_statuses
+from app.services.resource_monitor_service import _services_compact
+
+CHECKS = ("online", "version", "carp", "gateways", "services", "locks", "compliance")
+DEFAULT_CHECKS = {"online": True, "version": True, "carp": True, "gateways": True, "services": True, "locks": True,
+                  "compliance": False}
+ALWAYS_ON = ("online", "version", "locks")  # a rollout without these would be blind
+_RANK = {"skip": 0, "ok": 0, "warn": 1, "fail": 2}
+
+
+def _r(result: str, code: str, **params) -> dict:
+    return {"result": result, "code": code, "params": params}
+
+
+async def _optional(coro):
+    try:
+        return await coro
+    except client.OpnsenseAPIError:
+        return None
+
+
+async def _gateways(host) -> dict | None:
+    gws = await _optional(gateway_health_service.get_gateway_health(host))
+    return None if gws is None else {g.name: g.state for g in gws}
+
+
+async def _services(host) -> dict | None:
+    listing = await _optional(client.search_services(host))
+    return None if listing is None else _services_compact(listing)
+
+
+async def baseline(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    info, gateways, services = await asyncio.gather(
+        _optional(client.get_firmware_info(host)), _gateways(host), _services(host))
+    score = await db.scalar(select(ComplianceResult.score).where(ComplianceResult.host_id == host.id))
+    return {
+        "version": (info or {}).get("product_version"),
+        "gateways": gateways,
+        "services": services,
+        "compliance_score": score,
+    }
+
+
+def _check_gateways(before: dict | None, now: dict | None) -> dict:
+    if now is None:
+        return _r("skip", "unreadable_both") if before is None else _r("fail", "unreadable")
+    if before is None:
+        bad = sorted(n for n, s in now.items() if s == "offline")
+        return _r("warn", "gateway_down", names=", ".join(bad)) if bad else _r("ok", "no_baseline")
+    down = sorted(n for n, s in before.items() if s in ("online", "unknown") and now.get(n) == "offline")
+    gone = sorted(n for n in before if n not in now)
+    degraded = sorted(n for n, s in now.items() if s == "degraded" and before.get(n) != "degraded")
+    still_bad = sorted(n for n, s in before.items() if s in ("offline", "degraded") and now.get(n) in ("offline", "degraded"))
+    # "unknown" (not monitored) going to "offline" is a real change too: monitoring just started and reports down.
+    if down:
+        return _r("fail", "gateway_down", names=", ".join(down))
+    if gone:
+        return _r("warn", "gateway_missing", names=", ".join(gone))
+    if degraded:
+        return _r("warn", "gateway_degraded", names=", ".join(degraded))
+    if still_bad:
+        return _r("warn", "gateway_bad_before", names=", ".join(still_bad))
+    return _r("ok", "ok")
+
+
+def _check_services(before: dict | None, now: dict | None) -> dict:
+    if now is None:
+        return _r("skip", "unreadable_both") if before is None else _r("fail", "unreadable")
+    if before is None:
+        return _r("ok", "no_baseline")
+    stopped = sorted(name.split("/")[0] for name, running in before.items() if running == 1 and now.get(name) != 1)
+    if stopped:
+        return _r("fail", "service_stopped", names=", ".join(dict.fromkeys(stopped)))
+    return _r("ok", "ok")
+
+
+async def _check_carp(db: AsyncSession, fleet: list[OpnsenseHost], statuses: dict) -> dict:
+    offline = sorted(h.name for h in fleet if h.enabled and statuses.get(h.id, {}).get("status") != "online")
+    if offline:
+        return _r("fail", "node_offline", names=", ".join(offline))
+    online = [h for h in fleet if statuses.get(h.id, {}).get("status") == "online"]
+    demoted = sorted(h.name for h in online if statuses[h.id].get("carp_maintenance_mode"))
+    if demoted:
+        return _r("fail", "maintenance_mode", names=", ".join(demoted))
+    timers = (await db.scalars(select(CarpMaintenanceWindow.host_name).where(
+        CarpMaintenanceWindow.host_id.in_([h.id for h in fleet]), CarpMaintenanceWindow.status == "active"))).all()
+    if timers:
+        return _r("fail", "auto_revert_active", names=", ".join(sorted(timers)))
+    masters: dict[str, int] = defaultdict(int)
+    broken: set[str] = set()
+    for h in online:
+        for vhid, state in (statuses[h.id].get("carp_vips") or {}).items():
+            masters[vhid] += state == "MASTER"
+            if state not in ("MASTER", "BACKUP"):
+                broken.add(vhid)
+    wrong = sorted(set(v for v, n in masters.items() if n != 1) | broken, key=lambda v: (len(v), v))
+    if wrong:
+        return _r("fail", "vhid_roles", vhids=", ".join(wrong))
+    if not masters and not any(statuses[h.id].get("carp_status") == "MASTER" for h in online):
+        return _r("fail", "no_master")
+    return _r("ok", "ok")
+
+
+async def evaluate(db: AsyncSession, hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], baselines: dict, *, target_version: str | None,
+                   checks: dict | None = None, compliance_mode: str = "warn") -> dict:
+    """{"hosts": {host_id: {check: result}}, "verdict": ok|warn|fail}. ``baselines`` is keyed by str(host.id)."""
+    enabled = {**DEFAULT_CHECKS, **(checks or {})}
+    for name in ALWAYS_ON:
+        enabled[name] = True
+    results: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    fleets: dict[str, list[OpnsenseHost]] = {}
+    for host in hosts:
+        fleets[str(host.id)] = await peers(db, host) if host.cluster_name else [host]
+    every = {h.id: h for fleet in fleets.values() for h in fleet}
+    statuses = await get_statuses(list(every.values()))
+    carp_cache: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for host in hosts:
+        hid = str(host.id)
+        before = baselines.get(hid) or {}
+        row: dict[str, dict] = {}
+        st = statuses.get(host.id, {})
+        running = await _optional(client.get_firmware_running(host)) if st.get("status") == "online" else None
+        if not host.enabled:
+            row["online"] = _r("fail", "disabled")
+        elif st.get("status") != "online":
+            row["online"] = _r("fail", "offline")
+        elif (running or {}).get("status") != "ready":
+            row["online"] = _r("fail", "firmware_busy")
+        else:
+            row["online"] = _r("ok", "ok")
+        reachable = row["online"]["result"] == "ok"
+
+        if enabled["version"]:
+            info = await _optional(client.get_firmware_info(host)) if reachable else None
+            version = (info or {}).get("product_version")
+            if not target_version:
+                row["version"] = _r("skip", "no_target")
+            elif version is None:
+                row["version"] = _r("fail", "unreadable")
+            elif version != target_version:
+                row["version"] = _r("fail", "version_mismatch", expected=target_version, actual=version)
+            else:
+                row["version"] = _r("ok", "ok", actual=version)
+
+        if enabled["carp"]:
+            if not host.cluster_name:
+                row["carp"] = _r("skip", "no_cluster")
+            else:
+                if host.cluster_name not in carp_cache:
+                    carp_cache[host.cluster_name] = await _check_carp(db, fleets[hid], statuses)
+                row["carp"] = carp_cache[host.cluster_name]
+
+        if enabled["gateways"]:
+            row["gateways"] = _check_gateways(before.get("gateways"), await _gateways(host) if reachable else None)
+        if enabled["services"]:
+            row["services"] = _check_services(before.get("services"), await _services(host) if reachable else None)
+
+        blockers = await _shared_change_blockers(db, fleets[hid])
+        row["locks"] = _r("fail", "open_locks", count=len(blockers)) if blockers else _r("ok", "ok")
+
+        if enabled["compliance"]:
+            base_score = before.get("compliance_score")
+            if base_score is None:
+                row["compliance"] = _r("skip", "no_baseline")
+            elif not reachable:
+                row["compliance"] = _r("fail", "unreadable")
+            else:
+                fresh = await compliance_service.check_host(db, host)
+                if fresh.score is None:
+                    row["compliance"] = _r("warn", "unreadable")
+                elif fresh.score < base_score:
+                    row["compliance"] = _r("fail" if compliance_mode == "fail" else "warn", "score_lower",
+                                           before=base_score, after=fresh.score)
+                else:
+                    row["compliance"] = _r("ok", "ok", before=base_score, after=fresh.score)
+        results[hid] = row
+    worst = max((_RANK[c["result"]] for row in results.values() for c in row.values()), default=0)
+    return {"hosts": results, "verdict": ("ok", "warn", "fail")[worst]}
+
+
+def failed_checks(gate: dict) -> list[str]:
+    """Flat "host-id:check" list of everything that failed (for notifications and the audit trail)."""
+    return [f"{hid}:{name}" for hid, row in (gate.get("hosts") or {}).items() for name, c in row.items() if c["result"] == "fail"]

backend/app/services/rollout_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+"""Rollout plans: resolving waves to hosts, validation, preview token / activation fingerprint.
+
+The run engine (rollout_engine.py) builds on ``resolve``: what a preview shows is exactly what a run
+freezes when it starts.
+"""
+import hashlib
+import json
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.maintenance_window import MaintenanceWindow
+from app.models.policy import DeviceGroup
+from app.models.rollout import RolloutPlan
+from app.services import rollout_health, window_service
+
+# Hard limits: an unattended engine that fires firmware updates must stay small and explainable.
+MAX_WAVES = 10
+MAX_HOSTS = 100
+MAX_SOAK_MINUTES = 24 * 60
+
+
+def _issue(code: str, **params) -> dict:
+    return {"code": code, "params": params}
+
+
+async def resolve(db: AsyncSession, plan: RolloutPlan) -> dict:
+    """Waves with their hosts (a host in several waves belongs to the earliest), errors that block a
+    start/activation, and warnings."""
+    errors: list[dict] = []
+    warnings: list[dict] = []
+    seen: dict = {}
+    duplicates: set[str] = set()
+    waves = []
+    group_ids = {g.id for w in plan.waves for g in w.groups}
+    groups = {g.id: g for g in (await db.scalars(
+        select(DeviceGroup).where(DeviceGroup.id.in_(group_ids)).options(selectinload(DeviceGroup.hosts)))).all()} if group_ids else {}
+    for index, wave in enumerate(plan.waves):
+        hosts: list[OpnsenseHost] = []
+        for group in sorted(wave.groups, key=lambda g: g.name):
+            for host in sorted(groups[group.id].hosts, key=lambda h: h.name):
+                if host.id in seen:
+                    if seen[host.id] != index:
+                        duplicates.add(host.name)
+                    continue
+                seen[host.id] = index
+                hosts.append(host)
+        if not hosts:
+            warnings.append(_issue("empty_wave", wave=wave.label))
+        clusters = sorted({h.cluster_name for h in hosts if h.cluster_name})
+        if clusters and not wave.carp_handover:
+            warnings.append(_issue("master_needs_handover", wave=wave.label, clusters=", ".join(clusters)))
+        waves.append({
+            "index": index, "label": wave.label, "soak_minutes": wave.soak_minutes, "carp_handover": wave.carp_handover,
+            "require_approval": wave.require_approval, "groups": sorted(g.name for g in wave.groups),
+            "hosts": [{"id": str(h.id), "name": h.name, "cluster_name": h.cluster_name, "enabled": h.enabled} for h in hosts],
+        })
+    if duplicates:
+        warnings.append(_issue("duplicate_hosts", names=", ".join(sorted(duplicates))))
+    all_hosts = [h for w in waves for h in w["hosts"]]
+    disabled = sorted(h["name"] for h in all_hosts if not h["enabled"])
+    if disabled:
+        warnings.append(_issue("disabled_hosts", names=", ".join(disabled)))
+    if not plan.waves:
+        errors.append(_issue("no_waves"))
+    elif not all_hosts:
+        errors.append(_issue("no_hosts"))
+    if len(plan.waves) > MAX_WAVES:
+        errors.append(_issue("too_many_waves", limit=MAX_WAVES))
+    if len(all_hosts) > MAX_HOSTS:
+        errors.append(_issue("too_many_hosts", limit=MAX_HOSTS))
+
+    # Clusters: where are their nodes?
+    cluster_names = sorted({h["cluster_name"] for h in all_hosts if h["cluster_name"]})
+    for cluster in cluster_names:
+        members = (await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost.id).where(OpnsenseHost.cluster_name == cluster))).all()
+        in_plan = {h["id"]: w["index"] for w in waves for h in w["hosts"] if h["cluster_name"] == cluster}
+        partial = len(in_plan) < len(members)
+        split = len(set(in_plan.values())) > 1
+        if plan.action == "major_update" and (partial or split):
+            # Never two major releases side by side in one cluster longer than one wave.
+            errors.append(_issue("cluster_split", cluster=cluster))
+        elif partial:
+            warnings.append(_issue("cluster_partial", cluster=cluster))
+        elif split:
+            warnings.append(_issue("mixed_versions", cluster=cluster, wave=waves[max(in_plan.values())]["label"]))
+
+    window = await db.get(MaintenanceWindow, plan.window_id) if plan.window_id else None
+    if plan.auto_start and plan.action != "update":
+        errors.append(_issue("auto_start_update_only"))
+    if plan.auto_start and window is None:
+        errors.append(_issue("auto_start_needs_window"))
+    if window is None:
+        warnings.append(_issue("no_window"))
+    elif not window.enabled:
+        warnings.append(_issue("window_disabled"))
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    return {
+        "waves": waves, "errors": errors, "warnings": warnings,
+        "window": {"id": str(window.id), "name": window.name, "definition": window_service.definition(window),
+                   "next": [o.as_dict() for o in window_service.occurrences(window, now, 3)] if window.enabled else []}
+        if window else None,
+    }
+
+
+def definition(plan: RolloutPlan) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "id": str(plan.id), "name": plan.name, "action": plan.action, "window_id": str(plan.window_id) if plan.window_id else None,
+        "auto_start": plan.auto_start, "gate_checks": effective_checks(plan.gate_checks), "compliance_mode": plan.compliance_mode,
+        "waves": [{"position": w.position, "label": w.label, "soak_minutes": w.soak_minutes, "carp_handover": w.carp_handover,
+                   "require_approval": w.require_approval, "group_ids": sorted(str(g.id) for g in w.groups)} for w in plan.waves],
+    }
+
+
+def effective_checks(checks: dict | None) -> dict:
+    merged = {**rollout_health.DEFAULT_CHECKS, **{k: bool(v) for k, v in (checks or {}).items() if k in rollout_health.CHECKS}}
+    for name in rollout_health.ALWAYS_ON:
+        merged[name] = True
+    return merged
+
+
+def fingerprint(plan: RolloutPlan, resolved: dict) -> str:
+    """Covers the plan, every resolved host (id, name, cluster, enabled) and the window definition: a change
+    to any of them invalidates a preview and stops an activated automatic start."""
+    state = {
+        "plan": definition(plan),
+        "hosts": [[w["index"], h["id"], h["name"], h["cluster_name"], h["enabled"]] for w in resolved["waves"] for h in w["hosts"]],
+        "window": (resolved.get("window") or {}).get("definition"),
+    }
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(state, sort_keys=True, default=str).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+async def load_plan(db: AsyncSession, plan_id) -> RolloutPlan | None:
+    return await db.scalar(
+        select(RolloutPlan).where(RolloutPlan.id == plan_id).execution_options(populate_existing=True))

backend/app/services/rule_adopt_service.py

@@ -19,27 +19,18 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
 from app.models.rule import FirewallRule
 from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
-from app.services import opnsense_client
+from app.services import adopt_link_service, opnsense_client
+from app.services.adopt_common import NotAdoptable, NotFoundOnHost, clean, on  # noqa: F401  (NotAdoptable is re-exported for routers/rules.py)
 from app.services.policy_service import revision
 from app.services.rule_deploy_service import _build_payload
 
 
-class RuleNotFoundOnHost(Exception):
+class RuleNotFoundOnHost(NotFoundOnHost):
     pass
 
 
-class NotAdoptable(Exception):
-    def __init__(self, reasons: list[str]):
-        super().__init__(", ".join(reasons))
-        self.reasons = reasons
-
-
-def _on(value) -> bool:
-    return value in ("1", 1, True)
-
-
-def _clean(value) -> str:
-    return "" if value is None else str(value).strip()
+_on = on
+_clean = clean
 
 
 def reasons_not_adoptable(row: dict, managed_uuids: set[str]) -> list[str]:
@@ -73,6 +64,30 @@ def reasons_not_adoptable(row: dict, managed_uuids: set[str]) -> list[str]:
     return reasons
 
 
+def _values(row: dict) -> dict:
+    """The fields OPNexus manages, normalised exactly as adopting stores them (also what a link compares)."""
+    return {
+        "description": _clean(row.get("description")),
+        "interface": _clean(row.get("interface")),
+        "direction": _clean(row.get("direction")),
+        "ipprotocol": _clean(row.get("ipprotocol")),
+        "protocol": _clean(row.get("protocol")) or "any",
+        "action": _clean(row.get("action")),
+        "source_net": _clean(row.get("source_net")) or "any",
+        "source_port": _clean(row.get("source_port")) or None,
+        "destination_net": _clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any",
+        "destination_port": _clean(row.get("destination_port")) or None,
+        "enabled": _on(row.get("enabled")),
+        "log": _on(row.get("log")),
+    }
+
+
+LINK_SPEC = adopt_link_service.LinkSpec(
+    model=FirewallRule, deployment=RuleDeployment, fk="rule_id", uuid_attr="opnsense_rule_uuid",
+    identity="description", payload=_build_payload, revision=revision,
+)
+
+
 async def _managed_uuids(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> set[str]:
     rows = await db.scalars(
         select(RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid).where(
@@ -90,6 +105,7 @@ async def _live_rows(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
 
 async def list_unmanaged(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
     managed = await _managed_uuids(db, host)
+    central = await adopt_link_service.load_central(db, LINK_SPEC)
     result = []
     for row in await _live_rows(host):
         if row.get("is_automatic"):
@@ -97,7 +113,11 @@ async def list_unmanaged(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
         reasons = reasons_not_adoptable(row, managed)
         if "already_managed" in reasons:
             continue
+        matches, similar = adopt_link_service.find(central, LINK_SPEC, host, _values(row))
         result.append({
+            "matches": [adopt_link_service.describe(LINK_SPEC, m) for m in matches],
+            "similar": [adopt_link_service.describe(LINK_SPEC, m) for m in similar],
+            "linkable": any(not m.busy for m in matches) and not reasons,
             "uuid": _clean(row.get("uuid")),
             "description": _clean(row.get("description")),
             "interface": _clean(row.get("interface")),
@@ -117,7 +137,15 @@ async def list_unmanaged(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
     return result
 
 
-async def adopt(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, rule_uuid: str) -> FirewallRule:
+async def adopt(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, rule_uuid: str, link_to=None) -> FirewallRule:
+    """Takes the rule over as a new central rule, or - with `link_to` - links it to that existing rule."""
+    if link_to is not None:
+        existing = await db.scalar(select(RuleDeployment).where(
+            RuleDeployment.host_id == host.id, RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid == rule_uuid))
+        if existing is not None:
+            if existing.rule_id == link_to:
+                return await db.get(FirewallRule, link_to)  # second click: already linked
+            raise NotAdoptable(["already_managed"])
     managed = await _managed_uuids(db, host)
     row = next((r for r in await _live_rows(host) if _clean(r.get("uuid")) == rule_uuid), None)
     if row is None:
@@ -125,23 +153,10 @@ async def adopt(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, rule_uuid: str) -> Firewal
     reasons = reasons_not_adoptable(row, managed)
     if reasons:
         raise NotAdoptable(reasons)
+    if link_to is not None:
+        return await adopt_link_service.link(db, LINK_SPEC, host, link_to, rule_uuid, _values(row))
 
-    rule = FirewallRule(
-        description=_clean(row.get("description")),
-        interface=_clean(row.get("interface")),
-        direction=_clean(row.get("direction")),
-        ipprotocol=_clean(row.get("ipprotocol")),
-        protocol=_clean(row.get("protocol")) or "any",
-        action=_clean(row.get("action")),
-        source_net=_clean(row.get("source_net")) or "any",
-        source_port=_clean(row.get("source_port")) or None,
-        destination_net=_clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any",
-        destination_port=_clean(row.get("destination_port")) or None,
-        enabled=_on(row.get("enabled")),
-        log=_on(row.get("log")),
-        targets=[host],
-        groups=[],
-    )
+    rule = FirewallRule(**_values(row), targets=[host], groups=[])
     db.add(rule)
     await db.flush()
     revision(db, rule, "Von Firewall übernommen")

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/__init__.py

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+"""Rule analysis (1.26): which firewall rule decides a packet, with honest confidence."""

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/cleanup.py

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+"""Cleanup candidates of one firewall: unused, shadowed, duplicate and long-disabled rules (read-only).
+
+Nothing here changes a firewall. The list says *which rules are worth a look and how sure that is*; removing
+them is a separate step (not part of this module).
+
+Categories
+* ``unused``       OPNexus has watched the rule's pf counters for at least N days and saw no hit
+                   (services/rule_hit_service.py; N is a parameter, default 30).
+* ``shadowed``     an earlier quick rule already decides everything the rule matches (rule_analysis/coverage.py).
+* ``duplicate``    like shadowed, with the same action and the rule also covering the earlier one.
+* ``disabled_long`` disabled, and OPNexus has seen it unchanged for N days or more (rule history).
+
+Confidence (never higher than what is proven; what is not proven is never "sure")
+* ``sure``      the evidence is complete: unused = the rule is loaded in pf, has no schedule, the counters were
+                sampled recently and over the whole window; shadowed/duplicate = literal comparison, order from
+                ``sort_order``, the covering rule is loaded; disabled_long = observed unchanged for N days.
+* ``probable``  relies on a guess or on static alias content, or pf's loaded ruleset is not available, or the rule
+                has a schedule (a hit might happen at another time).
+* ``unknown``   there is a hint but no support: the rule is not loaded in pf (no counters can exist), or the
+                counters are stale.
+
+``removable`` says whether the rule could be offered for removal at all; the reason is a code:
+``automatic`` (generated by OPNsense), ``legacy`` (not yet migrated, migrate it in OPNsense first),
+``managed`` (OPNexus manages the rule: remove it through the normal flow of the rules page).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta
+from typing import Iterable
+
+from app.services import rule_hit_service
+from app.services.rule_analysis import coverage
+from app.services.rule_analysis.context import Context
+from app.services.rule_analysis.model import SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_INVALID, SECTION_NAT_AUTO, NormRule
+
+CATEGORIES = ("unused", "shadowed", "duplicate", "disabled_long")
+DEFAULT_UNUSED_DAYS = 30
+MIN_DAYS, MAX_DAYS = 1, 3650
+
+
+def removal_block(rule: NormRule, managed: dict | None) -> str | None:
+    """Why the rule could not be offered for removal (None = it could)."""
+    if rule.automatic or rule.section in (SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_NAT_AUTO):
+        return "automatic"
+    if rule.legacy:
+        return "legacy"
+    if managed is not None:
+        return "managed"
+    return None
+
+
+def unused_confidence(rule: NormRule, hit, now: datetime) -> str:
+    """Confidence of an 'unused' verdict (the caller already knows the window passed without a hit)."""
+    if rule.loaded is False:
+        return "unknown"   # pf did not load it (schedule, missing interface, gateway down): no counter can exist
+    if hit.last_sampled_at is None or now - hit.last_sampled_at > rule_hit_service.SAMPLE_FRESH:
+        return "unknown"   # stale counters say nothing about the present
+    if rule.loaded is None or rule.sched:
+        return "probable"  # pf's ruleset not available / the rule only works at certain times
+    return "sure"
+
+
+def _name(rule: NormRule) -> str:
+    return rule.description or rule.label or rule.uuid or (f"@{rule.pf_numbers[0]}" if rule.pf_numbers else "")
+
+
+def build(rules: list[NormRule], ctx: Context, *, hits: dict, states: dict, managed: dict[str, dict],
+          now: datetime, unused_days: int = DEFAULT_UNUSED_DAYS, order_guessed: bool = False) -> list[dict]:
+    """Candidate rows, in evaluation order. ``hits``: RuleHit per rule label, ``states``: LiveRuleState per label,
+    ``managed``: {label: {"kind", "id", "name"}} of the rules OPNexus deployed to this firewall."""
+    unused_days = max(MIN_DAYS, min(MAX_DAYS, int(unused_days)))
+    overlaps = {id(o.rule): o for o in coverage.analyse(rules, ctx, order_guessed=order_guessed)}
+    rows: list[dict] = []
+    for rule in rules:
+        if rule.automatic or rule.section in (SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_INVALID, SECTION_NAT_AUTO):
+            continue
+        categories: list[dict] = []
+        key = rule.uuid.lower()
+        hit = hits.get(key)
+        if hit is not None and rule_hit_service.classify(hit, now, unused_days) == "unused":
+            categories.append({"kind": "unused", "confidence": unused_confidence(rule, hit, now), "days": unused_days})
+        overlap = overlaps.get(id(rule))
+        if overlap is not None:
+            categories.append({
+                "kind": overlap.kind, "confidence": overlap.confidence,
+                "by": {"uuid": overlap.by.uuid, "description": _name(overlap.by), "section": overlap.by.section,
+                       "automatic": overlap.by.automatic},
+            })
+        state = states.get(key)
+        if (not rule.enabled and state is not None and state.present
+                and now - state.changed_at >= timedelta(days=unused_days)):
+            categories.append({"kind": "disabled_long", "confidence": "sure", "days": unused_days,
+                               "since": state.changed_at})
+        if not categories:
+            continue
+        block = removal_block(rule, managed.get(key))
+        rows.append({
+            **rule.summary(), "enabled": rule.enabled, "categories": categories,
+            "hit_state": rule_hit_service.classify(hit, now, unused_days) if hit is not None else None,
+            "last_hit_at": hit.last_hit_at if hit is not None else None,
+            "watched_since": hit.first_seen_at if hit is not None else None,
+            "removable": block is None, "not_removable_reason": block,
+            "managed_by": managed.get(key),
+        })
+    return rows
+
+
+def summarize(rows: Iterable[dict]) -> dict:
+    counts = {kind: 0 for kind in CATEGORIES}
+    for row in rows:
+        for category in row["categories"]:
+            counts[category["kind"]] += 1
+    return counts

