Release v1.16.0

Erste Schritte nach der Installation. Ende-zu-Ende gegen einen isolierten Stack getestet, siehe
Handbuch „Einrichtungsassistent und Passwort-Reset“:

- **Einrichtungsassistent** (`/setup`, System › Einrichtung): vier Schritte mit Erklärungen —
  Willkommen und Sprache, Konto (eigenes Passwort, Zwei-Faktor-Anmeldung), erste Firewall
  verbinden (inklusive Anleitung für den API-Key in OPNsense, Zertifikat festsetzen,
  Verbindungsstatus) und eine Übersicht, was als Nächstes sinnvoll ist. Auf einer frischen
  Installation ohne Hosts öffnet er sich nach der ersten Anmeldung von selbst; „Assistent
  überspringen“ merkt sich das pro Benutzer, erneut öffnen geht jederzeit über System › Einrichtung
  oder die Einstellungen. Nur für Admins. Neue Spalte `user_preferences.setup_done`
  (Migration `0005`).
- **`opnexus password [NAME]`** setzt ein neues Zufallspasswort für den Admin und zeigt es an
  (`--yes` ohne Rückfrage; Rückfrage nur, wenn sich schon jemand angemeldet hat). Ersetzt das
  Suchen im Backend-Log nach dem beim ersten Start erzeugten Passwort und taugt zugleich für ein
  vergessenes Admin-Passwort. Alle Sitzungen des Kontos enden. Dahinter steht
  `python -m app.reset_password`. Die Meldung beim ersten Start verweist darauf.

.env.example

@@ -71,6 +71,25 @@ TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=false
 # Release-Feed (GitHub/Forgejo "releases/latest"). Leer = aus: dann macht
 # OPNexus keine ausgehende Anfrage. Gesendet wird nur ein GET mit
 # User-Agent "OPNexus/<Version>". Admins sehen bei einer neueren Version einen
-# Hinweis; aktualisiert wird nie automatisch, sondern mit `opnexus update`.
+# Hinweis; aktualisiert wird nie automatisch, sondern mit `opnexus update` oder
+# (optional, siehe unten) per Klick im Webinterface.
 # UPDATE_CHECK_URL=https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json
 # UPDATE_CHECK_INTERVAL_HOURS=12
+
+# ── Updates aus dem Webinterface (optional, braucht Release-Images) ───
+# Startet den Updater-Container, mit dem Admins unter Einstellungen › „OPNexus
+# aktualisieren“ ein Update auslösen können. Er ist der einzige Container mit
+# Docker-Socket-Zugriff (= root-gleiche Rechte auf diesem Host) und standardmäßig
+# AUS. Benötigt außerdem UPDATE_CHECK_URL (oben). Siehe Handbuch.
+# COMPOSE_PROFILES=updater
+
+# ── Transportsicherheit (nur ändern, wenn nötig) ──────────────────────
+# Firewall-API-Zugangsdaten gehen per HTTP-Basic-Auth raus, deshalb sind
+# http://-Adressen für Firewalls abgelehnt (beim Anlegen UND bei jeder
+# Anfrage). Nur für isolierte Labor-Setups auf "true" setzen.
+# ALLOW_INSECURE_FIREWALL_URLS=false
+# SMTP über SSL/STARTTLS prüft Zertifikat UND Hostname. Mailserver mit
+# privater CA: CA-PEM in den Backend-Container einbinden und hier angeben.
+# SMTP_CA_FILE=/data/smtp-ca.pem
+# SMTP-Anmeldung ohne Verschlüsselung (Sicherheit "none") bleibt gesperrt.
+# ALLOW_INSECURE_SMTP_AUTH=false

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -59,3 +59,5 @@ jobs:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
       - run: python3 scripts/check_i18n.py
       - run: bash -n scripts/opnexus && bash -n scripts/check_version.sh && bash -n scripts/make_release_bundle.sh
+      # Updater-Container (Zustandsübergänge, Ablehnungen, Auth) ohne Docker-Daemon.
+      - run: python3 -m unittest discover -s updater -p 'test_*.py'

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #                                 Berechtigung "write:package" eintragen)
 # Wer auf mehrere Registries veröffentlichen will, pusht den Tag einfach zu
 # mehreren Remotes — jeder Remote baut mit seiner eigenen Konfiguration.
-# Ergebnis: <REGISTRY>/<IMAGE_NAMESPACE>/opnexus-{backend,frontend,proxy}:<version>
+# Ergebnis: <REGISTRY>/<IMAGE_NAMESPACE>/opnexus-{backend,frontend,proxy,updater}:<version>
 # (flache Namen, weil verschachtelte Pfade je Registry unterschiedlich gehen).
 #
 # Der Publish-Job braucht einen Runner mit Docker-Zugriff, der QEMU-
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ jobs:
     strategy:
       fail-fast: true
       matrix:
-        service: [backend, frontend, proxy]
+        service: [backend, frontend, proxy, updater]
     steps:
       - uses: actions/checkout@v4
 

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -31,6 +31,261 @@ den Einstellungen.
 Nächste Codenamen (der Reihe nach, wenn die jeweils nächste MINOR-Version
 ansteht): Merlin …
 
+## [1.16.0] "Hobby" — 2026-10-10
+
+Erste Schritte nach der Installation. Ende-zu-Ende gegen einen isolierten Stack getestet, siehe
+Handbuch „Einrichtungsassistent und Passwort-Reset“:
+
+- **Einrichtungsassistent** (`/setup`, System › Einrichtung): vier Schritte mit Erklärungen —
+  Willkommen und Sprache, Konto (eigenes Passwort, Zwei-Faktor-Anmeldung), erste Firewall
+  verbinden (inklusive Anleitung für den API-Key in OPNsense, Zertifikat festsetzen,
+  Verbindungsstatus) und eine Übersicht, was als Nächstes sinnvoll ist. Auf einer frischen
+  Installation ohne Hosts öffnet er sich nach der ersten Anmeldung von selbst; „Assistent
+  überspringen“ merkt sich das pro Benutzer, erneut öffnen geht jederzeit über System › Einrichtung
+  oder die Einstellungen. Nur für Admins. Neue Spalte `user_preferences.setup_done`
+  (Migration `0005`).
+- **`opnexus password [NAME]`** setzt ein neues Zufallspasswort für den Admin und zeigt es an
+  (`--yes` ohne Rückfrage; Rückfrage nur, wenn sich schon jemand angemeldet hat). Ersetzt das
+  Suchen im Backend-Log nach dem beim ersten Start erzeugten Passwort und taugt zugleich für ein
+  vergessenes Admin-Passwort. Alle Sitzungen des Kontos enden. Dahinter steht
+  `python -m app.reset_password`. Die Meldung beim ersten Start verweist darauf.
+
+## [1.15.0] "Gyrfalcon" — 2026-10-10
+
+Updates aus dem Webinterface. Auf Klick, mit Fortschritt und automatischem Rollback; ein eigener,
+optionaler Container erledigt die Arbeit. Ende-zu-Ende mit echten Images getestet, siehe Handbuch
+„Update aus dem Webinterface (optional)“:
+
+- **Updates aus dem Webinterface (optional):** Einstellungen › „OPNexus aktualisieren“ zeigt die
+  neueste Version samt Release-Notes und aktualisiert auf Klick — mit Fortschrittsanzeige,
+  automatischem Rollback bei einem fehlgeschlagenen Update und „Auf Vorversion zurücksetzen“
+  (mit Hinweis, ob dabei Daten verloren gehen). Dahinter arbeitet ein eigener, kleiner
+  **Updater-Container** (`updater/`, Compose-Profil `updater`, mit `COMPOSE_PROFILES=updater`
+  in `.env` aktivieren), der dieselbe Logik wie `opnexus update` ausführt. Er ist standardmäßig
+  **aus** und der einzige Container mit Docker-Socket; das Backend bekommt ihn nie. Der Updater
+  hat keinen veröffentlichten Port, ist nur mit einem selbst erzeugten Token ansprechbar und kann
+  ausschließlich „aktualisieren auf die vom Release-Feed gemeldete neueste stabile Version“,
+  „zurückrollen“ und „Status“. Hauptversions-Sprünge bleiben der Kommandozeile vorbehalten.
+  Anfragen stehen im Audit-Log (neuer Typ „OPNexus-System“). Gilt nur für Release-Images.
+- `opnexus` (jetzt in `updater/opnexus`, `scripts/opnexus` ist ein Symlink): `status --porcelain`,
+  Exit-Code 3 für „fehlgeschlagen und sauber zurückgerollt“. Release-Images und -Bundle enthalten
+  zusätzlich `opnexus-updater`.
+- Der Banner „Neue Version verfügbar“ verlinkt auf den neuen Abschnitt in den Einstellungen.
+
+## [1.14.0] "Eagle" — 2026-10-09
+
+Diagnose von der Firewall aus sowie VXLAN und GIF. Gegen die OPNsense-Core-Quellen
+geprüft und live auf den Test-Firewalls getestet, siehe Handbuch „Erweiterung 1.14.0“:
+
+- **Host-System › Diagnose:** Ping, Traceroute, Port-Prüfung und DNS-Abfrage, ausgeführt von der
+  ausgewählten Firewall. Nur für Admins, strenge Eingabeprüfung, jeder Lauf im Audit-Log,
+  Ping-Jobs werden immer wieder aufgeräumt, der Banner der Gegenstelle wird nicht weitergegeben.
+  Packet-Capture gibt es bewusst nicht (Mitschnitte enthalten fremde Nutzdaten).
+- **Netzwerk › Geräte:** VXLAN und GIF-Tunnel (anlegen, ändern, löschen) über dieselbe abgesicherte
+  Engine wie die übrigen Geräte.
+- **Fehlerkorrektur:** Auf den Host-System-Seiten war „Übersicht › Hosts“ markiert und der Seitentitel
+  falsch, weil `/hostsystem` mit `/hosts` beginnt.
+
+## [1.13.0] "Buzzard" — 2026-10-09
+
+Mehr Verwaltung pro Firewall und ein Abgleich der Cluster-Knoten. Alles über
+dieselbe abgesicherte Engine wie in 1.12.0 und live auf drei Test-Firewalls
+geprüft, siehe Handbuch „Erweiterung 1.13.0“:
+
+- **Netzwerk › Geräte:** LAGG, Bridge, Loopback und GRE. Dazu Gateway-Gruppen,
+  DNS-Weiterleitungen (Unbound) und DHCP-Bereiche (dnsmasq).
+- **Neue Gruppe „Host-System“:** Tunables (immer mit Bestätigung, Vorgaben nur per
+  „Überschreiben“), Cron, Syslog-Ziele und ZFS-Snapshots (anlegen und löschen; der
+  aktive Snapshot ist geschützt, das Aktivieren bleibt OPNsense selbst überlassen).
+- **Netzwerk › Abgleich:** zeigt Unterschiede in der Netzwerk-Konfiguration zwischen den
+  Knoten eines Clusters. Neuer Alarm „Netzwerk-Abweichung im Cluster“ (Einstellungen ›
+  Benachrichtigungen, Migration 0004).
+- **Auf den Partner übertragen:** Nach dem Anlegen eines Objekts lässt es sich mit
+  einem Klick auch auf dem anderen Cluster-Knoten anlegen (eigene Vorschau, eigenes Backup).
+- **Kopfzeile:** Mit acht Gruppen zeigt die Navigation die Namen ab 1150 px, darunter
+  nur Icons, damit Suche und Abmelden in einer Zeile bleiben.
+
+## [1.12.0] "Condor" — 2026-10-09
+
+Netzwerk-Verwaltung und Übernahme von Hand angelegter Regeln. Alles gegen die
+OPNsense-Core-Quellen geprüft und live auf drei Test-Firewalls (26.7.1 und
+26.7.6) getestet, siehe Handbuch „Netzwerk, DNS und DHCP“:
+
+- **Neuer Bereich „Netzwerk“:** Inventar je Firewall (Schnittstellen mit
+  Adressen und CARP-Zustand, VLANs, virtuelle IPs, Gateways, Routen, DNS-Einträge,
+  DHCP) und Änderungen daran: anlegen, bearbeiten, löschen für VLANs, virtuelle
+  IPs, Gateways, statische Routen, Schnittstellen-Zuweisung samt IP-Konfiguration,
+  Unbound-DNS-Einträge, dnsmasq-Hosts sowie Kea-Subnetze und -Reservierungen.
+- **Abgesichert:** Jede Änderung läuft über eine Vorschau mit Diff und einem Token,
+  der den Firewall-Stand erfasst. Vor dem Schreiben wird ein Konfig-Backup
+  gespeichert (ohne Backup keine Änderung), danach angewendet und zurückgelesen.
+  OPNexus erkennt, über welche Schnittstelle es die Firewall erreicht; Änderungen,
+  die diese Verbindung kappen können (Verwaltungs-Schnittstelle, Standard-Gateway,
+  Standardroute, Route über die Firewall-Adresse), brauchen eine ausdrückliche
+  Bestätigung mit Eingabe des Firewall-Namens. Es gibt bewusst **keinen**
+  automatischen Rollback: OPNexus kann eine Änderung nicht zurücknehmen, wenn sie
+  seine eigene Verbindung trennt. Das Backup vor der Änderung ist der Rückweg.
+- **Schnittstellen-Löschen:** OPNsense entfernt dabei selbst alle Regeln, die die
+  Schnittstelle nutzen. Die Vorschau listet sie, die Bestätigung ist Pflicht.
+  Bereits auf der Firewall vorgemerkte Änderungen blockieren eine neue Änderung.
+- **IP-Konfiguration per API gibt es erst ab OPNsense 26.7.6.** Auf 26.7.1 ist die
+  Zuweisungsliste nur lesbar; OPNexus erkennt das an den Daten und sperrt die
+  Änderung mit Begründung.
+- **Von der Firewall übernehmen:** Regeln, die direkt in OPNsense angelegt wurden,
+  lassen sich in OPNexus übernehmen, bearbeiten und ausrollen. Die Übernahme schreibt
+  nichts auf die Firewall. Regeln, die das Modell verfälschen würde (invertierte
+  Quelle/Ziel, mehrere Schnittstellen, keine Quick-Regel, …), werden mit Grund
+  abgelehnt. Neu: Regeln haben ein Protokollieren-Flag (`log`, Migration 0003),
+  damit es beim Bearbeiten nicht still verloren geht; nicht modellierte Felder
+  (Gateway, Zustandsoptionen, …) bleiben auf der Firewall unverändert.
+- **Geheimnisse:** Das CARP-Passwort (liefert OPNsense im Klartext) und der
+  Kea-DDNS-Schlüssel werden nie zurückgegeben, gespeichert oder auditiert.
+- **Host-Adresse änderbar:** Hosts › Bearbeiten hat jetzt das Feld „Adresse“. Nach
+  einer Änderung der Verwaltungs-IP muss der Host nicht mehr gelöscht und neu
+  angelegt werden; Verlauf und Zuordnungen bleiben erhalten. Meldet eine Änderung
+  „angewendet, aber nicht prüfbar“, weist die Oberfläche darauf hin.
+- **Fehler aus den Live-Tests, die Mocks nicht gezeigt haben:** Jede Änderung einer
+  virtuellen IP muss die Adresse (`network`) wiederholen, sonst leert OPNsense sie
+  bzw. lehnt ab; die Prüfung nach dem Anwenden vergleicht jetzt den vollständigen
+  Soll-Zustand statt nur der gesendeten Felder. Dazu: Gateway-Priorität als Zahl,
+  Routen mit `enabled` statt `disabled`, Beschreibungsmuster der Schnittstellen,
+  gesperrte Schnittstellen, Pflicht-Backup vor jeder Änderung.
+- **Hinweis zu den Versionen:** Die IP-Konfiguration von Schnittstellen per API gibt
+  es erst ab OPNsense 26.7.6. Mit 26.7.5 (die Prod-Firewalls) sind VLANs, virtuelle
+  IPs, Gateways, Routen, DNS und DHCP verwaltbar, Schnittstellen nur lesbar.
+
+## [1.11.1] "Merlin" — 2026-10-09
+
+Fehler aus dem ersten Live-Test der bisher nur gemockten Funktionen auf drei
+echten OPNsense-Firewalls (alle in den Tests mit Mocks unsichtbar geblieben).
+Live bestätigt sind jetzt auch das Major-Upgrade über den Update Center
+(25.7 → 26.1 → 26.7, je mit Backup und Abschluss-Bestätigung), WireGuard,
+OpenVPN, IPsec, Zertifikate, ACME (Staging), hierarchische Policies,
+Benachrichtigungen und der HA-Config-Sync:
+
+- **Zertifikate (Trust-Store) und ACME ließen sich nicht pushen:** Die URLs
+  endeten auf `…Action` (`/trust/cert/addAction`), OPNsense kennt aber nur
+  `/trust/cert/add`, `set`, `del` bzw. `/acmeclient/…/add`, `update`, `del` (404).
+  Die Mocks hatten denselben Tippfehler. Ein neuer Test prüft den Client-Quelltext
+  gegen dieses Muster.
+- **OpenVPN-Deploy scheiterte immer:** Die Firewall verlangt `vpnid` und vergibt
+  es nicht selbst. OPNexus wählt jetzt die nächste freie. Außerdem erwarten
+  `cert`/`ca` (OpenVPN) und `caref` (Zertifikat signieren) die **refid** der
+  Trust-Store-Einträge, der Picker lieferte die Zeilen-UUID. Die Listen
+  `/hosts/{id}/certificates` und `/cas` liefern jetzt `refid`; im
+  Zertifikatsformular gibt es ein CA-Dropdown statt eines Freitextfelds.
+- **WireGuard meldete „Erfolg“ ohne laufenden Tunnel:** Ist der globale Dienst
+  (VPN › WireGuard › Allgemein) aus, entsteht trotz geschriebener Konfiguration
+  kein Interface. Der Deploy schaltet den Dienst jetzt ein.
+- **Dienststeuerung:** Das Backend prüfte weder, ob der Dienst existiert, noch ob
+  er gesperrt ist (pf, webgui, routing …). Beides war nur in der UI gesperrt;
+  unbekannte Namen meldete die Firewall trotzdem als „ok“. Jetzt 404
+  `SERVICE_NOT_FOUND` bzw. 409 `SERVICE_LOCKED`.
+- **Fehlertexte der Firewall unleserlich:** Die Redaktion maskierte jede
+  Validierungsmeldung, deren Feldname `cert`, `crt` oder `auth` enthält
+  („instance.cert: [redacted]“). In `validations` lösen diese drei Namen die
+  Maskierung nicht mehr aus; echte Geheimnisfelder bleiben maskiert. Das
+  Löschen eines benutzten Zertifikats nennt jetzt den Grund der Firewall
+  („Item in use by OpenVPN …“) statt eines allgemeinen Fehlers.
+- **Drift-Alarme flackerten beim Neustart eines Cluster-Mitglieds:** Mit nur
+  einem erreichbaren Host gab es nichts zu vergleichen, offene Regel-/NAT-Drift-
+  und Zertifikatsprobleme wurden „gelöst“ und danach neu geöffnet (je ein
+  Meldungspaar pro Problem). Offene Probleme bleiben jetzt unverändert, solange
+  sie nicht beurteilbar sind.
+- **IPsec lief nach dem Deploy nicht:** Der globale IPsec-Schalter war aus, die
+  Verbindungen wurden gespeichert, `reconfigure` antwortete „ok“, OPNexus meldete
+  „Erfolg“ (gleiche Klasse wie bei WireGuard). Der Deploy schaltet ihn jetzt ein;
+  zwischen zwei Test-FWs steht der Tunnel (Phase 1 verbunden).
+- **Löschen scheiterte ohne Grund:** Wenn die Firewall ein Löschen ablehnt (Alias
+  noch in einer Regel, Zertifikat in Benutzung), nennt die Meldung jetzt den Grund
+  der Firewall (`UPSTREAM_REJECTED`) statt „Anfrage fehlgeschlagen“.
+- **Kaputte Eingaben:** Ein NUL-Zeichen in einem Textfeld ergab einen 500er samt
+  abgebrochener Verbindung, ebenso ein langes oder NUL-haltiges Pfadsegment (der
+  Audit-Eintrag übernahm es ungeprüft in `VARCHAR(36)`). Jetzt 422 bzw. 404/422;
+  ein Fuzz-Lauf über alle 188 Routen findet keine 5xx mehr.
+- **`opnexus rollback` landete auf der falschen Version:** Zurückgesetzt wurde auf
+  die vom Backend gemeldete Programmversion statt auf den vorher eingestellten
+  Image-Tag. Bei Release-Candidates (rc1-Images melden schon `1.11.0`) führte das
+  auf das neuere Release. Jetzt wird der vorherige exakte Tag wiederhergestellt.
+- **Handy-Ansicht (375px) zoomte aus:** Die ausgeblendete Überschrift der
+  Aktionsspalte (`sr-only`, absolut positioniert) lag außerhalb der scrollbaren
+  Tabellenkarte und machte die Seite bis zu doppelt so breit (Hosts, Benutzer,
+  Host-Details). Scroll-Container sind jetzt der Bezugsrahmen.
+- **Überschriften-Reihenfolge:** Kartentitel in den Listen (OpenVPN, IPsec,
+  WireGuard, NAT) sind `h2` statt `h3`, sichtbar erst mit Daten; axe meldet auf
+  allen Seiten, hell und dunkel, nichts mehr.
+
+- **CARP-Wartungsfenster mit Auto-Revert:** Nach dem automatischen Zurückschalten
+  blieb die Aktion „CARP-Übergabe“ (`carp_enter`) offen. Sie ließ sich nicht mehr
+  bestätigen (der Host ist ja nicht mehr im Wartungsmodus) und blockierte alle
+  Deploys und Updates im Cluster (`OPEN_HOST_MAINTENANCE_BLOCKS_DEPLOY`), bis
+  jemand sie von Hand abbrach. Der Auto-Revert schließt die Aktion jetzt selbst
+  (Status „abgebrochen“, Audit-Eintrag). Schlägt das Zurückschalten fehl, bleibt
+  sie bewusst offen. Gefunden beim Live-Test gegen zwei OPNsense-26.7-Firewalls.
+- **Update Center, Protokoll-Fenster:** Nach einem Update mit Neustart ist das
+  Protokoll der Firewall leer; angezeigt wurde dann nur das Wort „error“, obwohl
+  das Update erfolgreich war. Jetzt steht dort ein erklärender Hinweis.
+
+## [1.11.0] "Merlin" — 2026-10-07
+
+Sicherheitsüberprüfung vom 2026-10-07, umgesetzte Korrekturen.
+**Verhaltensänderungen**, die beim Update auffallen können:
+
+- **Backup-Rohdownload nur für Admins**. Nur-Lese-Konten sehen weiter die
+  Liste der Snapshots, bekommen die `config.xml` (enthält Passwort-Hashes, VPN-Schlüssel)
+  aber nicht mehr; jeder Versuch steht im Audit-Verlauf (neuer Status „abgelehnt“).
+- **Passwortwechsel/-reset beendet alle Sitzungen** des Kontos; ebenso
+  2FA-Reset durch einen Admin. 2FA aktivieren/deaktivieren beendet die *anderen* Sitzungen.
+- **SMTP über SSL/STARTTLS prüft Zertifikat und Hostname**. Mailserver mit
+  privater CA: `SMTP_CA_FILE` setzen. SMTP-Anmeldung ohne Verschlüsselung ist gesperrt
+  (`ALLOW_INSECURE_SMTP_AUTH=true` hebt das bewusst auf).
+- **Firewalls nur noch per `https://`** — beim Anlegen und bei jeder Anfrage;
+  ein vorhandener `http://`-Host zeigt „offline“, statt Zugangsdaten im Klartext zu senden
+  (`ALLOW_INSECURE_FIREWALL_URLS=true` nur für Labor-Setups).
+- **VPN-Push (IPsec/OpenVPN/WireGuard) verlangt das Vorschau-Token** und das
+  Token ändert sich, sobald nur das Geheimnis (PSK/Schlüssel) rotiert wurde. Die Vorschau
+  zeigt „unverändert“ jetzt korrekt, statt jeden Tunnel dauerhaft als geändert.
+- **Host löschen** ist auch bei VPN-, Zertifikats- und ACME-Objekten auf der Firewall
+  gesperrt, bis diese entfernt sind; Schlüsseldateien nie bereitgestellter
+  Entwürfe werden mit entfernt.
+- Benachrichtigungs-Geheimnisse liegen jetzt im Volume `notification_secrets`
+ . Ohne lesbares Signatur-/SMTP-Geheimnis wird **nichts** mehr gesendet
+  (vorher: unsigniert/ohne Login). Wer Geheimnisse gesetzt hat, muss sie nach dem
+  Update einmal neu eingeben, falls der Container zwischenzeitlich ersetzt wurde.
+
+Weitere Korrekturen:
+
+- Oberfläche: Der „Bestätigen“-Button steht jetzt am Ende der Deploy-Ergebnis-Zeile statt
+  in der Aktionszeile (Regeln, Aliase, Port-Forwards, 1:1-NAT, Outbound-NAT,
+  Hierarchie-Regeln); die Aktionszeile springt nicht mehr, wenn ein Deployment offen wird.
+
+- **Deployments hinterlassen vor dem ersten Firewall-Aufruf eine dauerhafte Spur**
+  (gemeinsamer Ablauf `deploy_flow.py` für Regeln, Aliase, Port-Forwards, 1:1-NAT,
+  Outbound-NAT und Hierarchie-Regeln): Bei Absturz, verlorener Antwort oder Timeout bleibt
+  die Rollback-Frist erhalten und der Sweeper macht die Änderung rückgängig. Wo die Firewall
+  eine neue Regel möglicherweise angelegt hat, ohne dass eine UUID bekannt ist, steht der
+  Eintrag auf „Rollback fehlgeschlagen“ mit dem Hinweis „Ausgang unklar“ (blockiert
+  erneutes Deployen, löst die Benachrichtigung aus); „Rollback wiederholen“ entfernt ihn.
+  Von der Firewall beantwortete Ablehnungen und Verbindungsfehler bleiben einfache Fehler.
+- TOTP- und Recovery-Codes sind auch bei gleichzeitigen Anfragen genau einmal
+  verwendbar (Zeilensperre).
+- Login-Sperre: begrenzter Speicher, Argon2 läuft außerhalb des Event-Loops mit
+  Parallelitätsgrenze, 2FA-Einrichtung/-Aktivierung/-Deaktivierung und Passwortwechsel
+  haben ein Versuchslimit; offene 2FA-Einrichtung läuft nach 15 Minuten ab; Proxy
+  begrenzt API-Anfragen auf 2 MB.
+- Fehlermeldungen der Firewall werden vor Speicherung/Anzeige von Geheimnissen
+  bereinigt und gekürzt; Validierungsfehler (422) geben Eingaben nicht mehr
+  zurück; Webhook-URLs (oft mit Token) sieht ein Nur-Lese-Konto nur noch als
+  Host.
+- Audit: MFA/Passwort, VPN, Zertifikate/ACME, Benachrichtigungen und Backup-Exporte
+  werden aufgezeichnet, ebenso abgelehnte Schreibversuche von Nur-Lese-Konten.
+- Same-Origin-Prüfung berücksichtigt das Schema bei `COOKIE_SECURE=true`;
+  Warnung beim Start, wenn `FRONTEND_ORIGIN` https ist, das Cookie aber nicht `Secure`
+ . Geheimnisdateien werden atomar mit Modus 0600 angelegt.
+- Frontend-Abhängigkeiten (`sharp`, `source-map-js`, `brace-expansion`) aktualisiert.
+  Offen: `braces`/`postcss-selector-parser` nur in Build-Werkzeugen (Tailwind 3 /
+  ESLint), nicht im Laufzeit-Image; für `braces` gibt es keine gepatchte Version.
+
 ## [1.10.1] "Lanner" — 2026-10-06
 
