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OPNexus/backend/app/gui_gateway.py
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Julian Boldt ec20940139
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Release v1.29.0
- **Fehlende API-Rechte werden sichtbar:** Darf der API-Schlüssel einer Firewall den Gateway- oder Dienststatus nicht lesen (OPNsense antwortet
  mit 403), fiel das bisher niemandem auf, und der standardmäßig aktive Gateway-Alarm konnte nie auslösen. Jetzt zeigen die Host-Seite
  (Abschnitt „Gateways“) und die Dashboard-Karte „Fleet-/CARP-Gesundheit“ ein Warn-Badge „API-Rechte fehlen: Gateways, Dienste“; der Tooltip nennt die
  OPNsense-Berechtigung, die beim Benutzer oder bei der Gruppe fehlt (System: Gateways, Status: Services, Lobby: Dashboard). Zusätzlich gibt es
  den neuen Alarm **API-Rechte fehlen** (standardmäßig an, abschaltbar unter Einstellungen › Benachrichtigungen, gleiche Entprellung wie die
  anderen Messungs-Alarme) und die Prometheus-Metrik `opnexus_host_api_rights_missing{host,read}`. Nur eine ausdrückliche Ablehnung zählt;
  Zeitüberschreitungen oder Serverfehler bleiben „unbekannt“.
- **Gateway-Alarm pro Gateway abschaltbar:** In der Gateway-Liste der Host-Seite schaltet eine Glocke den Alarm für ein einzelnes Gateway aus
  (z. B. ruhendes Zweit-WAN oder tote IPv6-Gateways); ein „Alarm aus“-Badge zeigt es an. Ein offener Alarm dieses Gateways löst sich dabei
  auf. Nur Administratoren, die Änderung steht im Audit-Log. Das Dashboard zeigt bei mehr als acht Gateways „+ N weitere“.
- **Firewall-Oberfläche (GUI-Zugriff) härter:** Ein frei gewordener Platz wird für eine **andere** Firewall erst 5 Minuten nach dem Ende der letzten
  Sitzung vergeben (Schutz, falls dort noch ein Tab offen ist, der die Cookies des Platzes teilt); dieselbe Firewall bekommt ihn sofort wieder.
  Sind alle Plätze belegt oder noch in der Abkühlzeit, nennt die Meldung den Grund. Ändern sich Adresse, festgesetztes Zertifikat oder Tunnelweg
  einer Firewall, während ihre Oberfläche offen ist, endet die Sitzung spätestens nach 20 Sekunden. Das Limit von 64 gleichzeitigen Sitzungen
  verdrängt keine laufende Sitzung mehr: eine neue wird abgelehnt (mit Meldung), bis eine endet. **Hinweis:** Das GUI-Gateway-Image muss zur
  Backend-Version passen (wie bisher beim Update beider Container).
- **Anmeldung (Cookies) härter:** Das alte Sitzungs-Cookie `opnexus-session` wird bei HTTPS **nicht mehr akzeptiert**. **Alle, die sich seit der
  Umstellung auf 1.27 nicht neu angemeldet haben, müssen sich einmal neu anmelden**; Skripte mit rohem Sitzungs-Cookie brauchen den Namen
  `__Host-opnexus-session` (API-Tokens sind nicht betroffen, ohne HTTPS bleibt `opnexus-session` der normale Name). Beim Abmelden wird ein altes
  Cookie weiterhin gelöscht. Das Cookie, das die SSO-Anmeldung an den Browser bindet, heißt bei HTTPS jetzt `__Host-opnexus-oidc-state`; der
  Rückweg vom Anbieter wird nur noch als Seitenaufruf (Navigation) von einer fremden Seite zugelassen, und ohne dieses Cookie scheitert er immer.
- **Webhook, Benachrichtigungskanäle und SSO-Anbieter: Schutz vor DNS-Rebinding:** Bisher prüfte OPNexus die Adresse, auf die ein Name zeigt, und
  der HTTP-Client löste den Namen danach noch einmal auf; ein Server unter Fremdkontrolle konnte beim zweiten Mal eine interne Adresse liefern. Jetzt
  verbindet OPNexus genau zu der geprüften Adresse (Host-Name, TLS-Zertifikatsprüfung und Anfrage bleiben beim Namen); zeigt eine Antwort auch nur
  teilweise auf Loopback, Link-Local oder einen Cloud-Metadaten-Dienst (auch AWS-IPv6 und Alibaba), kommt keine Verbindung zustande und die Zustellung meldet „Zieladresse nicht
  erlaubt“. Private Netze bleiben erlaubt (eigener ntfy, Gotify, Matrix). Proxy-Umgebungsvariablen werden für diese Aufrufe nicht mehr beachtet.