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/context.py

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+"""Everything about one firewall the analysis needs, fetched read-only and cached briefly.
+
+Sources (see the evidence block in opnsense_client.py): ``firewall/filter/searchRule`` (all
+rules incl. automatic ones, with ``sort_order``), ``diagnostics/firewall/pfStatistics/rules``
+(what pf has loaded), ``interfaces/overview/interfacesInfo`` (identifier, device, addresses
+incl. CARP VIPs, gateways), ``firewall/group/searchItem`` (interface groups),
+``firewall/alias/searchItem`` (alias definitions), ``firewall/d_nat/searchRule`` (port
+forwards, only to warn about NAT) and, per queried IP, ``firewall/alias_util/findReferences``.
+Optional sources may fail; the analysis then lowers its confidence instead of guessing.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import ipaddress
+import logging
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import opnsense_client
+from app.services.rule_analysis import pf_ruleset
+from app.services.rule_analysis.model import IPAddr, IPNet
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+CACHE_SECONDS = 60
+# Built-in interface groups whose members are the matching dynamic devices.
+BUILTIN_GROUP_DEVICES = {"wireguard": ("wg",), "openvpn": ("ovpns", "ovpnc"), "enc0": ("enc0",)}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class IfInfo:
+    identifier: str
+    device: str
+    description: str
+    nets: list[IPNet] = field(default_factory=list)
+    addrs: list[IPAddr] = field(default_factory=list)      # primary addresses
+    vips: list[IPAddr] = field(default_factory=list)       # CARP / alias VIPs on this interface
+    has_gateway: bool = False
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Context:
+    rows: list[dict]
+    pf: pf_ruleset.PfRuleset | None
+    interfaces: dict[str, IfInfo]
+    groups: dict[str, set[str]] | None            # name -> member identifiers; None = unknown
+    aliases: dict[str, dict]
+    port_forwards: list[dict] | None
+    refs: dict[str, list[str] | None] = field(default_factory=dict)
+    notes: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    loaded_at: float = 0.0
+
+    @property
+    def self_addrs(self) -> list[IPAddr]:
+        addrs = [a for i in self.interfaces.values() for a in (*i.addrs, *i.vips)]
+        return addrs + [ipaddress.ip_address("127.0.0.1"), ipaddress.ip_address("::1")]
+
+    def by_device(self, device: str) -> IfInfo | None:
+        return next((i for i in self.interfaces.values() if i.device == device), None)
+
+    def by_label(self, label: str) -> IfInfo | None:
+        lowered = label.strip().lower()
+        return self.interfaces.get(lowered) or next(
+            (i for i in self.interfaces.values() if i.description.lower() == lowered), None)
+
+
+def _interfaces(info: dict) -> dict[str, IfInfo]:
+    result: dict[str, IfInfo] = {}
+    for row in (info or {}).get("rows", []) or []:
+        identifier = str(row.get("identifier") or "").strip()
+        if not identifier:
+            continue
+        item = IfInfo(identifier=identifier, device=str(row.get("device") or ""),
+                      description=str(row.get("description") or identifier),
+                      has_gateway=bool(row.get("gateways")) or "default" in (row.get("routes") or []))
+        for entry in [*(row.get("ipv4") or []), *(row.get("ipv6") or [])]:
+            try:
+                iface = ipaddress.ip_interface(str(entry.get("ipaddr")).split("%")[0])
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+            (item.vips if entry.get("vhid") or entry.get("vip") else item.addrs).append(iface.ip)
+            if iface.network not in item.nets:
+                item.nets.append(iface.network)
+        result[identifier] = item
+    return result
+
+
+def _groups(data: dict | None, interfaces: dict[str, IfInfo]) -> dict[str, set[str]] | None:
+    if not isinstance(data, dict) or not isinstance(data.get("rows"), list):
+        return None
+    groups: dict[str, set[str]] = {}
+    for row in data["rows"]:
+        name = str(row.get("ifname") or "")
+        members = {m.strip() for m in str(row.get("members") or "").split(",") if m.strip()}
+        prefixes = BUILTIN_GROUP_DEVICES.get(name)
+        if prefixes:
+            members |= {i.identifier for i in interfaces.values() if i.device.startswith(prefixes)}
+        if name:
+            groups[name] = members
+    return groups
+
+
+async def _optional(coro, note: str, notes: list[str]):
+    try:
+        return await coro
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - optional source: degrade, never fail the analysis
+        logger.info("rule analysis: optional source failed (%s): %s", note, exc)
+        notes.append(note)
+        return None
+
+
+_CACHE: dict[str, Context] = {}
+
+
+async def load_context(host: OpnsenseHost, *, use_cache: bool = True) -> Context:
+    key = str(host.id)
+    cached = _CACHE.get(key)
+    if use_cache and cached and time.monotonic() - cached.loaded_at < CACHE_SECONDS:
+        return cached
+    notes: list[str] = []
+    rules, info = await asyncio.gather(
+        opnsense_client.search_rules(host, all_rows=True), opnsense_client.get_interfaces_info(host))
+    stats, groups, aliases, forwards = await asyncio.gather(
+        _optional(opnsense_client.get_pf_rule_statistics(host), "PF_RULESET_UNAVAILABLE", notes),
+        _optional(opnsense_client.search_interface_groups(host), "GROUPS_UNAVAILABLE", notes),
+        _optional(opnsense_client._request(host, "GET", "/firewall/alias/searchItem", params={"rowCount": -1}),
+                  "ALIASES_UNAVAILABLE", notes),
+        _optional(opnsense_client.search_port_forward_rules(host), "NAT_UNAVAILABLE", notes),
+    )
+    interfaces = _interfaces(info)
+    pf = pf_ruleset.parse(stats)
+    if stats is not None and pf is None:
+        notes.append("PF_RULESET_UNAVAILABLE")
+    ctx = Context(
+        rows=list((rules or {}).get("rows") or []), pf=pf, interfaces=interfaces,
+        groups=_groups(groups, interfaces),
+        aliases={str(a.get("name")): a for a in ((aliases or {}).get("rows") or []) if a.get("name")},
+        port_forwards=None if forwards is None else list(forwards.get("rows") or []),
+        notes=notes, loaded_at=time.monotonic(),
+    )
+    _CACHE[key] = ctx
+    return ctx
+
+
+async def ensure_refs(host: OpnsenseHost, ctx: Context, ips: list[str]) -> None:
+    """Ask pf which tables contain each IP (cached in the context)."""
+    for ip in ips:
+        if ip in ctx.refs:
+            continue
+        try:
+            ctx.refs[ip] = await opnsense_client.find_alias_references(host, ip)
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 - table membership becomes "unknown"
+            logger.info("rule analysis: findReferences failed: %s", exc)
+            ctx.refs[ip] = None
+
+
+def clear_cache() -> None:
+    _CACHE.clear()

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/coverage.py

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+"""Does an earlier rule make a later one pointless? (shadowed / duplicate)
+
+Pure functions on ``NormRule``; no I/O. Used by the security check (``compliance_service``, rules taken
+from config.xml) and by the cleanup candidates (rules taken from ``searchRule``).
+
+pf evaluates all rules in order, the last matching rule wins unless a matching rule is ``quick``. So a later
+rule b can only be made dead by an earlier rule a when
+
+* a is ``quick`` (a non-quick match is overridden by later rules and decides nothing by itself),
+* a is in force (enabled, not known to be unloaded) and has no condition we cannot compare
+  (schedule, tags, ``received-on``, TCP flags, rate limits), and
+* every packet b matches is also matched by a: set coverage per field (interfaces, direction, address
+  family, protocols, source/destination, ports, ICMP types).
+
+The order is ``sort_order`` (floating 200000 before groups 300000+ before interfaces 400000, then the
+sequence); nothing is re-implemented here, ``NormRule.order`` already holds it.
+
+Every comparison answers ``"sure"`` (literal values or identical names), ``"probable"`` (the result relies
+on the static content of aliases or on a guessed order) or ``None`` (not provable, so no claim is made).
+Whatever is not proven is never "sure": the weakest link decides.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+
+from app.services.rule_analysis.context import Context
+from app.services.rule_analysis.model import (
+    SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_FLOATING, SECTION_GROUP, SECTION_INTERFACE, SECTION_INVALID, SECTION_NAT_AUTO,
+    Endpoint, NormRule,
+)
+from app.services.rule_analysis.normalize import _af, _protos
+from app.services.rule_analysis.resolve import ADDRESS_TYPES, MAX_ALIAS_DEPTH, port_ranges
+
+SURE, PROBABLE = "sure", "probable"
+_RANK = {None: 0, PROBABLE: 1, SURE: 2}
+
+
+def weakest(*values: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """The lowest confidence of the arguments (None beats everything: one unproven part spoils the claim)."""
+    return min(values, key=lambda v: _RANK[v]) if values else SURE
+
+
+def _empty_context() -> Context:
+    return Context(rows=[], pf=None, interfaces={}, groups=None, aliases={}, port_forwards=None)
+
+
+# ── Addresses ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+Range = tuple[int, int, int]  # (ip version, low, high)
+
+
+def _literal(token: str) -> Range | None:
+    """CIDR, single address or ``low-high`` range as an integer interval; None for names."""
+    token = token.strip()
+    try:
+        if "-" in token and not token.startswith("-"):
+            low, _, high = token.partition("-")
+            lo, hi = ipaddress.ip_address(low.strip()), ipaddress.ip_address(high.strip())
+            return (lo.version, int(lo), int(hi)) if lo.version == hi.version and lo <= hi else None
+        net = ipaddress.ip_network(token, strict=False)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return (net.version, int(net.network_address), int(net.broadcast_address))
+
+
+def _alias_ranges(name: str, ctx: Context, depth: int = 0, seen: tuple = ()) -> list[Range] | None:
+    """Static content of a host/network alias as intervals; None when anything about it is not static
+    (tables, URLs, FQDNs, exclusions, unknown names, cycles)."""
+    alias = ctx.aliases.get(name)
+    if alias is None or name in seen or depth > MAX_ALIAS_DEPTH:
+        return None
+    if str(alias.get("type") or "").lower() not in ADDRESS_TYPES:
+        return None
+    if str(alias.get("enabled", "1")).strip().lower() in ("0", "false", "no", "off"):
+        return None  # a disabled alias is an empty table in pf: its configured content proves nothing
+    result: list[Range] = []
+    for entry in (e.strip() for e in re.split(r"[\n,]", str(alias.get("content") or "")) if e.strip()):
+        if entry.startswith("!"):
+            return None
+        literal = _literal(entry)
+        if literal is not None:
+            result.append(literal)
+            continue
+        nested = _alias_ranges(entry, ctx, depth + 1, (*seen, name)) if entry in ctx.aliases else None
+        if nested is None:
+            return None
+        result += nested
+    return result or None
+
+
+def _ranges_of(token: str, ctx: Context) -> tuple[list[Range] | None, bool]:
+    """(intervals, came_from_alias)"""
+    literal = _literal(token)
+    if literal is not None:
+        return [literal], False
+    return _alias_ranges(token, ctx), True
+
+
+def _covered(inner: list[Range], outer: list[Range]) -> bool:
+    return all(any(o[0] == i[0] and o[1] <= i[1] and i[2] <= o[2] for o in outer) for i in inner)
+
+
+def _item_covers(x: str, y: str, ctx: Context) -> str | None:
+    """Does the address item x contain everything the item y contains?"""
+    x, y = x.strip(), y.strip()
+    if x == y:
+        return SURE
+    outer, outer_alias = _ranges_of(x, ctx)
+    inner, inner_alias = _ranges_of(y, ctx)
+    if outer is None or inner is None or not _covered(inner, outer):
+        return None
+    return PROBABLE if (outer_alias or inner_alias) else SURE
+
+
+def endpoint_covers(a: Endpoint, b: Endpoint, ctx: Context) -> str | None:
+    if a.is_any and not a.negated:
+        return SURE
+    if b.is_any and not b.negated:
+        return None  # a is narrower than "any"
+    if a.negated != b.negated:
+        return None
+    if not a.negated:  # every item of b lies inside some item of a
+        parts = []
+        for y in b.items:
+            best = None
+            for x in a.items:
+                got = _item_covers(x, y, ctx)
+                if _RANK[got] > _RANK[best]:
+                    best = got
+            parts.append(best)
+        return weakest(*parts)
+    # "!A" covers "!B" when A lies inside B (outside of B is a subset of outside of A)
+    parts = []
+    for x in a.items:
+        best = None
+        for y in b.items:
+            got = _item_covers(y, x, ctx)
+            if _RANK[got] > _RANK[best]:
+                best = got
+        parts.append(best)
+    return weakest(*parts)
+
+
+# ── Ports, interfaces, the rest ───────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _norm_ports(spec: str) -> str:
+    return re.sub(r"\s+", "", spec or "").lower()
+
+
+def ports_cover(a: str, b: str, ctx: Context) -> str | None:
+    if _norm_ports(a) in ("", "any"):
+        return SURE
+    if _norm_ports(b) in ("", "any"):
+        return None
+    if _norm_ports(a) == _norm_ports(b):
+        return SURE
+    outer, _ = port_ranges(a, ctx)
+    inner, _ = port_ranges(b, ctx)
+    if outer is None or inner is None:
+        return None
+    if not all(any(lo <= il and ih <= hi for lo, hi in outer) for il, ih in inner):
+        return None
+    alias_involved = any(part.strip() in ctx.aliases for spec in (a, b) for part in re.split(r"[\n,]", spec))
+    return PROBABLE if alias_involved else SURE
+
+
+def _expand(names: set[str], ctx: Context) -> set[str]:
+    result: set[str] = set()
+    for name in names:
+        result |= (ctx.groups[name] | {name}) if ctx.groups and name in ctx.groups else {name}
+    return result
+
+
+def interfaces_cover(a: NormRule, b: NormRule, ctx: Context) -> str | None:
+    if not a.interfaces and not a.if_not:
+        return SURE  # every interface
+    if a.if_not or b.if_not:
+        return SURE if (a.interfaces, a.if_not) == (b.interfaces, b.if_not) else None
+    if not b.interfaces:
+        return None  # b applies everywhere, a only to some interfaces
+    return SURE if _expand(b.interfaces, ctx) <= _expand(a.interfaces, ctx) else None
+
+
+def _conditions_ok(a: NormRule) -> bool:
+    """a must not depend on something we cannot compare: schedule, tags, received-on, TCP flags, limits."""
+    return not (a.sched or a.tagged or a.received_on or a.extra_notes)
+
+
+def covers_fields(a: NormRule, b: NormRule, ctx: Context | None = None) -> str | None:
+    """Every packet rule b matches is already matched by rule a (order and enabled state not considered)."""
+    ctx = ctx or _empty_context()
+    if a.quick is not True or not _conditions_ok(a):
+        return None
+    if a.direction != "any" and a.direction != b.direction:
+        return None
+    if not b.af <= a.af:
+        return None
+    if a.protos is not None and (b.protos is None or not b.protos <= a.protos):
+        return None
+    if a.icmptypes is not None and (b.icmptypes is None or not b.icmptypes <= a.icmptypes):
+        return None
+    parts = [
+        interfaces_cover(a, b, ctx),
+        endpoint_covers(a.src, b.src, ctx), endpoint_covers(a.dst, b.dst, ctx),
+        ports_cover(a.sport, b.sport, ctx), ports_cover(a.dport, b.dport, ctx),
+    ]
+    return weakest(*parts)
+
+
+# ── Order-aware analysis ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _in_force(rule: NormRule) -> bool:
+    return rule.enabled and rule.loaded is not False and rule.section not in (SECTION_INVALID, SECTION_NAT_AUTO)
+
+
+# normalize() notes after which the evaluation order is not trustworthy: findings stay at "probable" at most.
+ORDER_DOUBT = frozenset({"ORDER_GUESSED", "ORDER_MISMATCH"})
+
+
+def order_doubtful(notes) -> bool:
+    return bool(ORDER_DOUBT & set(notes))
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Overlap:
+    rule: NormRule        # the later rule that is made pointless
+    by: NormRule          # the earlier rule that already decides everything the later one matches
+    kind: str             # "shadowed" | "duplicate"
+    confidence: str       # "sure" | "probable"
+
+
+def analyse(rules: list[NormRule], ctx: Context | None = None, *, order_guessed: bool = False) -> list[Overlap]:
+    """``rules`` in evaluation order. Each later rule is reported at most once, with the first earlier rule that
+    covers it. Duplicate = same action and the later rule also covers the earlier one."""
+    ctx = ctx or _empty_context()
+    result: list[Overlap] = []
+    for index, later in enumerate(rules):
+        if not later.enabled or later.section in (SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_INVALID, SECTION_NAT_AUTO):
+            continue
+        if later.action is None:
+            continue
+        for earlier in rules[:index]:
+            if not _in_force(earlier) or earlier.action is None:
+                continue
+            confidence = covers_fields(earlier, later, ctx)
+            if confidence is None:
+                continue
+            # (Equal sort_order without pf line numbers always comes with loaded=None, i.e. "probable" here.)
+            if order_guessed or not (earlier.order_known and later.order_known) or earlier.loaded is None:
+                confidence = weakest(confidence, PROBABLE)
+            duplicate = earlier.action == later.action and covers_fields(later, earlier, ctx) is not None
+            if duplicate:
+                confidence = weakest(confidence, covers_fields(later, earlier, ctx))
+            result.append(Overlap(later, earlier, "duplicate" if duplicate else "shadowed", confidence or PROBABLE))
+            break
+    return result
+
+
+# ── Rules read from a config.xml (security check) ─────────────────────────
+
+def config_order(rule: dict) -> tuple[int, int]:
+    """sort_order of a rule from config.xml in OPNsense's terms: floating 200000, interface group 300000,
+    single interface 400000, each by sequence."""
+    return (200000 if rule["floating"] else 300000 if rule.get("group") else 400000, rule["order"])
+
+
+def _config_endpoint(raw: str, negated: bool) -> Endpoint:
+    raw = (raw or "").strip()
+    items = [] if raw.lower() in ("", "any") else [i.strip() for i in raw.split(",") if i.strip()]
+    return Endpoint(raw=raw, negated=negated, items=items)
+
+
+def from_config_rule(rule: dict) -> NormRule:
+    """Adapter for the rule dicts of compliance_service (MVC and legacy shapes already merged). Nothing is known
+    about the loaded pf ruleset there, so ``loaded`` stays None (coverage then caps at "probable")."""
+    order = config_order(rule)
+    section = SECTION_FLOATING if rule["floating"] else SECTION_GROUP if rule.get("group") else SECTION_INTERFACE
+    return NormRule(
+        uuid="", label="", description=rule["descr"], order=order, order_known=True, section=section,
+        enabled=rule["enabled"], action=rule["action"] if rule["action"] in ("pass", "block", "reject") else None,
+        quick=bool(rule["quick"]), interfaces=set(rule["interfaces"]), if_not=bool(rule.get("if_not")),
+        direction=rule["direction"] or "in", af=_af(rule["ipprotocol"]), protos=_protos(rule["protocol"]),
+        src=_config_endpoint(rule["src"], rule["src_not"]), dst=_config_endpoint(rule["dst"], rule["dst_not"]),
+        sport=rule["sport"] or "", dport=rule["dport"] or "",
+        icmptypes={t.strip() for t in (rule.get("icmptype") or "").split(",") if t.strip()} or None,
+        tagged=rule.get("tagged") or "", received_on=rule.get("received_on") or "", sched=rule.get("sched") or "",
+        extra_notes=["RATE_LIMIT"] if rule.get("limited") else [],
+    )

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/engine.py

@@ -0,0 +1,317 @@
+"""Which rule decides a packet, following pf semantics.
+
+pf walks the loaded ruleset top to bottom; the *last* matching rule wins unless a matching
+rule is ``quick``, which ends the walk. OPNsense orders rules by ``sort_order`` (system,
+floating, groups, interfaces). The analysis looks at the first packet of a new connection.
+
+Confidence:
+- ``rule_confidence`` is "sure" only when no rule that could still change the outcome
+  matched with an unknown result;
+- ``confidence`` (the verdict) is "sure" when every such unknown rule has the same action as
+  the deciding rule (then the verdict holds either way), "unknown" otherwise;
+- notes about guesses (interface guessed from the address, NAT nearby, pf ruleset missing,
+  TCP flags, rate limits) lower a "sure" to "probable".
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+
+from app.services.rule_analysis import resolve
+from app.services.rule_analysis.context import Context
+from app.services.rule_analysis.model import IPAddr, NormRule, Outcome, t_and, tri_str
+from app.services.rule_analysis.normalize import norm_proto, normalize
+
+SURE, PROBABLE, UNKNOWN = "sure", "probable", "unknown"
+_RANK = {SURE: 2, PROBABLE: 1, UNKNOWN: 0}
+DOWNGRADING_NOTES = {
+    "IFACE_GUESSED", "EGRESS_GUESSED", "NAT_NEARBY", "TCP_FLAGS", "RATE_LIMIT", "ORDER_GUESSED",
+    "ORDER_MISMATCH", "PF_RULESET_UNAVAILABLE", "NAT_UNAVAILABLE", "QUICK_UNKNOWN",
+}
+_PORT_PROTOS = {"6", "17"}
+_ICMP_PROTOS = {"1", "58"}
+ICMP_NAMES = {
+    4: {"0": "echorep", "3": "unreach", "4": "squench", "5": "redir", "8": "echoreq", "9": "routeradv",
+        "10": "routersol", "11": "timex", "12": "paramprob", "13": "timereq", "14": "timerep"},
+    6: {"1": "unreach", "2": "toobig", "3": "timex", "4": "paramprob", "128": "echoreq", "129": "echorep",
+        "133": "routersol", "134": "routeradv", "135": "neighbrsol", "136": "neighbradv", "137": "redir"},
+}
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Query:
+    src: IPAddr
+    dst: IPAddr
+    proto: str                 # normalized ("6", "17", "1", "58", other number or name)
+    proto_label: str
+    sport: int | None = None
+    dport: int | None = None
+    icmptype: str | None = None
+    iface: str | None = None   # None = guess from the source address
+    direction: str = "in"
+    egress: str | None = "none"  # "none" = only the first leg, None = guess, else identifier
+
+    @property
+    def af(self) -> int:
+        return self.src.version
+
+
+@dataclass
+class LegResult:
+    direction: str
+    iface: str | None
+    iface_source: str
+    action: str | None
+    decisive: NormRule | None
+    confidence: str
+    rule_confidence: str
+    notes: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    unknowns: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    steps: list[dict] = field(default_factory=list)
+
+
+def _min_conf(*values: str) -> str:
+    return min(values, key=lambda v: _RANK[v])
+
+
+def _max_conf(*values: str) -> str:
+    return max(values, key=lambda v: _RANK[v])
+
+
+def _icmp_name(q: Query) -> str | None:
+    if q.icmptype is None:
+        return None
+    return ICMP_NAMES[q.af].get(q.icmptype, q.icmptype)
+
+
+def rule_fields(r: NormRule, q: Query, direction: str, iface: str, ctx: Context,
+                tags: set[str], first_leg_iface: str | None) -> dict[str, Outcome]:
+    fields: dict[str, Outcome] = {
+        "interface": resolve.iface_match(r.interfaces, r.if_not, iface, ctx),
+        "direction": Outcome(r.direction in ("any", direction)),
+        "family": Outcome(q.af in r.af),
+        "protocol": Outcome(True if r.protos is None else q.proto in r.protos),
+        "source": resolve.endpoint_match(r.src, q.src, ctx),
+        "destination": resolve.endpoint_match(r.dst, q.dst, ctx),
+    }
+    if q.proto in _PORT_PROTOS:
+        fields["source_port"] = resolve.port_match(r.sport, q.sport, ctx, ephemeral_default=True)
+        fields["destination_port"] = resolve.port_match(r.dport, q.dport, ctx)
+    elif r.sport or r.dport:
+        fields["ports"] = Outcome(False)  # pf only generates port rules for tcp/udp
+    if r.icmptypes is not None and q.proto in _ICMP_PROTOS:
+        name = _icmp_name(q)
+        fields["icmp_type"] = Outcome(None, ["ICMP_TYPE_NOT_GIVEN"]) if name is None else \
+            Outcome(name in r.icmptypes or q.icmptype in r.icmptypes)
+    if r.tagged:
+        fields["tagged"] = Outcome(True) if r.tagged in tags else Outcome(None, ["TAGGED"])
+    if r.received_on:
+        if direction == "in":
+            fields["received_on"] = Outcome(r.received_on == iface)
+        elif first_leg_iface:
+            fields["received_on"] = Outcome(r.received_on == first_leg_iface)
+        else:
+            fields["received_on"] = Outcome(None, ["RECEIVED_ON"])
+    if r.action is None:
+        fields["action"] = Outcome(None, ["ACTION_UNKNOWN"])
+    return fields
+
+
+def _step(r: NormRule, fields: dict[str, Outcome], result, effect: str) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "rule": r.summary(), "result": tri_str(result), "effect": effect,
+        "fields": {k: tri_str(v.value) for k, v in fields.items()},
+        "reasons": sorted({reason for v in fields.values() if v.value is None for reason in v.reasons}),
+    }
+
+
+def eval_leg(rules: list[NormRule], q: Query, ctx: Context, direction: str, iface: str,
+             first_leg_iface: str | None = None) -> LegResult:
+    steps: list[dict] = []
+    candidate: NormRule | None = None
+    possible: list[tuple[NormRule, bool]] = []   # (rule, came after the current candidate)
+    tags: set[str] = set()
+    final: NormRule | None = None
+    for r in rules:
+        if not r.enabled:
+            steps.append({"rule": r.summary(), "result": "false", "effect": "disabled", "fields": {}, "reasons": []})
+            continue
+        if r.loaded is False:
+            steps.append({"rule": r.summary(), "result": "false", "effect": "not_loaded", "fields": {}, "reasons": []})
+            continue
+        fields = rule_fields(r, q, direction, iface, ctx, tags, first_leg_iface)
+        result = t_and(*(f.value for f in fields.values()))
+        if result is False:
+            steps.append(_step(r, fields, result, "no_match"))
+            continue
+        if result is None or r.quick is None:
+            possible.append((r, True))
+            steps.append(_step(r, fields, result, "possible"))
+            continue
+        if r.quick:
+            final = r
+            for s in steps:
+                if s["effect"] == "candidate":
+                    s["effect"] = "overridden"
+            steps.append(_step(r, fields, result, "final"))
+            break
+        if candidate is not None:
+            for s in steps:
+                if s["effect"] == "candidate":
+                    s["effect"] = "overridden"
+        candidate = r
+        possible = [(p, False) for p, _ in possible]
+        if r.tag:
+            tags.add(r.tag)
+        steps.append(_step(r, fields, result, "candidate"))
+    decisive = final or candidate
+    if final is None:
+        for s in steps:
+            if s["effect"] == "candidate":
+                s["effect"] = "decisive"
+    else:
+        steps[-1]["effect"] = "decisive"
+    action = decisive.action if decisive else "pass"  # pf without any matching rule passes
+    # Unknown matches that could still change the outcome: quick (or quick-unknown) ones always,
+    # non-quick ones only after the deciding candidate (an earlier one is overridden anyway).
+    relevant = [p for p, after in possible if p.quick is not False or (final is None and after)]
+    rule_conf = SURE if not relevant else PROBABLE
+    conf = SURE if all(p.action == action for p in relevant) else UNKNOWN
+    unknowns = sorted({reason for s in steps if s["effect"] == "possible" for reason in s["reasons"]})
+    if any(p.quick is None for p, _ in possible):
+        unknowns = sorted({*unknowns, "QUICK_UNKNOWN"})
+    notes: list[str] = []
+    if decisive is None:
+        notes.append("PF_DEFAULT_PASS")
+    else:
+        notes += decisive.extra_notes
+        if decisive.gateway and action == "pass":
+            notes.append("POLICY_ROUTE")
+        if decisive.statetype.lower() == "none" or "no state" in getattr(decisive.pf_line, "text", ""):
+            notes.append("STATELESS")
+        if decisive.sched:
+            notes.append("SCHEDULE_NOW")
+    if any(s["effect"] == "not_loaded" and s["rule"]["loaded"] is False for s in steps):
+        notes.append("RULES_NOT_LOADED")
+    return LegResult(direction=direction, iface=iface, iface_source="given", action=action, decisive=decisive,
+                     confidence=conf, rule_confidence=rule_conf, notes=notes, unknowns=unknowns, steps=steps)
+
+
+def guess_iface(ip: IPAddr, ctx: Context) -> str | None:
+    """The interface whose connected network holds ``ip`` (longest prefix), else the one with
+    the default gateway."""
+    best, best_len = None, -1
+    for info in ctx.interfaces.values():
+        if info.identifier == "lo0":
+            continue
+        for net in info.nets:
+            if net.version == ip.version and ip in net and net.prefixlen > best_len and not net.is_link_local:
+                best, best_len = info.identifier, net.prefixlen
+    if best:
+        return best
+    gateways = [i.identifier for i in ctx.interfaces.values() if i.has_gateway]
+    return gateways[0] if len(gateways) == 1 else None
+
+
+def _nat_nearby(q: Query, iface: str, ctx: Context) -> bool:
+    for row in ctx.port_forwards or []:
+        if str(row.get("disabled") or "0") == "1" or str(row.get("enabled", "1")) == "0":
+            continue
+        if str(row.get("nordr") or "0") == "1":  # "no rdr" exclusions (anti-lockout) redirect nothing
+            continue
+        if q.dport is not None and resolve.port_match(str(row.get("destination.port") or ""), q.dport, ctx).value is False:
+            continue
+        ifaces = {i.strip().lower() for i in str(row.get("interface") or "").split(",") if i.strip()}
+        if ifaces and iface not in ifaces:
+            continue
+        proto = str(row.get("protocol") or "").lower()
+        if proto and proto not in ("any", "tcp/udp") and norm_proto(proto) != q.proto:
+            continue
+        return True
+    return False
+
+
+def evaluate(ctx: Context, q: Query) -> dict:
+    rules, order_notes = normalize(ctx)
+    context_notes = [*ctx.notes, *order_notes]
+    legs: list[LegResult] = []
+    iface, iface_source = q.iface, "given"
+    if iface is None:
+        iface, iface_source = guess_iface(q.src if q.direction == "in" else q.dst, ctx), "guessed"
+    if iface is None:
+        return _result(q, legs, context_notes + ["IFACE_UNRESOLVED"], unresolved=True)
+    first = eval_leg(rules, q, ctx, q.direction, iface)
+    first.iface_source = iface_source
+    if iface_source == "guessed":
+        first.notes.append("IFACE_GUESSED")
+    if q.direction == "in" and (ctx.port_forwards is None or _nat_nearby(q, iface, ctx)):
+        first.notes.append("NAT_NEARBY" if ctx.port_forwards is not None else "NAT_UNAVAILABLE")
+    legs.append(first)
+    if q.direction == "in" and q.egress != "none":
+        egress, source = q.egress, "given"
+        if egress is None:
+            egress, source = guess_iface(q.dst, ctx), "guessed"
+        if egress is None:
+            context_notes.append("EGRESS_UNRESOLVED")
+        else:
+            out = eval_leg(rules, q, ctx, "out", egress, first_leg_iface=iface)
+            out.iface_source = source
+            if source == "guessed":
+                out.notes.append("EGRESS_GUESSED")
+            legs.append(out)
+    return _result(q, legs, context_notes)
+
+
+def _leg_conf(leg: LegResult, context_notes: list[str]) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    downgrade = any(n in DOWNGRADING_NOTES for n in (*leg.notes, *context_notes))
+    conf, rule_conf = leg.confidence, leg.rule_confidence
+    if downgrade:
+        conf = _min_conf(conf, PROBABLE)
+        rule_conf = _min_conf(rule_conf, PROBABLE)
+    return conf, rule_conf
+
+
+def _result(q: Query, legs: list[LegResult], context_notes: list[str], unresolved: bool = False) -> dict:
+    leg_dicts, confs = [], []
+    for leg in legs:
+        conf, rule_conf = _leg_conf(leg, context_notes)
+        confs.append((leg, conf, rule_conf))
+        leg_dicts.append({
+            "direction": leg.direction, "interface": leg.iface, "interface_source": leg.iface_source,
+            "action": leg.action, "confidence": conf, "rule_confidence": rule_conf,
+            "decisive_rule": leg.decisive.summary() if leg.decisive else None,
+            "notes": sorted(set(leg.notes)), "unknowns": leg.unknowns,
+        })
+    if unresolved or not legs:
+        action, conf, rule_conf, decisive = None, UNKNOWN, UNKNOWN, None
+    else:
+        blocking = [c for c in confs if c[0].action != "pass"]
+        if blocking:
+            leg, _, rule_conf = blocking[0]
+            action, decisive = leg.action, leg.decisive
+            # Blocked if any blocking leg is right: the best of their confidences counts.
+            conf = _max_conf(*(c[1] for c in blocking))
+            if conf == SURE and any(c[0].action != action for c in blocking):
+                conf = PROBABLE
+        else:
+            leg, _, rule_conf = confs[0]
+            action, decisive = "pass", leg.decisive
+            conf = _min_conf(*(c[1] for c in confs))
+    return {
+        "query": {
+            "src": str(q.src), "dst": str(q.dst), "proto": q.proto_label, "sport": q.sport, "dport": q.dport,
+            "icmptype": q.icmptype, "direction": q.direction,
+            "assumptions": ["FIRST_PACKET"] + (["SRC_PORT_EPHEMERAL"] if q.sport is None and q.proto in _PORT_PROTOS else []),
+        },
+        "action": action, "confidence": conf, "rule_confidence": rule_conf,
+        "decisive_rule": decisive.summary() if decisive else None,
+        "notes": sorted({*context_notes, *(n for leg in legs for n in leg.notes)}),
+        "unknowns": sorted({u for leg in legs for u in leg.unknowns}),
+        "legs": leg_dicts,
+        "trace": [{"leg": i, "direction": leg.direction, "interface": leg.iface, "steps": leg.steps}
+                  for i, leg in enumerate(legs)],
+    }
+
+
+def parse_ip(value: str) -> IPAddr:
+    return ipaddress.ip_address(value.strip())