 PATCH-Release (Bugfixes, Dokumentation, Lizenz/Repo-Umstellung) nach dem ersten Live-Test

README.de.md

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ Zentrale Verwaltung mehrerer [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org)-Firewalls: Regeln,
 
 [Website](https://opnexus.dev/) · [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) · [Handbuch](docs/HANDBUCH.md) · [English](README.md)
 
-![Zentrale Firewall-Regeln](website/assets/screenshots/de/rules-light-desktop.webp)
+![Zentrale Firewall-Regeln](docs/screenshots/readme-rules-de.webp)
 
-> **Stand:** `1.10.1-rc2` ist der aktuelle öffentliche Release-Candidate (er löst `1.10.0-rc1`/`-rc2` ab). Entwickelt wurde gegen echte OPNsense-Instanzen, eine frische Installation aus den veröffentlichten Images ist aber noch nicht im Feld erprobt — bitte Ecken und Kanten melden.
+> **Stand:** `1.16.0` ist die aktuelle stabile Version. Entwickelt und getestet wurde gegen echte OPNsense-Instanzen; eine frische Installation aus dem Release-Bundle sowie Updates und Rollbacks sind durchgängig geprüft. Ecken und Kanten bitte melden.
 
 ## Funktionen
 
@@ -16,13 +16,23 @@ Zentrale Verwaltung mehrerer [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org)-Firewalls: Regeln,
 - **Sichere Änderungen** — jede Änderung läuft *Prüfen → Ausrollen → Bestätigen*; bleibt die Bestätigung im Zeitfenster aus, rollt OPNexus zurück.
 - **Hierarchische Policies** — Pre-/Post-Rulebases mit Vererbung über Gruppenbäume.
 - **VPN** — IPsec-Site-to-Site, OpenVPN und WireGuard, einmal definiert und ausgerollt.
+- **Netzwerk** — Schnittstellen, VLANs, virtuelle IPs, Gateways, Routen, LAGG/Bridge/GRE, DNS und DHCP je Firewall, dazu Tunables, Cron, Syslog, Snapshots und Diagnose (Ping, Traceroute, Port-Prüfung, DNS), ein Abgleich der Cluster-Knoten, mit Diff-Vorschau, Backup vor jeder Änderung und Schutz davor, die eigene Verbindung zu kappen; von Hand angelegte Regeln lassen sich übernehmen.
 - **Zertifikate** — Trust-Store für alle Firewalls und Ausstellung per ACME / Let's Encrypt.
 - **Logs & Audit** — zentrale Log-Suche mit Korrelation, Dashboards und lückenloser Deploy-Verlauf.
 - **Update-Center** — Firmware-Updates für die Flotte, mit Blick auf HA-Reihenfolge und Wartungsmodus.
+- **Einrichtungsassistent** — geführter Erststart nach der Installation: eigenes Passwort, Zwei-Faktor und die erste Firewall verbinden.
+- **Selbst-Update** — OPNexus aktualisiert sich auf Wunsch aus der eigenen Oberfläche, mit Fortschritt und automatischem Rollback (optional).
 - **Zugang** — HTTPS mit gepinnten Firewall-Zertifikaten, optionale Zwei-Faktor-Anmeldung, Rollen (Admin / Nur-Lesen), Tastaturbedienung, Dark Mode, Oberfläche auf Deutsch und Englisch.
 
 Alle Screenshots zeigen fiktive Beispieldaten.
 
+## Ratgeber
+
+- [OPNsense-Firewalls zentral verwalten](https://opnexus.dev/opnsense-zentral-verwalten/) – wann sich zentrale Verwaltung lohnt und wie sie funktioniert
+- [OPNsense-HA-Cluster mit CARP verwalten](https://opnexus.dev/opnsense-ha-cluster-carp/) – Rollen, Alarme, geordnete Updates, Abgleich beider Knoten
+- [OPNsense-Regeln sicher ausrollen](https://opnexus.dev/opnsense-regeln-sicher-ausrollen/) – Vorschau, Bestätigungsfenster und automatischer Rollback
+- [Das Kommandozeilen-Werkzeug `opnexus`](https://opnexus.dev/docs/cli/) – Installation aktualisieren, zurückrollen und sichern
+
 ## Schnellstart
 
 Voraussetzung: Docker mit Compose-Plugin.
@@ -34,19 +44,21 @@ cp .env.example .env        # POSTGRES_PASSWORD (und ADMIN_PASSWORD) setzen
 docker compose up -d --build
 ```
 
-Die Oberfläche läuft dann unter `http://localhost:3100`. Ohne `ADMIN_PASSWORD` wird beim ersten Start ein zufälliges Admin-Passwort erzeugt und **einmalig** im Backend-Log ausgegeben:
+Die Oberfläche läuft dann unter `http://localhost:3100`. Ohne `ADMIN_PASSWORD` wird beim ersten Start ein zufälliges Admin-Passwort erzeugt und **einmalig** im Backend-Log ausgegeben. Verloren oder nie gesehen? Dieses Kommando setzt ein neues Zufallspasswort und zeigt es an (im Repo-Checkout `scripts/opnexus`, im Release-Bundle `./opnexus`):
 
 ```bash
-docker compose logs backend | grep -A5 "generated password"
+scripts/opnexus password
 ```
 
+Nach der ersten Anmeldung öffnet sich von selbst ein kurzer **Einrichtungsassistent**: eigenes Passwort setzen, optional Zwei-Faktor-Anmeldung einschalten, die erste Firewall verbinden (samt Anleitung für den API-Key in OPNsense). Er lässt sich überspringen und jederzeit unter System › Einrichtung wieder öffnen.
+
 Für den Zugriff von anderen Rechnern und den Produktivbetrieb mit TLS (mitgelieferter Caddy-Proxy) siehe das [Handbuch](docs/HANDBUCH.md#zugriff-von-außerhalb-dieser-vm--produktivbetrieb-mit-tls).
 
 **Fertige Images** (amd64) liegen in der Registry dieses Gitea. In der `.env`:
 
 ```bash
 OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO=git.opnexus.dev/opnexus
-OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.10.1-rc2
+OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.16.0
 ```
 
 ```bash

README.md

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ Central management for multiple [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org) firewalls: rule
 
 [Website](https://opnexus.dev) · [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) · [Handbook (German)](docs/HANDBUCH.md) · [Deutsch](README.de.md)
 
-![Central firewall rules](website/assets/screenshots/en/rules-light-desktop.webp)
+![Central firewall rules](docs/screenshots/readme-rules-en.webp)
 
-> **Status:** `1.10.1-rc2` is the current public release candidate (it replaces `1.10.0-rc1`/`-rc2`). It has been developed against real OPNsense instances, but a fresh install from the published images has not been field-tested yet — please expect rough edges and report them.
+> **Status:** `1.16.0` is the current stable release. It has been developed and tested against real OPNsense instances; a clean install from the release bundle, updates and rollbacks have been verified end to end. Please report rough edges.
 