- **Benachrichtigungen parallel zugestellt:** Webhook, E-Mail und alle Kanäle werden gleichzeitig bedient, jeder mit eigener Zeitgrenze (20 Sekunden),
  und ein Prüfdurchlauf sendet insgesamt höchstens 90 Sekunden. Ein hängender Kanal verzögert weder die anderen noch die nächsten Prüfungen; im Log
  steht dann „timed out“ (ohne Adresse oder Token). Wie bisher wird einmal je Ereignis zugestellt, ohne Wiederholung, **außer** der Durchlauf war so voll, dass
  für ein Ereignis noch gar kein Versuch stattfand: es wird im nächsten Durchlauf zugestellt. Die Zustellung beginnt jetzt nach allen Prüfungen
  eines Durchlaufs statt mitten darin.
- **Rollouts: Fingerabdruck, verantwortliche Person, überlappende Termine:** Der Fingerabdruck eines aktivierten Plans umfasst jetzt auch die
  ausgelassenen und verschobenen Termine seines Fensters: **wer einen Termin auslässt oder verschiebt, muss einen automatischen Plan danach neu
  aktivieren** (ohne solche Ausnahmen bleiben bestehende Aktivierungen gültig; **Pläne, deren Fenster schon Ausnahmen haben, nach dem Update
  einmal neu aktivieren**, sonst meldet der Plan „Plan geändert“ und startet nicht automatisch). Die verantwortliche Person (Aktivierende, Startende, Freigebende)
  wird zusätzlich als Konto-ID gespeichert (Migration 0026, bestehende Einträge werden über den Namen zugeordnet): ein gelöschtes und unter gleichem
  Namen neu angelegtes Konto gilt nicht mehr als dieselbe Person, der Lauf pausiert bzw. der automatische Start unterbleibt mit „Person darf nicht mehr
  ausrollen“. Angezeigt wird weiter der Benutzername. Überlappen sich zwei Termine eines Wartungsfensters, zählt der zuletzt begonnene (bisher der
  früheste), sodass ein älterer, längst abgeschnittener Termin keinen neuen Start mehr blockiert.
- **Kleinigkeiten:** Ressourcen-Alarme zeigen bei fehlendem Messwert keine Zahl mehr („None %“ entfällt). Der Dialog „Von Firewall übernehmen“ zeigt ohne aktive
  Firewall einen Hinweis statt dauerhaft „Lädt…“. Fehlermeldungen beim Übernehmen und Verknüpfen nennen die Gründe in Klartext (Deutsch/Englisch) statt
  roher Codes wie `name_exists`; dasselbe gilt für „GUI-Zugriff nicht eingerichtet“ und blockierte Netzwerkänderungen. Der Test-Knopf der
  Benachrichtigungskanäle ist für Nicht-Admins ausgeblendet (der Server verweigert den Test ohnehin). Der Tooltip der aktiven Plätze nennt keine
  Umgebungsvariable mehr. Eine Gateway-Sitzung, die der Gateway-Container nicht mehr bestätigt (Absturz), zählt für die Abkühlzeit der Plätze als
  beendet.
- **Grafana-Dashboard erweitert:** neue Felder für Gateways (erreichbar, Paketverlust, Latenz), Swap, gestoppte Dienste, fehlende API-Rechte und
  Rollouts nach Status; dazu die Metrik `opnexus_rollout_runs{status}`.
2026-10-22 01:58:06 +02:00

610 lines
30 KiB
Python

"""The ``gui-gateway`` container: firewall web interfaces in their own browser origin (1.27).
Runs from the backend image (``python -m app.gui_gateway``) behind the proxy, which terminates TLS for the
slot ports and sets ``X-Onx-Slot`` (overwriting any client value). It never touches the database or the
secret stores; it only talks to the backend's internal API (``/internal/gui/*``, shared GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN)
and, per gateway session, to exactly one firewall.