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/model.py

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+"""Shared types of the rule analysis: three-valued logic and the normalized rule.
+
+``Tri`` is Kleene logic with ``True``/``False``/``None`` (unknown). An unknown never turns
+into a definite answer by negation, and an AND is only False when one side is definitely
+False. This is what keeps the engine from claiming "sure" for something it cannot prove.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from typing import Optional
+
+Tri = Optional[bool]
+
+IPAddr = ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address
+IPNet = ipaddress.IPv4Network | ipaddress.IPv6Network
+
+
+def t_and(*values: Tri) -> Tri:
+    if any(v is False for v in values):
+        return False
+    if any(v is None for v in values):
+        return None
+    return True
+
+
+def t_or(*values: Tri) -> Tri:
+    if any(v is True for v in values):
+        return True
+    if any(v is None for v in values):
+        return None
+    return False
+
+
+def t_not(value: Tri) -> Tri:
+    return None if value is None else not value
+
+
+def tri_str(value: Tri) -> str:
+    return "unknown" if value is None else ("true" if value else "false")
+
+
+class Outcome:
+    """A Tri plus the reason codes that made it unknown (or noteworthy)."""
+    __slots__ = ("value", "reasons")
+
+    def __init__(self, value: Tri, reasons: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = ()):
+        self.value = value
+        self.reasons = list(reasons)
+
+    def __repr__(self) -> str:  # pragma: no cover - debugging aid
+        return f"Outcome({self.value!r}, {self.reasons!r})"
+
+
+def o_or(outcomes: list[Outcome]) -> Outcome:
+    value = t_or(*(o.value for o in outcomes)) if outcomes else False
+    reasons = [] if value is True else [r for o in outcomes if o.value is None for r in o.reasons]
+    return Outcome(value, reasons)
+
+
+SECTION_SYSTEM, SECTION_FLOATING, SECTION_GROUP, SECTION_INTERFACE = "system", "floating", "group", "interface"
+SECTION_NAT_AUTO, SECTION_INVALID, SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_OTHER = "nat_auto", "invalid", "antispoof", "other"
+
+
+@dataclass
+class Endpoint:
+    raw: str
+    negated: bool = False
+    items: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)  # empty = any
+
+    @property
+    def is_any(self) -> bool:
+        return not self.items
+
+
+@dataclass
+class NormRule:
+    uuid: str
+    label: str
+    description: str
+    order: tuple[int, int]
+    order_known: bool
+    section: str
+    enabled: bool
+    action: str | None             # pass | block | reject | None (unknown)
+    quick: bool | None             # None = unknown (automatic rule without pf ruleset)
+    interfaces: set[str]           # identifiers or group names; empty = every interface
+    if_not: bool
+    direction: str                 # in | out | any
+    af: set[int]                   # {4}, {6} or {4, 6}
+    protos: set[str] | None        # None = any; normalized names/numbers as strings
+    src: Endpoint
+    dst: Endpoint
+    sport: str
+    dport: str
+    icmptypes: set[str] | None = None   # None = no restriction
+    tag: str = ""
+    tagged: str = ""
+    received_on: str = ""
+    gateway: str = ""
+    statetype: str = ""
+    sched: str = ""
+    automatic: bool = False
+    legacy: bool = False
+    loaded: bool | None = None     # None = pf ruleset not available
+    pf_numbers: list[int] = field(default_factory=list)
+    extra_notes: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)   # e.g. TCP_FLAGS, RATE_LIMIT from pf text
+    pf_line: object = None         # set for unlabeled pf lines (antispoof)
+
+    def summary(self) -> dict:
+        return {
+            "uuid": self.uuid, "label": self.label, "description": self.description,
+            "section": self.section, "sort_order": f"{self.order[0]:06d}.{self.order[1]:07d}" if self.order_known else None,
+            "pf_numbers": self.pf_numbers, "action": self.action, "quick": self.quick,
+            "interfaces": sorted(self.interfaces), "interface_not": self.if_not, "direction": self.direction,
+            "automatic": self.automatic, "legacy": self.legacy, "loaded": self.loaded,
+            "editable": not self.automatic and not self.legacy and self.section != SECTION_ANTISPOOF,
+            "source": ("!" if self.src.negated else "") + (self.src.raw or "any"),
+            "destination": ("!" if self.dst.negated else "") + (self.dst.raw or "any"),
+            "source_port": self.sport or None, "destination_port": self.dport or None,
+            "gateway": self.gateway or None, "schedule": self.sched or None,
+        }

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/normalize.py

@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
+"""Turn ``searchRule`` rows (+ the loaded pf ruleset) into ``NormRule`` objects.
+
+Format pitfalls seen live on OPNsense 26.7:
+- automatic rows carry the interface *description* (``"LAN"``), MVC rows the identifier;
+- automatic rows often have ``quick``/``action`` empty; the pf lines with the same label
+  know the truth (``pass in quick on vtnet1_vlan10 ...``);
+- empty source/destination means any; address lists are comma separated;
+- unmigrated legacy rules have a 32-hex label instead of a UUID.
+
+Order is ``sort_order`` (``prio.0seq`` from FilterRuleField::getPriority: 1/5 system,
+10000 force gateway, 200000 floating, 300000+n groups, 400000 interface, 500000 automatic
+NAT, 600000 = interface missing, never loaded).
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+
+from app.services.rule_analysis.context import Context
+from app.services.rule_analysis.model import (
+    SECTION_ANTISPOOF, SECTION_FLOATING, SECTION_GROUP, SECTION_INTERFACE, SECTION_INVALID,
+    SECTION_NAT_AUTO, SECTION_OTHER, SECTION_SYSTEM, Endpoint, NormRule,
+)
+from app.services.rule_analysis.pf_ruleset import PfLine
+
+PROTO_NUMBERS = {
+    "icmp": "1", "igmp": "2", "ggp": "3", "ipencap": "4", "tcp": "6", "egp": "8", "udp": "17",
+    "ipv6": "41", "gre": "47", "esp": "50", "ah": "51", "ipv6-icmp": "58", "icmp6": "58",
+    "icmpv6": "58", "ospf": "89", "pim": "103", "vrrp": "112", "carp": "112", "sctp": "132", "pfsync": "240",
+}
+
+
+def norm_proto(value: str) -> str:
+    value = str(value).strip().lower()
+    return PROTO_NUMBERS.get(value, value)
+
+
+def _truthy(value) -> bool:
+    return value is True or str(value).strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
+
+
+def _section(prio: int) -> str:
+    if prio < 10001:
+        return SECTION_SYSTEM
+    if prio == 200000:
+        return SECTION_FLOATING
+    if 300000 <= prio < 400000:
+        return SECTION_GROUP
+    if prio == 400000:
+        return SECTION_INTERFACE
+    if prio == 500000:
+        return SECTION_NAT_AUTO
+    if prio >= 600000:
+        return SECTION_INVALID
+    return SECTION_OTHER
+
+
+def _order(row: dict) -> tuple[tuple[int, int], bool]:
+    raw = str(row.get("sort_order") or "")
+    if "." in raw:
+        head, _, tail = raw.partition(".")
+        if head.isdigit() and tail.isdigit():
+            return (int(head), int(tail)), True
+    # Older releases without sort_order: best effort from prio_group/sequence (confidence drops).
+    prio = str(row.get("prio_group") or row.get("#priority") or "")
+    seq = str(row.get("sequence") or "")
+    return (int(prio) if prio.isdigit() else 400000, int(seq) if seq.isdigit() else 0), False
+
+
+def _endpoint(row: dict, side: str) -> Endpoint:
+    raw = str(row.get(f"{side}_net") or "").strip()
+    items = [] if raw.lower() in ("", "any") else [i.strip() for i in raw.split(",") if i.strip()]
+    return Endpoint(raw=raw, negated=_truthy(row.get(f"{side}_not")), items=items)
+
+
+def _af(value: str) -> set[int]:
+    value = str(value or "").strip().lower()
+    return {4} if value == "inet" else ({6} if value == "inet6" else {4, 6})
+
+
+def _protos(value: str) -> set[str] | None:
+    value = str(value or "").strip().lower()
+    if value in ("", "any"):
+        return None
+    return {norm_proto(p) for p in value.split("/") if p}
+
+
+def _pf_interfaces(lines: list[PfLine], ctx: Context) -> tuple[set[str], bool] | None:
+    devices = {(line.on_device, line.on_negated) for line in lines}
+    if any(device is None for device, _ in devices):
+        return set(), False
+    if len({neg for _, neg in devices}) != 1:
+        return None
+    names: set[str] = set()
+    for device, _ in devices:
+        info = ctx.by_device(device)
+        if info is not None:
+            names.add(info.identifier)
+        elif ctx.groups is not None and device in ctx.groups:
+            names.add(device)
+        else:
+            return None
+    return names, next(iter(devices))[1]
+
+
+def normalize_row(row: dict, ctx: Context) -> NormRule:
+    order, order_known = _order(row)
+    label = str(row.get("uuid") or "")
+    automatic = _truthy(row.get("is_automatic"))
+    lines = ctx.pf.by_label.get(label, []) if ctx.pf else []
+    rule = NormRule(
+        uuid=label, label=label, description=str(row.get("description") or ""),
+        order=order, order_known=order_known, section=_section(order[0]),
+        enabled=_truthy(row.get("enabled", "1")),
+        action=(str(row.get("action") or "").lower() or None),
+        quick=None, interfaces=set(), if_not=_truthy(row.get("interfacenot")),
+        direction=(str(row.get("direction") or "in").lower() or "in"),
+        af=_af(row.get("ipprotocol")), protos=_protos(row.get("protocol")),
+        src=_endpoint(row, "source"), dst=_endpoint(row, "destination"),
+        sport=str(row.get("source_port") or "").strip(), dport=str(row.get("destination_port") or "").strip(),
+        tag=str(row.get("tag") or ""), tagged=str(row.get("tagged") or ""),
+        received_on=str(row.get("received-on") or row.get("received_on") or ""),
+        gateway=str(row.get("gateway") or ""), statetype=str(row.get("statetype") or ""),
+        sched=str(row.get("sched") or ""), automatic=automatic, legacy=_truthy(row.get("legacy")),
+        pf_numbers=[line.number for line in lines],
+    )
+    if rule.action not in ("pass", "block", "reject"):
+        rule.action = None
+    if row.get("quick") not in (None, ""):
+        rule.quick = _truthy(row.get("quick"))
+    raw_if = str(row.get("interface") or "").strip()
+    names = {n.strip() for n in raw_if.split(",") if n.strip()}
+    # Automatic and unmigrated legacy rows carry descriptions ("LAN"): map them to identifiers.
+    # Identifiers and group names stay as they are; the pf "on" clause decides when available.
+    mapped = set()
+    for name in names:
+        info = None if name in ctx.interfaces or name in (ctx.groups or {}) else ctx.by_label(name)
+        mapped.add(info.identifier if info else name)
+    names = mapped
+    rule.interfaces = names
+    if ctx.pf is not None:
+        rule.loaded = bool(lines) and rule.enabled
+        if lines:
+            actions = {line.action for line in lines}
+            if len(actions) == 1 and next(iter(actions)) in ("pass", "block", "reject"):
+                pf_action = next(iter(actions))
+                if rule.action is None or automatic:
+                    rule.action = pf_action
+            quick = {line.quick for line in lines}
+            rule.quick = next(iter(quick)) if len(quick) == 1 else None
+            if automatic or rule.legacy:
+                on = _pf_interfaces(lines, ctx)
+                if on is not None:
+                    rule.interfaces, rule.if_not = on
+                directions = {line.direction for line in lines}
+                if len(directions) == 1:
+                    rule.direction = next(iter(directions))
+            families = {line.af for line in lines}
+            if None not in families:
+                rule.af &= families
+            types = {t for line in lines for t in line.icmptypes}
+            if types:
+                rule.icmptypes = types
+            if any(line.flags not in (None, "S/SA", "any") for line in lines):
+                rule.extra_notes.append("TCP_FLAGS")
+            if any(word in line.text for line in lines for word in ("max-src-", "overload", "max-pkt-rate")):
+                rule.extra_notes.append("RATE_LIMIT")
+    elif rule.section == SECTION_INVALID:
+        rule.loaded = False
+    if rule.icmptypes is None and str(row.get("icmptype") or "").strip():
+        rule.icmptypes = {t.strip() for t in str(row["icmptype"]).split(",") if t.strip()}
+    return rule
+
+
+# Words in an unlabeled pf line that restrict it in ways antispoof_rule() does not model (protocol, ports, flags,
+# tags, user/group, received-on, ICMP types, OS): such a line must never be used as a covering rule.
+_UNMODELLED = re.compile(r"\b(proto|port|flags|tagged|received-on|user|group|icmp6?-type|os|tag|label)\b")
+
+
+def antispoof_rule(line: PfLine, order: tuple[int, int]) -> NormRule:
+    """An unlabeled pf line OPNsense generated itself (antispoof / own-address block)."""
+    return NormRule(
+        uuid=f"pf@{line.number}", label="", description=line.text, order=order, order_known=True,
+        section=SECTION_ANTISPOOF, enabled=True, action=line.action if line.action != "other" else None,
+        quick=line.quick, interfaces=set(), if_not=False, direction=line.direction,
+        af={line.af} if line.af else {4, 6}, protos=None,
+        src=Endpoint(raw="" if line.src == "any" else line.src, items=[] if line.src == "any" else [line.src]),
+        dst=Endpoint(raw="" if line.dst == "any" else line.dst, items=[] if line.dst == "any" else [line.dst]),
+        sport="", dport="", automatic=True, loaded=True, pf_numbers=[line.number], pf_line=line,
+        extra_notes=["UNMODELLED_CONDITION"] if _UNMODELLED.search(line.text) else [],
+    )
+
+
+def normalize(ctx: Context) -> tuple[list[NormRule], list[str]]:
+    """All rules in evaluation order plus context notes (order problems)."""
+    notes: list[str] = []
+    rules = [normalize_row(row, ctx) for row in ctx.rows]
+    if any(not r.order_known for r in rules):
+        notes.append("ORDER_GUESSED")
+    # Equal sort_order (e.g. two rules with the same sequence): what pf actually loaded decides, the uuid only as
+    # a last resort (then coverage.analyse() lowers its confidence, it cannot know the real order).
+    rules.sort(key=lambda r: (r.order, min(r.pf_numbers) if r.pf_numbers else 10**9, r.uuid))
+    if ctx.pf is not None:
+        loaded = [r for r in rules if r.loaded and r.pf_numbers]
+        firsts = [min(r.pf_numbers) for r in loaded]
+        if firsts != sorted(firsts):
+            notes.append("ORDER_MISMATCH")
+        # Unlabeled pf lines: placed before the first configured rule that pf evaluates later.
+        extra: list[tuple[tuple, NormRule]] = []
+        for line in ctx.pf.unlabeled:
+            after = next((r for r in loaded if min(r.pf_numbers) > line.number), None)
+            key = after.order if after else (999999, 9999999)
+            spoof = antispoof_rule(line, key)
+            if line.on_device:
+                info = ctx.by_device(line.on_device)
+                spoof.interfaces = {info.identifier if info else line.on_device}
+                spoof.if_not = line.on_negated
+            extra.append(((key, 0, line.number), spoof))
+        keyed = [((r.order, 1, 0), r) for r in rules] + extra
+        keyed.sort(key=lambda item: item[0])
+        rules = [r for _, r in keyed]
+    return rules, notes

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/pf_ruleset.py

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+"""The ruleset pf has actually loaded (``diagnostics/firewall/pfStatistics/rules``).
+
+Each key looks like ``@76 pass in quick on vtnet1_vlan10 inet from (...) to any flags S/SA
+keep state label "<uuid>"``. One configured rule can expand to several pf lines (address
+families, ICMP types, port lists); they share one label. Lines without a label are generated
+by OPNsense itself (antispoof: ``block drop in log on ! vtnet1_vlan10 inet from 192.0.2.0/24
+to any``). Only what the analysis needs is parsed: position, action, quick, direction, the
+``on`` interface, address family, ICMP types and a few pf options that make the answer
+uncertain.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import re
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+
+_HEAD = re.compile(r"^@(\d+)\s+(.*)$")
+_LABEL = re.compile(r'label "([^"]+)"')
+_ON = re.compile(r"\bon (!\s*)?([A-Za-z0-9_.]+)")
+_ICMP = re.compile(r"\bicmp6?-type (\S+)")
+_FROM = re.compile(r"\bfrom (\S+) to (\S+)")
+_FLAGS = re.compile(r"\bflags (\S+)")
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PfLine:
+    number: int
+    text: str
+    action: str           # pass | block | reject | match | scrub | other
+    quick: bool
+    direction: str        # in | out | any
+    on_negated: bool
+    on_device: str | None
+    af: int | None        # 4, 6 or None (both)
+    label: str | None
+    icmptypes: list[str] = field(default_factory=list)
+    src: str = "any"
+    dst: str = "any"
+    flags: str | None = None
+
+
+def parse_line(number: int, text: str) -> PfLine:
+    words = text.split()
+    first = words[0] if words else ""
+    action = first if first in ("pass", "match", "scrub") else "other"
+    if first == "block":
+        action = "reject" if len(words) > 1 and words[1].startswith("return") else "block"
+    direction = "in" if " in " in f" {text} " else ("out" if " out " in f" {text} " else "any")
+    on = _ON.search(text)
+    af = 4 if re.search(r"\binet\b", text) else (6 if re.search(r"\binet6\b", text) else None)
+    label = _LABEL.search(text)
+    endpoints = _FROM.search(text)
+    flags = _FLAGS.search(text)
+    return PfLine(
+        number=number, text=text, action=action, quick=" quick " in f" {text} ",
+        direction=direction, on_negated=bool(on and on.group(1)), on_device=on.group(2) if on else None,
+        af=af, label=label.group(1) if label else None, icmptypes=_ICMP.findall(text),
+        src=endpoints.group(1) if endpoints else ("any" if " all" in f" {text}" else "?"),
+        dst=endpoints.group(2) if endpoints else ("any" if " all" in f" {text}" else "?"),
+        flags=flags.group(1) if flags else None,
+    )
+
+
+@dataclass
+class PfRuleset:
+    lines: list[PfLine]
+    by_label: dict[str, list[PfLine]]
+
+    @property
+    def unlabeled(self) -> list[PfLine]:
+        return [line for line in self.lines if line.label is None and line.action in ("pass", "block", "reject")]
+
+
+def parse(stats: dict | None) -> PfRuleset | None:
+    """None when the answer does not look like a pf ruleset at all."""
+    rules = (stats or {}).get("rules") if isinstance(stats, dict) else None
+    filter_rules = rules.get("filter rules") if isinstance(rules, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(filter_rules, dict):
+        return None
+    lines: list[PfLine] = []
+    for key in filter_rules:
+        head = _HEAD.match(str(key).strip())
+        if not head:
+            continue
+        line = parse_line(int(head.group(1)), head.group(2))
+        if line.action == "scrub":
+            continue
+        lines.append(line)
+    lines.sort(key=lambda line: line.number)
+    by_label: dict[str, list[PfLine]] = {}
+    for line in lines:
+        if line.label:
+            by_label.setdefault(line.label, []).append(line)
+    return PfRuleset(lines=lines, by_label=by_label)