 ## What it does
 
@@ -16,15 +16,25 @@ Central management for multiple [OPNsense](https://opnsense.org) firewalls: rule
 - **Safe changes** — every change goes *preview → deploy → confirm*; without your confirmation inside the time window OPNexus rolls it back.
 - **Hierarchical policies** — pre/post rulebases with inheritance across group trees.
 - **VPN** — IPsec site-to-site, OpenVPN and WireGuard, defined once and rolled out.
+- **Network** — interfaces, VLANs, virtual IPs, gateways, routes, LAGG/bridge/GRE, DNS and DHCP per firewall, plus tunables, cron, syslog, snapshots and diagnostics (ping, traceroute, port check, DNS), a comparison of cluster nodes, with a diff preview, a backup before every change and a guard against cutting your own connection; rules created by hand on a firewall can be adopted.
 - **Certificates** — trust store for all firewalls and ACME / Let's Encrypt issuance.
 - **Logs & audit** — central log search with correlation, dashboards and a complete deploy audit trail.
 - **Update center** — firmware updates for the fleet, aware of HA order and maintenance mode.
+- **Setup assistant** — a guided first run after installation: your own password, two-factor, and connecting the first firewall.
+- **Self-update** — OPNexus can update itself from its web interface, with progress and automatic rollback (opt-in).
 - **Access** — HTTPS with pinned firewall certificates, optional two-factor sign-in, roles (admin / read-only), keyboard operation, dark mode, German and English UI.
 
-![Cluster view](website/assets/screenshots/en/cluster-light-desktop.webp)
+![Cluster view](docs/screenshots/readme-cluster-en.webp)
 
 All screenshots show fictitious sample data.
 
+## Guides
+
+- [Manage OPNsense firewalls centrally](https://opnexus.dev/en/manage-opnsense-centrally/) – when central management pays off and how it works
+- [Manage OPNsense HA clusters with CARP](https://opnexus.dev/en/opnsense-ha-cluster-carp/) – roles, alerts, ordered updates, comparing both nodes
+- [Roll out OPNsense rules safely](https://opnexus.dev/en/roll-out-opnsense-rules-safely/) – preview, confirmation window and automatic rollback
+- [The `opnexus` command-line tool](https://opnexus.dev/en/docs/cli/) – update, roll back and back up an installation
+
 ## Quick start
 
 Requires Docker with the Compose plugin.
@@ -36,19 +46,21 @@ cp .env.example .env        # set POSTGRES_PASSWORD (and ADMIN_PASSWORD)
 docker compose up -d --build
 ```
 
-The UI is then available at `http://localhost:3100`. Without `ADMIN_PASSWORD` a random admin password is generated on first start and printed **once** in the backend log:
+The UI is then available at `http://localhost:3100`. Without `ADMIN_PASSWORD` a random admin password is generated on first start and printed **once** in the backend log. Lost it, or never saw it? This sets a new random one and prints it (use `scripts/opnexus` in a repo checkout, `./opnexus` in the release bundle):
 
 ```bash
-docker compose logs backend | grep -A5 "generated password"
+scripts/opnexus password
 ```
 
+After the first sign-in a short **setup assistant** opens on its own: set your own password, optionally enable two-factor sign-in, connect your first firewall (including how to create the API key in OPNsense). You can skip it and reopen it any time under System › Setup.
+
 For access from other machines and for production use with TLS (bundled Caddy proxy), see the [handbook](docs/HANDBUCH.md#zugriff-von-außerhalb-dieser-vm--produktivbetrieb-mit-tls) (German).
 
 **Prebuilt images** (amd64) are published to this Gitea's registry. In `.env`:
 
 ```bash
 OPNEXUS_IMAGE_REPO=git.opnexus.dev/opnexus
-OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.10.1-rc2
+OPNEXUS_VERSION=1.16.0
 ```
 
 ```bash
@@ -57,6 +69,8 @@ docker compose pull && docker compose up -d --no-build
 
 `scripts/opnexus update` / `rollback` then update the installation (pull first, database backup before migrations, automatic rollback if the services do not become healthy).
 
+**Updating from the web interface** is available as an opt-in: set `COMPOSE_PROFILES=updater` in `.env` and an administrator can update (and roll back) under *Settings › Update OPNexus*. It runs as a separate small container that is the only one with Docker access — see the [handbook](docs/HANDBUCH.md#update-aus-dem-webinterface-optional) (German) for the security model.
+
 ## Privacy
 
 OPNexus is self-hosted and has no telemetry. It only connects to your firewalls and to notification targets you configure yourself. The optional new-version notice (`UPDATE_CHECK_URL=https://updates.opnexus.dev/latest.json`) is **off** unless you set it; when on, it makes one plain `GET` at most every 12 hours with the user agent `OPNexus/<version>` — no instance or user data.

backend/app/auth_middleware.py

@@ -42,6 +42,45 @@ _READ_ONLY_ALLOWED_WRITES = {
 }
 
 
+# Resource families whose URLs are /api/<family>/<collection>/<id>/<action>
+# (or /api/<family>/<action> for the account/notification endpoints). The
+# older kinds below keep their original /api/<kind>/<id>/<action> parsing.
+_SECURITY_KINDS = {
+    "ipsec": "ipsec_tunnel", "openvpn": "openvpn_instance", "wireguard": "wireguard_tunnel",
+    "certificates": "certificate", "acme": "acme", "notifications": "notification", "auth": "auth",
+}
+_COLLECTIONS = {"tunnels", "instances", "managed", "accounts", "certificates", "settings"}
+
+
+def _is_uuid(value: str) -> bool:
+    try:
+        uuid.UUID(value)
+        return True
+    except ValueError:
+        return False
+
+
+def _security_event(parts: list[str], method: str) -> dict:
+    """kind/action/entity/host for VPN, certificate, notification and account-security
+    requests. Only path segments are used — never query strings or bodies."""
+    ids = [p for p in parts[2:] if _is_uuid(p)]
+    tail = parts[-1]
+    if parts[1] == "auth":
+        action = "/".join(parts[2:])
+    elif method == "DELETE":
+        action = "delete"
+    elif ids and not _is_uuid(tail):
+        action = tail  # deploy / push / remove / register / sign / poll
+    elif method in ("PUT", "PATCH"):
+        action = "edit"
+    elif not ids and tail not in _COLLECTIONS and len(parts) > 2:
+        action = tail  # e.g. notifications/test
+    else:
+        action = "create"
+    return {"kind": _SECURITY_KINDS[parts[1]], "action": action[:40], "entity_id": ids[0] if ids else None,
+            "host_id": ids[1] if len(ids) > 1 else None}
+
+
 class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
     async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
         if request.url.path in _PUBLIC_PATHS:
@@ -52,25 +91,38 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
             async with SessionLocal() as db:
                 user = await auth_service.resolve_session(db, token)
             if user is not None:
+                parts = request.url.path.strip("/").split("/")
+                kinds = {"rules": "rule", "aliases": "alias", "port-forward": "port_forward", "one-to-one": "one_to_one", "outbound-nat": "outbound_nat", "hosts": "host", "users": "user", "system": "system"}
+                writing = request.method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE")
+                if len(parts) > 1 and parts[1] in _SECURITY_KINDS:
+                    event = {**_security_event(parts, request.method), "details": {"method": request.method, "path": request.url.path}}
+                    kind = event["kind"]
+                else:
+                    kind = kinds.get(parts[1]) if len(parts) > 1 else None
+                    action = ("delete" if request.method == "DELETE" else parts[-1] if len(parts) > 3 else "edit" if request.method in ("PUT", "PATCH") else "create")
+                    event = {"kind": kind, "action": action, "entity_id": parts[2] if len(parts) > 2 else None,
+                             "host_id": parts[2] if kind == "host" and len(parts) > 2 else None,
+                             "details": {"method": request.method, "path": request.url.path}}
+                tracked = kind and writing and not request.url.path.endswith(("/preview", "/carp-preview", "/revisions"))
+
                 if (
                     user.role == "read_only"
                     and request.method not in ("GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS")
                     and request.url.path not in _READ_ONLY_ALLOWED_WRITES
                 ):
+                    if tracked:
+                        # Refused attempts at security-relevant writes stay attributable.
+                        ctx = audit_service.context.set({"actor": user.username, "id": str(uuid.uuid4()), "action": event["action"]})
+                        try:
+                            await audit_service.persist(**event, status="denied", message="Schreibzugriff für Nur-Lese-Konto verweigert")
+                        finally:
+                            audit_service.context.reset(ctx)
                     return JSONResponse(
                         status_code=403,
                         content={"detail": {"code": ErrorCode.READ_ONLY_ACCESS.value, "params": {}}},
                     )
                 request.state.user = user
-                parts = request.url.path.strip("/").split("/")
+                token = audit_service.context.set({"actor": user.username, "id": str(uuid.uuid4()), "action": event["action"]})
-                kinds = {"rules": "rule", "aliases": "alias", "port-forward": "port_forward", "one-to-one": "one_to_one", "outbound-nat": "outbound_nat", "hosts": "host", "users": "user"}
-                kind = kinds.get(parts[1]) if len(parts) > 1 else None
-                tracked = kind and request.method in ("POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE") and not request.url.path.endswith(("/preview", "/carp-preview", "/revisions"))
-                action = ("delete" if request.method == "DELETE" else parts[-1] if len(parts) > 3 else "edit" if request.method in ("PUT", "PATCH") else "create")
-                token = audit_service.context.set({"actor": user.username, "id": str(uuid.uuid4()), "action": action})
-                event = {"kind": kind, "action": action, "entity_id": parts[2] if len(parts) > 2 else None,
-                         "host_id": parts[2] if kind == "host" and len(parts) > 2 else None,
-                         "details": {"method": request.method, "path": request.url.path}}
                 try:
                     if tracked:
                         await audit_service.persist(**event, status="requested")

backend/app/config.py

@@ -28,6 +28,14 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     update_check_url: str = ""
     update_check_interval_hours: int = 12
 
+    # ── Updates aus dem Webinterface (app/services/updater_client.py) ─────
+    # Optionaler Updater-Container (Compose-Profil "updater"). Das Backend hat
+    # nie Zugriff auf den Docker-Socket; es reicht nur "aktualisieren" /
+    # "zurückrollen" an diesen Dienst weiter, authentifiziert mit dem Token,
+    # den der Updater in sein Zustands-Volume schreibt.
+    updater_url: str = "http://updater:8080"
+    updater_token_file: str = "/updater/token"
+
     # Cookies now carry the session, so this can no longer be a bare "*"
     # (the Fetch spec forbids credentialed requests against a wildcard
     # response) — see main.py's allow_origin_regex. Default only matches
@@ -47,6 +55,10 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     opnsense_secret_dir: str = "/data/opnsense-secrets"
     opnsense_backup_dir: str = "/data/opnsense-backups"
     opnsense_timeout: float = 10.0
+    # Firewall API credentials are sent as HTTP Basic auth. Plain http://
+    # addresses are therefore refused (on create AND on every request) unless
+    # this is switched on — only meant for isolated lab setups.
+    allow_insecure_firewall_urls: bool = False
 
     # ── Auth ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     admin_username: str = "admin"
@@ -86,6 +98,13 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
     # calls every cycle.
     notification_poll_min_interval_seconds: int = 60
     notification_smtp_timeout_seconds: float = 10.0
+    # SMTP over SSL/STARTTLS always verifies the server certificate and host
+    # name against the container's trust store. A mail server with a private
+    # CA needs that CA's PEM file mounted and referenced here.
+    smtp_ca_file: str = ""
+    # Sending SMTP credentials over an unencrypted connection (security "none")
+    # is refused unless this is switched on explicitly.
+    allow_insecure_smtp_auth: bool = False
 
     # ── Log ingest ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
     # Floor against an admin setting an absurdly low poll interval — same

backend/app/errors.py

@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ from fastapi import HTTPException
 
 
 class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
+    UPDATER_UNAVAILABLE = "UPDATER_UNAVAILABLE"
+    UPDATER_BUSY = "UPDATER_BUSY"
+    UPDATER_REJECTED = "UPDATER_REJECTED"
+    UPDATE_NOT_OFFERED = "UPDATE_NOT_OFFERED"
+    UPDATE_MAJOR_CHANGE = "UPDATE_MAJOR_CHANGE"
+    ADMIN_REQUIRED = "ADMIN_REQUIRED"
     BACKUP_EMPTY = "BACKUP_EMPTY"
     BACKUP_INVALID_XML = "BACKUP_INVALID_XML"
     BACKUP_TOO_LARGE = "BACKUP_TOO_LARGE"
@@ -59,6 +65,7 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     HOST_HAT_NOCH_AKTIVE_POLICY_HIERARCHIE_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ADD78845 = "HOST_HAT_NOCH_AKTIVE_POLICY_HIERARCHIE_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ADD78845"
     HOST_HAT_NOCH_AKTIVE_REGEL_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ZUERST_0BF41721 = "HOST_HAT_NOCH_AKTIVE_REGEL_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ZUERST_0BF41721"
     HOST_HAT_NOCH_NAT_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ZUERST_GEZIELT_0C2A9E85 = "HOST_HAT_NOCH_NAT_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ZUERST_GEZIELT_0C2A9E85"
+    HOST_HAT_NOCH_VPN_ODER_ZERTIFIKATS_OBJEKTE_DIESE_ZUERST_ENTFERNEN = "HOST_HAT_NOCH_VPN_ODER_ZERTIFIKATS_OBJEKTE_DIESE_ZUERST_ENTFERNEN"
     HOST_IST_DEAKTIVIERT = "HOST_IST_DEAKTIVIERT"
     HOST_MIT_DIESEM_NAMEN_EXISTIERT_BEREITS = "HOST_MIT_DIESEM_NAMEN_EXISTIERT_BEREITS"
     HOST_MUSS_ERREICHBAR_SEIN_UND_FIRMWARE_AUFTRAG_BEENDET_BCE1390B = "HOST_MUSS_ERREICHBAR_SEIN_UND_FIRMWARE_AUFTRAG_BEENDET_BCE1390B"
@@ -98,6 +105,13 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     REGELLISTE_WURDE_INZWISCHEN_GEAENDERT_NEU_LADEN_UND_ERNEUT_529D7203 = "REGELLISTE_WURDE_INZWISCHEN_GEAENDERT_NEU_LADEN_UND_ERNEUT_529D7203"
     REGEL_HAT_KEINE_ZIEL_HOSTS = "REGEL_HAT_KEINE_ZIEL_HOSTS"
     REGEL_NICHT_GEFUNDEN = "REGEL_NICHT_GEFUNDEN"
+    NETWORK_ACK_REQUIRED = "NETWORK_ACK_REQUIRED"
+    NETWORK_APPLY_UNCERTAIN = "NETWORK_APPLY_UNCERTAIN"
+    NETWORK_BACKUP_FAILED = "NETWORK_BACKUP_FAILED"
+    NETWORK_CHANGE_BLOCKED = "NETWORK_CHANGE_BLOCKED"
+    NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID = "NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID"
+    NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND = "NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND"
+    RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE = "RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE"
     REGEL_WURDE_INZWISCHEN_GEAENDERT_NEU_LADEN_UND_AENDERUNGEN_BF51B6B0 = "REGEL_WURDE_INZWISCHEN_GEAENDERT_NEU_LADEN_UND_AENDERUNGEN_BF51B6B0"
     RESTORE_VORGANG_NICHT_GEFUNDEN = "RESTORE_VORGANG_NICHT_GEFUNDEN"
     ROLLBACK_ERNEUT_FEHLGESCHLAGEN_PRUEFE_DIE_ERREICHBARKEIT_DER_FIREWALL = "ROLLBACK_ERNEUT_FEHLGESCHLAGEN_PRUEFE_DIE_ERREICHBARKEIT_DER_FIREWALL"
@@ -133,6 +147,10 @@ class ErrorCode(str, Enum):
     OPEN_DEPLOYMENT_DRAFT_UNCHANGED = "OPEN_DEPLOYMENT_DRAFT_UNCHANGED"
     OPEN_HOST_MAINTENANCE_BLOCKS_DEPLOY = "OPEN_HOST_MAINTENANCE_BLOCKS_DEPLOY"
     OPEN_RESTORE_BLOCKS_DEPLOY = "OPEN_RESTORE_BLOCKS_DEPLOY"
+    UPSTREAM_REJECTED = "UPSTREAM_REJECTED"
+    INVALID_CHARACTERS = "INVALID_CHARACTERS"
+    SERVICE_NOT_FOUND = "SERVICE_NOT_FOUND"
+    SERVICE_LOCKED = "SERVICE_LOCKED"
     READ_ONLY_ACCESS = "READ_ONLY_ACCESS"
 