Security model (see the 1.27 design):
* Every slot port is its own origin. The firewall GUI therefore never runs in the OPNexus origin.
* Cookies never cross: the browser's ``Cookie`` header is not forwarded (it carries the OPNexus session),
and the firewall's ``Set-Cookie`` never reaches the browser — a server-side jar per gateway session
(memory only) holds them. The browser only gets ``__Host-onx-gw-<slot>``.
* Each upstream request is built from scratch: method, path and query from the browser, a small header
allow-list, the jar's cookies; target origin, pinned certificate and overlay proxy from the backend.
Absolute-form targets, CONNECT/TRACE, ``Upgrade`` and service-worker script requests are refused.
* ``Sec-Fetch-Site`` must be same-origin/none (same-site only for the redeem step), fail-closed;
non-GET/HEAD requests also need the slot's own ``Origin``.
* ``Location`` pointing anywhere but the firewall is dropped; responses get CSP, X-Frame-Options DENY,
``Cache-Control: no-store``.
* At most 3 failed GUI logins per firewall in 5 minutes (protects OPNexus' API access from the firewall's
login lockout, which would see all attempts coming from OPNexus).
* Idle and absolute limits; every 20 s the backend re-checks the session (OPNexus session, admin role,
switch, host, and that the firewall's address, pinned certificate and overlay route are still the ones the
session started with).
* At most MAX_SESSIONS sessions at once: expired ones are cleared first, a new session is refused otherwise —
a running session is never evicted by a newer one. Logs carry method, path (no query), status and duration only.
OPNsense behaviour this relies on (opnsense/core, src/www/authgui.inc, master as of 2026-10-21):
* session_auth(): a login is ``isset($_POST['login']) && !empty($_POST['usernamefld']) &&
!empty($_POST['passwordfld'])`` posted to the current URL (login form has no action). Success sends a
``Location:`` header and exits (302); a failure re-renders the login form (200) with "Wrong username or
password." and an auth_log entry.
* check_security_http_referer_enforcement() only runs when HTTP_REFERER is set, and wants the firewall's
own host name/IP — so the gateway sends no Referer (and no Origin) upstream at all.
* check_security_dns_rebind() accepts an IP address or the configured host name as Host — the gateway
sends the Host of the host record's base URL (httpx derives it from the URL).
"""
import asyncio
import hashlib
import logging
import os
import secrets
import ssl
import time
from collections import deque
from dataclasses import dataclass, field
from http.cookies import CookieError, SimpleCookie
from typing import Awaitable, Callable
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlsplit
import httpx
logger = logging.getLogger("gui_gateway")
# httpx/httpcore log full request URLs (query strings) at INFO/DEBUG: never in this process.
for _noisy in ("httpx", "httpcore"):
logging.getLogger(_noisy).setLevel(logging.WARNING)
LISTEN_PORT = 8080
COOKIE_PREFIX = "__Host-onx-gw-"
OPNEXUS_SESSION_COOKIE = "__Host-opnexus-session"
BODY_LIMIT = 64 * 1024 * 1024 # config restore uploads
LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT = 3
LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW = 300.0
UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT = 60.0
MAX_SESSIONS = 64
# Request headers copied from the browser; everything else (Cookie, Authorization, Origin, Referer,
# X-Forwarded-*, hop-by-hop, Sec-*, ...) is dropped.
_FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS = {
"accept", "accept-language", "content-type", "user-agent", "x-requested-with", "x-csrftoken", "range",
}
# Response headers copied from the firewall. Set-Cookie goes to the jar, Location is rewritten.
_FORWARD_RESPONSE_HEADERS = {
"content-type", "content-length", "content-encoding", "content-disposition", "content-language",
"content-range", "accept-ranges", "content-security-policy",
}
_GATEWAY_CSP = ("connect-src 'self'; form-action 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'; base-uri 'self'; "
"object-src 'none'; worker-src 'none'")
_SECURITY_HEADERS = [
(b"content-security-policy", _GATEWAY_CSP.encode()),
(b"x-frame-options", b"DENY"),
(b"x-content-type-options", b"nosniff"),
(b"cache-control", b"no-store"),
(b"pragma", b"no-cache"),
(b"referrer-policy", b"same-origin"),
(b"cross-origin-opener-policy", b"same-origin"),
(b"cross-origin-resource-policy", b"same-origin"),
(b"permissions-policy", b"camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), payment=(), usb=()"),
]
def _sha(value: str) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(value.encode()).hexdigest()
def _origin_of(url: str) -> str | None:
try:
parts = urlsplit(url)
port = parts.port
except ValueError:
return None
if parts.scheme not in ("http", "https") or not parts.hostname:
return None
default = 443 if parts.scheme == "https" else 80
host = parts.hostname.lower()
if ":" in host:
host = f"[{host}]"
return f"{parts.scheme}://{host}" + (f":{port}" if port and port != default else "")
def slot_origins_from(sites: str) -> dict[int, set[str]]:
"""OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES -> {port: {normalised origins}} (https only, explicit port)."""