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/resolve.py

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+"""Does a rule field match the queried packet? Addresses, interfaces, aliases, ports.
+
+Every function answers with an ``Outcome`` (True/False/None + reason codes). Whatever cannot
+be proven from the firewall's own data is ``None`` (unknown), never a guess.
+"""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import re
+
+from app.services.rule_analysis.context import Context
+from app.services.rule_analysis.model import IPAddr, Outcome, o_or, t_not
+
+MAX_ALIAS_DEPTH = 10
+TABLE_ONLY_TYPES = {"url", "urltable", "geoip", "asn", "mac", "dynipv6host", "authgroup", "external", "internal"}
+ADDRESS_TYPES = {"host", "network", "networkgroup"}
+
+SERVICES = {
+    "ftp-data": 20, "ftp": 21, "ssh": 22, "telnet": 23, "smtp": 25, "domain": 53, "dns": 53, "bootps": 67,
+    "bootpc": 68, "tftp": 69, "http": 80, "www": 80, "kerberos": 88, "pop3": 110, "ntp": 123, "imap": 143,
+    "snmp": 161, "snmptrap": 162, "ldap": 389, "https": 443, "smb": 445, "microsoft-ds": 445, "isakmp": 500,
+    "syslog": 514, "submission": 587, "ldaps": 636, "imaps": 993, "pop3s": 995, "openvpn": 1194,
+    "ms-sql-s": 1433, "radius": 1812, "radius-acct": 1813, "nfs": 2049, "mysql": 3306, "rdp": 3389,
+    "ipsec-nat-t": 4500, "sip": 5060, "postgresql": 5432, "dhcpv6-client": 546, "dhcpv6-server": 547,
+    "http-alt": 8080, "wireguard": 51820,
+}
+EPHEMERAL = (1024, 65535)
+
+
+def _ip_in(token: str, ip: IPAddr) -> bool | None:
+    """Literal IP / CIDR / range; None when the token is not a literal."""
+    token = token.strip()
+    if "-" in token and not token.startswith("-"):
+        low, _, high = token.partition("-")
+        try:
+            low_ip, high_ip = ipaddress.ip_address(low.strip()), ipaddress.ip_address(high.strip())
+        except ValueError:
+            return None
+        return low_ip.version == ip.version and low_ip <= ip <= high_ip
+    try:
+        net = ipaddress.ip_network(token, strict=False)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    return net.version == ip.version and ip in net
+
+
+def _interface_ref(token: str, ip: IPAddr, ctx: Context) -> Outcome | None:
+    name = token.strip()
+    lower = name.lower()
+    m = re.fullmatch(r"__(.+)_network", lower)
+    if m and m.group(1) in ctx.interfaces:
+        lower = m.group(1)
+    info = ctx.interfaces.get(lower)
+    if info is not None:  # "lan" = the interface's networks (pf: (dev:network), incl. VIP subnets)
+        return Outcome(any(ip in net for net in info.nets))
+    if lower.endswith("ip") and lower[:-2] in ctx.interfaces:  # "lanip" = the interface address
+        info = ctx.interfaces[lower[:-2]]
+        if ip in info.addrs:
+            return Outcome(True)
+        if ip in info.vips:
+            return Outcome(None, ["VIP_AS_INTERFACE_ADDRESS"])
+        return Outcome(False)
+    return None
+
+
+def addr_item(token: str, ip: IPAddr, ctx: Context, *, depth: int = 0, seen: tuple = ()) -> Outcome:
+    token = token.strip()
+    if token.lower() in ("any", ""):
+        return Outcome(True)
+    if token.lower() in ("(self)", "self", "this firewall"):
+        return Outcome(ip in ctx.self_addrs)
+    literal = _ip_in(token, ip)
+    if literal is not None:
+        return Outcome(literal)
+    ref = _interface_ref(token, ip, ctx)
+    if ref is not None:
+        return ref
+    return alias_contains(token, ip, ctx, depth=depth, seen=seen)
+
+
+def alias_contains(name: str, ip: IPAddr, ctx: Context, *, depth: int = 0, seen: tuple = ()) -> Outcome:
+    if name in seen:
+        return Outcome(None, ["ALIAS_CYCLE"])
+    if depth > MAX_ALIAS_DEPTH:
+        return Outcome(None, ["ALIAS_TOO_DEEP"])
+    alias = ctx.aliases.get(name)
+    refs = ctx.refs.get(str(ip))
+    if alias is None:
+        # pf knows tables the alias list may not show (e.g. internal ones): trust a positive hit.
+        if refs is not None and name in refs:
+            return Outcome(True)
+        return Outcome(None, ["ALIAS_MISSING"])
+    kind = str(alias.get("type") or "").lower()
+    if depth == 0 and refs is not None:
+        # pf's own table test: authoritative for every alias type (nesting, "!" entries, FQDNs).
+        return Outcome(name in refs)
+    if kind in ADDRESS_TYPES:
+        return _alias_content(alias, ip, ctx, depth, (*seen, name))
+    if refs is not None:
+        return Outcome(name in refs)
+    return Outcome(None, ["ALIAS_TABLE_UNAVAILABLE"])
+
+
+def _alias_content(alias: dict, ip: IPAddr, ctx: Context, depth: int, seen: tuple) -> Outcome:
+    entries = [e.strip() for e in re.split(r"[\n,]", str(alias.get("content") or "")) if e.strip()]
+    if any(e.startswith("!") for e in entries):
+        return Outcome(None, ["ALIAS_EXCLUSION"])
+    results = []
+    for entry in entries:
+        literal = _ip_in(entry, ip)
+        if literal is not None:
+            results.append(Outcome(literal))
+        elif entry in ctx.aliases or entry in seen:
+            results.append(alias_contains(entry, ip, ctx, depth=depth + 1, seen=seen))
+        elif "." in entry or ":" in entry:
+            results.append(Outcome(None, ["FQDN_UNRESOLVED"]))
+        else:
+            results.append(Outcome(None, ["ALIAS_MISSING"]))
+    return o_or(results)
+
+
+def endpoint_match(endpoint, ip: IPAddr, ctx: Context) -> Outcome:
+    if endpoint.is_any:
+        return Outcome(True)
+    result = o_or([addr_item(item, ip, ctx) for item in endpoint.items])
+    if endpoint.negated:
+        return Outcome(t_not(result.value), result.reasons)
+    return result
+
+
+# ── Ports ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def port_ranges(spec: str, ctx: Context, *, depth: int = 0, seen: tuple = ()) -> tuple[list[tuple[int, int]] | None, list[str]]:
+    """The port ranges a spec stands for; (None, reasons) when that cannot be known."""
+    ranges: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
+    reasons: list[str] = []
+    for part in [p.strip() for p in re.split(r"[\n,]", spec) if p.strip()]:
+        m = re.fullmatch(r"(\w[\w-]*?)\s*[-:]\s*(\w[\w-]*)", part) if not part.isdigit() and part not in ctx.aliases else None
+        if part.isdigit():
+            ranges.append((int(part), int(part)))
+        elif m and _port_number(m.group(1)) is not None and _port_number(m.group(2)) is not None:
+            ranges.append((_port_number(m.group(1)), _port_number(m.group(2))))
+        elif part.lower() in SERVICES:
+            ranges.append((SERVICES[part.lower()],) * 2)
+        elif part in ctx.aliases:
+            if part in seen or depth >= MAX_ALIAS_DEPTH:
+                return None, ["ALIAS_CYCLE" if part in seen else "ALIAS_TOO_DEEP"]
+            alias = ctx.aliases[part]
+            if str(alias.get("type") or "").lower() != "port":
+                return None, ["PORT_ALIAS_UNRESOLVED"]
+            sub, why = port_ranges(str(alias.get("content") or ""), ctx, depth=depth + 1, seen=(*seen, part))
+            if sub is None:
+                return None, why
+            ranges += sub
+        else:
+            return None, ["PORT_ALIAS_UNRESOLVED" if part.isidentifier() else "PORT_UNPARSEABLE"]
+    return ranges, reasons
+
+
+def _port_number(token: str) -> int | None:
+    if token.isdigit():
+        return int(token)
+    return SERVICES.get(token.lower())
+
+
+def port_match(spec: str, port: int | None, ctx: Context, *, ephemeral_default: bool = False) -> Outcome:
+    spec = (spec or "").strip()
+    if spec.lower() in ("", "any"):
+        return Outcome(True)
+    ranges, reasons = port_ranges(spec, ctx)
+    if ranges is None:
+        return Outcome(None, reasons)
+    if port is not None:
+        return Outcome(any(low <= port <= high for low, high in ranges))
+    if not ephemeral_default:
+        return Outcome(None, ["PORT_NOT_GIVEN"])
+    # No source port given: the query stands for an ephemeral client port (1024-65535).
+    low_e, high_e = EPHEMERAL
+    overlap = [(max(low, low_e), min(high, high_e)) for low, high in ranges if high >= low_e and low <= high_e]
+    if not overlap:
+        return Outcome(False)
+    covered, cursor = True, low_e
+    for low, high in sorted(overlap):
+        if low > cursor:
+            covered = False
+            break
+        cursor = max(cursor, high + 1)
+    if covered and cursor > high_e:
+        return Outcome(True)
+    return Outcome(None, ["SRC_PORT_NOT_GIVEN"])
+
+
+# ── Interfaces ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def iface_match(interfaces: set[str], if_not: bool, iface: str, ctx: Context) -> Outcome:
+    if not interfaces:
+        return Outcome(True)
+    results = []
+    for name in interfaces:
+        if name == iface:
+            results.append(Outcome(True))
+        elif name in ctx.interfaces:
+            results.append(Outcome(False))
+        elif ctx.groups is not None and name in ctx.groups:
+            results.append(Outcome(iface in ctx.groups[name]))
+        else:
+            results.append(Outcome(None, ["IFACE_UNRESOLVED" if ctx.groups is not None else "GROUPS_UNAVAILABLE"]))
+    result = o_or(results)
+    if if_not:
+        return Outcome(t_not(result.value), result.reasons)
+    return result

backend/app/services/rule_analysis/service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+"""Entry point used by the API: validate a query, load the firewall's context, evaluate."""
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import ipaddress
+import logging
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.policy_hierarchy_rule import PolicyHierarchyRule
+from app.models.policy_hierarchy_rule_deployment import PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment
+from app.models.rule import FirewallRule
+from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
+from app.models.rule_hit import RuleHit
+from app.models.rule_history import LiveRuleState
+from app.services import rule_hit_service
+from app.services.rule_history_service import BASELINE_KEY
+from app.services.rule_analysis import cleanup, coverage
+from app.services.rule_analysis import context as ctx_mod
+from app.services.rule_analysis.engine import Query, evaluate
+from app.services.rule_analysis.normalize import normalize
+from app.services.rule_analysis.normalize import PROTO_NUMBERS, norm_proto
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+def _ip(value: str | None, field: str):
+    try:
+        return ipaddress.ip_address(str(value or "").strip())
+    except ValueError:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_ADRESSE_UNGUELTIG, field=field, value=str(value or "")[:64]) from None
+
+
+def _port(value: str | int | None, field: str) -> int | None:
+    if value in (None, ""):
+        return None
+    text = str(value).strip()
+    if not text.isdigit() or int(text) > 65535:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG, field=field, value=text[:32])
+    return int(text)
+
+
+def build_query(*, src: str, dst: str, proto: str = "tcp", sport=None, dport=None, icmptype: str | None = None,
+                iface: str | None = None, direction: str = "in", egress: str | None = None) -> Query:
+    source, destination = _ip(src, "src"), _ip(dst, "dst")
+    if source.version != destination.version:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_FAMILIEN_MISCHUNG)
+    label = str(proto or "tcp").strip().lower()
+    if label == "icmp" and source.version == 6:
+        label = "ipv6-icmp"
+    number = norm_proto(label)
+    if not (number.isdigit() and int(number) <= 255) and label not in PROTO_NUMBERS:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG, field="proto", value=label[:32])
+    q = Query(src=source, dst=destination, proto=number, proto_label=label,
+              sport=_port(sport, "sport"), dport=_port(dport, "dport"))
+    if (q.sport is not None or q.dport is not None) and number not in ("6", "17"):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG, field="dport", value=str(dport or sport))
+    if icmptype not in (None, ""):
+        if number not in ("1", "58"):
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG, field="icmptype", value=str(icmptype)[:32])
+        q.icmptype = str(icmptype).strip().lower()
+    if direction not in ("in", "out"):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_PARAMETER_UNGUELTIG, field="direction", value=str(direction)[:8])
+    q.direction = direction
+    q.iface = None if str(iface or "").strip().lower() in ("", "auto") else str(iface).strip()
+    egress_value = str(egress or "").strip().lower()
+    q.egress = "none" if egress_value in ("", "none") else (None if egress_value == "auto" else str(egress).strip())
+    return q
+
+
+def check_interfaces(q: Query, ctx: ctx_mod.Context) -> None:
+    for name in (q.iface, None if q.egress in (None, "none") else q.egress):
+        if name is not None and name not in ctx.interfaces:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.ANALYSE_INTERFACE_UNBEKANNT, interface=name[:64],
+                            known=", ".join(sorted(i for i in ctx.interfaces if i != "lo0")))
+
+
+async def analyze_host(host: OpnsenseHost, q: Query, *, refresh: bool = False) -> dict:
+    """Raises api_error for a bad interface; OpnsenseAPIError/httpx errors when the firewall
+    cannot be read (callers map that)."""
+    ctx = await ctx_mod.load_context(host, use_cache=not refresh)
+    check_interfaces(q, ctx)
+    await ctx_mod.ensure_refs(host, ctx, [str(q.src), str(q.dst)])
+    result = evaluate(ctx, q)
+    if any(ctx.refs.get(ip) is None for ip in (str(q.src), str(q.dst))):
+        result["notes"] = sorted({*result["notes"], "ALIAS_REFERENCES_UNAVAILABLE"})
+    return result
+
+
+async def _managed_rules(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """{label on the firewall: what manages it} for every rule OPNexus deployed to this host."""
+    managed: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for dep_uuid, rule_id, description in (await db.execute(
+            select(RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid, FirewallRule.id, FirewallRule.description)
+            .join(FirewallRule, FirewallRule.id == RuleDeployment.rule_id)
+            .where(RuleDeployment.host_id == host.id, RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid.is_not(None)))).all():
+        managed[dep_uuid.lower()] = {"kind": "rule", "id": str(rule_id), "name": description}
+    for dep_uuid, rule_id, description in (await db.execute(
+            select(PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid, PolicyHierarchyRule.id, PolicyHierarchyRule.description)
+            .join(PolicyHierarchyRule, PolicyHierarchyRule.id == PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.policy_hierarchy_id)
+            .where(PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.host_id == host.id,
+                   PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid.is_not(None)))).all():
+        managed[dep_uuid.lower()] = {"kind": "policy_hierarchy", "id": str(rule_id), "name": description}
+    return managed
+
+
+async def cleanup_candidates(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, *, unused_days: int = cleanup.DEFAULT_UNUSED_DAYS,
+                             refresh: bool = False, now: datetime | None = None) -> dict:
+    """Read-only. Raises when the firewall cannot be read (callers map that)."""
+    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    ctx = await ctx_mod.load_context(host, use_cache=not refresh)
+    rules, notes = normalize(ctx)
+    hits = {r.rule_uuid.lower(): r for r in (await db.scalars(select(RuleHit).where(RuleHit.host_id == host.id))).all()}
+    states = {s.rule_uuid: s for s in (await db.scalars(select(LiveRuleState).where(LiveRuleState.host_id == host.id))).all()}
+    rows = cleanup.build(rules, ctx, hits=hits, states=states, managed=await _managed_rules(db, host), now=now,
+                         unused_days=unused_days, order_guessed=coverage.order_doubtful(notes))
+    all_notes = sorted({*notes, *ctx.notes})
+    return {
+        "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name, "cluster_name": host.cluster_name,
+        "unused_days": max(cleanup.MIN_DAYS, min(cleanup.MAX_DAYS, int(unused_days))), "generated_at": now,
+        "rules_total": sum(1 for r in rules if not r.automatic and r.section not in ("antispoof", "nat_auto", "invalid")),
+        "candidates": rows, "counts": cleanup.summarize(rows), "notes": all_notes,
+        "usage": {
+            "tracked": len(hits),
+            "collecting": sum(1 for h in hits.values() if rule_hit_service.classify(h, now, unused_days) == "collecting"),
+            "watching_since": min((h.first_seen_at for h in hits.values()), default=None),
+        },
+        "history": {"watching_since": baseline.first_seen_at if (baseline := states.get(BASELINE_KEY)) else None},
+    }

backend/app/services/rule_history_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+"""Change history of the rules that are live on a firewall, also those OPNexus did not create.
+
+Every ``rule_observe`` cycle reads ``searchRule`` (and the counters, for the usage sampling) of each enabled
+firewall and compares the user rules with the last observed state (``live_rule_states``). A difference becomes
+one ``rule_change_events`` row: added, changed, removed, enabled or disabled, with the rule as it was and as it
+is. The first observation of a firewall only records the starting point (no flood of "added" events).
+
+Origin: a change is ``opnexus`` when the audit trail has a deployment event for that rule UUID on that host in
+the time since the previous observation (the actor is taken from it), else ``external`` (changed in the
+firewall's own GUI, by a script, ...). The audit entry is written a moment after the change reaches the firewall,
+so an event classified ``external`` is re-checked in the next cycles (``reconcile_origins``).
+
+Two processes may run the loop at once (overlapping web updates, a replica): every change is claimed with an
+optimistic ``version`` on the state row and the event carries that version in a unique key, so a change is
+recorded exactly once.
+
+Only the rows' own fields are kept; derived display fields (``%…``, ``alias_meta_*``, colours, priorities) are
+dropped so that a changed alias or colour does not look like a rule change.
+"""
+import hashlib
+import json
+import logging
+import uuid as uuid_lib
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+
+from sqlalchemy import delete, select, update
+from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import insert as pg_insert
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.audit import AuditEvent
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.policy import RuleRevision
+from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
+from app.models.rule_history import LiveRuleState, RuleChangeEvent
+from app.services import opnsense_client as client
+from app.services import rule_hit_service
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+BASELINE_KEY = "__baseline__"
+RETENTION_DAYS = 365
+# Audit kinds whose events carry the UUID of a rule on a firewall in details["remote_uuid"].
+AUDIT_KINDS = ("rule", "policy_hierarchy")
+# Audit statuses that mean the firewall's rule was (or was meant to be) touched.
+AUDIT_STATUSES_NO_CHANGE = ("requested", "interrupted", "error")
+# The audit entry is written right after the firewall changed; allow for the observer running just before it.
+AUDIT_SLACK = timedelta(minutes=2)
+RECHECK_WINDOW = timedelta(minutes=45)
+_DROP_PREFIXES = ("%", "alias_meta", "#")
+_DROP_KEYS = {"category_colors", "categories_colors", "icons", "ref"}
+
+
+def clean_row(row: dict) -> dict:
+    """The part of a ``searchRule`` row that describes the rule itself."""
+    return {k: v for k, v in row.items() if not k.startswith(_DROP_PREFIXES) and k not in _DROP_KEYS}
+
+
+def fingerprint(row: dict) -> str:
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(row, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _enabled(row: dict) -> bool:
+    return str(row.get("enabled", "1")).strip().lower() in ("1", "true", "yes", "on")
+
+
+# Fields that only say where the rule sits in the order. Another rule being inserted or a group being re-sorted
+# changes them for many rules at once; that is a "moved", not an edit of the rule.
+ORDER_FIELDS = frozenset({"sort_order", "prio_group", "sequence"})
+# Kinds after which what OPNexus learned about the rule's traffic no longer describes it.
+RESTARTS_USAGE = frozenset({"added", "changed", "enabled", "disabled"})
+
+
+def change_kind(before: dict | None, after: dict | None) -> str:
+    if before is None:
+        return "added"
+    if after is None:
+        return "removed"
+    differing = {k for k in {*before, *after} if before.get(k) != after.get(k)}
+    if differing == {"enabled"}:
+        return "enabled" if _enabled(after) else "disabled"
+    if differing and differing <= ORDER_FIELDS:
+        return "moved"
+    return "changed"
+
+
+def diff_fields(before: dict | None, after: dict | None, limit: int = 12) -> list[dict]:
+    """Short field-by-field difference: [{field, before, after}] (a missing side is None)."""
+    before, after = before or {}, after or {}
+    changes = [{"field": key, "before": before.get(key), "after": after.get(key)}
+               for key in sorted({*before, *after}) if before.get(key) != after.get(key)]
+    return changes[:limit]
+
+
+def _tracked(search: dict) -> dict[str, dict] | None:
+    """{rule label: cleaned row} of the user rules; None when the answer is not a rule list at all (an error
+    page must never look like 'every rule was removed')."""
+    rows = search.get("rows") if isinstance(search, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(rows, list):
+        return None
+    result: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for row in rows:
+        if not isinstance(row, dict) or not row.get("uuid") or row.get("is_automatic") in (True, 1, "1"):
+            continue
+        result[str(row["uuid"]).lower()[:64]] = clean_row(row)
+    return result
+
+
+async def _find_audit(db: AsyncSession, host_id, rule_uuid: str, start: datetime, end: datetime) -> AuditEvent | None:
+    """The newest deployment audit entry of this rule after ``start`` that no other event has claimed yet. The
+    audit entry is written after the firewall changed, so it can only lie after the previous observation."""
+    claimed = select(RuleChangeEvent.audit_id).where(RuleChangeEvent.audit_id.is_not(None))
+    return await db.scalar(
+        select(AuditEvent).where(
+            AuditEvent.host_id == str(host_id), AuditEvent.kind.in_(AUDIT_KINDS),
+            AuditEvent.created_at >= start, AuditEvent.created_at <= end + AUDIT_SLACK,
+            AuditEvent.id.notin_(claimed),
+            AuditEvent.status.notin_(AUDIT_STATUSES_NO_CHANGE),
+            AuditEvent.details["remote_uuid"].as_string() == rule_uuid,
+        ).order_by(AuditEvent.created_at.desc()).limit(1))
+
+
+async def observe_rows(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, search: dict, now: datetime | None = None) -> dict:
+    """Compare a ``searchRule`` answer with the stored state of the host. Returns {"baseline": bool, "events": n}."""
+    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    current = _tracked(search)
+    if current is None or not rule_hit_service.looks_complete(search):
+        # Not a full rule list (no automatic rules in it): never read an empty or partial answer as "all removed".
+        return {"baseline": False, "events": 0, "skipped": True, "touched": []}
+    states = {s.rule_uuid: s for s in (await db.scalars(select(LiveRuleState).where(LiveRuleState.host_id == host.id))).all()}
+    baseline = states.get(BASELINE_KEY)
+    since = baseline.last_seen_at if baseline else now
+    events = 0
+    touched: list[str] = []
+    if baseline is not None:
+        known = [u for u, st in states.items() if u != BASELINE_KEY and st.present]
+        missing = sorted(u for u in known if u not in current)
+        if known and len(missing) * 2 > len(known):
+            # More than half of the known rules vanished at once: possible, but far more often a broken answer.
+            # Only the same picture on two observations in a row counts.
+            marker = hashlib.sha256("\n".join(missing).encode()).hexdigest()
+            if (baseline.row or {}).get("pending") != marker:
+                await db.execute(update(LiveRuleState).where(
+                    LiveRuleState.host_id == host.id, LiveRuleState.rule_uuid == BASELINE_KEY)
+                    .values(row={"pending": marker}).execution_options(synchronize_session=False))
+                await db.commit()
+                return {"baseline": False, "events": 0, "skipped": True, "touched": [], "unconfirmed": len(missing)}
+
+    async def claim(rule_uuid: str, state: LiveRuleState, new_row: dict | None) -> int | None:
+        """Move the state to its new version; None when another process already did."""
+        values = {"version": LiveRuleState.version + 1, "changed_at": now, "last_seen_at": now,
+                  "present": new_row is not None}
+        if new_row is not None:
+            values.update(fingerprint=fingerprint(new_row), row=new_row)
+        else:
+            values.update(fingerprint="")
+        return await db.scalar(update(LiveRuleState).where(
+            LiveRuleState.host_id == host.id, LiveRuleState.rule_uuid == rule_uuid, LiveRuleState.version == state.version,
+        ).values(**values).returning(LiveRuleState.version).execution_options(synchronize_session=False))
+
+    async def record(rule_uuid: str, seq: int, before: dict | None, after: dict | None) -> None:
+        nonlocal events
+        kind = change_kind(before, after)
+        if kind in RESTARTS_USAGE:
+            touched.append(rule_uuid)
+        audit = await _find_audit(db, host.id, rule_uuid, since, now)
+        stmt = pg_insert(RuleChangeEvent).values(
+            id=uuid_lib.uuid4(), host_id=host.id, rule_uuid=rule_uuid, seq=seq, observed_at=now,
+            kind=kind, before=before, after=after,
+            origin="opnexus" if audit else "external", actor=audit.actor if audit else None,
+            audit_id=audit.id if audit else None, window_start=since,
+        ).on_conflict_do_nothing(constraint="uq_rule_change_event")
+        events += 1 if (await db.execute(stmt)).rowcount else 0
+
+    for rule_uuid, row in current.items():
+        state = states.get(rule_uuid)
+        if state is None:
+            stmt = pg_insert(LiveRuleState).values(
+                host_id=host.id, rule_uuid=rule_uuid, fingerprint=fingerprint(row), row=row, present=True, version=1,
+                first_seen_at=now, changed_at=now, last_seen_at=now).on_conflict_do_nothing()
+            inserted = (await db.execute(stmt)).rowcount
+            if inserted and baseline is not None:
+                await record(rule_uuid, 1, None, row)
+        elif not state.present:
+            seq = await claim(rule_uuid, state, row)
+            if seq is not None:
+                await record(rule_uuid, seq, None, row)
+        elif state.fingerprint != fingerprint(row):
+            seq = await claim(rule_uuid, state, row)
+            if seq is not None:
+                await record(rule_uuid, seq, state.row, row)
+    if baseline is not None:
+        for rule_uuid, state in states.items():
+            if rule_uuid == BASELINE_KEY or rule_uuid in current or not state.present:
+                continue
+            seq = await claim(rule_uuid, state, None)
+            if seq is not None:
+                await record(rule_uuid, seq, state.row, None)
+    unchanged = [u for u in current if u in states and states[u].present]
+    if unchanged:
+        await db.execute(update(LiveRuleState).where(
+            LiveRuleState.host_id == host.id, LiveRuleState.rule_uuid.in_(unchanged)).values(last_seen_at=now)
+            .execution_options(synchronize_session=False))
+    if baseline is None:
+        await db.execute(pg_insert(LiveRuleState).values(
+            host_id=host.id, rule_uuid=BASELINE_KEY, fingerprint="", row={}, present=False, version=1,
+            first_seen_at=now, changed_at=now, last_seen_at=now).on_conflict_do_nothing())
+    else:
+        await db.execute(update(LiveRuleState).where(
+            LiveRuleState.host_id == host.id, LiveRuleState.rule_uuid == BASELINE_KEY).values(last_seen_at=now, row={})
+            .execution_options(synchronize_session=False))
+    await db.commit()
+    return {"baseline": baseline is None, "events": events, "touched": touched}
+
+
+async def reconcile_origins(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, now: datetime | None = None) -> int:
+    """Recent 'external' events may only look so because the audit entry was written after the observation."""
+    now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    recent = (await db.scalars(select(RuleChangeEvent).where(
+        RuleChangeEvent.host_id == host.id, RuleChangeEvent.origin == "external",
+        RuleChangeEvent.observed_at >= now - RECHECK_WINDOW).order_by(RuleChangeEvent.observed_at, RuleChangeEvent.seq))).all()
+    fixed = 0
+    for event in recent:  # oldest first: an audit entry belongs to the earliest change it can explain
+        start = event.window_start or (event.observed_at - RECHECK_WINDOW)
+        audit = await _find_audit(db, host.id, event.rule_uuid, start, event.observed_at)
+        if audit is not None:
+            event.origin, event.actor, event.audit_id = "opnexus", audit.actor, audit.id
+            # (autoflush makes the claim visible to the next event's query)
+            fixed += 1
+    if fixed:
+        await db.commit()
+    return fixed
+
+
+async def observe_host(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, now: datetime | None = None) -> dict:
+    """Two GETs: the rules and their counters. One read serves the usage sampling and the history."""
+    # First settle the origin of earlier events (their audit entries may have arrived late), so that an entry is
+    # not taken by a newer change of the same rule that happens to fall in its window.
+    await reconcile_origins(db, host, now)
+    search = await client.search_rules(host, all_rows=True)
+    try:
+        counters = await rule_hit_service.read_counters(host)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        counters = None
+        logger.info("Regelzähler von %s nicht lesbar: %s", host.name, exc)
+    result = await observe_rows(db, host, search, now)
+    if not result.get("skipped"):  # a rejected or unconfirmed answer must not touch the usage data either
+        if counters is not None:
+            await rule_hit_service.apply_sample(db, host, counters, search, now)
+        await rule_hit_service.restart_window(db, host.id, result["touched"], now)
+    return result
+
+
+async def observe_all(db: AsyncSession, now: datetime | None = None) -> dict:
+    hosts = (await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).where(OpnsenseHost.enabled.is_(True)).order_by(OpnsenseHost.name))).all()
+    summary = {"hosts": 0, "failed": 0, "events": 0}
+    for host in hosts:
+        try:
+            result = await observe_host(db, host, now)
+            summary["hosts"] += 1
+            summary["events"] += result["events"]
+        except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+            summary["failed"] += 1
+            logger.warning("Regelverlauf von %s nicht lesbar: %s", host.name, exc)
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - one host must never stop the cycle for the others
+            summary["failed"] += 1
+            await db.rollback()
+            logger.exception("Regelverlauf von %s fehlgeschlagen", host.name)
+    return summary
+
+
+async def prune(db: AsyncSession, retention_days: int = RETENTION_DAYS) -> int:
+    cutoff = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=retention_days)
+    events = await db.execute(delete(RuleChangeEvent).where(RuleChangeEvent.observed_at < cutoff))
+    gone = await db.execute(delete(LiveRuleState).where(
+        LiveRuleState.present.is_(False), LiveRuleState.rule_uuid != BASELINE_KEY, LiveRuleState.changed_at < cutoff))
+    await db.commit()
+    return (events.rowcount or 0) + (gone.rowcount or 0)
+
+
+# ── Reading the history of one rule ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _iso(value: datetime | None) -> str | None:
+    return value.isoformat() if value else None
+
+
+async def rule_timeline(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, rule_uuid: str, limit: int = 200) -> list[dict]:
+    """Observed changes, saved revisions (OPNexus-managed rules) and audit entries of one rule, newest first."""
+    rule_uuid = rule_uuid.lower()[:64]
+    items: list[dict] = []
+    for event in (await db.scalars(select(RuleChangeEvent).where(
+            RuleChangeEvent.host_id == host.id, RuleChangeEvent.rule_uuid == rule_uuid)
+            .order_by(RuleChangeEvent.observed_at.desc()).limit(limit))).all():
+        items.append({
+            "source": "observed", "at": event.observed_at, "kind": event.kind, "origin": event.origin, "actor": event.actor,
+            "changes": diff_fields(event.before, event.after), "audit_id": event.audit_id,
+        })
+    audits = (await db.scalars(select(AuditEvent).where(
+        AuditEvent.host_id == str(host.id), AuditEvent.kind.in_(AUDIT_KINDS),
+        AuditEvent.details["remote_uuid"].as_string() == rule_uuid,
+        AuditEvent.status.notin_(("requested",))).order_by(AuditEvent.created_at.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
+    explained = {item["audit_id"] for item in items if item["audit_id"]}  # already shown as the observed change
+    for audit in audits:
+        if audit.id in explained:
+            continue
+        items.append({
+            "source": "audit", "at": audit.created_at, "kind": audit.action, "status": audit.status, "actor": audit.actor,
+            "origin": "opnexus", "message": audit.message, "audit_id": audit.id, "changes": [],
+        })
+    deployment = await db.scalar(select(RuleDeployment).where(
+        RuleDeployment.host_id == host.id, RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid == rule_uuid))
+    if deployment is not None:
+        revisions = (await db.scalars(select(RuleRevision).where(RuleRevision.rule_id == deployment.rule_id)
+                                      .order_by(RuleRevision.created_at.desc()).limit(limit))).all()
+        ordered = sorted(revisions, key=lambda r: r.created_at)
+        previous = None
+        for revision in ordered:
+            items.append({
+                "source": "revision", "at": revision.created_at, "kind": "revision", "origin": "opnexus", "actor": None,
+                "note": revision.note, "changes": diff_fields(previous, revision.snapshot) if previous is not None else [],
+                "audit_id": None, "managed_rule_id": deployment.rule_id,
+            })
+            previous = revision.snapshot
+    items.sort(key=lambda item: item["at"], reverse=True)
+    return items[:limit]

backend/app/services/rule_hit_service.py

@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
 """Rule usage from pf's counters: which rules never match anything?
 