 

backend/app/main.py

@@ -3,8 +3,13 @@ import logging
 import re
 from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
 
-from fastapi import FastAPI
+from fastapi import FastAPI, Request
+from fastapi.exceptions import RequestValidationError
 from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
+from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
+from sqlalchemy.exc import DBAPIError
+
+from app.errors import ErrorCode
 
 from app import models  # noqa: F401 - registers models with Base.metadata
 from app.auth_middleware import AuthMiddleware
@@ -31,6 +36,10 @@ from app.routers import ipsec as ipsec_router
 from app.routers import openvpn as openvpn_router
 from app.routers import wireguard as wireguard_router
 from app.routers import certificates as certificates_router
+from app.routers import network as network_router
+from app.routers import snapshots as snapshots_router
+from app.routers import network_drift as network_drift_router
+from app.routers import diagnostics as diagnostics_router
 from app.routers import restore as restore_router
 from app.version import APP_VERSION
 from app.routers import dashboard as dashboard_router
@@ -245,6 +254,13 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     await migrate.run()
     async with SessionLocal() as db:
         await auth_service.bootstrap_admin(db)
+    if any(o.startswith("https://") for o in settings.allowed_origins) and not settings.cookie_secure:
+        logger.warning(
+            "FRONTEND_ORIGIN is https:// but COOKIE_SECURE is false — the session cookie "
+            "would also be sent over plain HTTP. Set COOKIE_SECURE=true."
+        )
+    if settings.allow_insecure_firewall_urls:
+        logger.warning("ALLOW_INSECURE_FIREWALL_URLS is on: firewall API credentials may travel over plain HTTP.")
 
     sweep_task = asyncio.create_task(_deploy_revert_sweep_loop())
     notification_task = asyncio.create_task(_notification_poll_loop())
@@ -268,6 +284,31 @@ async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
 
 app = FastAPI(title="OPNexus", version=APP_VERSION, lifespan=lifespan)
 
+@app.exception_handler(RequestValidationError)
+async def _safe_validation_error(request: Request, exc: RequestValidationError):
+    """FastAPI's default 422 body echoes the offending `input` (and validator
+    `ctx`) back — for password/key/PSK fields that puts the secret into
+    responses that browsers, proxies and error telemetry may record. Only
+    where the problem is and what it is are returned."""
+    return JSONResponse(
+        status_code=422,
+        content={"detail": [{"loc": list(err.get("loc", ())), "msg": err.get("msg", ""), "type": err.get("type", "")} for err in exc.errors()]},
+    )
+
+
+@app.exception_handler(DBAPIError)
+async def _database_text_errors(request: Request, exc: DBAPIError):
+    """A NUL byte in any text field cannot be stored by Postgres and used to
+    surface as a 500 plus a dropped connection (found by fuzzing). That is bad
+    input, not a server fault. Anything else stays a normal 500."""
+    if type(exc.orig).__name__.endswith("CharacterNotInRepertoireError") or "0x00" in str(exc.orig):
+        return JSONResponse(
+            status_code=422,
+            content={"detail": {"code": ErrorCode.INVALID_CHARACTERS.value, "params": {}}},
+        )
+    raise exc
+
+
 app.add_middleware(AuthMiddleware)
 # Inside CORS so preflights are answered first; outside Auth so a forged
 # cross-site write is rejected before any session lookup happens.
@@ -353,5 +394,9 @@ app.include_router(restore_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(dashboard_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(cluster_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(services_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(network_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(snapshots_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(network_drift_router.router, prefix="/api")
+app.include_router(diagnostics_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(resource_samples_router.router, prefix="/api")
 app.include_router(scheduled_maintenance_router.router, prefix="/api")

backend/app/models/notification.py

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ class NotificationSettings(Base):
     maintenance_unknown_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True)
     carp_health_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
     nat_drift_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
+    network_drift_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
     carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=True, server_default="true")
 
     poll_interval_seconds: Mapped[int] = mapped_column(Integer, default=300)

backend/app/models/preferences.py

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import uuid
-from sqlalchemy import ForeignKey, String
+from sqlalchemy import Boolean, ForeignKey, String
 from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column
 from app.database import Base
@@ -9,3 +9,6 @@ class UserPreferences(Base):
     user_id: Mapped[uuid.UUID] = mapped_column(PGUUID(as_uuid=True), ForeignKey('admin_users.id',ondelete='CASCADE'), primary_key=True)
     theme: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(10), default='system')
     language: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(5), nullable=False, default='de', server_default='de')
+    # Set once the user finished or dismissed the first-run setup assistant
+    # (frontend /setup); it is then no longer offered automatically.
+    setup_done: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, nullable=False, default=False, server_default='false')

backend/app/models/rule.py

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
-from sqlalchemy import Boolean, DateTime, String
+from sqlalchemy import Boolean, DateTime, String, false
 from sqlalchemy.dialects.postgresql import UUID as PGUUID
 from sqlalchemy.orm import Mapped, mapped_column, relationship
 
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ class FirewallRule(Base):
     destination_net: Mapped[str] = mapped_column(String(128), default="any")
     destination_port: Mapped[str | None] = mapped_column(String(32), nullable=True)
     enabled: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=True)
+    log: Mapped[bool] = mapped_column(Boolean, default=False, server_default=false())
     created_at: Mapped[datetime] = mapped_column(
         DateTime(timezone=True), default=lambda: datetime.now(timezone.utc)
     )

backend/app/reset_password.py

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"""Recovery: give an account a new random password and print it once.
+
+For a fresh install whose generated first-start password scrolled out of the
+log, and for an admin who forgot theirs. Needs shell access to the server,
+which is the trust boundary for this tool anyway (same as app.reset_2fa).
+All sessions of the account are ended. Normally called through the host
+CLI:
+
+    ./opnexus password [username]
+
+or directly:
+
+    docker compose exec backend python -m app.reset_password [username]
+
+Without a username the configured ADMIN_USERNAME is used; if that account does
+not exist and there is exactly one admin, that one.
+"""
+import asyncio
+import secrets
+import sys
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.database import SessionLocal
+from app.models.user import AdminUser
+from app.services import auth_service
+
+
+async def main(username: str | None) -> int:
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        if username is None:
+            username = settings.admin_username
+            user = (await db.execute(select(AdminUser).where(AdminUser.username == username))).scalar_one_or_none()
+            if user is None:
+                admins = (await db.execute(select(AdminUser).where(AdminUser.role == "admin"))).scalars().all()
+                if len(admins) != 1:
+                    names = ", ".join(sorted(a.username for a in admins)) or "-"
+                    print(f"No account named '{username}'. Pass the username (admins: {names}).", file=sys.stderr)
+                    return 1
+                user = admins[0]
+        else:
+            user = (await db.execute(select(AdminUser).where(AdminUser.username == username))).scalar_one_or_none()
+            if user is None:
+                print(f"No such user: {username}", file=sys.stderr)
+                return 1
+
+        password = secrets.token_urlsafe(18)
+        user.password_hash = await auth_service.hash_password_async(password)
+        await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, commit=False)
+        await db.commit()
+        name = user.username
+        has_totp = user.totp_enabled
+
+    print(f"Username: {name}")
+    print(f"Password: {password}")
+    if has_totp:
+        print("Two-factor sign-in is still on (lost the code? python -m app.reset_2fa).", file=sys.stderr)
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    if len(sys.argv) > 2:
+        print("usage: python -m app.reset_password [username]", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(2)
+    sys.exit(asyncio.run(main(sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) == 2 else None)))

backend/app/routers/aliases.py

@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ async def delete_alias(alias_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     try:
         await undeploy_alias(db, alias)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(alias, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     await db.delete(alias)
     await db.commit()

backend/app/routers/auth.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import logging
 
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Request, Response, status
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
@@ -45,6 +46,22 @@ def _clear_session_cookie(response: Response) -> None:
     response.delete_cookie(key=COOKIE_NAME, path="/")
 
 
+def _check_account_budget(user: AdminUser, action: str) -> None:
+    """429 once too many failed password/code attempts piled up for this account
+    and action (see auth_service.account_throttle)."""
+    wait = auth_service.account_throttle.retry_after(str(user.id), action)
+    if wait > 0:
+        raise api_error(status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS, ErrorCode.TOO_MANY_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS, wait=wait)
+
+
+def _account_failure(user: AdminUser, action: str) -> None:
+    auth_service.account_throttle.record_failure(str(user.id), action)
+
+
+def _account_success(user: AdminUser, action: str) -> None:
+    auth_service.account_throttle.reset(str(user.id), action)
+
+
 async def resolve_user(request: Request, db: AsyncSession) -> AdminUser:
     token = request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, "")
     user = await auth_service.resolve_session(db, token)
@@ -84,6 +101,7 @@ async def login(payload: LoginRequest, request: Request, response: Response, db:
         logger.info("Failed login for '%s' from %s", payload.username, ip)
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.UNGUELTIGER_BENUTZERNAME_ODER_PASSWORT)
 
+    verified_hash = user.password_hash
     if user.totp_enabled:
         # Only revealed after the password was correct, so it cannot be used
         # to find out which usernames exist or have 2FA.
@@ -98,7 +116,7 @@ async def login(payload: LoginRequest, request: Request, response: Response, db:
     auth_service.throttle.reset(ip, payload.username)
     failed_since_last_login = auth_service.throttle.pop_failures_since_success(payload.username)
     token, expires_at = await auth_service.create_session(
-        db, user, user_agent=request.headers.get("User-Agent"), ip_address=ip
+        db, user, user_agent=request.headers.get("User-Agent"), ip_address=ip, verified_hash=verified_hash
     )
     _set_session_cookie(response, token)
     logger.info("Successful login for '%s' from %s", user.username, ip)
@@ -114,20 +132,33 @@ async def login(payload: LoginRequest, request: Request, response: Response, db:
 
 
 async def _accept_second_factor(db: AsyncSession, user: AdminUser, code: str) -> bool:
-    """Authenticator code (replay-protected) or, failing that, a one-time recovery code."""
+    """Authenticator code (replay-protected) or, failing that, a one-time recovery code.
-    secret = totp_service.read_secret(user.id)
+
+    A code is single-use only if "check, then mark as used" cannot interleave
+    with a second request carrying the same code. The user row is therefore
+    re-read under a row lock (FOR UPDATE, fresh values) and the used step /
+    consumed recovery hash is committed while holding it; a concurrent attempt
+    blocks here and then sees the updated state.
+    """
+    locked = await db.scalar(
+        select(AdminUser).where(AdminUser.id == user.id).with_for_update().execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+    )
+    if locked is None:
+        return False
+    secret = totp_service.read_secret(locked.id)
     if secret:
-        step = totp_service.verify_code(secret, code, user.totp_last_step)
+        step = totp_service.verify_code(secret, code, locked.totp_last_step)
         if step is not None:
-            user.totp_last_step = step
+            locked.totp_last_step = step
             await db.commit()
             return True
-    remaining = totp_service.consume_recovery(user.totp_recovery_hashes, code)
+    remaining = totp_service.consume_recovery(locked.totp_recovery_hashes, code)
     if remaining is not None:
-        user.totp_recovery_hashes = remaining
+        locked.totp_recovery_hashes = remaining
         await db.commit()
-        logger.warning("Recovery code used by '%s' (%d left)", user.username, len(remaining))
+        logger.warning("Recovery code used by '%s' (%d left)", locked.username, len(remaining))
         return True
+    await db.commit()  # nothing changed — just release the row lock
     return False
 
 
@@ -156,45 +187,66 @@ async def totp_setup(payload: TotpSetupRequest, user: AdminUser = Depends(curren
     active until /2fa/enable proves the authenticator works."""
     if user.totp_enabled:
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.TOTP_ALREADY_ENABLED)
-    if not auth_service.verify_password(user.password_hash, payload.password):
+    _check_account_budget(user, "2fa-setup")
+    if not await auth_service.verify_password_async(user.password_hash, payload.password):
+        _account_failure(user, "2fa-setup")
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.AKTUELLES_PASSWORT_IST_FALSCH)
+    _account_success(user, "2fa-setup")
     secret = totp_service.generate_secret()
     totp_service.save_secret(user.id, secret, pending=True)
     return {"secret": secret, "otpauth_uri": totp_service.otpauth_uri(user.username, secret)}
 
 
 @router.post("/2fa/enable")
-async def totp_enable(payload: TotpEnableRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+async def totp_enable(
+    payload: TotpEnableRequest, request: Request,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user),
+):
     if user.totp_enabled:
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.TOTP_ALREADY_ENABLED)
+    _check_account_budget(user, "2fa-enable")
     pending = totp_service.read_secret(user.id, pending=True)
     if not pending:
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.TOTP_SETUP_MISSING)
     step = totp_service.verify_code(pending, payload.code)
     if step is None:
+        # Not reset by a fresh /2fa/setup: recreating the pending enrolment
+        # must not hand out a new guessing budget.
+        _account_failure(user, "2fa-enable")
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.TOTP_INVALID)
+    _account_success(user, "2fa-enable")
     plain, hashes = totp_service.new_recovery_codes()
     totp_service.promote_pending(user.id)
     user.totp_enabled = True
     user.totp_last_step = step
     user.totp_recovery_hashes = hashes
+    # Other sessions were established without the second factor — end them.
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, keep_token=request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, ""), commit=False)
     await db.commit()
     logger.info("Two-factor enabled for '%s'", user.username)
     return {"enabled": True, "recovery_codes": plain}
 
 
 @router.post("/2fa/disable")
-async def totp_disable(payload: TotpDisableRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
+async def totp_disable(
+    payload: TotpDisableRequest, request: Request,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user),
+):
     if not user.totp_enabled:
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_409_CONFLICT, ErrorCode.TOTP_NOT_ENABLED)
-    if not auth_service.verify_password(user.password_hash, payload.password):
+    _check_account_budget(user, "2fa-disable")
+    if not await auth_service.verify_password_async(user.password_hash, payload.password):
+        _account_failure(user, "2fa-disable")
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.AKTUELLES_PASSWORT_IST_FALSCH)
     if not await _accept_second_factor(db, user, payload.code):
+        _account_failure(user, "2fa-disable")
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.TOTP_INVALID)
+    _account_success(user, "2fa-disable")
     totp_service.delete_secrets(user.id)
     user.totp_enabled = False
     user.totp_recovery_hashes = None
     user.totp_last_step = 0
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, keep_token=request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, ""), commit=False)
     await db.commit()
     logger.info("Two-factor disabled for '%s'", user.username)
     return {"enabled": False}
@@ -225,15 +277,18 @@ async def change_password(
     db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
     user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user),
 ):
-    if not auth_service.verify_password(user.password_hash, payload.current_password):
+    _check_account_budget(user, "change-password")
+    if not await auth_service.verify_password_async(user.password_hash, payload.current_password):
+        _account_failure(user, "change-password")
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED, ErrorCode.AKTUELLES_PASSWORT_IST_FALSCH)
+    _account_success(user, "change-password")
     if payload.new_password == payload.current_password:
         raise api_error(status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, ErrorCode.DAS_NEUE_PASSWORT_MUSS_SICH_VOM_AKTUELLEN_UNTERSCHEIDEN)
 