slots: dict[int, set[str]] = {}
for raw in sites.split(","):
raw = raw.strip().rstrip("/")
try:
parts = urlsplit(raw)
port = parts.port
except ValueError:
continue
if parts.scheme == "https" and parts.hostname and port:
slots.setdefault(port, set()).add(_origin_of(raw))
return slots
@dataclass
class GatewaySession:
gui_session_id: str
session_hash: str
slot: int
upstream_origin: str
ca_pem: str | None
proxy_url: str | None
idle_timeout: float
absolute_deadline: float
revalidate_every: float
target_fp: str | None = None
last_activity: float = field(default_factory=time.monotonic)
next_check: float = 0.0
jar: dict[str, str] = field(default_factory=dict)
client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None
class BackendClient:
"""The backend's internal GUI API. Raises httpx.HTTPError when the backend is unreachable."""
def __init__(self, base_url: str, token: str, transport: httpx.AsyncBaseTransport | None = None):
self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(base_url=base_url, headers={"X-Onx-Gateway-Token": token},
timeout=10.0, transport=transport)
async def redeem(self, ticket_hash: str, session_hash: str, slot: int, client_ip: str | None) -> dict:
resp = await self._client.post("/internal/gui/redeem", json={
"ticket_hash": ticket_hash, "session_hash": session_hash, "slot": slot, "client_ip": client_ip})
if resp.status_code == 200:
return resp.json()
if resp.status_code == 403:
return {"ok": False, "reason": (resp.json().get("detail") or {}).get("reason", "denied")}
resp.raise_for_status()
return {"ok": False, "reason": f"http_{resp.status_code}"}
async def revalidate(self, gs: GatewaySession) -> dict:
resp = await self._client.post("/internal/gui/revalidate",
json={"gui_session_id": gs.gui_session_id, "session_hash": gs.session_hash,
"target_fp": gs.target_fp})
resp.raise_for_status()
return resp.json()
async def end(self, gs: GatewaySession, reason: str) -> None:
try:
await self._client.post("/internal/gui/end", json={
"gui_session_id": gs.gui_session_id, "session_hash": gs.session_hash, "reason": reason})
except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
logger.warning("Could not report the end of a GUI session (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
async def aclose(self) -> None:
await self._client.aclose()
def build_upstream_client(gs: GatewaySession) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
"""Same transport rules as opnsense_client._client: pinned certificate (or system CAs), overlay proxy."""
verify: ssl.SSLContext | bool
if gs.ca_pem:
from app.services.tls_pin_service import pinned_context # no database layer behind this import
verify = pinned_context(gs.ca_pem)
else:
verify = True
return httpx.AsyncClient(verify=verify, proxy=gs.proxy_url, timeout=UPSTREAM_TIMEOUT,
follow_redirects=False, trust_env=False)
class LoginLimiter:
"""At most LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT failed GUI logins per firewall within LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW seconds."""
def __init__(self, clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic):
self._failures: dict[str, deque] = {}
self._clock = clock
def _recent(self, key: str) -> deque:
now = self._clock()
q = self._failures.setdefault(key, deque())
while q and now - q[0] > LOGIN_FAILURE_WINDOW:
q.popleft()
return q
def blocked(self, key: str) -> bool:
return len(self._recent(key)) >= LOGIN_FAILURE_LIMIT
def record_failure(self, key: str) -> None:
self._recent(key).append(self._clock())
def is_login_attempt(method: str, content_type: str, body: bytes) -> bool:
if method != "POST":
return False
if content_type.lower().startswith("multipart/form-data"):
# PHP fills $_POST from multipart bodies too, so authgui.inc accepts a login posted this way.
return all(f'name="{field}"'.encode() in body for field in ("login", "usernamefld", "passwordfld"))
if not content_type.lower().startswith("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"):
return False
try:
form = parse_qs(body.decode("latin-1"), keep_blank_values=True)
except ValueError:
return False
return "login" in form and bool(form.get("usernamefld", [""])[0]) and bool(form.get("passwordfld", [""])[0])
def rewrite_location(location: str, upstream_origin: str) -> str | None:
"""Relative target for the browser, or None when the redirect leaves the firewall."""