-``sample_host`` reads the per-rule packet counters (``diagnostics/firewall/pfStatistics/rules``) and the
-configured rules (``searchRule``) and updates one row per rule: the time of the last observed hit.
+``sample_host`` reads the per-rule packet counters and the configured rules (``searchRule``) and updates one
+row per rule: the time of the last observed hit. The counters come from ``firewall/filter_util/ruleStats``
+(already summed per label by the firewall; verified live on OPNsense 26.7 on all three test firewalls, see
+the evidence block in opnsense_client.py, where its numbers equal the sum over ``pfStatistics/rules``). Older
+releases without that endpoint fall back to parsing ``diagnostics/firewall/pfStatistics/rules``.
 
 * A counter that grew since the last sample is a hit "now" (at most one sampling interval late).
 * A counter that is *lower* than before means pf reloaded its ruleset (an apply or a reboot), which
@@ -10,14 +13,16 @@ configured rules (``searchRule``) and updates one row per rule: the time of the
 * A rule is called unused only after OPNexus has watched it for ``UNUSED_AFTER_DAYS`` without a hit.
   A new rule, or a brand-new installation, is "still collecting data" instead of a false alarm.
 
-Only rules with a UUID label are tied to a configured rule (rules created in the rule editor or API; OPNsense's
-built-in automatic rules carry hash labels and are not user rules).
+A counter belongs to a configured rule by its label: the UUID of a rule created in the rule editor or API, or the
+32-hex label of a not yet migrated legacy rule (the ``searchRule`` row carries the same string as ``uuid``).
+OPNsense's built-in automatic rules also have hash labels but are flagged ``is_automatic`` there, so they are
+never tracked.
 """
 import logging
 import re
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 
-from sqlalchemy import delete, select
+from sqlalchemy import delete, select, update
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
@@ -28,7 +33,12 @@ from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 UNUSED_AFTER_DAYS = 30
-_LABEL = re.compile(r'label "([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12})"')
+_LABEL = re.compile(r'label "([0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}|[0-9a-fA-F]{32})"')
+# A sample counts as fresh for the "unused" confidence when it is at most this old.
+SAMPLE_FRESH = timedelta(hours=24)
+# A pf reload zeroes the counters; whatever was hit between the last sample and the reload is lost. After a gap
+# this long the loss is too big to call the rule unused on that evidence: the observation window starts over.
+SAMPLE_GAP = timedelta(hours=2)
 
 
 def parse_counters(stats: dict) -> dict[str, dict]:
@@ -45,18 +55,65 @@ def parse_counters(stats: dict) -> dict[str, dict]:
     return result
 
 
+def parse_rule_stats(data: dict) -> dict[str, dict] | None:
+    """{label: {packets, bytes, evaluations}} from ``filter_util/ruleStats``; None when the answer is not
+    that shape (older release, error page), so the caller can fall back to pfStatistics."""
+    stats = (data or {}).get("stats") if isinstance(data, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(stats, dict) or (data or {}).get("status") != "ok":
+        return None
+    result: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for label, values in stats.items():
+        if isinstance(values, dict):
+            result[str(label).lower()] = {key: int(values.get(key) or 0) for key in ("packets", "bytes", "evaluations")}
+    return result
+
+
+async def read_counters(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    """Counters per rule label: ruleStats first, the pf ruleset text as fallback."""
+    try:
+        parsed = parse_rule_stats(await client.get_rule_stats(host))
+    except OpnsenseAPIError:
+        parsed = None
+    if parsed is not None:
+        return parsed
+    return parse_counters(await client.get_pf_rule_statistics(host))
+
+
+def looks_complete(search) -> bool:
+    """A usable ``searchRule`` answer: a list that contains OPNsense's own automatic rules. A real firewall always
+    has some, so an empty or partial answer (a firewall just restarting a service, a proxy error page) is rejected
+    instead of being read as "every rule is gone"."""
+    rows = search.get("rows") if isinstance(search, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(rows, list) or not rows:
+        return False
+    dicts = [r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict)]
+    if not any("is_automatic" in r for r in dicts):
+        return bool(dicts)  # firmware that does not flag automatic rules at all: a non-empty list is all we can ask for
+    return any(r.get("is_automatic") in (True, 1, "1") for r in dicts)
+
+
 def configured_rules(search: dict) -> dict[str, dict]:
     rows = (search or {}).get("rows") or []
     return {
         str(r["uuid"]).lower(): {"description": r.get("description") or "", "enabled": r.get("enabled") in ("1", 1, True)}
-        for r in rows if r.get("uuid") and not r.get("is_automatic")
+        for r in rows if r.get("uuid") and r.get("is_automatic") not in (True, 1, "1")
     }
 
 
 async def sample_host(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, now: datetime | None = None) -> int:
+    """Read the counters and the rules from the firewall and update the hit rows."""
+    counters = await read_counters(host)
+    return await apply_sample(db, host, counters, await client.search_rules(host, all_rows=True), now)
+
+
+async def apply_sample(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, counters: dict[str, dict], search: dict,
+                       now: datetime | None = None) -> int:
+    """Update the hit rows from counters (per label) and a ``searchRule`` answer that are already read
+    (the observe loop shares one read between usage and change history)."""
     now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-    counters = parse_counters(await client.get_pf_rule_statistics(host))
-    rules = configured_rules(await client.search_rules(host, all_rows=True))
+    if not looks_complete(search):
+        return 0  # not a full rule list: an error or partial answer must not look like "every rule was deleted"
+    rules = configured_rules(search)
     rows = {r.rule_uuid: r for r in (await db.scalars(select(RuleHit).where(RuleHit.host_id == host.id))).all()}
     for uuid_, meta in rules.items():
         counter = counters.get(uuid_, {"packets": 0, "bytes": 0})
@@ -68,6 +125,10 @@ async def sample_host(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, now: datetime | None
                 row.last_hit_at = now  # already matching when first seen
         elif counter["packets"] > row.last_packets or (counter["packets"] < row.last_packets and counter["packets"] > 0):
             row.last_hit_at = now
+        elif counter["packets"] < row.last_packets and now - row.last_sampled_at > SAMPLE_GAP:
+            row.first_seen_at = now  # reloaded after a long gap: the hits in between are unknown
+        if meta["enabled"] and not row.enabled:
+            row.first_seen_at = now  # a rule that was off has not been "waiting for traffic" while it was off
         row.description = meta["description"][:255]
         row.enabled = meta["enabled"]
         row.last_packets, row.last_bytes, row.last_sampled_at = counter["packets"], counter["bytes"], now
@@ -78,6 +139,18 @@ async def sample_host(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, now: datetime | None
     return len(rules)
 
 
+async def restart_window(db: AsyncSession, host_id, rule_uuids, now: datetime | None = None) -> int:
+    """The rules were edited, enabled or created: what OPNexus saw before does not describe them any more, so the
+    observation window for "unused" starts over (an earlier last hit is kept)."""
+    keys = [u.lower() for u in rule_uuids]
+    if not keys:
+        return 0
+    result = await db.execute(update(RuleHit).where(RuleHit.host_id == host_id, RuleHit.rule_uuid.in_(keys))
+                              .values(first_seen_at=now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).execution_options(synchronize_session=False))
+    await db.commit()
+    return result.rowcount or 0
+
+
 async def sample_all(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
     hosts = (await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).where(OpnsenseHost.enabled.is_(True)))).all()
     sampled = 0
@@ -92,14 +165,14 @@ async def sample_all(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
     return sampled
 
 
-def classify(row: RuleHit, now: datetime) -> str:
-    """'used' | 'unused' | 'collecting' | 'disabled'"""
+def classify(row: RuleHit, now: datetime, days: int = UNUSED_AFTER_DAYS) -> str:
+    """'used' | 'unused' | 'collecting' | 'disabled'; ``days`` is the observation window."""
     if not row.enabled:
         return "disabled"
-    if row.last_hit_at is not None and now - row.last_hit_at < timedelta(days=UNUSED_AFTER_DAYS):
+    if row.last_hit_at is not None and now - row.last_hit_at < timedelta(days=days):
         return "used"
     watched = now - row.first_seen_at
-    if watched < timedelta(days=UNUSED_AFTER_DAYS):
+    if watched < timedelta(days=days):
         return "used" if row.last_hit_at is not None else "collecting"
     return "unused"
 

backend/app/services/scheduled_maintenance_service.py

@@ -15,18 +15,31 @@ the UI) but is NOT wired into the NotificationSettings webhook/email
 system — that system is built around persistent NotificationProblem rows
 with their own admin-configurable toggles, and adding a new problem kind
 for this is a bigger change than this feature's own scope. Flagged here,
-not silently dropped, in case it's wanted later.
+not silently dropped, in case it's wanted later. (Later: the failure is reported by
+notification_checks.check_scheduled_maintenance_failed since 1.17.)
+
+auto_verify (1.25, set for every rollout step): instead of leaving the operation "submitted"
+for a human, the run waits for the job (phase job_wait) and then checks the result itself
+(phase verify: firmware idle for a while, a reboot really happened when one was due, version
+readable). Only then the operation is closed as "acknowledged"; anything unclear ends as
+"unknown" (stays locked, notification). Without auto_verify nothing changes.
+
+Concurrency: due rows and running rows are each taken with SELECT ... FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED,
+one row per transaction, so a second backend (briefly possible during a web update) can never
+fire or step the same row at the same time.
 """
 import logging
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 
 from fastapi import HTTPException
-from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy import select, true
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
 from app.models.host_operation import HostOperation
 from app.models.scheduled_maintenance import ScheduledMaintenance
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+
 from app.services import audit_service, backup_store, opnsense_client as client
 from app.services.host_maintenance_service import ACTIVE, ensure_no_maintenance, inspect_carp_switch, inspect_host, peers
 from app.services.host_status_service import get_statuses
@@ -51,40 +64,93 @@ HANDOVER_TIMEOUT = timedelta(minutes=3)
 LEAVE_TIMEOUT = timedelta(minutes=5)
 JOB_GRACE = timedelta(minutes=5)  # no sign of a job after this long: treat a package update as already done
 JOB_TIMEOUT = {"reboot": timedelta(minutes=20), "update": timedelta(minutes=60), "major_update": timedelta(minutes=150)}
+# auto_verify: the firmware must report "ready" for this long in a row (a reboot at the end of an update
+# can follow a short "ready" moment), and the whole check gives up after VERIFY_TIMEOUT.
+VERIFY_SETTLE = timedelta(seconds=60)
+VERIFY_TIMEOUT = timedelta(minutes=20)
+# A rollout step is created with run_at=now and fires on the next poll. Found much later (OPNexus was down,
+# e.g. during an update), it no longer belongs to the decision that created it: the window may have closed
+# and the run may have been paused meanwhile. It is then not fired; the rollout engine re-queues the host.
+ROLLOUT_FIRE_GRACE = timedelta(minutes=5)
 
 
 def _now() -> datetime:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
 
+@contextmanager
+def _as_actor(sched: ScheduledMaintenance):
+    """Audit events of an unattended run name the person who planned it (not the rollback worker)."""
+    token = audit_service.context.set({"actor": f"{sched.actor} (geplant)"[:150], "id": str(sched.id)})
+    try:
+        yield
+    finally:
+        audit_service.context.reset(token)
+
+
+def _rollout_details(sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> dict:
+    rollout = (sched.progress or {}).get("rollout")
+    return {"rollout": rollout} if rollout else {}
+
+
 async def fire_due(db: AsyncSession) -> dict:
-    due = list(
-        (
-            await db.scalars(
-                select(ScheduledMaintenance).where(
-                    ScheduledMaintenance.status == "pending", ScheduledMaintenance.run_at <= _now()
-                )
-            )
-        ).all()
-    )
-    fired = 0
-    blocked = 0
-    for sched in due:
-        try:
-            await _fire_one(db, sched)
-        except Exception:
-            logger.exception("Geplante Wartung %s fehlgeschlagen", sched.id)
-            sched.status = "failed"
-            sched.result = {"error": "Unerwarteter Fehler beim Ausführen"}
+    due = fired = blocked = 0
+    seen: set = set()
+    while True:
+        # One row per transaction, locked: a second backend skips it instead of firing it again.
+        sched = await db.scalar(
+            select(ScheduledMaintenance)
+            .where(ScheduledMaintenance.status == "pending", ScheduledMaintenance.run_at <= _now(),
+                   ScheduledMaintenance.id.not_in(seen) if seen else true())
+            .order_by(ScheduledMaintenance.run_at)
+            .limit(1)
+            .with_for_update(skip_locked=True)
+            .execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+        )
+        if sched is None:
             await db.commit()
+            break
+        seen.add(sched.id)
+        due += 1
+        with _as_actor(sched):
+            try:
+                await _fire_one(db, sched)
+            except Exception:
+                logger.exception("Geplante Wartung %s fehlgeschlagen", sched.id)
+                await db.rollback()
+                sched = await db.get(ScheduledMaintenance, sched.id, populate_existing=True)
+                if sched.status in ("pending", "running") and sched.phase is None:
+                    sched.status = "failed"
+                    sched.result = {"error": "Unerwarteter Fehler beim Ausführen"}
+                await db.commit()
+        await db.commit()  # never keep the row lock past this row
         if sched.status == "failed":
             blocked += 1
         else:
             fired += 1
-    return {"due": len(due), "fired": fired, "blocked_or_failed": blocked}
+    return {"due": due, "fired": fired, "blocked_or_failed": blocked}
+
+
+def _reboot_expected(action: str, state: dict) -> bool:
+    return action in ("reboot", "major_update") or bool(state.get("reboot_required"))
+
+
+async def _boot_time(host: OpnsenseHost) -> str | None:
+    """systemTime's "boottime" (Diagnostics SystemController::systemTimeAction, read-only, already used by the
+    resource sampler). A different value afterwards proves a reboot even if no poll caught the host offline."""
+    try:
+        return (await client.get_system_time(host)).get("boottime") or None
+    except client.OpnsenseAPIError:
+        return None
 
 
 async def _fire_one(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> None:
+    if sched.origin == "rollout" and _now() - sched.run_at > ROLLOUT_FIRE_GRACE:
+        sched.status = "failed"
+        sched.result = {"error": "Rollout-Schritt nicht rechtzeitig gestartet, nichts ausgeführt", "not_fired": True}
+        await db.commit()
+        logger.warning("Geplante Wartung %s: Rollout-Schritt überfällig, nicht ausgeführt", sched.id)
+        return
     host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, sched.host_id)
     if not host or not host.enabled:
         sched.status = "failed"
@@ -137,6 +203,7 @@ async def _fire_one(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> None:
         logger.warning("Geplante Wartung %s blockiert: %s", sched.id, sched.result["error"])
         return
 
+    boot_before = await _boot_time(host) if sched.auto_verify else None
     op = HostOperation(
         host_id=host.id, host_name=host.name, actor=sched.actor, action=sched.action,
         expires_at=_now(), fingerprint="", snapshot=state, status="starting", started_at=_now(),
@@ -147,14 +214,23 @@ async def _fire_one(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> None:
     await audit_service.persist(
         kind="host", action=sched.action, status="requested",
         host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name, entity_id=str(op.id),
-        details={"scheduled": True, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "snapshot": state},
+        details={"scheduled": True, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "snapshot": state, **_rollout_details(sched)},
     )
     try:
         result = await _ACTION_FN[sched.action](host)
         op.status = "submitted"
-        op.message = "Geplant übergeben. Abschluss und Erreichbarkeit prüfen; anschließend Wartung abschließen."
-        sched.status = "succeeded"
-        sched.result = {"response": result}
+        if sched.auto_verify:
+            # Not done yet: the poll loop waits for the job and checks the result (job_wait -> verify).
+            op.message = "Geplant übergeben. Abschluss wird automatisch geprüft."
+            sched.phase, sched.phase_since = "job_wait", _now()
+            _progress(sched, handover=False, job_started_at=_now().isoformat(), seen_down=False, seen_running=False,
+                      version_before=state.get("version"), boot_before=boot_before,
+                      reboot_expected=_reboot_expected(sched.action, state))
+            sched.result = {"response": result}
+        else:
+            op.message = "Geplant übergeben. Abschluss und Erreichbarkeit prüfen; anschließend Wartung abschließen."
+            sched.status = "succeeded"
+            sched.result = {"response": result}
     except client.OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
         op.status = "unknown"
         op.message = "Ausgang unklar: " + str(exc)[:800] + ". Nicht automatisch wiederholen."
@@ -166,7 +242,7 @@ async def _fire_one(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> None:
     await audit_service.persist(
         kind="host", action=sched.action, status=op.status,
         host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name, entity_id=str(op.id),
-        message=op.message, details={"scheduled": True, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "response": result},
+        message=op.message, details={"scheduled": True, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "response": result, **_rollout_details(sched)},
     )
 
 
@@ -182,21 +258,24 @@ async def _audit(host, sched, op, action, status, message=None, **details):
     await audit_service.persist(
         kind="host", action=action, status=status, host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name,
         entity_id=str(op.id) if op else None, message=message,
-        details={"scheduled": True, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "handover": True, **details},
+        details={"scheduled": True, "schedule_id": str(sched.id), "handover": bool((sched.progress or {}).get("handover")),
+                 **_rollout_details(sched), **details},
     )
 
 
 async def _end(db, sched, host, op, *, ok, message, op_status=None, **result):
+    handover = bool((sched.progress or {}).get("handover"))
     sched.status = "succeeded" if ok else "failed"
     sched.phase = None
-    sched.result = {"handover": True, **result} if ok else {"error": message[:900], **result}
+    sched.result = ({"handover": handover, "auto_verified": bool(sched.auto_verify), **result} if ok
+                    else {"error": message[:900], **result})
     if op is not None:
         op.status = op_status or ("acknowledged" if ok else "unknown")
         op.message = message[:1000]
     await db.commit()
     await _audit(host, sched, op, sched.action, "completed" if ok else (op_status or "unknown"), message)
     if not ok:
-        logger.warning("Geplante Wartung %s (CARP-Übergabe) beendet: %s", sched.id, message)
+        logger.warning("Geplante Wartung %s beendet: %s", sched.id, message)
 
 
 async def _toggle(host, expected: str) -> None:
@@ -230,6 +309,7 @@ async def _start_handover(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance, host: O
         await fail(" ".join(blocked))
         return
 
+    boot_before = await _boot_time(host) if sched.auto_verify else None
     now = _now()
     op = HostOperation(
         host_id=host.id, host_name=host.name, actor=sched.actor, action=sched.action,
@@ -237,6 +317,7 @@ async def _start_handover(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance, host: O
     )
     db.add(op)
     sched.status = "running"
+    _progress(sched, handover=True, boot_before=boot_before, reboot_expected=_reboot_expected(sched.action, state))
     await db.commit()
     sched.host_operation_id = op.id
     await _audit(host, sched, op, "carp_enter", "requested", snapshot=state)
@@ -255,32 +336,56 @@ async def _start_handover(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance, host: O
 
 
 async def advance_running(db: AsyncSession) -> int:
-    """One step for every handover run in progress. Returns how many are still running."""
-    rows = list((await db.scalars(
-        select(ScheduledMaintenance).where(ScheduledMaintenance.status == "running", ScheduledMaintenance.phase.is_not(None))
+    """One step for every run in progress (handover and/or auto_verify). Returns how many are still running."""
+    ids = list((await db.scalars(
+        select(ScheduledMaintenance.id).where(ScheduledMaintenance.status == "running", ScheduledMaintenance.phase.is_not(None))
     )).all())
-    for sched in rows:
-        host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, sched.host_id)
-        op = await db.get(HostOperation, sched.host_operation_id) if sched.host_operation_id else None
-        try:
-            if host is None:
-                raise RuntimeError("Host nicht mehr vorhanden")
-            if op is not None and op.status not in ACTIVE:
-                # A human closed or cancelled the operation: stop here and touch nothing more.
-                sched.status, sched.phase = "failed", None
-                sched.result = {"error": f"Vorgang von Hand beendet, Ablauf gestoppt. CARP-Rolle von {host.name} prüfen."}
-                await db.commit()
-                continue
-            await _STEPS[sched.phase](db, sched, host, op)
-        except Exception as exc:  # a stuck run must not loop forever or take the poll loop down
-            logger.exception("Geplante Wartung %s: Schritt %s fehlgeschlagen", sched.id, sched.phase)
-            if host is not None:
-                await _end(db, sched, host, op, ok=False,
-                           message=f"Unerwarteter Fehler während der CARP-Übergabe ({type(exc).__name__}). "
-                                   f"{host.name} kann im CARP-Wartungsmodus verblieben sein — Rollen prüfen.")
-    return sum(1 for s in rows if s.status == "running")
+    await db.commit()
+    still_running = 0
+    for sched_id in ids:
+        # Locked for the whole step: a second backend skips the row instead of toggling or submitting twice.
+        sched = await db.scalar(
+            select(ScheduledMaintenance)
+            .where(ScheduledMaintenance.id == sched_id, ScheduledMaintenance.status == "running",
+                   ScheduledMaintenance.phase.is_not(None))
+            .with_for_update(skip_locked=True)
+            .execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+        )
+        if sched is None:
+            await db.commit()
+            still_running += 1 if await db.scalar(select(ScheduledMaintenance.status).where(ScheduledMaintenance.id == sched_id)) == "running" else 0
+            await db.commit()
+            continue
+        with _as_actor(sched):
+            await _advance_one(db, sched)
+        await db.commit()
+        if sched.status == "running":
+            still_running += 1
+    return still_running
 
 
+async def _advance_one(db: AsyncSession, sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> None:
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, sched.host_id)
+    op = await db.get(HostOperation, sched.host_operation_id) if sched.host_operation_id else None
+    try:
+        if host is None:
+            raise RuntimeError("Host nicht mehr vorhanden")
+        if op is not None and op.status not in ACTIVE:
+            # A human closed or cancelled the operation: stop here and touch nothing more.
+            hint = f" CARP-Rolle von {host.name} prüfen." if (sched.progress or {}).get("handover") else ""
+            sched.status, sched.phase = "failed", None
+            sched.result = {"error": f"Vorgang von Hand beendet, Ablauf gestoppt.{hint}"}
+            await db.commit()
+            return
+        await _STEPS[sched.phase](db, sched, host, op)
+    except Exception as exc:  # a stuck run must not loop forever or take the poll loop down
+        logger.exception("Geplante Wartung %s: Schritt %s fehlgeschlagen", sched.id, sched.phase)
+        if host is not None:
+            hint = (f"{host.name} kann im CARP-Wartungsmodus verblieben sein — Rollen prüfen."
+                    if (sched.progress or {}).get("handover") else f"Zustand von {host.name} prüfen.")
+            await _end(db, sched, host, op, ok=False,
+                       message=f"Unerwarteter Fehler während der geplanten Wartung ({type(exc).__name__}). {hint}")
+
 def _since(sched: ScheduledMaintenance) -> timedelta:
     return _now() - (sched.phase_since or _now())
 
@@ -352,17 +457,75 @@ async def _step_job_wait(db, sched, host, op):
         else:
             done = bool(prog.get("seen_down") or prog.get("seen_running")) or elapsed >= JOB_GRACE
         if done:
-            sched.phase, sched.phase_since = "leave", _now()
+            sched.phase = "verify" if sched.auto_verify else "leave"
+            sched.phase_since = _now()
             await db.commit()
             return
     if elapsed >= JOB_TIMEOUT[sched.action]:
-        await _end(db, sched, host, op, ok=False,
-                   message=f"Auftrag „{sched.action}“ auf {host.name} nicht rechtzeitig abgeschlossen. {host.name} bleibt im "
-                           f"CARP-Wartungsmodus, der Partner trägt den Verkehr. Bitte prüfen und von Hand zurückschalten.")
+        if prog.get("handover"):
+            text = (f"Auftrag „{sched.action}“ auf {host.name} nicht rechtzeitig abgeschlossen. {host.name} bleibt im "
+                    f"CARP-Wartungsmodus, der Partner trägt den Verkehr. Bitte prüfen und von Hand zurückschalten.")
+        else:
+            text = f"Auftrag „{sched.action}“ auf {host.name} nicht rechtzeitig abgeschlossen. Bitte {host.name} prüfen."
+        await _end(db, sched, host, op, ok=False, message=text)
         return
     await db.commit()
 
 
+async def _step_verify(db, sched, host, op):
+    """auto_verify: is the job really over and the host healthy? Read-only, never repeats the action."""
+    prog = dict(sched.progress or {})
+    handover = bool(prog.get("handover"))
+
+    async def wait_or_give_up(why: str):
+        if _since(sched) >= VERIFY_TIMEOUT:
+            tail = (f" {host.name} bleibt im CARP-Wartungsmodus, der Partner trägt den Verkehr." if handover else "")
+            await _end(db, sched, host, op, ok=False,
+                       message=f"Automatische Prüfung nach „{sched.action}“ nicht bestanden: {why}.{tail} "
+                               f"Bitte {host.name} prüfen und die Wartung von Hand abschließen.")
+            return
+        _progress(sched, waiting_for=why)
+        await db.commit()
+
+    try:
+        running = (await client.get_firmware_running(host)).get("status")
+    except client.OpnsenseAPIError:
+        running = None
+        _progress(sched, seen_down=True)
+    if running != "ready":
+        _progress(sched, ready_since=None)
+        await wait_or_give_up("Firmware-Auftrag läuft noch oder Host nicht erreichbar")
+        return
+    if not prog.get("ready_since"):
+        _progress(sched, ready_since=_now().isoformat())
+        await db.commit()
+        return
+    if _now() - datetime.fromisoformat(prog["ready_since"]) < VERIFY_SETTLE:
+        await db.commit()
+        return
+    boot_now = await _boot_time(host)
+    rebooted = bool(prog.get("seen_down")) or bool(prog.get("boot_before") and boot_now and boot_now != prog["boot_before"])
+    if prog.get("reboot_expected") and not rebooted:
+        await wait_or_give_up("der erwartete Neustart wurde nicht beobachtet")
+        return
+    try:
+        version = (await client.get_firmware_info(host)).get("product_version")
+    except client.OpnsenseAPIError:
+        version = None
+    online = (await get_statuses([host])).get(host.id, {}).get("status") == "online"
+    if not version or not online:
+        await wait_or_give_up("Host nicht vollständig erreichbar (Version/Status nicht lesbar)")
+        return
+    _progress(sched, version_after=version, boot_after=boot_now, rebooted=rebooted, waiting_for=None)
+    if handover:
+        sched.phase, sched.phase_since = "leave", _now()  # only now take the traffic back
+        await db.commit()
+        return
+    await _end(db, sched, host, op, ok=True,
+               message=f"Automatisch geprüft: {host.name} erreichbar, Firmware-Auftrag beendet, Version {version}.",
+               version_before=prog.get("version_before"), version_after=version, rebooted=rebooted)
+
+
 async def _step_leave(db, sched, host, op):
     me, _partner = await _roles(db, host)
     if me.get("status") != "online":
@@ -397,6 +560,8 @@ async def _step_leave_wait(db, sched, host, op):
         except client.OpnsenseAPIError:
             pass
         extra["version_before"] = (sched.progress or {}).get("version_before")
+        if sched.auto_verify:
+            extra["rebooted"] = bool((sched.progress or {}).get("rebooted"))  # what verify saw before leaving
         text = "Automatisch abgeschlossen: Übergabe, Auftrag und Zurückschalten bestätigt."
         if extra.get("reboot_required"):
             text += " Ein Neustart ist noch erforderlich."
@@ -410,6 +575,7 @@ async def _step_leave_wait(db, sched, host, op):
 _STEPS = {
     "handover_wait": _step_handover_wait,
     "job_wait": _step_job_wait,
+    "verify": _step_verify,
     "leave": _step_leave,
     "leave_wait": _step_leave_wait,
 }

backend/app/services/tls_pin_service.py

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ from cryptography import x509
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes, serialization
 from cryptography.x509.oid import ExtensionOID, NameOID
 