-    user.password_hash = auth_service.hash_password(payload.new_password)
+    # New hash, revocation of EVERY existing session (including other devices
-    await db.commit()
+    # an attacker may hold) and the replacement session commit as one unit.
-
+    user.password_hash = await auth_service.hash_password_async(payload.new_password)
-    await auth_service.revoke_session(db, request.cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME, ""))
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, user.id, commit=False)
     token, _ = await auth_service.create_session(
         db, user, user_agent=request.headers.get("User-Agent"), ip_address=client_ip(request)
     )

backend/app/routers/certificates.py

@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ async def delete_managed_certificate(cert_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depe
     try:
         await managed_certificate_service.delete_certificate(db, cert, host)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
 
 
 # ── ACME accounts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ async def delete_acme_account(account_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(
     try:
         await acme_service.delete_account(db, account, host)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
 
 
 # ── ACME certificate requests ─────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -298,4 +298,4 @@ async def delete_acme_certificate_request(request_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSessio
     try:
         await acme_service.delete_certificate_request(db, req, host)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc

backend/app/routers/diagnostics.py

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+import uuid
+from typing import Literal
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import diagnostics_service
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics", tags=["diagnostics"])
+IpProto = Literal["inet", "inet6"]
+
+
+class PingRequest(BaseModel):
+    target: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=253)
+    ipproto: IpProto = "inet"
+    count: int = Field(default=4, ge=1, le=10)
+    packetsize: int | None = Field(default=None, ge=1, le=9000)
+    source: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=64)
+
+
+class TracerouteRequest(BaseModel):
+    target: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=253)
+    ipproto: IpProto = "inet"
+    protocol: Literal["udp", "icmp"] = "icmp"
+    source: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=64)
+
+
+class PortprobeRequest(BaseModel):
+    target: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=253)
+    port: int = Field(ge=1, le=65535)
+    ipproto: IpProto = "inet"
+    source: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=64)
+
+
+class DnsRequest(BaseModel):
+    name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=253)
+    server: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=64)
+
+
+async def _host(db: AsyncSession, host_id: uuid.UUID) -> OpnsenseHost:
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    return host
+
+
+@router.post("/ping")
+async def ping(host_id: uuid.UUID, p: PingRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await diagnostics_service.ping(await _host(db, host_id), p.target, p.ipproto, p.count, p.packetsize, p.source)
+
+
+@router.post("/traceroute")
+async def traceroute(host_id: uuid.UUID, p: TracerouteRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await diagnostics_service.traceroute(await _host(db, host_id), p.target, p.ipproto, p.protocol, p.source)
+
+
+@router.post("/portprobe")
+async def portprobe(host_id: uuid.UUID, p: PortprobeRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await diagnostics_service.portprobe(await _host(db, host_id), p.target, p.port, p.ipproto, p.source)
+
+
+@router.post("/dns")
+async def dns(host_id: uuid.UUID, p: DnsRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    return await diagnostics_service.dns_lookup(await _host(db, host_id), p.name, p.server)

backend/app/routers/hosts.py

@@ -10,11 +10,20 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.database import get_db
+from app.models.user import AdminUser
+from app.routers.auth import current_user
+from app.services import audit_service
 from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
 from app.models.policy_hierarchy_group import PolicyHierarchyGroup
 from app.models.policy_hierarchy_rule_deployment import PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment
 from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
+from app.models.ipsec_tunnel_deployment import IpsecTunnelDeployment
+from app.models.openvpn_instance_deployment import OpenVpnInstanceDeployment
+from app.models.wireguard_tunnel_deployment import WireguardTunnelDeployment
+from app.models.managed_certificate import ManagedCertificate
+from app.models.acme_account import AcmeAccount
+from app.models.acme_certificate_request import AcmeCertificateRequest
 from app.models.alias_deployment import AliasDeployment
 from app.schemas.host import AliasOption, FirmwareInfo, HostBackup, HostCa, HostCertificate, HostCreate, HostRead, HostUpdate, TlsProbeRequest, TlsProbeResult, InterfaceOption, LiveRule
 from app.services import backup_store, opnsense_client, opnsense_secret_store, tls_pin_service
@@ -146,6 +155,8 @@ async def update_host(host_id: uuid.UUID, payload: HostUpdate, db: AsyncSession
         if existing:
             raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.HOST_MIT_DIESEM_NAMEN_EXISTIERT_BEREITS)
         host.name = payload.name
+    if payload.base_url is not None:
+        host.base_url = payload.base_url
     if payload.verify_tls is not None:
         host.verify_tls = payload.verify_tls
     if payload.clear_tls_pin:
@@ -192,13 +203,35 @@ async def delete_host(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
             raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.HOST_HAT_NOCH_NAT_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ZUERST_GEZIELT_0C2A9E85)
     if await db.scalar(select(PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.id).where(PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.host_id == host_id).limit(1)):
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.HOST_HAT_NOCH_AKTIVE_POLICY_HIERARCHIE_DEPLOYMENTS_DIESE_ADD78845)
+    # VPN tunnels, certificates and ACME objects likewise cascade away with the host
+    # while staying live on the firewall: block until they are removed there.
+    for deployment_model in (IpsecTunnelDeployment, OpenVpnInstanceDeployment, WireguardTunnelDeployment):
+        if await db.scalar(select(deployment_model.id).where(deployment_model.host_id == host_id).limit(1)):
+            raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.HOST_HAT_NOCH_VPN_ODER_ZERTIFIKATS_OBJEKTE_DIESE_ZUERST_ENTFERNEN)
+    for cert_model in (ManagedCertificate, AcmeAccount, AcmeCertificateRequest):
+        # A never-deployed draft only exists locally and may go with the host.
+        if await db.scalar(
+            select(cert_model.id).where(
+                cert_model.host_id == host_id,
+                (cert_model.opnsense_uuid.is_not(None)) | (cert_model.status == "success"),
+            ).limit(1)
+        ):
+            raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.HOST_HAT_NOCH_VPN_ODER_ZERTIFIKATS_OBJEKTE_DIESE_ZUERST_ENTFERNEN)
     from app.models.host_operation import HostOperation
     from app.services.host_maintenance_service import ACTIVE
     if await db.scalar(select(HostOperation.id).where(HostOperation.host_id == host_id, HostOperation.status.in_(ACTIVE)).limit(1)):
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.HOST_HAT_EINE_OFFENE_WARTUNGSAKTION_ZUERST_PRUEFEN_UND_8CC5FBE0)
+    # Local drafts cascade away with the host; their file-backed secrets must not outlive them.
+    from app.services import acme_secret_store, cert_key_store
+    draft_certs = (await db.scalars(select(ManagedCertificate.id).where(ManagedCertificate.host_id == host_id))).all()
+    draft_accounts = (await db.scalars(select(AcmeAccount.id).where(AcmeAccount.host_id == host_id))).all()
     await db.delete(host)
     await db.commit()
     opnsense_secret_store.delete_secret(host_id)
+    for cert_id in draft_certs:
+        cert_key_store.delete_secret(cert_id)
+    for account_id in draft_accounts:
+        acme_secret_store.delete_secret(account_id)
 
 
 @router.get("/{host_id}/live-rules", response_model=list[LiveRule])
@@ -246,11 +279,23 @@ async def list_host_backups(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_d
 
 
 @router.get("/{host_id}/backups/{backup_id}")
-async def download_host_backup(host_id: uuid.UUID, backup_id: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+async def download_host_backup(
-    await _get_host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    host_id: uuid.UUID, backup_id: str,
+    db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user),
+):
+    """Raw config.xml snapshot — contains password hashes, VPN keys and other
+    firewall secrets, so unlike the (metadata-only) listing it is not part of
+    the "read_only may GET everything" allowance. Every attempt is audited
+    (who/which snapshot, never the content)."""
+    host = await _get_host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    event = {"kind": "backup", "action": "download", "entity_id": backup_id[:36], "host_id": str(host_id), "host_name": host.name}
+    if user.role != "admin":
+        await audit_service.persist(**event, status="denied", message="Rohdownload nur für Administratoren")
+        raise api_error(403, ErrorCode.READ_ONLY_ACCESS)
     content = backup_store.read_snapshot(host_id, backup_id)
     if content is None:
         raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.BACKUP_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    await audit_service.persist(**event, status="accepted")
     return Response(
         content=content,
         media_type="application/xml",

backend/app/routers/ipsec.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import uuid
 
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Body
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
@@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ async def list_revisions(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db
 
 
 @router.post("/{tunnel_id}/deploy", response_model=IpsecTunnelRead)
-async def deploy(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, approval: IpsecDeployApproval | None = Body(default=None), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+async def deploy(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, approval: IpsecDeployApproval, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     tunnel = await _load_tunnel(db, tunnel_id)
     plan = preview(tunnel)
-    if approval and approval.preview_token != plan["token"]:
+    if approval.preview_token != plan["token"]:
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ENTWURF_ODER_ZIELE_WURDEN_GEAENDERT_VORSCHAU_ERNEUT_OEFFNEN)
     if not tunnel.pre_shared_key_set:
         raise api_error(400, ErrorCode.FUER_DIESEN_TUNNEL_IST_NOCH_KEIN_PRE_SHARED_4AE1FC63)
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ async def delete_tunnel(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
     try:
         await undeploy_tunnel(db, tunnel)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(tunnel, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     ipsec_psk_store.delete_secret(tunnel.id)
     await db.delete(tunnel)

backend/app/routers/network.py

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+import re
+import uuid
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.routers.hosts import _upstream_error
+from app.schemas.network import (
+    HostNetwork, NetworkChangeExecute, NetworkChangePreview, NetworkChangeRequest, NetworkChangeResult,
+)
+from app.services import network_change_service, network_service
+from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/hosts/{host_id}/network", tags=["network"])
+
+
+@router.get("", response_model=HostNetwork)
+async def host_network(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    try:
+        return await network_service.get_host_network(host)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise _upstream_error(host, exc) from exc
+
+
+async def _host_or_404(db: AsyncSession, host_id: uuid.UUID) -> OpnsenseHost:
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    return host
+
+
+@router.post("/changes/preview", response_model=NetworkChangePreview)
+async def preview_change(host_id: uuid.UUID, payload: NetworkChangeRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    host = await _host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    try:
+        plan = await network_change_service.preview(db, host, payload.kind, payload.action, payload.uuid, payload.fields)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise _upstream_error(host, exc) from exc
+    return {k: v for k, v in plan.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
+
+
+@router.post("/changes", response_model=NetworkChangeResult)
+async def execute_change(host_id: uuid.UUID, payload: NetworkChangeExecute, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    host = await _host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    return await network_change_service.execute(
+        db, host, payload.kind, payload.action, payload.uuid, payload.fields, payload.preview_token, payload.acknowledge)
+
+
+@router.get("/template/{kind}")
+async def change_template(host_id: uuid.UUID, kind: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Blank form for one kind, with the choices this firewall accepts for its select fields."""
+    if kind not in network_change_service.FIELDS:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    host = await _host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    try:
+        return await network_change_service.template(host, kind)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise _upstream_error(host, exc) from exc
+
+
+@router.get("/item/{kind}/{item_uuid}")
+async def current_item(host_id: uuid.UUID, kind: str, item_uuid: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """The object's current values on the firewall, for pre-filling an edit form."""
+    if kind not in network_change_service.FIELDS or not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{1,64}", item_uuid):
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    host = await _host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    try:
+        return await network_change_service.item(host, kind, item_uuid)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise _upstream_error(host, exc) from exc
+
+
+@router.get("/objects/{kind}")
+async def list_objects(host_id: uuid.UUID, kind: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Rows of a generic object kind (tunables, cron jobs, LAGG, ...), reduced to their display columns."""
+    if kind not in network_change_service.OBJECT_COLUMNS:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    host = await _host_or_404(db, host_id)
+    try:
+        return await network_change_service.list_objects(host, kind)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise _upstream_error(host, exc) from exc

backend/app/routers/network_drift.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+from collections import defaultdict
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import network_drift_service
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/network", tags=["network"])
+
+
+@router.get("/drift")
+async def network_drift(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Per cluster: differences in the network configuration between its nodes (live read of every node)."""
+    hosts = (await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost).where(OpnsenseHost.enabled.is_(True)).order_by(OpnsenseHost.name))).all()
+    by_cluster: dict[str, list[OpnsenseHost]] = defaultdict(list)
+    for host in hosts:
+        if host.cluster_name:
+            by_cluster[host.cluster_name].append(host)
+    clusters = []
+    for name, members in sorted(by_cluster.items()):
+        if len(members) < 2:
+            continue
+        differences, compared, unreachable = await network_drift_service.compute_cluster(members)
+        clusters.append({"name": name, "hosts": [h.name for h in members], "compared": compared,
+                         "unreachable": unreachable, "differences": differences})
+    return {"clusters": clusters}

backend/app/routers/notifications.py

@@ -1,9 +1,13 @@
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
 from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Query
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
 from app.database import get_db
+from app.models.user import AdminUser
+from app.routers.auth import current_user
 from app.models.notification import NotificationProblem
 from app.schemas.notification import (
     NotificationProblemRead,
@@ -16,9 +20,25 @@ from app.services import notification_delivery, notification_settings_service
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/notifications", tags=["notifications"])
 
 
+def _redact_url(url: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Webhook URLs very often carry the credential itself (a token in the path or
+    query), so anyone who can read the URL can post to the receiver. Readers see
+    only where it points."""
+    if not url:
+        return url
+    parts = urlsplit(url)
+    if not parts.hostname:
+        return "…"
+    return f"{parts.scheme}://{parts.hostname}{f':{parts.port}' if parts.port else ''}/…"
+
+
 @router.get("/settings", response_model=NotificationSettingsRead)
-async def read_settings(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+async def read_settings(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db), user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)):
-    return await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    row = await notification_settings_service.get_settings(db)
+    result = NotificationSettingsRead.model_validate(row)
+    if user.role != "admin":
+        result = result.model_copy(update={"webhook_url": _redact_url(result.webhook_url)})
+    return result
 
 
 @router.put("/settings", response_model=NotificationSettingsRead)

backend/app/routers/one_to_one.py

@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ async def delete_one_to_one_rule(rule_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(
     try:
         await undeploy_one_to_one(db, rule)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(rule, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     await db.delete(rule)
     await db.commit()
@@ -268,4 +268,4 @@ async def live_rules(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     try:
         return split_rows(await opnsense_client.search_one_to_one_rules(host))
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc

backend/app/routers/openvpn.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import uuid
 
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Body
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
@@ -153,10 +153,10 @@ async def list_revisions(instance_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_
 
 
 @router.post("/{instance_id}/deploy", response_model=OpenVpnInstanceRead)
-async def deploy(instance_id: uuid.UUID, approval: OpenVpnDeployApproval | None = Body(default=None), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+async def deploy(instance_id: uuid.UUID, approval: OpenVpnDeployApproval, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     instance = await _load_instance(db, instance_id)
     plan = preview(instance)
-    if approval and approval.preview_token != plan["token"]:
+    if approval.preview_token != plan["token"]:
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ENTWURF_ODER_ZIELE_WURDEN_GEAENDERT_VORSCHAU_ERNEUT_OEFFNEN)
     if instance.tls_key_enabled and not instance.tls_key_material_set:
         raise api_error(400, ErrorCode.TLS_HARDENING_IST_AKTIVIERT_ABER_ES_WURDE_NOCH_F53C81DD)
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ async def delete_instance(instance_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get
     try:
         await undeploy_instance(db, instance)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(instance, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     openvpn_key_store.delete_secret(instance.id)
     await db.delete(instance)

backend/app/routers/outbound_nat.py

@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ async def delete_outbound_nat_rule(rule_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depend
     try:
         await undeploy_outbound_nat(db, rule)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(rule, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     await db.delete(rule)
     await db.commit()
@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ async def live_rules(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     try:
         return split_rows(await opnsense_client.search_outbound_nat_rules(host))
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
 
 
 @router.get("/hosts/{host_id}/mode")

backend/app/routers/policy_hierarchy.py

@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ async def delete_rule(rule_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     try:
         await undeploy_hierarchy_rule(db, rule)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(rule, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     await db.delete(rule)
     await db.commit()

backend/app/routers/port_forward.py

@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ async def delete_port_forward_rule(rule_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depend
     try:
         await undeploy_port_forward(db, rule)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(rule, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     await db.delete(rule)
     await db.commit()
@@ -270,4 +270,4 @@ async def live_rules(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     try:
         return split_rows(await opnsense_client.search_port_forward_rules(host))
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc

backend/app/routers/rules.py

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ from app.services.alias_service import check_alias_consistency, describe_alias_c
 from app.services.interface_service import check_interface_consistency
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.rule_deploy_service import confirm_rule, deploy_rule, undeploy_rule, revert_deployment
+from app.services import rule_adopt_service
+from app.schemas.rule import AdoptRequest, UnmanagedRule
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/rules", tags=["rules"])
 