location = location.strip()
if not location or "\\" in location or any(ord(c) < 0x20 for c in location):
return None
if location.startswith("//"):
location = "https:" + location
parts = urlsplit(location)
if parts.scheme or parts.netloc:
if _origin_of(location) != _origin_of(upstream_origin):
return None
path = parts.path or "/"
return path + (f"?{parts.query}" if parts.query else "") + (f"#{parts.fragment}" if parts.fragment else "")
return location
def _page(title: str, text_de: str, text_en: str) -> bytes:
return (f"<!doctype html><html lang=\"de\"><head><meta charset=\"utf-8\"><title>{title}</title></head>"
f"<body style=\"font-family:sans-serif;max-width:40rem;margin:3rem auto\"><h1>{title}</h1>"
f"<p>{text_de}</p><p lang=\"en\">{text_en}</p></body></html>").encode()
_SESSION_GONE = _page("OPNexus", "Diese Sitzung ist abgelaufen oder ungültig. Öffne die Oberfläche erneut aus OPNexus.",
"This session has expired or is invalid. Open the interface again from OPNexus.")
_FORBIDDEN = _page("OPNexus", "Diese Anfrage wurde vom GUI-Gateway abgelehnt.", "This request was refused by the GUI gateway.")
_BAD_REDIRECT = _page("OPNexus", "Die Firewall wollte auf eine fremde Adresse umleiten; die Umleitung wurde verworfen.",
"The firewall tried to redirect to a foreign address; the redirect was dropped.")
_LOGIN_LOCKED = _page("OPNexus", "Zu viele fehlgeschlagene Anmeldungen an dieser Firewall. Bitte warte 5 Minuten.",
"Too many failed sign-ins at this firewall. Please wait 5 minutes.")
_UNAVAILABLE = _page("OPNexus", "Die Firewall oder OPNexus ist gerade nicht erreichbar.",
"The firewall or OPNexus is not reachable right now.")
_TOO_MANY = _page("OPNexus", "Es laufen schon zu viele Firewall-Oberflächen gleichzeitig. Versuche es später erneut.",
"Too many firewall interfaces are open at the same time. Try again later.")
_REDEEMED = (b"<!doctype html><html><head><meta charset=\"utf-8\"><meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=/\">"
b"<title>OPNexus</title></head><body><a href=\"/\">&rarr;</a></body></html>")
class GuiGateway:
def __init__(self, *, backend: BackendClient, slot_origins: dict[int, set[str]],
upstream_factory: Callable[[GatewaySession], httpx.AsyncClient] = build_upstream_client,
clock: Callable[[], float] = time.monotonic, wall_clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time):
self.backend = backend
self.slot_origins = slot_origins
self.upstream_factory = upstream_factory
self.clock = clock
self.wall_clock = wall_clock
self.sessions: dict[str, GatewaySession] = {} # sha256(gateway cookie) -> session
self.limiter = LoginLimiter(clock)
self._loop_task: asyncio.Task | None = None
# ── ASGI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def __call__(self, scope, receive, send):
if scope["type"] == "lifespan":
await self._lifespan(receive, send)
return
if scope["type"] != "http":
# WebSocket and anything else: not supported (design: no WebSocket).
if scope["type"] == "websocket":
await send({"type": "websocket.close", "code": 1008})
return
started = time.monotonic()
status = await self._handle(scope, receive, send)
# Method, path and status only: never the query string, headers or bodies.
logger.info("%s %s %d %.0fms", scope.get("method", "?"), scope.get("path", "?")[:200], status,
(time.monotonic() - started) * 1000)
async def _lifespan(self, receive, send):
while True:
message = await receive()
if message["type"] == "lifespan.startup":
self._loop_task = asyncio.create_task(self._revalidate_loop())
await send({"type": "lifespan.startup.complete"})
elif message["type"] == "lifespan.shutdown":
if self._loop_task:
self._loop_task.cancel()
for key in list(self.sessions):
await self._drop(key, "shutdown")
await self.backend.aclose()
await send({"type": "lifespan.shutdown.complete"})
return
async def _revalidate_loop(self):
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(10)
try:
await self.sweep()
except Exception: # never let the loop die
logger.exception("GUI session sweep failed")
async def sweep(self) -> None:
"""Idle/absolute limits and the periodic backend re-check for every gateway session."""