-from app.services import overlay_service, proxy_connect
+from app.services import proxy_connect
 
 MAX_PEM_BYTES = 32 * 1024
 
@@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ def verify_argument(verify_tls: bool, tls_ca_pem: str | None):
 
 async def _open_tls(base_url: str, parsed, ctx: ssl.SSLContext, timeout: float):
     """TLS connection to the firewall: directly, or through the overlay hub's proxy for overlay addresses."""
+    # Imported here so that pinned_context() stays usable without the database layer (gui-gateway container).
+    from app.services import overlay_service
     proxy = overlay_service.proxy_for(base_url)
     port = parsed.port or 443
     if proxy is None:

backend/app/services/update_check_service.py

@@ -17,8 +17,10 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
 
 import httpx
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.models.update_check_settings import DEFAULT_FEED_URL, UpdateCheckSettings
 from app.version import APP_VERSION
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -38,6 +40,7 @@ class _State:
     latest: str | None = None
     release_url: str | None = None
     error: str | None = None
+    url: str | None = None
 
 
 _state = _State()
@@ -45,11 +48,41 @@ _lock = asyncio.Lock()
 
 
 def reset_cache() -> None:
-    """Nur für Tests."""
+    """Verwirft den gemerkten Stand (Tests, geänderter Feed)."""
     global _state
     _state = _State()
 
 
+_SINGLETON_ID = 1
+_URL = re.compile(r"^https?://[^\s<>\"']+$")
+
+
+def valid_feed_url(value: str) -> bool:
+    return bool(_URL.match(value)) and len(value) <= 500
+
+
+async def get_settings(db: AsyncSession) -> UpdateCheckSettings:
+    row = await db.get(UpdateCheckSettings, _SINGLETON_ID)
+    if row is None:
+        row = UpdateCheckSettings(id=_SINGLETON_ID, enabled=False, feed_url=DEFAULT_FEED_URL)
+        db.add(row)
+        await db.flush()
+    return row
+
+
+def managed_by_server() -> bool:
+    """UPDATE_CHECK_URL in the server's .env wins over the setting in the web UI."""
+    return bool(settings.update_check_url.strip())
+
+
+async def feed_url(db: AsyncSession) -> str:
+    """The feed to ask, or "" while the check is off."""
+    if managed_by_server():
+        return settings.update_check_url.strip()
+    row = await get_settings(db)
+    return row.feed_url.strip() if row.enabled else ""
+
+
 def _parse(tag: str) -> tuple[int, int, int] | None:
     match = _STABLE_TAG.match(tag.strip())
     return tuple(int(part) for part in match.groups()) if match else None  # type: ignore[return-value]
@@ -62,10 +95,10 @@ def _safe_url(value: object) -> str | None:
     return None
 
 
-async def _fetch() -> tuple[str, str | None]:
+async def _fetch(url: str) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, follow_redirects=True, max_redirects=3) as http:
         response = await http.get(
-            settings.update_check_url,
+            url,
             headers={"Accept": "application/json", "User-Agent": f"OPNexus/{APP_VERSION}"},
         )
     response.raise_for_status()
@@ -78,9 +111,10 @@ async def _fetch() -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     return tag, _safe_url(data.get("html_url"))
 
 
-async def check() -> dict:
+async def check(db: AsyncSession) -> dict:
     """Aktueller Stand für GET /api/system/version-check."""
-    enabled = bool(settings.update_check_url.strip())
+    url = await feed_url(db)
+    enabled = bool(url)
     current = _parse(APP_VERSION)
     result = {
         "enabled": enabled,
@@ -95,6 +129,9 @@ async def check() -> dict:
         return result
 
     async with _lock:
+        if _state.url != url:  # Feed geändert: alter Stand gehört nicht mehr dazu
+            reset_cache()
+            _state.url = url
         now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
         interval = timedelta(hours=max(1, settings.update_check_interval_hours))
         fresh = _state.checked_at is not None and now - _state.checked_at < interval
@@ -102,12 +139,12 @@ async def check() -> dict:
         if not fresh and not backing_off:
             _state.attempted_at = now
             try:
-                tag, url = await _fetch()
+                tag, release_url = await _fetch(url)
                 if _parse(tag) is None:
                     # z. B. eine Vorabversion — kein Fehler, nur kein Update.
                     _state.latest, _state.release_url = None, None
                 else:
-                    _state.latest, _state.release_url = tag.lstrip("v"), url
+                    _state.latest, _state.release_url = tag.lstrip("v"), release_url
                 _state.checked_at, _state.error = now, None
             except Exception as exc:  # Netz, HTTP, JSON, Format: alles nur "geht gerade nicht"
                 logger.warning("Update-Check fehlgeschlagen: %s", exc.__class__.__name__)

backend/app/services/url_guard.py

@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+"""Destination check for URLs OPNexus is told to call (notification channels, webhook).
+
+Admins legitimately point these at servers on their own network (a self-hosted ntfy, Gotify or
+Matrix), so private ranges are allowed. What is refused is what cannot be a notification target:
+anything but http(s), credentials inside the URL, and addresses that only ever mean "this machine"
+or "the cloud metadata service" (loopback, link-local such as 169.254.169.254, unspecified,
+multicast). Redirects are never followed by the callers, so a public host cannot bounce a request
+to such an address. The hostname is resolved at send time and every address is checked (a name that
+does not resolve is let through; the request then fails on its own).
+
+DNS rebinding (1.29): a check followed by a second, independent resolution inside the HTTP client could be
+answered differently ("first public, then 127.0.0.1"). ``guarded_client`` closes that window: its transport
+resolves the name itself when it opens the connection, refuses the connection if ANY answer is forbidden and
+connects to exactly the address it checked. Host header, SNI and certificate verification keep using the name.
+The up-front ``ensure_resolved_safe`` stays as the early, friendly error.
+
+How: httpcore (the layer under httpx) accepts a pluggable network backend. httpx does not expose it, so
+``GuardedTransport`` replaces the backend of the pool its parent class built (``_pool._network_backend``, httpx
+0.28 / httpcore 1.0). If those internals change, constructing the transport raises instead of silently
+unguarding; tests/test_url_guard.py opens a real socket against it, so an upgrade that breaks the hook fails the
+suite. The smaller alternative (rewriting the request URL to the checked IP with an ``sni_hostname`` extension)
+was rejected: it changes the URL every caller, log line and mock sees.
+"""
+import asyncio
+import contextlib
+import contextvars
+import ipaddress
+import logging
+import socket
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+import httpcore
+import httpx
+
+# httpx logs every request line ("HTTP Request: POST https://api.telegram.org/bot<token>/sendMessage"). For
+# targets whose URL is the credential that line must not reach the logs: callers wrap the request in muted().
+_muted = contextvars.ContextVar("url_guard_muted", default=False)
+
+
+class _MuteFilter(logging.Filter):
+    def filter(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> bool:
+        return not _muted.get()
+
+
+for _name in ("httpx", "httpcore"):
+    logging.getLogger(_name).addFilter(_MuteFilter())
+
+
+@contextlib.contextmanager
+def muted():
+    token = _muted.set(True)
+    try:
+        yield
+    finally:
+        _muted.reset(token)
+
+
+# Cloud metadata services outside the link-local range (AWS IPv6 IMDS, Alibaba Cloud).
+_METADATA_ADDRESSES = {ipaddress.ip_address("fd00:ec2::254"), ipaddress.ip_address("100.100.100.200")}
+
+
+def _forbidden(ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
+    if isinstance(ip, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and ip.ipv4_mapped is not None:
+        ip = ip.ipv4_mapped
+    return ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_unspecified or ip.is_multicast or ip in _METADATA_ADDRESSES
+
+
+def validate_url(url: str, *, max_length: int = 500) -> str:
+    """Returns the cleaned URL or raises ValueError with a short reason (shown to the admin)."""
+    value = (url or "").strip()
+    if not value or len(value) > max_length or any(c.isspace() for c in value):
+        raise ValueError("Die Adresse ist leer, zu lang oder enthält Leerzeichen")
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(value)
+        host = parts.hostname
+        parts.port  # noqa: B018 - raises ValueError for an invalid port
+    except ValueError:
+        raise ValueError("Die Adresse ist ungültig") from None
+    if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not host:
+        raise ValueError("Die Adresse muss mit http:// oder https:// beginnen")
+    if parts.username or parts.password:
+        raise ValueError("Zugangsdaten gehören nicht in die Adresse")
+    try:
+        literal = ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+    except ValueError:
+        literal = None
+    if literal is not None and _forbidden(literal):
+        raise ValueError("Diese Adresse (lokal, Link-Local oder Metadaten-Dienst) ist als Ziel nicht erlaubt")
+    if literal is None and host.lower() in ("localhost", "localhost.localdomain"):
+        raise ValueError("Diese Adresse (lokal, Link-Local oder Metadaten-Dienst) ist als Ziel nicht erlaubt")
+    return value
+
+
+async def resolve_host(host: str, port: int | None = None) -> list[str]:
+    """Every address the name currently resolves to (a literal answers itself). Raises OSError."""
+    host = host.strip("[]").split("%")[0]
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        return [host]
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    infos = await asyncio.get_running_loop().getaddrinfo(host, port, type=socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    seen: list[str] = []
+    for info in infos:
+        address = info[4][0].split("%")[0]
+        if address not in seen:
+            seen.append(address)
+    return seen
+
+
+def _any_forbidden(addresses: list[str]) -> bool:
+    for address in addresses:
+        try:
+            if _forbidden(ipaddress.ip_address(address)):
+                return True
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
+async def ensure_resolved_safe(url: str) -> None:
+    """Send-time check against DNS answers pointing at forbidden addresses. Raises ValueError."""
+    host = urlsplit(url).hostname
+    if not host:
+        raise ValueError("Die Adresse ist ungültig")
+    try:
+        ipaddress.ip_address(host)
+        return  # a literal was already checked by validate_url
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    try:
+        addresses = await resolve_host(host)
+    except OSError:
+        return
+    if _any_forbidden(addresses):
+        raise ValueError("Der Name zeigt auf eine nicht erlaubte Adresse (lokal, Link-Local oder Metadaten-Dienst)")
+
+
+# ── connection-time guard (DNS rebinding) ─────────────────────────────────
+
+BLOCKED_MESSAGE = "Zieladresse nicht erlaubt"
+
+
+class BlockedAddress(httpcore.ConnectError):
+    """The name resolved to a forbidden address when the connection was opened (httpx reports ConnectError)."""
+
+
+class _GuardedBackend(httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
+    def __init__(self, inner: httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
+        self._inner = inner
+
+    async def connect_tcp(self, host, port, timeout=None, local_address=None, socket_options=None):
+        try:
+            addresses = await asyncio.wait_for(resolve_host(host, port), timeout)
+        except asyncio.TimeoutError:
+            raise httpcore.ConnectTimeout("name resolution timed out") from None
+        except OSError as exc:
+            raise httpcore.ConnectError(f"name resolution failed ({type(exc).__name__})") from None
+        if not addresses or _any_forbidden(addresses):
+            raise BlockedAddress(BLOCKED_MESSAGE)
+        last: Exception | None = None
+        for address in addresses:  # the checked addresses only, in resolver order
+            try:
+                return await self._inner.connect_tcp(address, port, timeout=timeout, local_address=local_address,
+                                                     socket_options=socket_options)
+            except (httpcore.ConnectError, httpcore.ConnectTimeout) as exc:
+                last = exc
+        raise last  # type: ignore[misc]
+
+    async def connect_unix_socket(self, path, timeout=None, socket_options=None):
+        raise httpcore.ConnectError("unix sockets are not allowed")
+
+    async def sleep(self, seconds):
+        await self._inner.sleep(seconds)
+
+
+class GuardedTransport(httpx.AsyncHTTPTransport):
+    def __init__(self, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(**kwargs)
+        pool = getattr(self, "_pool", None)
+        backend = getattr(pool, "_network_backend", None)
+        if not isinstance(backend, httpcore.AsyncNetworkBackend):
+            raise RuntimeError("httpx/httpcore internals changed: the connection guard cannot be installed")
+        pool._network_backend = _GuardedBackend(backend)
+
+
+def guarded_client(**kwargs) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
+    """An httpx client whose connections only ever go to addresses that passed the check. Environment proxies are
+    ignored (a proxy would resolve the name itself, where the check cannot see it)."""
+    return httpx.AsyncClient(transport=GuardedTransport(), trust_env=False, **kwargs)
+
+
+def failure_reason(exc: httpx.HTTPError) -> str:
+    """Short, URL-free reason for a failed request (the URL often is the credential)."""
+    if isinstance(exc, httpx.HTTPStatusError):
+        return f"HTTP {exc.response.status_code}"
+    if isinstance(exc.__cause__, BlockedAddress):
+        return BLOCKED_MESSAGE
+    return type(exc).__name__

backend/app/services/window_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+"""Occurrences of recurring maintenance windows.
+
+Rules (deliberately simple and written down, because a firmware rollout depends on them):
+
+* A window is a wall-clock start time in its own IANA time zone plus a duration. "Sunday 02:00
+  Europe/Berlin" stays 02:00 local time in summer and in winter.
+* Daylight saving: a local start time that does not exist on that day (spring forward, e.g. 02:30 on
+  the last Sunday of March in Europe/Berlin) moves FORWARD by the gap (03:30). A local time that
+  exists twice (fall back) means the FIRST of the two (fold=0, still summer time). Both follow from
+  Python's zoneinfo with fold=0 and are covered by tests.
+* The duration is real elapsed time (a 3 h window over the fall-back night still lasts 3 h).
+* Exceptions are keyed by the occurrence's local date: "skip" drops it, "move" replaces its start
+  with an absolute instant (same duration and cut-off).
+* New host actions may only START within the first ``start_cutoff_minutes`` of an occurrence
+  (``startable``); actions already running finish even after the window has closed.
+"""
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from datetime import date, datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from zoneinfo import ZoneInfo, ZoneInfoNotFoundError, available_timezones
+
+from app.models.maintenance_window import MaintenanceWindow
+
+# How far ahead occurrences are searched. A monthly "5th ..." does not exist; the longest real gap
+# between two occurrences is a month, so two years is plenty and bounds the work per call.
+_SEARCH_DAYS = 2 * 366
+MAX_DURATION_MINUTES = 24 * 60
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class Occurrence:
+    local_date: date
+    start: datetime  # UTC
+    end: datetime  # UTC
+    cutoff: datetime  # UTC: no new host action after this instant
+    moved: bool = False
+    skipped: bool = False
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict:
+        return {"local_date": self.local_date.isoformat(), "start": self.start.isoformat(), "end": self.end.isoformat(),
+                "cutoff": self.cutoff.isoformat(), "moved": self.moved, "skipped": self.skipped}
+
+
+def valid_timezone(name: str) -> bool:
+    if not name or name not in available_timezones():
+        return False
+    try:
+        ZoneInfo(name)
+    except (ZoneInfoNotFoundError, ValueError):
+        return False
+    return True
+
+
+def _matches(window: MaintenanceWindow, day: date) -> bool:
+    if window.recurrence == "weekly":
+        return day.weekday() in (window.weekdays or [])
+    if window.recurrence == "monthly":
+        if window.month_mode == "day":
+            return day.day == window.month_day
+        if window.month_mode == "nth_weekday":
+            if day.weekday() != window.month_weekday:
+                return False
+            if window.month_nth == -1:
+                return (day + timedelta(days=7)).month != day.month
+            return (day.day - 1) // 7 + 1 == window.month_nth
+    return False
+
+
+def local_start(window: MaintenanceWindow, day: date) -> datetime:
+    """The UTC instant of the window's start on local date ``day`` (DST rules see module docstring)."""
+    tz = ZoneInfo(window.timezone)
+    wall = datetime.combine(day, window.start_time, tzinfo=tz).replace(fold=0)
+    return wall.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _occurrence(window: MaintenanceWindow, day: date, start: datetime, *, moved: bool = False, skipped: bool = False) -> Occurrence:
+    duration = timedelta(minutes=window.duration_minutes)
+    cutoff = timedelta(minutes=min(window.start_cutoff_minutes, window.duration_minutes))
+    return Occurrence(local_date=day, start=start, end=start + duration, cutoff=start + cutoff, moved=moved, skipped=skipped)
+
+
+def occurrences(window: MaintenanceWindow, after: datetime, n: int = 10, *, with_skipped: bool = False) -> list[Occurrence]:
+    """The next ``n`` occurrences whose END lies after ``after`` (so one that is open right now is first).
+    ``with_skipped`` lists skipped ones too (flagged, for the UI); the engine never sees them."""
+    if n <= 0:
+        return []
+    after = after.astimezone(timezone.utc)
+    tz = ZoneInfo(window.timezone)
+    exceptions = {e.occurrence_date: e for e in (window.exceptions or [])}
+    duration = timedelta(minutes=window.duration_minutes)
+    # Start one day early: an occurrence that began yesterday (local) may still be open.
+    day = (after - duration).astimezone(tz).date() - timedelta(days=1)
+    found: list[Occurrence] = []
+    # Moved occurrences can land anywhere, so they are collected separately and merged at the end.
+    for exc in exceptions.values():
+        if exc.kind == "move" and exc.moved_start is not None and _matches(window, exc.occurrence_date):
+            occ = _occurrence(window, exc.occurrence_date, exc.moved_start.astimezone(timezone.utc), moved=True)
+            if occ.end > after:
+                found.append(occ)
+    regular = 0
+    for _ in range(_SEARCH_DAYS):
+        if regular >= n:
+            break
+        if _matches(window, day):
+            exc = exceptions.get(day)
+            if exc is None or (with_skipped and exc.kind == "skip"):
+                occ = _occurrence(window, day, local_start(window, day), skipped=exc is not None)
+                if occ.end > after:
+                    found.append(occ)
+                    regular += 1
+        day += timedelta(days=1)
+    found.sort(key=lambda o: o.start)
+    return found[:n]
+
+
+def current(window: MaintenanceWindow, now: datetime) -> Occurrence | None:
+    """The occurrence open at ``now`` (start <= now < end), if any.
+
+    Occurrences can overlap (a moved one reaching into the next regular one, a 24 h window on a 25 h day). Then the
+    one that started LAST counts: its start cut-off lies latest, so "may a new host action start now" is not
+    decided by an older occurrence whose cut-off has long passed (1.29; before, the earliest one was taken)."""
+    if not window.enabled:
+        return None
+    open_now = [occ for occ in occurrences(window, now, 5) if occ.start <= now < occ.end]
+    return max(open_now, key=lambda occ: occ.start) if open_now else None
+
+
+def startable(window: MaintenanceWindow | None, now: datetime) -> Occurrence | None:
+    """The occurrence in which a NEW host action may start right now (start <= now < cutoff)."""
+    if window is None or not window.enabled:
+        return None
+    occ = current(window, now)
+    if occ is not None and occ.start <= now < occ.cutoff:
+        return occ
+    return None
+
+
+def is_occurrence_date(window: MaintenanceWindow, day: date) -> bool:
+    return _matches(window, day)
+
+
+def definition(window: MaintenanceWindow) -> dict:
+    """What a rollout plan's fingerprint covers: changing any of this re-requires activation. Skipped and moved
+    occurrences count too (1.29; keyed by the occurrence's local date, the reason text and the actor do not matter).
+    Without any exception the result is the same as before 1.29, so existing activations stay valid."""
+    result = {
+        "id": str(window.id), "timezone": window.timezone, "recurrence": window.recurrence,
+        "weekdays": sorted(window.weekdays or []), "month_mode": window.month_mode, "month_nth": window.month_nth,
+        "month_weekday": window.month_weekday, "month_day": window.month_day,
+        "start_time": window.start_time.strftime("%H:%M"), "duration_minutes": window.duration_minutes,
+        "start_cutoff_minutes": window.start_cutoff_minutes, "enabled": window.enabled,
+    }
+    if window.exceptions:
+        result["exceptions"] = sorted(
+            [e.occurrence_date.isoformat(), e.kind, e.moved_start.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat() if e.moved_start else None]
+            for e in window.exceptions)
+    return result

backend/app/version.py

@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ convention — but both are bumped together whenever a release ships).
 Versioning scheme: see CHANGELOG.md ("Versionierung").
 """
 
-APP_VERSION = "1.23.5"
-APP_CODENAME = "Harrier"
+APP_VERSION = "1.30.0"
+APP_CODENAME = "Owl"

backend/migrations/versions/0019_update_check_settings.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+"""Versionsprüfung im Webinterface einstellbar.
+
+Revision ID: 0019
+Revises: 0018
+Create Date: 2026-10-20
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0019"
+down_revision = "0018"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+_DEFAULT_FEED_URL = "https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json"
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    if sa.inspect(op.get_bind()).has_table("update_check_settings"):
+        return
+    op.create_table(
+        "update_check_settings",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("enabled", sa.Boolean(), server_default="false", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("feed_url", sa.String(length=500), server_default=_DEFAULT_FEED_URL, nullable=False),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS update_check_settings")

backend/migrations/versions/0020_monitoring_alerts_channels.py

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+"""Alarme für Gateways, Ressourcen und Dienste; zusätzliche Benachrichtigungskanäle.
+
+Revision ID: 0020
+Revises: 0019
+Create Date: 2026-10-21
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision = "0020"
+down_revision = "0019"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+_COLUMNS = [
+    ("gateway_down_enabled", "boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true"),
+    ("resource_threshold_enabled", "boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false"),
+    ("service_down_enabled", "boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false"),
+    ("gateway_loss_threshold_pct", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 20"),
+    ("gateway_delay_threshold_ms", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 500"),
+    ("disk_threshold_pct", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 90"),
+    ("memory_threshold_pct", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 95"),
+    ("swap_threshold_pct", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 50"),
+    ("load_per_cpu_threshold", "double precision NOT NULL DEFAULT 2.0"),
+    ("alert_confirm_samples", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 3"),
+    ("resource_confirm_samples", "integer NOT NULL DEFAULT 5"),
+    ("service_watchlist", "json"),
+]
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    for name, ddl in _COLUMNS:
+        op.execute(f"ALTER TABLE notification_settings ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS {name} {ddl}")
+    if sa.inspect(op.get_bind()).has_table("notification_channels"):
+        return
+    op.create_table(
+        "notification_channels",
+        sa.Column("id", postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("name", sa.String(length=100), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("channel_type", sa.String(length=16), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("enabled", sa.Boolean(), server_default="true", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("config", sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("secret_set", sa.Boolean(), server_default="false", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("updated_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("name"),
+    )
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS notification_channels")
+    for name, _ddl in reversed(_COLUMNS):
+        op.execute(f"ALTER TABLE notification_settings DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS {name}")

backend/migrations/versions/0021_maintenance_windows.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"""Wiederkehrende Wartungsfenster mit Ausnahmen (1.25).
+
+Revision ID: 0021
+Revises: 0020
+Create Date: 2026-10-21
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision = "0021"
+down_revision = "0020"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # A pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first (app/migrate.py), which already made the tables.
+    if sa.inspect(op.get_bind()).has_table("maintenance_windows"):
+        return
+    op.create_table(
+        "maintenance_windows",
+        sa.Column("id", postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("name", sa.String(length=120), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("timezone", sa.String(length=64), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("recurrence", sa.String(length=16), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("weekdays", sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("month_mode", sa.String(length=16), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("month_nth", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("month_weekday", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("month_day", sa.Integer(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("start_time", sa.Time(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("duration_minutes", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("start_cutoff_minutes", sa.Integer(), server_default="60", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("enabled", sa.Boolean(), server_default="true", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("created_by", sa.String(length=150), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("name"),
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "maintenance_window_exceptions",
+        sa.Column("id", postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("window_id", postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("occurrence_date", sa.Date(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("kind", sa.String(length=8), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("moved_start", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("reason", sa.String(length=300), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("actor", sa.String(length=150), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("created_at", sa.DateTime(timezone=True), nullable=False),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["window_id"], ["maintenance_windows.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("window_id", "occurrence_date", name="uq_window_exception_date"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_maintenance_window_exceptions_window_id", "maintenance_window_exceptions", ["window_id"])
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS maintenance_window_exceptions")
+    op.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS maintenance_windows")

backend/migrations/versions/0022_scheduled_auto_verify.py

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+"""Geplante Wartung: automatische Prüfung nach dem Auftrag (auto_verify) und Herkunft (manuell/Rollout).
+
+Revision ID: 0022
+Revises: 0021
+Create Date: 2026-10-21
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0022"
+down_revision = "0021"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE scheduled_maintenance ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS auto_verify boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false")
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE scheduled_maintenance ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS origin varchar(16) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'manual'")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE scheduled_maintenance DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS origin")
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE scheduled_maintenance DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS auto_verify")

backend/migrations/versions/0023_rollouts.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""Firmware-Rollouts in Wellen: Pläne, Läufe, Hosts je Lauf; Benachrichtigung bei Rollout-Problemen (1.25).
+
+Revision ID: 0023
+Revises: 0022
+Create Date: 2026-10-21
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision = "0023"
+down_revision = "0022"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+UUID = postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True)
+TS = sa.DateTime(timezone=True)
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE notification_settings ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS rollout_problems_enabled boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true")
+    # A pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first (app/migrate.py), which already made the tables.
+    if sa.inspect(op.get_bind()).has_table("rollout_plans"):
+        return
+    op.create_table(
+        "rollout_plans",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("name", sa.String(120), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("description", sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("action", sa.String(16), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("window_id", UUID, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("auto_start", sa.Boolean(), server_default="false", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("gate_checks", sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("compliance_mode", sa.String(8), server_default="warn", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("activated_by", sa.String(150), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("activated_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("activated_fingerprint", sa.String(64), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("auto_start_error", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("created_by", sa.String(150), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("created_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("updated_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["window_id"], ["maintenance_windows.id"], ondelete="SET NULL"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("name"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_plans_window_id", "rollout_plans", ["window_id"])
+    op.create_table(
+        "rollout_plan_waves",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("plan_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("position", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("label", sa.String(60), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("soak_minutes", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("carp_handover", sa.Boolean(), server_default="false", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("require_approval", sa.Boolean(), server_default="false", nullable=False),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["plan_id"], ["rollout_plans.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_plan_waves_plan_id", "rollout_plan_waves", ["plan_id"])
+    op.create_table(
+        "rollout_wave_groups",
+        sa.Column("wave_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("group_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["wave_id"], ["rollout_plan_waves.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["group_id"], ["device_groups.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("wave_id", "group_id"),
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "rollout_runs",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("plan_id", UUID, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("plan_name", sa.String(120), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("plan_snapshot", sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("action", sa.String(16), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("status", sa.String(20), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("paused_from", sa.String(20), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("current_wave", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("target_version", sa.String(40), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("pause_reason", sa.String(40), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("pause_detail", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("started_by", sa.String(150), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("trigger", sa.String(8), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("window_occurrence", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("revision", sa.Integer(), server_default="0", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("progress", sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("step_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("created_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("finished_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["plan_id"], ["rollout_plans.id"], ondelete="SET NULL"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("plan_id", "window_occurrence", name="uq_rollout_run_occurrence"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_runs_plan_id", "rollout_runs", ["plan_id"])
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_runs_status", "rollout_runs", ["status"])
+    op.create_table(
+        "rollout_run_waves",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("run_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("index", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("label", sa.String(60), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("status", sa.String(20), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("baseline", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("gate_result", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("soak_until", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("gate_attempts", sa.Integer(), server_default="0", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("approved_by", sa.String(150), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("started_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("finished_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["run_id"], ["rollout_runs.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_run_waves_run_id", "rollout_run_waves", ["run_id"])
+    op.create_table(
+        "rollout_run_hosts",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("run_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("wave_index", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("host_id", UUID, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("host_name", sa.String(120), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("cluster_name", sa.String(120), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("order", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("status", sa.String(16), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("scheduled_maintenance_id", UUID, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("version_before", sa.String(40), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("version_after", sa.String(40), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("detail", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("started_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("finished_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["run_id"], ["rollout_runs.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["host_id"], ["opnsense_hosts.id"], ondelete="SET NULL"),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["scheduled_maintenance_id"], ["scheduled_maintenance.id"], ondelete="SET NULL"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("run_id", "host_id", name="uq_rollout_run_host"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_run_hosts_run_id", "rollout_run_hosts", ["run_id"])
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_run_hosts_host_id", "rollout_run_hosts", ["host_id"])
+    op.create_index("ix_rollout_run_hosts_scheduled_maintenance_id", "rollout_run_hosts", ["scheduled_maintenance_id"])
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    for table in ("rollout_run_hosts", "rollout_run_waves", "rollout_runs", "rollout_wave_groups", "rollout_plan_waves", "rollout_plans"):
+        op.execute(f"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS {table}")
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE notification_settings DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS rollout_problems_enabled")