@@ -59,6 +61,7 @@ def _to_read(
         destination_net=rule.destination_net,
         destination_port=rule.destination_port,
         enabled=rule.enabled,
+        log=rule.log,
         created_at=rule.created_at,
         updated_at=rule.updated_at,
         target_host_ids=[host.id for host in rule.targets],
@@ -84,6 +87,42 @@ async def list_rules(db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     return [_to_read(rule, rule.targets, rule.deployments) for rule in rules]
 
 
+@router.get("/unmanaged", response_model=list[UnmanagedRule])
+async def list_unmanaged_rules(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Rules found on the host that OPNexus does not manage yet (live read)."""
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    try:
+        return await rule_adopt_service.list_unmanaged(db, host)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+
+
+@router.post("/adopt", response_model=RuleRead, status_code=201)
+async def adopt_rule(payload: AdoptRequest, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    """Takes over a hand-made rule. Writes nothing to the firewall."""
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, payload.host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    try:
+        rule = await rule_adopt_service.adopt(db, host, payload.rule_uuid)
+    except rule_adopt_service.RuleNotFoundOnHost as exc:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.REGEL_NICHT_GEFUNDEN) from exc
+    except rule_adopt_service.NotAdoptable as exc:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.RULE_NOT_ADOPTABLE, reasons=", ".join(exc.reasons)) from exc
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+    await db.commit()
+    # The new object sits in the session without its relationships loaded; db.get() would return it as-is.
+    rule = (await db.execute(
+        select(FirewallRule).where(FirewallRule.id == rule.id).options(*_load_options())
+        .execution_options(populate_existing=True)
+    )).scalar_one()
+    return _to_read(rule, rule.targets, rule.deployments)
+
+
 @router.post("", response_model=RuleRead, status_code=201)
 async def create_rule(payload: RuleCreate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     await policy_lock(db)
@@ -101,6 +140,7 @@ async def create_rule(payload: RuleCreate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
         destination_net=payload.destination_net,
         destination_port=payload.destination_port,
         enabled=payload.enabled,
+        log=payload.log,
         targets=hosts,
         groups=groups,
     )
@@ -172,7 +212,7 @@ async def delete_rule(rule_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     try:
         await undeploy_rule(db, rule)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(rule, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     await db.delete(rule)
     await db.commit()

backend/app/routers/services.py

@@ -31,6 +31,19 @@ async def _control(host_id: uuid.UUID, name: str, action: str, fn, db: AsyncSess
     await policy_lock(db)
     host = await host_or_404(db, host_id)
     await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+    # The UI greys out locked services, but the API must not rely on that:
+    # unknown names are accepted by the firewall with "ok", and locked ones
+    # (pf, webgui, routing, ...) can be stopped through it.
+    try:
+        listing = await client.search_services(host)
+    except client.OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+    rows = listing.get("rows", []) if isinstance(listing, dict) else []
+    row = next((r for r in rows if name in (r.get("id"), r.get("name"))), None)
+    if row is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.SERVICE_NOT_FOUND, service=name)
+    if row.get("locked") in (1, "1", True):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.SERVICE_LOCKED, service=name)
     await audit_service.persist(
         kind="host", action=action, status="requested",
         host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name,

backend/app/routers/settings.py

@@ -14,12 +14,14 @@ router=APIRouter(prefix='/settings',tags=['settings'])
 class Preferences(BaseModel):
     theme: Literal['light','dark','system'] | None = None
     language: Literal['de','en'] | None = None
+    setup_done: bool | None = None
 
 @router.get('')
 async def read(user: AdminUser=Depends(current_user),db:AsyncSession=Depends(get_db)):
     preferences=await db.get(UserPreferences,user.id)
     return {'username':user.username,'theme':preferences.theme if preferences else 'system',
             'language':preferences.language if preferences else 'de',
+            'setup_done':preferences.setup_done if preferences else False,
             'deploy_confirm_window_seconds':settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds,
             'session_lifetime_seconds':settings.session_lifetime}
 
@@ -29,8 +31,9 @@ async def update(payload:Preferences,user:AdminUser=Depends(current_user),db:Asy
     current = await db.get(UserPreferences, user.id)
     theme = payload.theme or (current.theme if current else 'system')
     language = payload.language or (current.language if current else 'de')
-    await db.execute(insert(UserPreferences).values(user_id=user.id,theme=theme,language=language).on_conflict_do_update(index_elements=['user_id'],set_={'theme':theme,'language':language}))
+    setup_done = payload.setup_done if payload.setup_done is not None else bool(current.setup_done if current else False)
+    await db.execute(insert(UserPreferences).values(user_id=user.id,theme=theme,language=language,setup_done=setup_done).on_conflict_do_update(index_elements=['user_id'],set_={'theme':theme,'language':language,'setup_done':setup_done}))
     await db.commit()
-    return {'username':username,'theme':theme,'language':language,
+    return {'username':username,'theme':theme,'language':language,'setup_done':setup_done,
             'deploy_confirm_window_seconds':settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds,
             'session_lifetime_seconds':settings.session_lifetime}

backend/app/routers/snapshots.py

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+import uuid
+
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.database import get_db
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.routers.hosts import _upstream_error
+from app.services import snapshot_service
+from app.services.host_maintenance_service import ensure_no_maintenance
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+
+router = APIRouter(prefix="/hosts/{host_id}/snapshots", tags=["snapshots"])
+
+
+class SnapshotCreate(BaseModel):
+    name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+    note: str = Field(default="", max_length=200)
+
+
+async def _host(db: AsyncSession, host_id: uuid.UUID) -> OpnsenseHost:
+    host = await db.get(OpnsenseHost, host_id)
+    if not host:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.HOST_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
+    return host
+
+
+@router.get("")
+async def list_snapshots(host_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    host = await _host(db, host_id)
+    try:
+        return await snapshot_service.list_snapshots(host)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise _upstream_error(host, exc) from exc
+
+
+@router.post("", status_code=201)
+async def create_snapshot(host_id: uuid.UUID, payload: SnapshotCreate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    host = await _host(db, host_id)
+    await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+    return await snapshot_service.create(host, payload.name, payload.note)
+
+
+@router.delete("/{snapshot_uuid}", status_code=204)
+async def delete_snapshot(host_id: uuid.UUID, snapshot_uuid: str, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+    await policy_lock(db)
+    host = await _host(db, host_id)
+    await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+    if not snapshot_uuid.replace("-", "").isalnum() or len(snapshot_uuid) > 64:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    await snapshot_service.delete(host, snapshot_uuid)

backend/app/routers/system.py

@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
-from fastapi import APIRouter
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
 
-from app.services import update_check_service
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.user import AdminUser
+from app.routers.auth import current_user
+from app.services import update_check_service, updater_client
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/system", tags=["system"])
 
@@ -10,3 +14,93 @@ async def version_check() -> dict:
     """Ist eine neuere OPNexus-Version veröffentlicht? Aus, solange
     UPDATE_CHECK_URL nicht gesetzt ist (dann ohne ausgehende Anfrage)."""
     return await update_check_service.check()
+
+
+def _admin(user: AdminUser) -> AdminUser:
+    # Der Updater ist Administration der Installation selbst — auch das reine
+    # Lesen (Logs, Rollback-Optionen) bleibt Admins vorbehalten.
+    if user.role != "admin":
+        raise api_error(403, ErrorCode.ADMIN_REQUIRED)
+    return user
+
+
+def _major(version: str | None) -> int | None:
+    try:
+        return int((version or "").split(".")[0])
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+class UpdateRequest(BaseModel):
+    version: str = Field(min_length=5, max_length=20)
+
+
+@router.get("/updater")
+async def updater_status(user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
+    """Zustand für den Abschnitt "OPNexus aktualisieren" in den Einstellungen:
+    Versionshinweis des Release-Feeds plus (falls aktiviert) der Updater."""
+    _admin(user)
+    check = await update_check_service.check()
+    result: dict = {
+        "available": False, "reason": None, "mode": None,
+        "current": check["current"], "latest": check["latest"], "update_available": check["update_available"],
+        "release_url": check["release_url"], "feed_enabled": check["enabled"],
+        "feed_error": check["error"], "checked_at": check["checked_at"],
+        "can_update": False, "major_change": False,
+        "job": None, "phases": [], "log": [], "services": {},
+        "rollback_available": False, "rollback_loses_data": False, "rollback_version": None,
+    }
+    try:
+        updater = await updater_client.status()
+    except updater_client.UpdaterUnavailable as exc:
+        result["reason"] = str(exc)
+        return result
+    except updater_client.UpdaterRejected:
+        result["reason"] = "unreachable"
+        return result
+
+    mode = updater.get("mode")
+    running = (updater.get("job") or {}).get("state") == "running"
+    result.update(
+        available=True, mode=mode, job=updater.get("job"), phases=updater.get("phases") or [],
+        log=updater.get("log") or [], services=updater.get("services") or {},
+        rollback_available=bool(updater.get("rollback_available")),
+        rollback_loses_data=bool(updater.get("rollback_loses_data")),
+        rollback_version=((updater.get("last_update") or {}).get("prev_version")),
+    )
+    # Hauptversionssprünge nur bewusst über die Kommandozeile (Release-Notes lesen).
+    result["major_change"] = bool(check["latest"]) and _major(check["latest"]) != _major(check["current"])
+    result["can_update"] = (
+        mode == "release" and not running and bool(check["update_available"]) and not result["major_change"]
+    )
+    return result
+
+
+@router.post("/updater/update", status_code=202)
+async def updater_update(payload: UpdateRequest, user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
+    """Aktualisiert OPNexus auf die vom Release-Feed gemeldete neueste stabile
+    Version. Beliebige Versionen werden bewusst nicht angenommen."""
+    _admin(user)
+    check = await update_check_service.check()
+    if not check["update_available"] or payload.version.lstrip("v") != check["latest"]:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.UPDATE_NOT_OFFERED)
+    if _major(check["latest"]) != _major(check["current"]):
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.UPDATE_MAJOR_CHANGE)
+    return await _forward(updater_client.start_update(check["latest"]))
+
+
+@router.post("/updater/rollback", status_code=202)
+async def updater_rollback(user: AdminUser = Depends(current_user)) -> dict:
+    _admin(user)
+    return await _forward(updater_client.start_rollback())
+
+
+async def _forward(call) -> dict:
+    try:
+        return await call
+    except updater_client.UpdaterUnavailable:
+        raise api_error(503, ErrorCode.UPDATER_UNAVAILABLE)
+    except updater_client.UpdaterRejected as rejected:
+        if rejected.code == "busy":
+            raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.UPDATER_BUSY)
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.UPDATER_REJECTED, reason=rejected.code)

backend/app/routers/users.py

@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ async def create_user(payload: UserCreate, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.BENUTZERNAME_BEREITS_VERGEBEN)
     user = AdminUser(
         username=payload.username,
-        password_hash=auth_service.hash_password(payload.password),
+        password_hash=await auth_service.hash_password_async(payload.password),
         role=payload.role.value,
     )
     db.add(user)
@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ async def reset_two_factor(user_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db
     target.totp_enabled = False
     target.totp_recovery_hashes = None
     target.totp_last_step = 0
+    # The account lost its second factor (maybe to someone else): force a fresh login.
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, target.id, commit=False)
     await db.commit()
     return target
 
@@ -73,7 +75,10 @@ async def reset_password(user_id: uuid.UUID, payload: UserPasswordReset, db: Asy
     target = await db.get(AdminUser, user_id)
     if target is None:
         raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.BENUTZER_NICHT_GEFUNDEN)
-    target.password_hash = auth_service.hash_password(payload.new_password)
+    target.password_hash = await auth_service.hash_password_async(payload.new_password)
+    # A reset is the answer to a suspected compromise: every session of the
+    # account ends with the old password, atomically with the new hash.
+    await auth_service.revoke_sessions(db, target.id, commit=False)
     await db.commit()
     return target
 

backend/app/routers/wireguard.py

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import uuid
 
-from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, Body
+from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
 from sqlalchemy import select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 from sqlalchemy.orm import selectinload
@@ -162,10 +162,10 @@ async def list_revisions(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db
 
 
 @router.post("/{tunnel_id}/deploy", response_model=WireguardTunnelRead)
-async def deploy(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, approval: WireguardDeployApproval | None = Body(default=None), db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
+async def deploy(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, approval: WireguardDeployApproval, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)):
     tunnel = await _load_tunnel(db, tunnel_id)
     plan = preview(tunnel)
-    if approval and approval.preview_token != plan["token"]:
+    if approval.preview_token != plan["token"]:
         raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ENTWURF_ODER_ZIELE_WURDEN_GEAENDERT_VORSCHAU_ERNEUT_OEFFNEN)
     if not tunnel.server_private_key_set:
         raise api_error(400, ErrorCode.FUER_DIESEN_TUNNEL_IST_NOCH_KEIN_SERVER_PRIVATSCHLUESSEL_D7527998)
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ async def delete_tunnel(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, db: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db)
     try:
         await undeploy_tunnel(db, tunnel)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED) from exc
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)) from exc
     await db.refresh(tunnel, attribute_names=["deployments"])
     wireguard_key_store.delete_private_key(tunnel.id)
     wireguard_key_store.delete_psk(tunnel.id)

backend/app/schemas/host.py

@@ -2,7 +2,9 @@ import uuid
 from datetime import datetime
 from typing import Literal
 
-from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field
+from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator
+
+from app.services.firewall_url import validate_base_url
 
 
 class HostCreate(BaseModel):
@@ -17,6 +19,11 @@ class HostCreate(BaseModel):
     cluster_name: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=120)
     policy_hierarchy_group_id: uuid.UUID | None = None
 
+    @field_validator("base_url")
+    @classmethod
+    def _base_url_is_safe(cls, value: str) -> str:
+        return validate_base_url(value)
+
 
 class TlsProbeRequest(BaseModel):
     base_url: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=255)
@@ -40,6 +47,8 @@ class HostUpdate(BaseModel):
     recreate is still the way to rotate a host's API key for now."""
 
     name: str | None = Field(default=None, min_length=1, max_length=120)
+    # New address of the firewall, e.g. after its management IP was changed.
+    base_url: str | None = Field(default=None, min_length=1, max_length=255)
     verify_tls: bool | None = None
     tls_ca_pem: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=32768)
     clear_tls_pin: bool = False
@@ -49,6 +58,11 @@ class HostUpdate(BaseModel):
     policy_hierarchy_group_id: uuid.UUID | None = None
     clear_policy_hierarchy_group_id: bool = False  # same ambiguity as clear_cluster_name above
 