for key, gs in list(self.sessions.items()):
reason = self._expired(gs)
if reason:
await self._drop(key, reason)
elif self.clock() >= gs.next_check:
await self._recheck(key, gs)
# ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@staticmethod
def _headers(scope) -> dict[str, str]:
result: dict[str, str] = {}
for k, v in scope.get("headers", []):
name = k.decode("latin-1").lower()
value = v.decode("latin-1")
if name in result:
value = f"{result[name]}{'; ' if name == 'cookie' else ', '}{value}"
result[name] = value
return result
@staticmethod
def _cookies(header: str) -> dict[str, str]:
cookies: dict[str, str] = {}
for part in header.split(";"):
name, sep, value = part.strip().partition("=")
if sep and name and name not in cookies:
cookies[name] = value
return cookies
async def _respond(self, send, status: int, body: bytes = b"", headers: list | None = None,
content_type: bytes = b"text/html; charset=utf-8") -> int:
out = [(b"content-type", content_type), (b"content-length", str(len(body)).encode())]
out += list(headers or []) + _SECURITY_HEADERS
await send({"type": "http.response.start", "status": status, "headers": out})
await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": body})
return status
def _expired(self, gs: GatewaySession) -> str | None:
if self.wall_clock() >= gs.absolute_deadline:
return "absolute"
if self.clock() - gs.last_activity >= gs.idle_timeout:
return "idle"
return None
async def _drop(self, key: str, reason: str, *, report: bool = True) -> None:
gs = self.sessions.pop(key, None)
if gs is None:
return
gs.jar.clear()
if gs.client is not None:
await gs.client.aclose()
if report:
await self.backend.end(gs, reason)
async def _recheck(self, key: str, gs: GatewaySession) -> bool | None:
"""True = still valid, False = ended (dropped), None = backend unreachable (fail closed, keep for retry)."""
try:
result = await self.backend.revalidate(gs)
except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
logger.warning("GUI session re-check failed (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
return None
if not result.get("ok"):
await self._drop(key, str(result.get("reason", "revoked")), report=False) # backend already ended it
return False
gs.absolute_deadline = min(gs.absolute_deadline, float(result.get("absolute_deadline", gs.absolute_deadline)))
gs.idle_timeout = float(result.get("idle_timeout_seconds", gs.idle_timeout))
gs.next_check = self.clock() + gs.revalidate_every
return True
async def _clear_expired(self) -> None:
for key, gs in list(self.sessions.items()):
reason = self._expired(gs)
if reason:
await self._drop(key, reason)
def _has_room(self, browser_hash: str, slot: int) -> bool:
"""Room for one more session; the one this redeem would replace (same browser session and slot) does not count."""
replaced = sum(1 for g in self.sessions.values() if g.slot == slot and g.session_hash == browser_hash)
return len(self.sessions) - replaced < MAX_SESSIONS
# ── request handling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def _handle(self, scope, receive, send) -> int:
method = scope.get("method", "")
path = scope.get("path", "")
raw_path = scope.get("raw_path") or path.encode()
headers = self._headers(scope)
if method in ("CONNECT", "TRACE"):
return await self._respond(send, 501, _FORBIDDEN)