backend/migrations/versions/0024_gui_access.py

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""GUI-Zugriff über das gui-gateway (1.27): Einstellungen, Einmal-Tickets, Gateway-Sitzungen.
+
+Revision ID: 0024
+Revises: 0023
+Create Date: 2026-10-21
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision = "0024"
+down_revision = "0023"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+UUID = postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True)
+TS = sa.DateTime(timezone=True)
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # A pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first (app/migrate.py), which already made the tables.
+    if sa.inspect(op.get_bind()).has_table("gui_access_settings"):
+        return
+    op.create_table(
+        "gui_access_settings",
+        sa.Column("id", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("enabled", sa.Boolean(), server_default="false", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("idle_timeout_minutes", sa.Integer(), server_default="15", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("absolute_timeout_minutes", sa.Integer(), server_default="60", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("slot_count", sa.Integer(), server_default="4", nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("updated_by", sa.String(150), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("updated_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+    )
+    op.create_table(
+        "gui_tickets",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("ticket_hash", sa.String(64), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("session_hash", sa.String(64), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("user_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("host_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("slot", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("created_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("expires_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("redeemed_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["user_id"], ["admin_users.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["host_id"], ["opnsense_hosts.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+        sa.UniqueConstraint("ticket_hash"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_gui_tickets_session_hash", "gui_tickets", ["session_hash"])
+    op.create_index("ix_gui_tickets_user_id", "gui_tickets", ["user_id"])
+    op.create_index("ix_gui_tickets_host_id", "gui_tickets", ["host_id"])
+    op.create_table(
+        "gui_sessions",
+        sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("session_hash", sa.String(64), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("user_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("host_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("slot", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("client_ip", sa.String(45), nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("started_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("last_checked_at", TS, nullable=False),
+        sa.Column("ended_at", TS, nullable=True),
+        sa.Column("end_reason", sa.String(32), nullable=True),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["user_id"], ["admin_users.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["host_id"], ["opnsense_hosts.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+        sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+    )
+    op.create_index("ix_gui_sessions_session_hash", "gui_sessions", ["session_hash"])
+    op.create_index("ix_gui_sessions_user_id", "gui_sessions", ["user_id"])
+    op.create_index("ix_gui_sessions_host_id", "gui_sessions", ["host_id"])
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_table("gui_sessions")
+    op.drop_table("gui_tickets")
+    op.drop_table("gui_access_settings")

backend/migrations/versions/0025_api_rights_gateway_mute.py

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+"""Alarm bei fehlenden API-Rechten und pro Gateway abschaltbarer Gateway-Alarm.
+
+Revision ID: 0025
+Revises: 0024
+Create Date: 2026-10-21
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0025"
+down_revision = "0024"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+_COLUMNS = [
+    ("api_rights_enabled", "boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true"),
+    ("gateway_alert_muted", "json NOT NULL DEFAULT '[]'::json"),
+]
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # IF NOT EXISTS: a pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first, which may already have the columns.
+    for name, ddl in _COLUMNS:
+        op.execute(f"ALTER TABLE notification_settings ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS {name} {ddl}")
+    # The list default only fills existing rows; the model supplies it for new ones (and Alembic's schema
+    # comparison cannot compare a JSON server default).
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE notification_settings ALTER COLUMN gateway_alert_muted DROP DEFAULT")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    for name, _ddl in reversed(_COLUMNS):
+        op.execute(f"ALTER TABLE notification_settings DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS {name}")

backend/migrations/versions/0026_rollout_actor_ids.py

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+"""Rollouts: die verantwortliche Person zusätzlich als stabile Benutzer-ID (1.29).
+
+Bisher stand nur der Benutzername im Plan (``activated_by``) und im Lauf (``started_by``). Wird ein Konto gelöscht
+und ein neues mit gleichem Namen angelegt, hätte der automatische Start unter der Rechten der neuen Person
+weitergelaufen. Die ID ändert sich nie. Vorhandene Zeilen werden über den Benutzernamen zugeordnet (soweit das Konto
+noch existiert); ohne Treffer bleibt die ID leer und der Name gilt wie bisher.
+
+Revision ID: 0026
+Revises: 0025
+Create Date: 2026-10-22
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0026"
+down_revision = "0025"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # IF NOT EXISTS: a pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first, which may already have the columns.
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE rollout_plans ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS activated_by_id uuid")
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE rollout_runs ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS started_by_id uuid")
+    # No foreign key on purpose: a deleted account must stay recognisably gone (SET NULL would fall back to the name).
+    op.execute("UPDATE rollout_plans p SET activated_by_id = u.id FROM admin_users u "
+               "WHERE p.activated_by_id IS NULL AND p.activated_by IS NOT NULL AND u.username = p.activated_by")
+    op.execute("UPDATE rollout_runs r SET started_by_id = u.id FROM admin_users u "
+               "WHERE r.started_by_id IS NULL AND u.username = r.started_by")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE rollout_runs DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS started_by_id")
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE rollout_plans DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS activated_by_id")

backend/migrations/versions/0027_rule_history.py

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+"""Änderungsverlauf der Regeln auf den Firewalls (1.30): letzter beobachteter Stand und Änderungsereignisse.
+
+Revision ID: 0027
+Revises: 0026
+Create Date: 2026-10-22
+"""
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+from sqlalchemy.dialects import postgresql
+
+revision = "0027"
+down_revision = "0026"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+UUID = postgresql.UUID(as_uuid=True)
+TS = sa.DateTime(timezone=True)
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # A pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first (app/migrate.py), which already made the tables.
+    inspector = sa.inspect(op.get_bind())
+    if not inspector.has_table("live_rule_states"):
+        op.create_table(
+            "live_rule_states",
+            sa.Column("host_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("rule_uuid", sa.String(64), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("fingerprint", sa.String(64), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("row", sa.JSON(), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("present", sa.Boolean(), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("version", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("first_seen_at", TS, nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("changed_at", TS, nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("last_seen_at", TS, nullable=False),
+            sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["host_id"], ["opnsense_hosts.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("host_id", "rule_uuid"),
+        )
+    if not inspector.has_table("rule_change_events"):
+        op.create_table(
+            "rule_change_events",
+            sa.Column("id", UUID, nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("host_id", UUID, nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("rule_uuid", sa.String(64), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("seq", sa.Integer(), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("observed_at", TS, nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("kind", sa.String(16), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("before", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+            sa.Column("after", sa.JSON(), nullable=True),
+            sa.Column("origin", sa.String(16), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column("actor", sa.String(150), nullable=True),
+            sa.Column("audit_id", UUID, nullable=True),
+            sa.ForeignKeyConstraint(["host_id"], ["opnsense_hosts.id"], ondelete="CASCADE"),
+            sa.PrimaryKeyConstraint("id"),
+            sa.UniqueConstraint("host_id", "rule_uuid", "seq", name="uq_rule_change_event"),
+        )
+        op.create_index("ix_rule_change_events_observed_at", "rule_change_events", ["observed_at"])
+        op.create_index("ix_rule_change_events_rule", "rule_change_events", ["host_id", "rule_uuid", "observed_at"])
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS rule_change_events")
+    op.execute("DROP TABLE IF EXISTS live_rule_states")

backend/migrations/versions/0028_rule_event_window.py

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+"""Änderungsverlauf: Fensteranfang je Ereignis für die Herkunftsbestimmung (1.30).
+
+Revision ID: 0028
+Revises: 0027
+Create Date: 2026-10-22
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0028"
+down_revision = "0027"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    # IF NOT EXISTS: a pre-Alembic install is bridged with create_all() first, which may already have the column.
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE rule_change_events ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS window_start timestamptz")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE rule_change_events DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS window_start")

backend/requirements.txt

@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ respx==0.23.1
 cryptography==50.0.2
 alembic==1.20.0
 PyJWT==2.10.1
+tzdata==2025.2

backend/tests/fixtures/rule_stats_live.json

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+{
+ "_comment": "Anonymized from live OPNsense 26.7 test firewalls (2026-10-22): firewall/filter_util/ruleStats (3 automatic labels, 3 MVC rules, 1 unmigrated legacy rule with a 32-hex label; counters as read) and the matching searchRule row of the legacy rule. No addresses involved.",
+ "ruleStats": {
+  "status": "ok",
+  "stats": {
+   "02f4bab031b57d1e30553ce08e0ec131": {
+    "pf_rules": 2,
+    "evaluations": 17734,
+    "packets": 250,
+    "bytes": 28670,
+    "states": 0
+   },
+   "7355b5da99f40893221b6c4140de1006": {
+    "pf_rules": 6,
+    "evaluations": 860,
+    "packets": 0,
+    "bytes": 0,
+    "states": 0
+   },
+   "80f90f0d4c5aba0c28d1c539e1e35766": {
+    "pf_rules": 12,
+    "evaluations": 1219,
+    "packets": 0,
+    "bytes": 0,
+    "states": 0
+   },
+   "fccf1b9d-2461-43d6-938f-2c3c39b3ddee": {
+    "pf_rules": 1,
+    "evaluations": 171,
+    "packets": 458,
+    "bytes": 35302,
+    "states": 0
+   },
+   "920a850f-68c3-42f6-a5a4-5d06984e417b": {
+    "pf_rules": 2,
+    "evaluations": 8,
+    "packets": 4,
+    "bytes": 756,
+    "states": 0
+   },
+   "2ec1c6db-61e1-4476-b3f6-0599a28990a2": {
+    "pf_rules": 1,
+    "evaluations": 9625,
+    "packets": 234816,
+    "bytes": 99582131,
+    "states": 40
+   },
+   "db610dbc7c6467261cf08e8a72ade096": {
+    "pf_rules": 1,
+    "evaluations": 4712,
+    "packets": 110719,
+    "bytes": 55995167,
+    "states": 24
+   }
+  }
+ },
+ "legacy_row": {
+  "@attributes": {
+   "uuid": "a00d53d2-8107-4d87-a71d-53ac85c1e9da"
+  },
+  "interface": "WAN",
+  "ipprotocol": "inet",
+  "statetype": "keep state",
+  "direction": "in",
+  "quick": "1",
+  "updated": {
+   "username": "[email protected]",
+   "time": "1791536720.85",
+   "description": "/firewall_rules_edit.php made changes"
+  },
+  "created": {
+   "username": "[email protected]",
+   "time": "1791536720.85",
+   "description": "/firewall_rules_edit.php made changes"
+  },
+  "seq": 0,
+  "#priority": 400000,
+  "enabled": "1",
+  "action": "pass",
+  "replyto": "",
+  "description": "ALLOW ANY",
+  "source_net": "any",
+  "source_port": "",
+  "destination_net": "any",
+  "destination_port": "",
+  "ref": "ui/firewall/migration",
+  "uuid": "db610dbc7c6467261cf08e8a72ade096",
+  "source_not": "0",
+  "destination_not": "0",
+  "%direction": "In",
+  "%action": "Pass",
+  "%ipprotocol": "IPv4",
+  "protocol": "",
+  "%protocol": "",
+  "sort_order": "400000.1000023",
+  "legacy": true,
+  "is_automatic": false,
+  "category_colors": [],
+  "alias_meta_source_net": [
+   {
+    "value": "any",
+    "%value": "any",
+    "isAlias": false,
+    "description": ""
+   }
+  ],
+  "alias_meta_destination_net": [
+   {
+    "value": "any",
+    "%value": "any",
+    "isAlias": false,
+    "description": ""
+   }
+  ]
+ }
+}

backend/tests/mutation_check.py

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+"""Mutation check helper (run manually, not collected by pytest).
+
+    python tests/mutation_check.py tests/mutations_gui.json
+
+Each mutation: {"file": ..., "old": ..., "new": ..., "tests": "pytest selection"}.
+The file is patched, the selected tests must FAIL, then the file is restored.
+"""
+import json
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def main(spec_path: str) -> int:
+    mutations = json.loads(Path(spec_path).read_text())
+    survivors = []
+    for i, m in enumerate(mutations, 1):
+        path = Path(m["file"])
+        original = path.read_text()
+        if original.count(m["old"]) != 1:
+            print(f"[{i}] SKIP (anchor not unique/found): {m['file']}: {m['old'][:60]!r}")
+            survivors.append(m)
+            continue
+        try:
+            path.write_text(original.replace(m["old"], m["new"]))
+            result = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pytest", "-q", "-x", "-p", "no:cacheprovider", *m["tests"].split()],
+                                    capture_output=True, text=True)
+        finally:
+            path.write_text(original)
+        killed = result.returncode != 0
+        print(f"[{i}] {'KILLED ' if killed else 'SURVIVED'} {m.get('name', m['old'][:50])}")
+        if not killed:
+            survivors.append(m)
+    print(f"{len(mutations) - len(survivors)}/{len(mutations)} mutations killed")
+    return 1 if survivors else 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main(sys.argv[1]))

backend/tests/mutations_gateway.json

@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+[
+ {
+  "name": "GW browser Cookie forwarded",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    out_headers = {k: v for k, v in headers.items() if k in _FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS}",
+  "new": "    out_headers = {k: v for k, v in headers.items() if k in _FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS or k == \"cookie\"}",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW Referer/Authorization forwarded",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "\"accept\", \"accept-language\", \"content-type\", \"user-agent\", \"x-requested-with\", \"x-csrftoken\", \"range\",",
+  "new": "\"accept\", \"accept-language\", \"content-type\", \"user-agent\", \"x-requested-with\", \"x-csrftoken\", \"range\", \"referer\", \"authorization\",",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW Set-Cookie passed to browser",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "\"content-range\", \"accept-ranges\", \"content-security-policy\",",
+  "new": "\"content-range\", \"accept-ranges\", \"content-security-policy\", \"set-cookie\",",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW jar never forgets deleted cookies",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "                if expired:\n                    gs.jar.pop(name, None)",
+  "new": "                if False:\n                    gs.jar.pop(name, None)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW foreign Location kept",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if _origin_of(location) != _origin_of(upstream_origin):\n            return None",
+  "new": "        pass",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW backslash Location kept",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    if not location or \"\\\\\" in location",
+  "new": "    if not location",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW Sec-Fetch-Site lax",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if site not in (\"same-origin\", \"none\"):",
+  "new": "        if site in (\"cross-site\",):",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW redeem Sec-Fetch-Site unchecked",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "            if method != \"GET\" or site not in (\"same-site\", \"same-origin\", \"none\"):",
+  "new": "            if method != \"GET\":",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW redeem without OPNexus cookie",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if not ticket or len(ticket) > 128 or not browser_session:",
+  "new": "        if not ticket or len(ticket) > 128:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW Origin unchecked for writes",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "            if _origin_of(origin) not in own_origins:",
+  "new": "            if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW absolute-form accepted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if not path.startswith(\"/\") or path.startswith(\"//\") or not raw_path.startswith(b\"/\") \\",
+  "new": "        if False \\",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW CONNECT accepted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if method in (\"CONNECT\", \"TRACE\"):",
+  "new": "        if method in (\"TRACE\",):",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW Upgrade accepted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if \"upgrade\" in headers or \"upgrade\" in headers.get(\"connection\", \"\").lower():",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW service worker accepted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if headers.get(\"service-worker\", \"\").lower() == \"script\":",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW slot header optional",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if not own_origins:\n            return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)",
+  "new": "        if False:\n            return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW foreign slot cookie accepted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if gs is None or gs.slot != slot:",
+  "new": "        if gs is None:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW login rate limit off",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if login and self.limiter.blocked(gs.upstream_origin):",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW login failures not counted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "            if login and not (300 <= response.status_code < 400):",
+  "new": "            if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW no periodic re-check",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if self.clock() >= gs.next_check:\n            state = await self._recheck(key, gs)",
+  "new": "        if False:\n            state = await self._recheck(key, gs)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW fail-open when backend down",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "            if state is None:\n                return await self._respond(send, 503, _UNAVAILABLE)",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW idle timeout off",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if self.clock() - gs.last_activity >= gs.idle_timeout:",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW absolute timeout off",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        if self.wall_clock() >= gs.absolute_deadline:",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW no CSP",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    (b\"content-security-policy\", _GATEWAY_CSP.encode()),",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW no X-Frame-Options",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    (b\"x-frame-options\", b\"DENY\"),",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW no no-store",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    (b\"cache-control\", b\"no-store\"),",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW streaming body limit off",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "            if size > BODY_LIMIT:\n                return None",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW query logged",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "scope.get(\"path\", \"?\")[:200], status,",
+  "new": "scope.get(\"path\", \"?\")[:200] + \"?\" + scope.get(\"query_string\", b\"\").decode(), status,",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW httpx URL logging on",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    logging.getLogger(_noisy).setLevel(logging.WARNING)",
+  "new": "    pass",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW weak gateway cookie",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "={value}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict\"",
+  "new": "={value}; Path=/\"",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW no Clear-Site-Data",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "            (b\"set-cookie\", cookie.encode()), (b\"clear-site-data\", b'\"cache\", \"storage\"'),",
+  "new": "            (b\"set-cookie\", cookie.encode()),",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW pin not used",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        verify = pinned_context(gs.ca_pem)",
+  "new": "        verify = False",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "GW access log on",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "http=\"h11\", ws=\"none\", access_log=False,",
+  "new": "http=\"h11\", ws=\"none\", access_log=True,",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ }
+]

backend/tests/mutations_gui.json

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+[
+ {
+  "name": "AP1 sec-fetch: cross-site not blocked",
+  "file": "app/security_middleware.py",
+  "old": "    if site == \"cross-site\":\n        return True",
+  "new": "    if site == \"cross-site\":\n        return False",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP1 sec-fetch: same-site always allowed",
+  "file": "app/security_middleware.py",
+  "old": "        return not _explicit_frontend_origin(request.headers.get(\"origin\", \"\"))",
+  "new": "        return False",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP1 sec-fetch: check not wired",
+  "file": "app/security_middleware.py",
+  "old": "        if sec_fetch_blocked(request):",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP1 cookie: plain name falls back even with __Host-",
+  "file": "app/routers/auth.py",
+  "old": "        return request.cookies.get(SECURE_COOKIE_NAME) or request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, \"\")",
+  "new": "        return request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME) or request.cookies.get(SECURE_COOKIE_NAME, \"\")",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP1 cookie: no __Host- prefix",
+  "file": "app/routers/auth.py",
+  "old": "    return SECURE_COOKIE_NAME if settings.cookie_secure else COOKIE_NAME",
+  "new": "    return COOKIE_NAME",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP1 startup: conflict check removed",
+  "file": "app/main.py",
+  "old": "    if conflicts:\n",
+  "new": "    if False:\n",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 ticket expiry ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    elif ticket.expires_at <= now:",
+  "new": "    elif False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 replay allowed",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if replayed:\n        reason = \"replayed\"",
+  "new": "    if False:\n        reason = \"replayed\"",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 session binding ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    elif not secrets.compare_digest(ticket.session_hash, session_hash):",
+  "new": "    elif False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 slot binding ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    elif ticket.slot != slot:",
+  "new": "    elif False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 revalidate: role not rechecked",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if user is None or user.role != \"admin\":",
+  "new": "    if user is None:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 revalidate: session not rechecked",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if session is None or session.expires_at <= _now() or session.user_id != user_id:",
+  "new": "    if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 revalidate: switch not rechecked",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if not row.enabled:\n        return \"disabled\", user, None",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py::test_revalidate_fails_when_switched_off"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 absolute limit ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if _now() >= gs.started_at + timedelta(minutes=row.absolute_timeout_minutes):",
+  "new": "    if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 host tls requirement dropped",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if not host.verify_tls:\n        return \"tls\"",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 slot limit ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    if not free:\n        raise",
+  "new": "    if False:\n        raise",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 gateway token not compared",
+  "file": "app/routers/gui_access.py",
+  "old": "    if not hmac.compare_digest(",
+  "new": "    if False and not hmac.compare_digest(",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 switch not checked for tickets",
+  "file": "app/routers/gui_access.py",
+  "old": "    if not row.enabled:\n        raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.GUI_ACCESS_DISABLED)",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 legacy cookie accepted for tickets",
+  "file": "app/routers/gui_access.py",
+  "old": "    session_cookie = request.cookies.get(SECURE_COOKIE_NAME, \"\")",
+  "new": "    session_cookie = request.cookies.get(SECURE_COOKIE_NAME) or request.cookies.get(\"opnexus-session\", \"\")",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 enabling without https allowed",
+  "file": "app/routers/gui_access.py",
+  "old": "    if payload.enabled and svc.unavailable_reasons():",
+  "new": "    if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP2 redeem leaks api key",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "        \"upstream_origin\": firewall_origin(host.base_url),",
+  "new": "        \"upstream_origin\": firewall_origin(host.base_url), \"k\": host.api_key,",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "AP7 revalidation interval back to 30 s (switch-off took 31 s live)",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "REVALIDATE_SECONDS = 20",
+  "new": "REVALIDATE_SECONDS = 30",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "Review: multipart login not counted",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "    if content_type.lower().startswith(\"multipart/form-data\"):",
+  "new": "    if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "Review: decoded path forwarded upstream",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "url = gs.upstream_origin + raw_path +",
+  "new": "url = gs.upstream_origin + scope[\"path\"] +",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ }
+]

backend/tests/mutations_security_1_29.json

@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+[
+ {
+  "name": "S1 cooldown ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "    usable = [s for s in free if s not in cooling]",
+  "new": "    usable = list(free)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S1 cooldown window zero",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "            | (GuiSession.ended_at > now - SLOT_COOLDOWN)))).all()",
+  "new": "            | (GuiSession.ended_at > now)))).all()",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S1 same firewall blocked too",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "        if h_id == host_id or slot not in free:",
+  "new": "        if slot not in free:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S1 open sessions of other browser ignored",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "((GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None)) & (GuiSession.started_at > now - absolute))\n            | ",
+  "new": "(GuiSession.ended_at.is_(None) & (GuiSession.started_at > now))\n            | ",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S1 cooldown not per user",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "            GuiSession.user_id == user_id,\n            ((GuiSession",
+  "new": "            ((GuiSession",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 fingerprint not compared",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "and not secrets.compare_digest(target_fp, target_fingerprint(host)):",
+  "new": "and False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 fingerprint ignores CA",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "host.tls_ca_pem or \"\", overlay",
+  "new": "\"\", overlay",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 fingerprint ignores overlay",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "overlay_service.proxy_for(host.base_url) or \"\",\n",
+  "new": "\"\",\n",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 fingerprint ignores origin",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "firewall_origin(host.base_url), host.tls_ca_pem",
+  "new": "\"x\", host.tls_ca_pem",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 gateway forgets fingerprint",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "\"target_fp\": gs.target_fp})",
+  "new": "\"target_fp\": None})",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 gateway evicts again",
+  "file": "app/gui_gateway.py",
+  "old": "        return len(self.sessions) - replaced < MAX_SESSIONS",
+  "new": "        return True",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 backend cap off",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "if (open_count or 0) >= MAX_GATEWAY_SESSIONS:",
+  "new": "if (open_count or 0) > 10**9:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S4 cap counts own replaced session",
+  "file": "app/services/gui_ticket_service.py",
+  "old": "        ~((GuiSession.session_hash == session_hash) & (GuiSession.slot == slot))))",
+  "new": "        GuiSession.slot > 0))",
+  "tests": "tests/test_gui_access.py tests/test_gui_gateway.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S3 plain cookie accepted again on HTTPS",
+  "file": "app/routers/auth.py",
+  "old": "    return request.cookies.get(session_cookie_name(), \"\")",
+  "new": "    return request.cookies.get(session_cookie_name()) or request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, \"\")",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S3 logout leaves legacy session",
+  "file": "app/routers/auth.py",
+  "old": "    if settings.cookie_secure and legacy and legacy != token:",
+  "new": "    if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S3 logout does not delete plain cookie",
+  "file": "app/routers/auth.py",
+  "old": "    response.delete_cookie(key=COOKIE_NAME, path=\"/\", secure=settings.cookie_secure, httponly=True, samesite=\"lax\")\n    if settings.cookie_secure:\n        response.delete_cookie(key=SECURE",
+  "new": "    if settings.cookie_secure:\n        response.delete_cookie(key=SECURE",
+  "tests": "tests/test_session_hardening.py tests/test_gui_access.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S2 plain state cookie name on HTTPS",
+  "file": "app/routers/oidc.py",
+  "old": "    return SECURE_STATE_COOKIE if settings.cookie_secure else STATE_COOKIE",
+  "new": "    return STATE_COOKIE",
+  "tests": "tests/test_oidc.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S2 state cookie path not /",
+  "file": "app/routers/oidc.py",
+  "old": "    return \"/\" if settings.cookie_secure else STATE_COOKIE_PATH",
+  "new": "    return STATE_COOKIE_PATH",
+  "tests": "tests/test_oidc.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S2 callback without cookie accepted",
+  "file": "app/routers/oidc.py",
+  "old": "        if not bound or not secrets.compare_digest(bound.encode(), state.encode()):",
+  "new": "        if False:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_oidc.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S2 sec-fetch exemption for any request",
+  "file": "app/security_middleware.py",
+  "old": "    if path in _SEC_FETCH_EXEMPT and _is_top_level_navigation(request):",
+  "new": "    if path in _SEC_FETCH_EXEMPT:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_oidc.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 no guard in transport",
+  "file": "app/services/url_guard.py",
+  "old": "        pool._network_backend = _GuardedBackend(backend)",
+  "new": "        pass",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 forbidden check skipped at connect",
+  "file": "app/services/url_guard.py",
+  "old": "        if not addresses or _any_forbidden(addresses):",
+  "new": "        if not addresses:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 only first answer checked",
+  "file": "app/services/url_guard.py",
+  "old": "def _any_forbidden(addresses: list[str]) -> bool:\n    for address in addresses:",
+  "new": "def _any_forbidden(addresses: list[str]) -> bool:\n    for address in addresses[:1]:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 connects by name again",
+  "file": "app/services/url_guard.py",
+  "old": "                return await self._inner.connect_tcp(address, port,",
+  "new": "                return await self._inner.connect_tcp(host, port,",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 webhook without guarded client",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_delivery.py",
+  "old": "async with url_guard.guarded_client(timeout=settings.opnsense_timeout, follow_redirects=False) as client:\n            with url_guard.muted():",
+  "new": "async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=settings.opnsense_timeout, follow_redirects=False) as client:\n            with url_guard.muted():",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 channel without guarded client",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_channels.py",
+  "old": "async with url_guard.guarded_client(",
+  "new": "async with httpx.AsyncClient(",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S5 oidc without guarded client",
+  "file": "app/services/oidc_service.py",
+  "old": "async with url_guard.guarded_client(timeout=10, follow_redirects=False) as client:",
+  "new": "async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10, follow_redirects=False) as client:",
+  "tests": "tests/test_url_guard.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S7 sequential delivery",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_service.py",
+  "old": "        await asyncio.gather(*calls, return_exceptions=True)",
+  "new": "        for call in calls:\n            await call",
+  "tests": "tests/test_notification_parallel.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S7 no per-target timeout",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_service.py",
+  "old": "            await asyncio.wait_for(make_call(), DELIVERY_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)",
+  "new": "            await make_call()",
+  "tests": "tests/test_notification_parallel.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S7 no cycle budget",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_service.py",
+  "old": "    done, late = await asyncio.wait(tasks, timeout=DELIVERY_CYCLE_BUDGET_SECONDS)",
+  "new": "    done, late = await asyncio.wait(tasks)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_notification_parallel.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S7 no parallel limit",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_service.py",
+  "old": "    gate = asyncio.Semaphore(DELIVERY_PARALLEL)",
+  "new": "    gate = asyncio.Semaphore(10**6)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_notification_parallel.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S7 attempt not recorded when cancelled",
+  "file": "app/services/notification_service.py",
+  "old": "    finally:\n        # \"Attempted\" is what is recorded",
+  "new": "    except ZeroDivisionError:\n        pass\n    else:\n        # \"Attempted\" is what is recorded",
+  "tests": "tests/test_notification_parallel.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 exceptions not in definition",
+  "file": "app/services/window_service.py",
+  "old": "    if window.exceptions:\n        result[",
+  "new": "    if False:\n        result[",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 moved start not in definition",
+  "file": "app/services/window_service.py",
+  "old": "e.moved_start.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat() if e.moved_start else None]",
+  "new": "None]",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 current takes earliest again",
+  "file": "app/services/window_service.py",
+  "old": "return max(open_now, key=lambda occ: occ.start) if open_now else None",
+  "new": "return min(open_now, key=lambda occ: occ.start) if open_now else None",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 may_roll_out ignores id",
+  "file": "app/services/rollout_engine.py",
+  "old": "    if user_id is not None:\n        user = await db.get(AdminUser, user_id)",
+  "new": "    if False:\n        user = await db.get(AdminUser, user_id)",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 auto start check ignores id",
+  "file": "app/services/rollout_engine.py",
+  "old": "may_roll_out(db, plan.activated_by or \"\", plan.activated_by_id)",
+  "new": "may_roll_out(db, plan.activated_by or \"\")",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 run does not get id",
+  "file": "app/services/rollout_engine.py",
+  "old": "started_by=plan.activated_by, started_by_id=plan.activated_by_id,",
+  "new": "started_by=plan.activated_by,",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 activation does not store id",
+  "file": "app/routers/rollouts.py",
+  "old": "    plan.activated_by_id = request.state.user.id\n",
+  "new": "",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "S6 migration no backfill of plans",
+  "file": "migrations/versions/0026_rollout_actor_ids.py",
+  "old": "    op.execute(\"UPDATE rollout_plans p SET",
+  "new": "    op.execute(\"SELECT 1 -- UPDATE rollout_plans p SET",
+  "tests": "tests/test_rollout_engine.py tests/test_maintenance_windows.py tests/test_migrations.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "UI None % shown again",
+  "file": "app/services/monitor_checks.py",
+  "old": "\"wert\": None if value is None else f\"{value}{unit}\",",
+  "new": "\"wert\": f\"{value}{unit}\",",
+  "tests": "tests/test_monitoring_alerts.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "UI adopt reason_details dropped",
+  "file": "app/routers/adopt_routes.py",
+  "old": "reason_details=json.dumps(exc.details, ensure_ascii=False)) from exc",
+  "new": "reason_details=\"{}\") from exc",
+  "tests": "tests/test_object_adopt.py"
+ },
+ {
+  "name": "UI channel test open to operators",
+  "file": "app/services/api_token_service.py",
+  "old": "r\"^/api/(users|settings|system|notifications|overlay)(/|$)\"",
+  "new": "r\"^/api/(users|settings|system|overlay)(/|$)\"",
+  "tests": "tests/test_operator_role.py"
+ }
+]