+    @field_validator("base_url")
+    @classmethod
+    def _base_url_is_safe(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
+        return validate_base_url(value) if value is not None else None
+
 
 class HostRead(BaseModel):
     model_config = ConfigDict(from_attributes=True)
@@ -116,6 +130,9 @@ CertStatus = Literal["valid", "expiring_soon", "expired", "unknown"]
 
 class HostCertificate(BaseModel):
     uuid: str
+    # OPNsense's own cross-references (OpenVPN cert/ca, Trust-Store caref) use
+    # this id, not the row UUID.
+    refid: str = ""
     descr: str
     common_name: str | None
     issuer: str
@@ -128,6 +145,7 @@ class HostCertificate(BaseModel):
 
 class HostCa(BaseModel):
     uuid: str
+    refid: str = ""
     descr: str
     common_name: str | None
     valid_from: datetime | None

backend/app/schemas/network.py

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+from typing import Any, Literal
+
+from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
+
+
+class NetAddress(BaseModel):
+    address: str  # CIDR, e.g. 192.168.1.2/24
+    # Set for CARP addresses only
+    vhid: str | None = None
+    carp_status: str | None = None
+
+
+class NetInterface(BaseModel):
+    device: str
+    identifier: str | None  # OPNsense's own name (wan, lan, opt3) — None when unassigned
+    description: str
+    status: str
+    enabled: bool
+    is_physical: bool
+    mtu: str | None
+    mac: str | None
+    media: str | None
+    vlan_tag: str | None
+    vlan_parent: str | None
+    ipv4_type: str | None  # "Static IPv4" / "DHCP" ... (assigned interfaces only)
+    ipv6_type: str | None
+    addresses: list[NetAddress]
+    pending_action: str | None = None
+    # Listed in the firewall's interface assignment (wan, lan, optN) — only those can be edited or removed.
+    assigned: bool = False
+    # This is the interface the firewall answers OPNexus on. Changing it can cut the connection.
+    is_management: bool = False
+
+
+class NetVlan(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    parent: str
+    tag: str
+    pcp: str | None
+    description: str
+    device: str | None
+
+
+class NetVip(BaseModel):
+    """No CARP password here, by design: OPNsense returns it in plain text."""
+    uuid: str
+    interface: str
+    interface_label: str
+    mode: str
+    address: str
+    vhid: str | None
+    advbase: str | None
+    advskew: str | None
+    description: str
+
+
+class NetGateway(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    name: str
+    description: str
+    interface: str
+    interface_label: str
+    ip_protocol: str
+    address: str
+    is_default: bool
+    disabled: bool
+    priority: str | None
+    status: str
+
+
+class NetRoute(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    network: str
+    gateway: str
+    description: str
+    disabled: bool
+
+
+class NetDnsHost(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    hostname: str
+    domain: str
+    record_type: str
+    server: str
+    enabled: bool
+    description: str
+
+
+class NetDhcpHost(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    host: str
+    domain: str
+    ip: str
+    hwaddr: str
+    lease_time: str
+    description: str
+
+
+class NetKeaSubnet(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    subnet: str
+    pools: str
+    routers: str
+    dns_servers: str
+    description: str
+
+
+class NetKeaReservation(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    subnet: str
+    ip_address: str
+    hw_address: str
+    hostname: str
+    description: str
+
+
+class HostNetwork(BaseModel):
+    host_id: str
+    host_name: str
+    interfaces: list[NetInterface]
+    vlans: list[NetVlan]
+    vips: list[NetVip]
+    gateways: list[NetGateway]
+    routes: list[NetRoute]
+    dns_hosts: list[NetDnsHost] = []
+    dhcp_hosts: list[NetDhcpHost] = []
+    kea_subnets: list[NetKeaSubnet] = []
+    kea_reservations: list[NetKeaReservation] = []
+    management_device: str | None
+    # The firewall's own API can set interface IPs/types (OPNsense >= ~26.7.6). Older 26.7.x
+    # only lists assignments. Detected from the data, not from a version number.
+    can_configure_interfaces: bool
+    # Sections the firewall could not deliver (e.g. older OPNsense without that API) — never silently empty.
+    unavailable: list[str]
+
+
+class NetworkChangeRequest(BaseModel):
+    kind: Literal["vlan", "vip", "gateway", "route", "interface", "dns_host", "dhcp_host", "kea_subnet", "kea_reservation",
+                  "tunable", "cron_job", "syslog_destination", "gateway_group", "lagg", "bridge", "loopback", "gre", "gif", "vxlan", "dns_forward", "dhcp_range"]
+    action: Literal["add", "set", "del"]
+    # Goes into a URL path, so only plain identifiers.
+    uuid: str | None = Field(default=None, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{1,64}$")
+    fields: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class NetworkChangeExecute(NetworkChangeRequest):
+    preview_token: str = Field(min_length=64, max_length=64)
+    acknowledge: bool = False
+
+
+class NetworkChangeRisk(BaseModel):
+    code: str
+    params: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict)
+
+
+class NetworkFieldChange(BaseModel):
+    field: str
+    before: str | None
+    after: str | None
+
+
+class NetworkChangePreview(BaseModel):
+    token: str
+    kind: str
+    action: str
+    uuid: str | None
+    host_id: str
+    host_name: str
+    changes: list[NetworkFieldChange]
+    risks: list[NetworkChangeRisk]
+    warnings: list[NetworkChangeRisk]
+    blocks: list[NetworkChangeRisk]
+    requires_acknowledgement: bool
+    management_device: str | None
+    can_execute: bool
+
+
+class NetworkChangeResult(BaseModel):
+    status: str
+    uuid: str | None
+    verified: bool
+    mismatches: list[str]
+    backup_id: str

backend/app/schemas/notification.py

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ from app.config import settings
 SmtpSecurity = Literal["none", "starttls", "ssl"]
 ProblemType = Literal[
     "host_offline", "cert_expiry", "rule_drift", "revert_failed", "maintenance_unknown",
-    "carp_split_brain", "nat_drift", "carp_auto_revert_failed",
+    "carp_split_brain", "nat_drift", "carp_auto_revert_failed", "network_drift",
 ]
 
 
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ class NotificationSettingsRead(BaseModel):
     maintenance_unknown_enabled: bool
     carp_health_enabled: bool
     nat_drift_enabled: bool
+    network_drift_enabled: bool = True
     carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled: bool
 
     poll_interval_seconds: int
@@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ class NotificationSettingsUpdate(BaseModel):
     maintenance_unknown_enabled: bool | None = None
     carp_health_enabled: bool | None = None
     nat_drift_enabled: bool | None = None
+    network_drift_enabled: bool | None = None
     carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled: bool | None = None
 
     poll_interval_seconds: int | None = Field(

backend/app/schemas/rule.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ class RuleCreate(BaseModel):
     destination_net: str = Field(default="any", min_length=1, max_length=128)
     destination_port: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=32)
     enabled: bool = True
+    log: bool = False
     target_host_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(default_factory=list)
     target_group_ids: list[uuid.UUID] = Field(default_factory=list)
 
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ class RuleRead(BaseModel):
     destination_net: str
     destination_port: str | None
     enabled: bool
+    log: bool = False
     created_at: datetime
     updated_at: datetime
     target_host_ids: list[uuid.UUID]
@@ -72,3 +74,27 @@ class RuleEdit(RuleCreate):
 
 class DeployApproval(BaseModel):
     preview_token: str = Field(min_length=64, max_length=64)
+
+
+class AdoptRequest(BaseModel):
+    host_id: uuid.UUID
+    rule_uuid: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=64)
+
+
+class UnmanagedRule(BaseModel):
+    uuid: str
+    description: str
+    interface: str
+    interface_label: str
+    direction: str
+    action: str
+    protocol: str
+    source_net: str
+    source_port: str
+    destination_net: str
+    destination_port: str
+    enabled: bool
+    log: bool
+    adoptable: bool
+    # Codes such as "negated_source" or "not_quick"; the UI turns them into text.
+    reasons: list[str]

backend/app/security_middleware.py

@@ -27,7 +27,11 @@ def _origin_allowed(origin: str, host_header: str) -> bool:
     if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
         return False
     if parsed.netloc.lower() == host_header.lower():
-        return True
+        # Same host is not enough on an HTTPS deployment: an http:// page on that
+        # very host (plain-HTTP port, downgraded first visit) is a different
+        # origin. The backend only sees the proxy's plain-HTTP hop, so the
+        # deployment's own COOKIE_SECURE switch says which scheme is legitimate.
+        return parsed.scheme == "https" or not settings.cookie_secure
     return f"{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}".lower() in {o.lower() for o in settings.allowed_origins}
 
 

backend/app/services/acme_secret_store.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".eabhmac"
 
@@ -20,9 +21,7 @@ def _path(account_id: uuid.UUID) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(account_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(account_id)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_secret(account_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:

backend/app/services/alias_deploy_service.py

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ from app.models.alias import FirewallAlias
 from app.models.alias_deployment import AliasDeployment
 from app.services.audit_service import tracked_rollback
 from app.services import opnsense_client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.deploy_flow import push_to_host
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
 
 
 def _now() -> datetime:
@@ -54,48 +55,23 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, alias: FirewallAlias, host: Opnsense
 
     prior_uuid = existing.opnsense_alias_uuid if existing else None
     prior_live_payload = existing.last_payload if existing else None
-    new_uuid = prior_uuid
-    try:
-        if prior_uuid:
-            await opnsense_client.set_alias_item(host, prior_uuid, payload)
-        else:
-            result = await opnsense_client.add_alias_item(host, payload)
-            new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-            if not new_uuid:
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError("Firewall hat keine Alias-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        await opnsense_client.reconfigure_aliases(host)
-    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        if existing:
-            existing.status = "error"
-            existing.opnsense_alias_uuid = new_uuid
-            existing.message = str(exc)
-            existing.revert_deadline = None
-            existing.deployed_at = _now()
-            return existing
-        deployment = AliasDeployment(
-            alias_id=alias.id, host_id=host.id, status="error", message=str(exc),
-            opnsense_alias_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
-        )
-        db.add(deployment)
-        return deployment
 
-    deadline = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
+    async def write(uuid_):
-    if existing:
+        if uuid_:
-        existing.status = "pending"
+            await opnsense_client.set_alias_item(host, uuid_, payload)
-        existing.message = None
+            return uuid_
-        existing.opnsense_alias_uuid = new_uuid
+        result = await opnsense_client.add_alias_item(host, payload)
-        existing.deployed_at = _now()
+        new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-        existing.revert_deadline = deadline
+        if not new_uuid:
-        existing.previous_payload = prior_live_payload
+            raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError("Firewall hat keine Alias-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        existing.last_payload = payload
+        return new_uuid
-        return existing
 
-    deployment = AliasDeployment(
+    deployment = await push_to_host(
-        alias_id=alias.id, host_id=host.id, status="pending", message=None,
+        db, existing=existing, uuid_attr="opnsense_alias_uuid",
-        opnsense_alias_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(), revert_deadline=deadline,
+        make=lambda **fields: AliasDeployment(alias_id=alias.id, host_id=host.id, **fields),
-        previous_payload=None, last_payload=payload,
+        prior_uuid=prior_uuid, prior_live_payload=prior_live_payload, payload=payload,
+        write=write, apply=lambda: opnsense_client.reconfigure_aliases(host),
     )
-    db.add(deployment)
     return deployment
 
 
@@ -113,7 +89,7 @@ async def deploy_alias(db: AsyncSession, alias: FirewallAlias, hosts: list[Opnse
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = f"Alias wurde übernommen, Hierarchie-Reihenfolge aber nicht bestätigt: {exc}"
-            deployment.revert_deadline = None
+            # The change is live: keep the revert deadline so an unconfirmed result is still undone.
     await db.commit()
     return deployments
 
@@ -134,7 +110,7 @@ async def sweep_expired_alias_deployments(db: AsyncSession) -> list[AliasDeploym
     from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
     await policy_lock(db)
     result = await db.execute(
-        select(AliasDeployment).where(AliasDeployment.status == "pending", AliasDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now())
+        select(AliasDeployment).where(AliasDeployment.status.in_(("pending", "error")), AliasDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now())
     )
     expired = list(result.scalars().all())
     touched: list[AliasDeployment] = []
@@ -159,7 +135,7 @@ async def undeploy_alias(db: AsyncSession, alias: FirewallAlias) -> None:
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = str(exc)
-                failures.append(host.name)
+                failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
                 continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/audit_service.py

@@ -15,10 +15,27 @@ from app.models.audit import AuditEvent
 context = ContextVar("audit_context", default=None)
 
 
+# Column widths of audit_events. entity_id/host_id/action are taken from the
+# request path BEFORE the router validated it, so a junk segment (300 chars,
+# or a NUL byte which Postgres text cannot store) used to turn into a 500 or a
+# dropped connection instead of a plain 404/422 (found by fuzzing, 2026-10-09).
+_LIMITS = {"correlation_id": 36, "actor": 150, "kind": 32, "action": 40, "status": 32,
+           "entity_id": 36, "entity_name": 255, "host_id": 36, "host_name": 255}
+
+
+def _clean(key, value):
+    if not isinstance(value, str):
+        return value
+    value = value.replace("\x00", "")
+    limit = _LIMITS.get(key)
+    return value[:limit] if limit else value
+
+
 def make_event(**values):
     ctx = context.get() or {}
-    return AuditEvent(actor=ctx.get("actor", "system:rollback"),
+    values = {k: _clean(k, v) for k, v in values.items()}
-                      correlation_id=ctx.get("id", str(uuid.uuid4())), **values)
+    return AuditEvent(actor=_clean("actor", ctx.get("actor", "system:rollback")),
+                      correlation_id=_clean("correlation_id", ctx.get("id", str(uuid.uuid4()))), **values)
 
 
 async def persist(**values):
@@ -42,7 +59,7 @@ def deployment_history(session, flush_context, instances):
         PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment: ("policy_hierarchy", PolicyHierarchyRule, "policy_hierarchy_id", "opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid"),
     }
     for dep in list(session.new) + list(session.dirty) + list(session.deleted):
-        if type(dep) not in mapping:
+        if type(dep) not in mapping or getattr(dep, "_skip_audit", False):
             continue
         is_new, deleted = dep in session.new, dep in session.deleted
         if not is_new and not deleted and not session.is_modified(dep, include_collections=False):

backend/app/services/auth_service.py

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ Design notes
   not reveal whether the account exists.
 """
 
+import asyncio
 import hashlib
 import logging
 import secrets
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import delete, select
 from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
 from app.models.user import AdminUser, Session
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -60,6 +62,36 @@ def verify_password(stored_hash: str, password: str) -> bool:
         return False
 
 
+# Argon2 is deliberately expensive (CPU and ~64 MiB each). Run on the default
+# executor so the single event loop (health checks, deploy/rollback sweeps)
+# keeps running, and cap how many run — and how many may queue — at once so a
+# flood of login attempts cannot exhaust CPU/memory or the thread pool.
+_HASH_CONCURRENCY = 4
+_HASH_MAX_WAITING = 32
+_hash_slots = asyncio.Semaphore(_HASH_CONCURRENCY)
+_hash_waiting = 0
+
+
+async def _bounded(function, *args):
+    global _hash_waiting
+    if _hash_waiting >= _HASH_MAX_WAITING:
+        raise api_error(503, ErrorCode.TOO_MANY_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS, wait=5)
+    _hash_waiting += 1
+    try:
+        async with _hash_slots:
+            return await asyncio.to_thread(function, *args)
+    finally:
+        _hash_waiting -= 1
+
+
+async def hash_password_async(password: str) -> str:
+    return await _bounded(hash_password, password)
+
+
+async def verify_password_async(stored_hash: str, password: str) -> bool:
+    return await _bounded(verify_password, stored_hash, password)
+
+
 def needs_rehash(stored_hash: str) -> bool:
     try:
         return _ph.check_needs_rehash(stored_hash)
@@ -76,21 +108,32 @@ class _AttemptRecord:
 
 
 class _LoginThrottle:
-    """Failed-login limiter with two independent buckets per window:
+    """Failed-attempt limiter with two independent buckets per window:
 
     * ``ip::username`` — targeted guessing against the one account
     * ``ip`` — spraying across many usernames from one source
 
     A login is blocked while *either* bucket is locked out.
+
+    All state is bounded: records whose window and lockout have both passed
+    are dropped, and a hard cap evicts the least recently active entries, so
+    a stream of made-up usernames/sources cannot grow memory without limit.
     """
 
+    MAX_RECORDS = 20_000
+    MAX_COUNTERS = 5_000
+    COUNTER_TTL_SECONDS = 24 * 3600
+    _PURGE_EVERY_SECONDS = 30.0
+
     def __init__(self) -> None:
         self._records: dict[str, _AttemptRecord] = {}
         # Total failures per username since their last successful login —
         # informational only (shown to the user after login), separate from
-        # the rolling lockout windows above. In-memory/per-process like the
+        # the rolling lockout windows above: username -> (count, last_failure).
-        # rest of this throttle, so it resets on a backend restart.
+        # In-memory/per-process like the rest of this throttle, so it resets
-        self._failures_since_success: dict[str, int] = {}
+        # on a backend restart.
+        self._failures_since_success: dict[str, tuple[int, float]] = {}
+        self._last_purge = 0.0
 
     @staticmethod
     def _user_key(ip: str, username: str) -> str:
@@ -107,6 +150,32 @@ class _LoginThrottle:
         remaining = rec.locked_until - time.monotonic()
         return int(remaining) + 1 if remaining > 0 else 0
 