# Origin-form only: "GET http://elsewhere/ HTTP/1.1" (absolute-form) or "//host" never reach upstream.
if not path.startswith("/") or path.startswith("//") or not raw_path.startswith(b"/") \
or raw_path.startswith(b"//") or "\\" in path:
return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)
if "upgrade" in headers or "upgrade" in headers.get("connection", "").lower():
return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN)
if headers.get("service-worker", "").lower() == "script":
return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)
try:
slot = int(headers.get("x-onx-slot", ""))
except ValueError:
slot = 0
own_origins = self.slot_origins.get(slot)
if not own_origins:
return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN) # not coming through the proxy's slot block
site = headers.get("sec-fetch-site", "").strip().lower()
if path == "/__onx/redeem":
if method != "GET" or site not in ("same-site", "same-origin", "none"):
return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)
return await self._redeem(scope, headers, slot, send)
if site not in ("same-origin", "none"):
return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN) # missing header = old/odd client: fail closed
if method not in ("GET", "HEAD"):
origin = headers.get("origin", "")
if _origin_of(origin) not in own_origins:
return await self._respond(send, 403, _FORBIDDEN)
if path.startswith("/__onx/"):
return await self._respond(send, 404, _FORBIDDEN)
cookies = self._cookies(headers.get("cookie", ""))
token = cookies.get(f"{COOKIE_PREFIX}{slot}", "")
key = _sha(token) if token else ""
gs = self.sessions.get(key) if key else None
if gs is None or gs.slot != slot:
return await self._respond(send, 401, _SESSION_GONE)
reason = self._expired(gs)
if reason:
await self._drop(key, reason)
return await self._respond(send, 401, _SESSION_GONE)
if self.clock() >= gs.next_check:
state = await self._recheck(key, gs)
if state is False:
return await self._respond(send, 401, _SESSION_GONE)
if state is None:
return await self._respond(send, 503, _UNAVAILABLE)
gs.last_activity = self.clock()
return await self._proxy(scope, receive, send, headers, gs)
async def _redeem(self, scope, headers, slot: int, send) -> int:
query = parse_qs(scope.get("query_string", b"").decode("latin-1"))
ticket = (query.get("t") or [""])[0]
browser_session = self._cookies(headers.get("cookie", "")).get(OPNEXUS_SESSION_COOKIE, "")
if not ticket or len(ticket) > 128 or not browser_session:
return await self._respond(send, 403, _SESSION_GONE)
client_ip = (headers.get("x-forwarded-for", "").split(",")[0].strip() or None)
# Room first, before the ticket is burned: expired sessions go, running ones are never evicted.
await self._clear_expired()
if not self._has_room(_sha(browser_session), slot):
return await self._respond(send, 503, _TOO_MANY)
try:
result = await self.backend.redeem(_sha(ticket), _sha(browser_session), slot, client_ip and client_ip[:45])
except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
logger.warning("Ticket redeem failed (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
return await self._respond(send, 503, _UNAVAILABLE)
if not result.get("ok"):
return await self._respond(send, 403, _SESSION_GONE)
# One browser session, one gateway session per slot: an older one in this slot is replaced.
for old_key, old in list(self.sessions.items()):
if old.slot == slot and old.session_hash == _sha(browser_session):
await self._drop(old_key, "superseded", report=False)
value = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
gs = GatewaySession(
gui_session_id=result["gui_session_id"], session_hash=_sha(browser_session), slot=slot,
upstream_origin=result["upstream_origin"], ca_pem=result.get("ca_pem"), proxy_url=result.get("proxy_url"),
idle_timeout=float(result["idle_timeout_seconds"]), absolute_deadline=float(result["absolute_deadline"]),
revalidate_every=float(result.get("revalidate_seconds", 20)), target_fp=result.get("target_fp"),
)
if len(self.sessions) >= MAX_SESSIONS: # filled up while the backend was answering
await self.backend.end(gs, "revoked")
return await self._respond(send, 503, _TOO_MANY)
gs.last_activity = self.clock()
gs.next_check = gs.last_activity + gs.revalidate_every
self.sessions[_sha(value)] = gs
cookie = f"{COOKIE_PREFIX}{slot}={value}; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict"