backend/tests/test_adopt_link.py

@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+"""Linking hand-made objects on a second firewall to the central object that already exists
+(services/adopt_link_service.py), instead of creating a duplicate."""
+import json
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy import func, select
+
+from app.database import SessionLocal
+from app.models.alias import FirewallAlias
+from app.models.audit import AuditEvent
+from app.models.port_forward import PortForwardRule
+from tests.helpers import deploy_approved
+from tests.test_api_tokens import _login
+from tests.test_object_adopt import AUTOMATIC_NAT, NAT_KINDS, SYSTEM_ALIASES, alias_row, o2o_row, pf_row, snat_row
+from tests.test_object_adopt import _mode
+from tests.test_rule_adopt import _row as rule_row
+
+A = "https://fw-link-a.test"
+B = "https://fw-link-b.test"
+
+
+async def _host(client, respx_mock, base, name):
+    respx_mock.get(url__regex=r".*/getVipStatus").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": []}))
+    r = await client.post("/api/hosts", json={"name": name, "base_url": base, "api_key": "k", "api_secret": "s"})
+    assert r.status_code == 201, r.text
+    return r.json()["id"]
+
+
+def _search(respx_mock, base, path, rows):
+    return respx_mock.get(f"{base}/api/firewall/{path}").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": rows, "total": len(rows)}))
+
+
+def _live_writes(respx_mock):
+    return [c for c in respx_mock.calls if c.request.method != "GET" and "/firewall/" in str(c.request.url)]
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+async def two(client, respx_mock):
+    a = await _host(client, respx_mock, A, "fw-link-a")
+    b = await _host(client, respx_mock, B, "fw-link-b")
+    _mode(respx_mock)  # outbound NAT mode is read per base url below
+    for base in (A, B):
+        respx_mock.get(f"{base}/api/firewall/source_nat/get").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(
+            200, json={"filter": {"general": {"snat_mode": {m: {"selected": 1 if m == "hybrid" else 0} for m in
+                                                              ("automatic", "hybrid", "advanced", "disabled")}}}}))
+    return a, b
+
+
+async def _put_vars(client, host_id, values):
+    r = await client.put(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/variables", json={"variables": values})
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.text
+
+
+# ── aliases ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_alias_is_linked_not_duplicated_and_rolls_out_to_both_hosts(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    live_a = alias_row("web_servers", "host", "10.0.0.1\n10.0.0.2", uuid="uuid-a")
+    live_b = alias_row("web_servers", "host", "10.0.0.1\n10.0.0.2", uuid="uuid-b")
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", SYSTEM_ALIASES + [live_a])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", SYSTEM_ALIASES + [live_b])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "uuid-a"})).json()
+
+    # host B: the candidate carries the exact twin (name_exists no longer decides alone)
+    cand = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()
+    row = next(r for r in cand if r["uuid"] == "uuid-b")
+    assert row["linkable"] is True and row["reasons"] == ["name_exists"]
+    assert [(m["id"], m["name"], m["targets"], m["diff"]) for m in row["matches"]] == [(first["id"], "web_servers", ["fw-link-a"], [])]
+    assert row["similar"] == [] and row["bulk_action"] == "link"
+
+    # adopting it as an own object is still refused (the name is taken)
+    assert (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "uuid-b"})).status_code == 409
+
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "uuid-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    linked = resp.json()
+    assert linked["id"] == first["id"] and sorted(linked["target_host_ids"]) == sorted([a, b])
+    assert {d["host_id"]: d["status"] for d in linked["deployments"]} == {a: "success", b: "success"}
+    assert not _live_writes(respx_mock)  # nothing is written to a firewall
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        assert await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(FirewallAlias)) == 1
+        events = (await db.scalars(select(AuditEvent).where(AuditEvent.kind == "alias"))).all()
+    assert any(e.message == "Mit vorhandenem Objekt verknüpft" and e.details["remote_uuid"] == "uuid-b" for e in events)
+    revisions = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}/revisions")).json()
+    assert any("fw-link-b verknüpft" in r["note"] for r in revisions)
+
+    # preview: unchanged on both hosts; it is no longer offered on B
+    preview = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}/preview")).json()
+    assert sorted(h["action"] for h in preview["hosts"]) == ["unchanged", "unchanged"]
+    assert [r for r in (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json() if r["reasons"] != ["system"]] == []
+
+    # one edit rolls out to both remote objects, never as a new one
+    edit = {"name": "web_servers", "type": "host", "content": "10.0.0.1\n10.0.0.3", "description": "web_servers desc", "enabled": True,
+            "target_host_ids": [a, b], "target_group_ids": [], "expected_updated_at": linked["updated_at"]}
+    assert (await client.put(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}", json=edit)).status_code == 200
+    add = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/alias/addItem").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "dup"}))
+    set_a = respx_mock.post(f"{A}/api/firewall/alias/setItem/uuid-a").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved"}))
+    set_b = respx_mock.post(f"{B}/api/firewall/alias/setItem/uuid-b").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved"}))
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/alias/reconfigure").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    assert (await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}/deploy")).status_code == 200
+    assert set_a.called and set_b.called and not add.called
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_link_is_idempotent(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("dup_me", uuid="uuid-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("dup_me", uuid="uuid-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "uuid-a"})).json()
+    body = {"host_id": b, "uuid": "uuid-b", "link_to": first["id"]}
+    assert (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json=body)).status_code == 201
+    again = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json=body)
+    assert again.status_code == 201, again.text
+    assert len(again.json()["deployments"]) == 2 and len(again.json()["target_host_ids"]) == 2
+    # linking the same live object to ANOTHER central object is refused
+    other = (await client.post("/api/aliases", json={"name": "other", "type": "host", "content": "1.1.1.1"})).json()
+    assert (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={**body, "link_to": other["id"]})).status_code == 409
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_different_content_shows_a_diff_and_is_never_linked(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("ntp", "host", "10.0.0.1", uuid="uuid-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("ntp", "host", "10.0.0.1\n10.0.0.9", uuid="uuid-b", description="other text")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "uuid-a"})).json()
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["linkable"] is False and row["matches"] == [] and row["bulk_action"] == "skip"
+    sim = row["similar"][0]
+    assert sim["id"] == first["id"]
+    assert {d["field"]: (d["central"], d["live"]) for d in sim["diff"]} == {
+        "content": ("10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1\n10.0.0.9"), "description": ("ntp desc", "other text")}
+    # forcing the link by id is refused too: the live state is compared again on the server
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "uuid-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 409 and resp.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED"
+    assert "content" in resp.json()["detail"]["params"]["fields"]
+    # nothing was linked
+    alias = next(x for x in (await client.get("/api/aliases")).json() if x["id"] == first["id"])
+    assert alias["target_host_ids"] == [a] and len(alias["deployments"]) == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_browser_state_is_not_trusted_live_state_decides(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("srv", "host", "10.0.0.1", uuid="uuid-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("srv", "host", "10.0.0.1", uuid="uuid-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "uuid-a"})).json()
+    assert (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]["linkable"] is True
+    # between listing and clicking somebody changes the alias on host B by hand
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("srv", "host", "10.0.0.1\n10.0.0.77", uuid="uuid-b")])
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "uuid-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 409 and resp.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_variables_are_resolved_per_host(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    await _put_vars(client, a, {"LAN_NET": "192.168.1.0/24"})
+    await _put_vars(client, b, {"LAN_NET": "192.168.2.0/24"})
+    central = (await client.post("/api/aliases", json={"name": "lan_net", "type": "network", "content": "{{LAN_NET}}", "description": "lan_net desc",
+                                                       "target_host_ids": [a]})).json()
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("lan_net", "network", "192.168.2.0/24", uuid="uuid-b")])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["linkable"] is True and row["matches"][0]["id"] == central["id"]
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "uuid-b", "link_to": central["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    dep_b = next(d for d in resp.json()["deployments"] if d["host_id"] == b)
+    assert dep_b["status"] == "success"
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        from app.models.alias_deployment import AliasDeployment
+        deps = {str(d.host_id): d for d in (await db.scalars(select(AliasDeployment))).all()}
+    assert deps[b].opnsense_alias_uuid == "uuid-b" and deps[b].last_payload["content"] == "192.168.2.0/24"
+    preview = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/{central['id']}/preview")).json()
+    assert {h["host_name"]: h["action"] for h in preview["hosts"]}["fw-link-b"] == "unchanged"  # resolved payload == live
+
+    # a host with a DIFFERENT value for the variable does not match; the diff shows the resolved value
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("lan_net", "network", "192.168.9.0/24", uuid="uuid-x")])
+    # (host B already has the object, so ask for it through a third host)
+    c = await _host(client, respx_mock, "https://fw-link-c.test", "fw-link-c")
+    await _put_vars(client, c, {"LAN_NET": "192.168.3.0/24"})
+    _search(respx_mock, "https://fw-link-c.test", "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("lan_net", "network", "192.168.9.0/24", uuid="uuid-c")])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={c}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["matches"] == [] and row["similar"][0]["diff"] == [{"field": "content", "central": "192.168.3.0/24", "live": "192.168.9.0/24"}]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_missing_variable_on_the_host_never_matches(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    await _put_vars(client, a, {"LAN_NET": "192.168.1.0/24"})
+    await client.post("/api/aliases", json={"name": "lan_net", "type": "network", "content": "{{LAN_NET}}", "description": "lan_net desc", "target_host_ids": [a]})
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("lan_net", "network", "192.168.2.0/24", uuid="uuid-b")])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["matches"] == [] and row["similar"][0]["diff"][0]["field"] == "variables"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_nested_alias_references_are_part_of_the_comparison(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [
+        alias_row("inner", "network", "10.1.0.0/16", uuid="in-a"),
+        alias_row("outer", "networkgroup", "inner\n10.2.0.0/16", uuid="out-a")])
+    result = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt-all", json={"host_id": a})).json()
+    assert len(result["adopted"]) == 2
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [
+        alias_row("inner", "network", "10.1.0.0/16", uuid="in-b"),
+        alias_row("outer", "networkgroup", "inner\n10.2.0.0/16", uuid="out-b")])
+    rows = {r["title"]: r for r in (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()}
+    assert rows["inner"]["linkable"] and rows["outer"]["linkable"]
+    # a different reference is a diff, not a match
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [
+        alias_row("inner", "network", "10.1.0.0/16", uuid="in-b"),
+        alias_row("outer", "networkgroup", "other_alias\n10.2.0.0/16", uuid="out-b"),
+        alias_row("other_alias", "network", "10.5.0.0/16", uuid="oth-b")])
+    rows = {r["title"]: r for r in (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()}
+    assert rows["outer"]["matches"] == [] and rows["outer"]["similar"][0]["diff"][0]["field"] == "content"
+
+    # "adopt all" with link: both linked, nothing created
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [
+        alias_row("inner", "network", "10.1.0.0/16", uuid="in-b"),
+        alias_row("outer", "networkgroup", "inner\n10.2.0.0/16", uuid="out-b")])
+    done = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b, "link_existing": True})).json()
+    assert sorted((x["title"], x["linked"]) for x in done["adopted"]) == [("inner", True), ("outer", True)] and done["skipped"] == []
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        assert await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(FirewallAlias)) == 2
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_adopt_all_without_link_flag_keeps_old_behaviour(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("x1", uuid="u-a")])
+    await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt-all", json={"host_id": a})
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("x1", uuid="u-b")])
+    done = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b})).json()
+    assert done["adopted"] == [] and done["skipped"][0]["reasons"] == ["name_exists"]
+
+
+# ── NAT + rules, every kind ─────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+KINDS = {
+    "port-forward": ("d_nat/searchRule", pf_row, {"descr": "Web"}, {"destination.port": "9999"}, "local_port"),
+    "one-to-one": ("one_to_one/searchRule", o2o_row, {"description": "Mail 1:1"}, {"external": "203.0.113.77"}, "external"),
+    "outbound-nat": ("source_nat/searchRule", snat_row, {"description": "LAN out"}, {"source_net": "192.168.9.0/24"}, "source_net"),
+}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("prefix", list(KINDS))
+async def test_nat_kinds_link_diff_and_bulk(client, respx_mock, two, prefix):
+    a, b = two
+    path, factory, _, change, _ = KINDS[prefix]
+    _search(respx_mock, A, path, [factory(uuid="a-1"), *AUTOMATIC_NAT])
+    first = (await client.post(f"/api/{prefix}/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "a-1"})).json()
+
+    # different on B -> hint + diff, no link possible
+    _search(respx_mock, B, path, [factory(uuid="b-1", **change)])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/{prefix}/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["adoptable"] is True and row["linkable"] is False and row["matches"] == []
+    assert row["similar"][0]["id"] == first["id"] and row["similar"][0]["diff"]
+    resp = await client.post(f"/api/{prefix}/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "b-1", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 409 and resp.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED"
+    adopt_all = (await client.post(f"/api/{prefix}/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b, "link_existing": True})).json()
+    assert adopt_all["adopted"][0]["linked"] is False  # a different object is adopted as its own, not linked
+
+    # fresh start for the exact case on a third host
+    c = await _host(client, respx_mock, "https://fw-link-c.test", "fw-link-c")
+    respx_mock.get("https://fw-link-c.test/api/firewall/source_nat/get").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(
+        200, json={"filter": {"general": {"snat_mode": {m: {"selected": 1 if m == "hybrid" else 0} for m in
+                                                          ("automatic", "hybrid", "advanced", "disabled")}}}}))
+    _search(respx_mock, "https://fw-link-c.test", path, [factory(uuid="c-1")])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/{prefix}/unmanaged?host_id={c}")).json()[0]
+    ids = [m["id"] for m in row["matches"]]
+    assert ids == [first["id"]] and row["bulk_action"] == "link" and row["linkable"]
+    resp = await client.post(f"/api/{prefix}/adopt", json={"host_id": c, "uuid": "c-1", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["id"] == first["id"] and c in resp.json()["target_host_ids"]
+    preview = (await client.get(f"/api/{prefix}/{first['id']}/preview")).json()
+    assert {h["host_name"]: h["action"] for h in preview["hosts"]}["fw-link-c"] == "unchanged"
+    assert not _live_writes(respx_mock)
+    listed = (await client.get(f"/api/{prefix}")).json()
+    assert len(listed) == 2  # first (A + C) and the different one from B
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_port_forward_link_updates_remote_object_without_duplicate(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "d_nat/searchRule", [pf_row(uuid="pf-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "d_nat/searchRule", [pf_row(uuid="pf-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/port-forward/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "pf-a"})).json()
+    linked = (await client.post("/api/port-forward/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "pf-b", "link_to": first["id"]})).json()
+    edit = {k: linked[k] for k in ("description", "interface", "ipprotocol", "protocol", "source_net", "source_port",
+                                    "destination_net", "destination_port", "target", "local_port", "natreflection", "enabled")}
+    for base in (A, B):  # alias lookups and the interface consistency check of a multi-host rollout
+        _search(respx_mock, base, "alias/searchItem", [])
+    for base in (A, B):  # the interface consistency check of a multi-host rollout
+        respx_mock.get(f"{base}/api/firewall/filter/getRule").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(
+            200, json={"rule": {"interface": {"wan": {"value": "WAN", "selected": 1}}}}))
+    edit.update(target="192.168.1.99", target_host_ids=[a, b], target_group_ids=[], expected_updated_at=linked["updated_at"])
+    assert (await client.put(f"/api/port-forward/{first['id']}", json=edit)).status_code == 200
+    add = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/d_nat/addRule").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "dup"}))
+    sa = respx_mock.post(f"{A}/api/firewall/d_nat/setRule/pf-a").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved"}))
+    sb = respx_mock.post(f"{B}/api/firewall/d_nat/setRule/pf-b").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved"}))
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/d_nat/apply").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    assert (await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/port-forward/{first['id']}/deploy")).status_code == 200
+    assert sa.called and sb.called and not add.called
+    assert json.loads(sb.calls.last.request.content)["rule"]["target"] == "192.168.1.99"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_rule_link_diff_and_errors(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "filter/searchRule", [rule_row("r-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "filter/searchRule", [rule_row("r-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/rules/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "rule_uuid": "r-a"})).json()
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/rules/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["linkable"] is True and [m["id"] for m in row["matches"]] == [first["id"]]
+    resp = await client.post("/api/rules/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "rule_uuid": "r-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 201, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["id"] == first["id"] and sorted(resp.json()["target_host_ids"]) == sorted([a, b])
+    again = await client.post("/api/rules/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "rule_uuid": "r-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert again.status_code == 201 and len(again.json()["deployments"]) == 2
+    preview = (await client.get(f"/api/rules/{first['id']}/preview")).json()
+    assert sorted(h["action"] for h in preview["hosts"]) == ["unchanged", "unchanged"]
+    assert not _live_writes(respx_mock)
+
+    # different port -> diff only
+    c = await _host(client, respx_mock, "https://fw-link-c.test", "fw-link-c")
+    _search(respx_mock, "https://fw-link-c.test", "filter/searchRule", [rule_row("r-c", destination_port="2222")])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/rules/unmanaged?host_id={c}")).json()[0]
+    assert row["linkable"] is False and row["similar"][0]["diff"] == [{"field": "destination_port", "central": "22", "live": "2222"}]
+    refused = await client.post("/api/rules/adopt", json={"host_id": c, "rule_uuid": "r-c", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert refused.status_code == 409 and refused.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_CHANGED"
+
+
+# ── error cases ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_deleted_target_and_host_already_has_object_and_busy(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("gone", uuid="u-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("gone", uuid="u-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a"})).json()
+    # busy: an unconfirmed deployment on the central object
+    respx_mock.post(f"{A}/api/firewall/alias/setItem/u-a").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved"}))
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/alias/reconfigure").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    edit = {"name": "gone", "type": "host", "content": "10.9.9.1\n10.9.9.2", "description": "gone desc", "enabled": False,
+            "target_host_ids": [a], "target_group_ids": [], "expected_updated_at": first["updated_at"]}
+    assert (await client.put(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}", json=edit)).status_code == 200
+    assert (await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}/deploy")).status_code == 200  # pending now
+    busy = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "u-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert busy.status_code == 409  # content differs now AND it is pending; either way nothing is linked
+    await client.post(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}/confirm")
+
+    # deleted in the meantime
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/alias/delItem/.*").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "deleted"}))
+    assert (await client.delete(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}")).status_code == 204
+    gone = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "u-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert gone.status_code == 404 and gone.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_TARGET_NOT_FOUND"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_pending_deployment_blocks_the_link(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("busy1", uuid="u-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("busy1", uuid="u-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a"})).json()
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        from app.models.alias_deployment import AliasDeployment
+        dep = (await db.scalars(select(AliasDeployment))).one()
+        dep.status = "pending"
+        await db.commit()
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "u-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 409 and resp.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_BUSY"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_host_that_already_has_the_object_is_not_a_candidate_and_cannot_link(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("twice", uuid="u-a")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a"})).json()
+    # a second, differently-UUID'd copy on host A itself: A already has the object
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("twice", uuid="u-a"), alias_row("twice", uuid="u-a2")])
+    rows = (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={a}")).json()
+    assert [r["uuid"] for r in rows] == ["u-a2"] and rows[0]["matches"] == [] and rows[0]["linkable"] is False
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a2", "link_to": first["id"]})
+    assert resp.status_code == 409 and resp.json()["detail"]["code"] == "ADOPT_LINK_HOST_HAS_OBJECT"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_bulk_never_guesses_between_two_twins_and_links_each_object_once(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    # two identical central objects exist from earlier separate adoptions
+    for _ in range(2):
+        await client.post("/api/port-forward", json={
+            "description": "Web", "interface": "wan", "ipprotocol": "inet", "protocol": "tcp", "source_net": "any",
+            "destination_net": "wanip", "destination_port": "8443", "target": "192.168.1.50", "local_port": "443",
+            "natreflection": "", "enabled": True, "target_host_ids": [a], "target_group_ids": []})
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "d_nat/searchRule", [pf_row(uuid="pf-b")])
+    row = (await client.get(f"/api/port-forward/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()[0]
+    assert len(row["matches"]) == 2 and row["bulk_action"] == "new"  # ask the user, do not guess
+    done = (await client.post("/api/port-forward/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b, "link_existing": True})).json()
+    assert [x["linked"] for x in done["adopted"]] == [False]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_bulk_links_each_central_object_only_once(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    await client.post("/api/port-forward", json={
+        "description": "Web", "interface": "wan", "ipprotocol": "inet", "protocol": "tcp", "source_net": "any",
+        "destination_net": "wanip", "destination_port": "8443", "target": "192.168.1.50", "local_port": "443",
+        "natreflection": "", "enabled": True, "target_host_ids": [a], "target_group_ids": []})
+    # two identical live rows on B, ONE twin: the first links, the second becomes its own object
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "d_nat/searchRule", [pf_row(uuid="b-1"), pf_row(uuid="b-2")])
+    rows = (await client.get(f"/api/port-forward/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json()
+    assert sorted(r["bulk_action"] for r in rows) == ["link", "new"]  # the dialog's summary equals what happens
+    done = (await client.post("/api/port-forward/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b, "link_existing": True})).json()
+    assert sorted(x["linked"] for x in done["adopted"]) == [False, True]
+    assert len((await client.get("/api/port-forward")).json()) == 2
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_roles_for_linking(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("roles1", uuid="u-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("roles1", uuid="u-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a"})).json()
+    for role, expected in (("read_only", 403), ("operator", 201)):
+        user = await client.post("/api/users", json={"username": f"lnk-{role}", "password": "adopt-test-password-1", "role": role})
+        assert user.status_code == 201, user.text
+        session = await _login(f"lnk-{role}", "adopt-test-password-1")
+        try:
+            resp = await session.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "u-b", "link_to": first["id"]})
+            assert resp.status_code == expected, (role, resp.text)
+        finally:
+            await session.aclose()
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_bulk_leaves_a_twin_alone_that_waits_for_a_confirmation(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("busy2", uuid="u-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("busy2", uuid="u-b")])
+    await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a"})
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        from app.models.alias_deployment import AliasDeployment
+        (await db.scalars(select(AliasDeployment))).one().status = "pending"
+        await db.commit()
+    row = next(r for r in (await client.get(f"/api/aliases/unmanaged?host_id={b}")).json() if r["uuid"] == "u-b")
+    assert row["linkable"] is False and row["bulk_action"] == "skip"
+    resp = await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b, "link_existing": True})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["adopted"] == []
+    assert "twin_busy" in resp.json()["skipped"][0]["reasons"]
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        assert await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(FirewallAlias)) == 1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_linking_invalidates_an_open_edit_form(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("stale1", uuid="u-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "alias/searchItem", [alias_row("stale1", uuid="u-b")])
+    first = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "u-a"})).json()
+    linked = (await client.post("/api/aliases/adopt", json={"host_id": b, "uuid": "u-b", "link_to": first["id"]})).json()
+    assert linked["updated_at"] != first["updated_at"]
+    stale = {"name": "stale1", "type": "host", "content": linked["content"], "description": linked["description"],
+             "enabled": linked["enabled"], "target_host_ids": [a], "target_group_ids": [],
+             "expected_updated_at": first["updated_at"]}
+    assert (await client.put(f"/api/aliases/{first['id']}", json=stale)).status_code == 409
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_bulk_neither_links_nor_duplicates_a_busy_nat_twin(client, respx_mock, two):
+    a, b = two
+    _search(respx_mock, A, "d_nat/searchRule", [pf_row(uuid="pf-a")])
+    _search(respx_mock, B, "d_nat/searchRule", [pf_row(uuid="pf-b")])
+    await client.post("/api/port-forward/adopt", json={"host_id": a, "uuid": "pf-a"})
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        from app.models.port_forward_deployment import PortForwardDeployment
+        (await db.scalars(select(PortForwardDeployment))).one().status = "pending"
+        await db.commit()
+    resp = await client.post("/api/port-forward/adopt-all", json={"host_id": b, "link_existing": True})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["adopted"] == [] and "twin_busy" in resp.json()["skipped"][0]["reasons"]
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        assert await db.scalar(select(func.count()).select_from(PortForwardRule)) == 1