# 200 + meta refresh instead of a 303: the follow-up request then starts in this origin
# (Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin) and the ticket leaves the address bar.
return await self._respond(send, 200, _REDEEMED, headers=[
(b"set-cookie", cookie.encode()), (b"clear-site-data", b'"cache", "storage"'),
])
async def _read_body(self, receive) -> bytes | None:
chunks, size = [], 0
while True:
message = await receive()
if message["type"] == "http.disconnect":
return None
chunk = message.get("body", b"")
size += len(chunk)
if size > BODY_LIMIT:
return None
chunks.append(chunk)
if not message.get("more_body"):
return b"".join(chunks)
def _store_cookies(self, gs: GatewaySession, response: httpx.Response) -> None:
for header in response.headers.get_list("set-cookie"):
jar = SimpleCookie()
try:
jar.load(header)
except CookieError:
continue
for name, morsel in jar.items():
expired = morsel["max-age"] in ("0",) or morsel.value in ("", "deleted")
if not expired and morsel["expires"]:
try:
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
expired = parsedate_to_datetime(morsel["expires"]).timestamp() <= self.wall_clock()
except (TypeError, ValueError):
pass
if expired:
gs.jar.pop(name, None)
else:
gs.jar[name] = morsel.value
async def _proxy(self, scope, receive, send, headers: dict, gs: GatewaySession) -> int:
length = headers.get("content-length", "")
if length.isdigit() and int(length) > BODY_LIMIT:
return await self._respond(send, 413, _FORBIDDEN)
body = await self._read_body(receive)
if body is None:
return await self._respond(send, 413, _FORBIDDEN)
method = scope["method"]
login = is_login_attempt(method, headers.get("content-type", ""), body)
if login and self.limiter.blocked(gs.upstream_origin):
return await self._respond(send, 429, _LOGIN_LOCKED)
out_headers = {k: v for k, v in headers.items() if k in _FORWARD_REQUEST_HEADERS}
out_headers["accept-encoding"] = "identity"
if gs.jar:
out_headers["cookie"] = "; ".join(f"{k}={v}" for k, v in gs.jar.items())
query = scope.get("query_string", b"").decode("latin-1")
# The path exactly as the browser sent it (still percent-encoded): the decoded scope["path"] would
# turn %3F/%23 into query/fragment, %2F into a separator and decode %25xx a second time upstream.
raw_path = (scope.get("raw_path") or scope["path"].encode()).split(b"?", 1)[0].decode("latin-1")
url = gs.upstream_origin + raw_path + (f"?{query}" if query else "")
if gs.client is None:
gs.client = self.upstream_factory(gs)
try:
request = gs.client.build_request(method, url, headers=out_headers, content=body)
except httpx.InvalidURL:
return await self._respond(send, 400, _FORBIDDEN) # e.g. control characters in the path
try:
response = await gs.client.send(request, stream=True)
except (httpx.HTTPError, ssl.SSLError, OSError) as exc:
logger.warning("Upstream request failed (%s)", type(exc).__name__)
return await self._respond(send, 502, _UNAVAILABLE)
try:
self._store_cookies(gs, response)
if login and not (300 <= response.status_code < 400):
self.limiter.record_failure(gs.upstream_origin)
out = []
for name, value in response.headers.multi_items():
lname = name.lower()
if lname in _FORWARD_RESPONSE_HEADERS:
out.append((lname.encode("latin-1"), value.encode("latin-1")))
if "location" in response.headers:
target = rewrite_location(response.headers["location"], gs.upstream_origin)
if target is None:
await response.aclose()
return await self._respond(send, 502, _BAD_REDIRECT)
out.append((b"location", target.encode("latin-1")))
await send({"type": "http.response.start", "status": response.status_code, "headers": out + _SECURITY_HEADERS})
async for chunk in response.aiter_raw():
await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": chunk, "more_body": True})
await send({"type": "http.response.body", "body": b""})
return response.status_code
finally:
await response.aclose()
def create_app(transport: httpx.AsyncBaseTransport | None = None) -> GuiGateway:
token = os.environ.get("GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN", "")
if len(token) < 32:
raise SystemExit("GUI_GATEWAY_TOKEN (at least 32 characters) is required")
slots = slot_origins_from(os.environ.get("OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES", ""))
if not slots:
raise SystemExit("OPNEXUS_GUI_SITES must list the https slot origins")
backend = BackendClient(os.environ.get("GUI_BACKEND_URL", "http://backend:8000"), token, transport)
return GuiGateway(backend=backend, slot_origins=slots)
def main() -> None:
import uvicorn
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(asctime)s %(name)s %(levelname)s %(message)s")
# h11: an absolute-form target stays visible in scope["path"] (and is refused); access_log off because
# uvicorn's access log would contain query strings (the redeem ticket).
uvicorn.run(create_app(), host="0.0.0.0", port=LISTEN_PORT, http="h11", ws="none", access_log=False,
server_header=False, date_header=False, proxy_headers=False, lifespan="on", log_config=None)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()