+    @staticmethod
+    def _last_activity(rec: _AttemptRecord) -> float:
+        return max([rec.locked_until, *rec.failures]) if rec.failures or rec.locked_until else 0.0
+
+    def _purge(self, now: float, *, force: bool = False) -> None:
+        if not force and now - self._last_purge < self._PURGE_EVERY_SECONDS and len(self._records) < self.MAX_RECORDS:
+            return
+        self._last_purge = now
+        window = settings.login_window_seconds
+        for key in [
+            k for k, r in self._records.items()
+            if r.locked_until <= now and all(now - t >= window for t in r.failures)
+        ]:
+            del self._records[key]
+        if len(self._records) > self.MAX_RECORDS:
+            # Still over the cap with live entries: drop the stalest unlocked ones first.
+            stale = sorted(self._records, key=lambda k: (self._records[k].locked_until > now, self._last_activity(self._records[k])))
+            for key in stale[: len(self._records) - self.MAX_RECORDS]:
+                del self._records[key]
+        for name in [n for n, (_, ts) in self._failures_since_success.items() if now - ts > self.COUNTER_TTL_SECONDS]:
+            del self._failures_since_success[name]
+        if len(self._failures_since_success) > self.MAX_COUNTERS:
+            oldest = sorted(self._failures_since_success, key=lambda n: self._failures_since_success[n][1])
+            for name in oldest[: len(self._failures_since_success) - self.MAX_COUNTERS]:
+                del self._failures_since_success[name]
+
     def _record_key(self, key: str, max_attempts: int) -> None:
         now = time.monotonic()
         rec = self._records.setdefault(key, _AttemptRecord())
@@ -119,16 +188,19 @@ class _LoginThrottle:
 
     def retry_after(self, ip: str, username: str) -> int:
         """Seconds the caller must wait, or 0 if not currently locked out."""
+        self._purge(time.monotonic())
         return max(
             self._retry_after_key(self._user_key(ip, username)),
             self._retry_after_key(self._ip_key(ip)),
         )
 
     def record_failure(self, ip: str, username: str) -> None:
+        self._purge(time.monotonic())
         self._record_key(self._user_key(ip, username), settings.login_max_attempts)
         self._record_key(self._ip_key(ip), settings.login_ip_max_attempts)
         key = username.lower()
-        self._failures_since_success[key] = self._failures_since_success.get(key, 0) + 1
+        count, _ = self._failures_since_success.get(key, (0, 0.0))
+        self._failures_since_success[key] = (count + 1, time.monotonic())
 
     def reset(self, ip: str, username: str) -> None:
         self._records.pop(self._user_key(ip, username), None)
@@ -136,10 +208,15 @@ class _LoginThrottle:
     def pop_failures_since_success(self, username: str) -> int:
         """Read and clear the failure count for a username, called on a
         successful login so the count reflects only attempts since then."""
-        return self._failures_since_success.pop(username.lower(), 0)
+        return self._failures_since_success.pop(username.lower(), (0, 0.0))[0]
 
 
 throttle = _LoginThrottle()
+# Separate budget for the self-service security endpoints (2FA setup/enable/
+# disable, password change): keyed by (user id, action) instead of (ip,
+# username), so repeating the request from a stolen session cannot be used to
+# guess the password or a second-factor code without limit.
+account_throttle = _LoginThrottle()
 
 
 # ── Sessions ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -158,12 +235,27 @@ async def create_session(
     *,
     user_agent: str | None = None,
     ip_address: str | None = None,
+    verified_hash: str | None = None,
 ) -> tuple[str, datetime]:
-    """Create a session, returning the raw token (to be set as a cookie) and its expiry."""
+    """Create a session, returning the raw token (to be set as a cookie) and its expiry.
+
+    ``verified_hash`` is the password hash the caller just authenticated
+    against. The user row is re-read under a row lock first: a password
+    change/reset that committed while the (slow) password check was running
+    changed the hash, and the login must not outlive that revocation.
+    """
+    user_id = user.id
+    if verified_hash is not None:
+        locked = await db.scalar(
+            select(AdminUser.password_hash).where(AdminUser.id == user_id).with_for_update()
+        )
+        if locked != verified_hash:
+            await db.rollback()
+            raise api_error(401, ErrorCode.UNGUELTIGER_BENUTZERNAME_ODER_PASSWORT)
     token = secrets.token_urlsafe(SESSION_TOKEN_BYTES)
     expires_at = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.session_lifetime)
     session = Session(
-        user_id=user.id,
+        user_id=user_id,
         token_hash=_hash_token(token),
         expires_at=expires_at,
         last_used_at=_now(),
@@ -171,7 +263,7 @@ async def create_session(
         ip_address=ip_address,
     )
     db.add(session)
-    await db.execute(delete(Session).where(Session.user_id == user.id, Session.expires_at < _now()))
+    await db.execute(delete(Session).where(Session.user_id == user_id, Session.expires_at < _now()))
     await db.commit()
     return token, expires_at
 
@@ -193,6 +285,18 @@ async def revoke_session(db: AsyncSession, token: str) -> None:
     await db.commit()
 
 
+async def revoke_sessions(db: AsyncSession, user_id, *, keep_token: str | None = None, commit: bool = True) -> None:
+    """Delete every session of an account (optionally sparing the caller's own).
+    With ``commit=False`` the deletion joins the caller's transaction, so a
+    credential change and the revocation succeed or fail together."""
+    query = delete(Session).where(Session.user_id == user_id)
+    if keep_token:
+        query = query.where(Session.token_hash != _hash_token(keep_token))
+    await db.execute(query)
+    if commit:
+        await db.commit()
+
+
 # ── Authentication ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 async def authenticate(
@@ -211,14 +315,14 @@ async def authenticate(
     user = result.scalar_one_or_none()
 
     if user is None:
-        verify_password(_DUMMY_HASH, password)
+        await verify_password_async(_DUMMY_HASH, password)
         return None
 
-    if not verify_password(user.password_hash, password):
+    if not await verify_password_async(user.password_hash, password):
         return None
 
     if needs_rehash(user.password_hash):
-        user.password_hash = hash_password(password)
+        user.password_hash = await hash_password_async(password)
     if finalize:
         await finalize_login(db, user, ip)
     else:
@@ -263,7 +367,8 @@ async def bootstrap_admin(db: AsyncSession) -> None:
         logger.warning(
             "\n%s\n  No ADMIN_PASSWORD set — created admin user '%s' with a\n"
             "  generated password:\n\n      %s\n\n"
-            "  Log in and change it now. This is shown only once.\n%s",
+            "  Log in and change it now. This is shown only once.\n"
+            "  Lost it?  ./opnexus password   (sets and prints a new one)\n%s",
             "=" * 64, settings.admin_username, password, "=" * 64,
         )
     else:

backend/app/services/backup_store.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".xml"
 
@@ -21,11 +22,10 @@ def save_snapshot(host_id: uuid.UUID, content: bytes) -> str:
     microsecond precision to avoid collisions on rapid consecutive saves.
     Returns the filename, used as the backup's id."""
     host_dir = _host_dir(host_id)
-    host_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    host_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
     filename = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%S%f") + _SUFFIX
     path = host_dir / filename
-    path.write_bytes(content)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, content)
-    path.chmod(0o600)
     return filename
 
 

backend/app/services/carp_maintenance_window_service.py

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
 
 from app.models.carp_maintenance_window import CarpMaintenanceWindow
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.host_operation import HostOperation
 from app.services import audit_service, host_status_service
 from app.services import opnsense_client as client
 
@@ -63,6 +64,26 @@ async def close_windows_for_manual_leave(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -
     await db.commit()
 
 
+async def _close_enter_operations(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, message: str) -> None:
+    """Closes the host's still-open `carp_enter` maintenance record once the
+    window has been resolved by the timer. Without this the record stays
+    "submitted" forever: acknowledge cannot succeed (the host is no longer in
+    maintenance) and `ensure_no_maintenance` keeps blocking every deploy and
+    update in the cluster until someone cancels it by hand."""
+    result = await db.execute(
+        select(HostOperation).where(
+            HostOperation.host_id == host.id, HostOperation.action == "carp_enter", HostOperation.status == "submitted",
+        )
+    )
+    for op in result.scalars().all():
+        op.status = "cancelled"
+        op.message = message
+        await audit_service.persist(
+            kind="host", action="carp_enter", status="cancelled",
+            host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name, entity_id=str(op.id), message=message,
+        )
+
+
 async def sweep_expired(db: AsyncSession) -> list[CarpMaintenanceWindow]:
     result = await db.execute(
         select(CarpMaintenanceWindow).where(
@@ -88,6 +109,7 @@ async def sweep_expired(db: AsyncSession) -> list[CarpMaintenanceWindow]:
                 window.status = "cancelled_manual"
                 window.resolved_at = _now()
                 window.message = "Host war beim Ablauf bereits nicht mehr im CARP-Wartungsmodus."
+                await _close_enter_operations(db, host, window.message)
                 resolved.append(window)
                 continue
             result_payload = await client.toggle_carp_maintenance(host)
@@ -96,6 +118,7 @@ async def sweep_expired(db: AsyncSession) -> list[CarpMaintenanceWindow]:
             window.status = "reverted"
             window.resolved_at = _now()
             window.message = "Automatisch nach Ablauf des Zeitfensters in den Normalbetrieb zurückgeschaltet."
+            await _close_enter_operations(db, host, window.message)
             await audit_service.persist(
                 kind="host", action="carp_auto_revert", status="submitted",
                 host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name, entity_id=str(window.id),

backend/app/services/cert_key_store.py

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".certkey"
 
@@ -32,9 +33,7 @@ def _path(cert_id: uuid.UUID) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(cert_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(cert_id)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_secret(cert_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:

backend/app/services/deploy_flow.py

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+"""The shared write path of every "push to a firewall, then confirm or auto-revert"
+feature (rules, aliases, port forwards, 1:1 NAT, outbound NAT, hierarchy rules).
+
+Safety property: from the moment OPNexus may have changed something on a
+firewall, a durable record exists that lets the revert sweeper (or an operator)
+find and undo it — even if the reply is lost, the apply fails or the process
+dies in between.
+
+1. *Intent* is committed BEFORE the first remote call:
+   - existing deployment: status "pending" with the revert deadline armed and
+     the previous payload as rollback target (a crash leaves a normal,
+     sweepable pending change);
+   - first deployment (no remote UUID known yet): status "revert_failed" =
+     "outcome unknown, check the firewall" — the state that already blocks
+     retries/edits and raises a notification; "Rollback wiederholen" just
+     forgets the row when no UUID was ever recorded.
+2. The write. A refusal the firewall answered restores the previous state; a
+   lost/ambiguous reply keeps the intent record (existing: deadline stays armed,
+   new: stays "unknown").
+3. After a confirmed write the UUID is committed at once and the row becomes a
+   normal armed "pending" change. If applying it fails the row is "error" but
+   keeps its deadline, so the sweeper still reverts a possibly live change.
+4. Only after a successful apply the confirmation window starts.
+
+policy_lock (a transaction-scoped advisory lock) is released by the intermediate
+commits and taken again right away; the intent row itself keeps other deploys
+and the sweeper away in the gap (pending/unknown rows are never re-deployed).
+"""
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from typing import Any, Awaitable, Callable
+
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.config import settings
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
+
+UNKNOWN_OUTCOME = (
+    "Ausgang unklar: Die Firewall hat die Anfrage möglicherweise ausgeführt. Stand dort prüfen; "
+    "„Rollback wiederholen“ entfernt diesen Eintrag, ohne die Firewall anzusprechen."
+)
+
+_FIELDS = ("status", "message", "last_payload", "previous_payload", "revert_deadline", "deployed_at")
+
+
+def _now() -> datetime:
+    return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+
+async def _checkpoint(db: AsyncSession) -> None:
+    from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
+
+    await db.commit()
+    await policy_lock(db)
+
+
+async def push_to_host(
+    db: AsyncSession,
+    *,
+    existing: Any | None,
+    make: Callable[..., Any],
+    uuid_attr: str,
+    prior_uuid: str | None,
+    prior_live_payload: dict | None,
+    payload: dict,
+    write: Callable[[str | None], Awaitable[str]],
+    apply: Callable[[], Awaitable[Any]],
+) -> Any:
+    window = timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
+    before = {name: getattr(existing, name) for name in _FIELDS} if existing else None
+
+    # 1. durable intent
+    if existing is not None:
+        row = existing
+        row.status, row.message = "pending", None
+        row.previous_payload, row.last_payload = prior_live_payload, payload
+        row.revert_deadline, row.deployed_at = _now() + window, _now()
+    else:
+        row = make(
+            status="revert_failed", message=UNKNOWN_OUTCOME, last_payload=payload, previous_payload=None,
+            revert_deadline=None, deployed_at=_now(), **{uuid_attr: None},
+        )
+        db.add(row)
+    # The intent is a technical safety record, not a state change worth a history
+    # entry of its own (the request itself is already audited as "requested").
+    row._skip_audit = True
+    await _checkpoint(db)
+    row._skip_audit = False
+
+    wrote = False
+    try:
+        new_uuid = await write(prior_uuid)
+        wrote = True
+        # 3. recoverable by UUID from here on
+        setattr(row, uuid_attr, new_uuid)
+        row.status, row.message = "pending", None
+        row.previous_payload = prior_live_payload if existing is not None else None
+        row.last_payload, row.revert_deadline, row.deployed_at = payload, _now() + window, _now()
+        await _checkpoint(db)
+        await apply()
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        ambiguous = isinstance(exc, OpnsenseAmbiguousError)
+        if wrote:
+            # written, apply unconfirmed: possibly live — status "error" but the deadline stays armed
+            row.status, row.message = "error", str(exc)
+            row.revert_deadline, row.deployed_at = _now() + window, _now()
+        elif existing is not None and ambiguous:
+            # the update may or may not have been applied: keep the armed rollback
+            row.status, row.message = "error", f"{exc} (Ausgang unklar, wird zurückgesetzt)"
+            row.deployed_at = _now()
+        elif existing is not None:
+            # a refusal the firewall answered: nothing changed, restore what was there
+            for name, value in before.items():
+                setattr(row, name, value)
+            row.status, row.message, row.deployed_at = "error", str(exc), _now()
+        elif ambiguous:
+            row.status, row.message = "revert_failed", f"{exc} — {UNKNOWN_OUTCOME}"
+        else:
+            row.status, row.message = "error", str(exc)
+            row.last_payload, row.revert_deadline = None, None
+        return row
+
+    # 4. confirmed: the confirmation window starts now
+    row.status, row.message = "pending", None
+    row.revert_deadline, row.deployed_at = _now() + window, _now()
+    return row

backend/app/services/diagnostics_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+"""Network probes run FROM a firewall: ping, traceroute, TCP port probe, DNS lookup.
+
+Admin-only by construction (every call is a POST, which the read-only role is
+refused for) and audited with the target, because a firewall that probes
+arbitrary addresses on request is also a scanning tool. Inputs are checked
+here before they are sent (the firewall validates them again); results are
+shown and never stored. Ping runs as a short job that is always stopped and
+removed again, even when polling fails.
+"""
+import asyncio
+import ipaddress
+import re
+import time
+
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import audit_service, opnsense_client
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError, OpnsenseDiagnosticRejected
+
+TARGET = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9]([A-Za-z0-9.:_-]{0,251}[A-Za-z0-9])?$")
+# At most a few probes at a time per OPNexus process, so the page cannot be used to hammer a firewall.
+_SLOTS = asyncio.Semaphore(4)
+
+
+def clean_target(value: str, field: str = "target") -> str:
+    value = (value or "").strip()
+    if not TARGET.match(value):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field=field)
+    return value
+
+
+def clean_source(value: str | None) -> str:
+    value = (value or "").strip()
+    if not value:
+        return ""
+    try:
+        return str(ipaddress.ip_address(value))
+    except ValueError:
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field="source") from None
+
+
+async def _audit(host: OpnsenseHost, tool: str, target: str, ok: bool, details: dict, message: str | None = None) -> None:
+    await audit_service.persist(kind="diagnostic", action=f"diag.{tool}", status="ok" if ok else "failed",
+                                entity_name=target, host_id=str(host.id), host_name=host.name, message=message, details=details)
+
+
+def _rejected(exc: OpnsenseDiagnosticRejected):
+    field = next(iter(exc.validations), "target").split(".")[-1]
+    return api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field=field)
+
+
+async def _guarded(host: OpnsenseHost, tool: str, target: str, params: dict, call):
+    async with _SLOTS:
+        try:
+            result = await call()
+        except OpnsenseDiagnosticRejected as exc:
+            await _audit(host, tool, target, False, params, "rejected: " + ", ".join(exc.validations))
+            raise _rejected(exc) from exc
+        except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+            await _audit(host, tool, target, False, params, str(exc)[:300])
+            raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+    await _audit(host, tool, target, True, params)
+    return result
+
+
+async def traceroute(host: OpnsenseHost, target: str, ipproto: str, protocol: str, source: str | None) -> dict:
+    target, source = clean_target(target), clean_source(source)
+    params = {"target": target, "ipproto": ipproto, "protocol": protocol, "source": source}
+
+    async def call():
+        data = await opnsense_client.diagnostic_set(
+            host, "/diagnostics/traceroute/set", "traceroute",
+            {"hostname": target, "ipproto": ipproto, "protocol": protocol, "source_address": source})
+        resp = data.get("response") or {}
+        hops = [{"ttl": str(r.get("ttl", "")), "address": str(r.get("address", "")), "host": str(r.get("host", "")),
+                 "as": str(r.get("AS", "")), "probes": str(r.get("probes", ""))} for r in resp.get("rows", []) if isinstance(r, dict)]
+        return {"target": target, "notice": str(resp.get("notice", "")), "hops": hops}
+    return await _guarded(host, "traceroute", target, params, call)
+
+
+async def portprobe(host: OpnsenseHost, target: str, port: int, ipproto: str, source: str | None) -> dict:
+    target, source = clean_target(target), clean_source(source)
+    params = {"target": target, "port": port, "ipproto": ipproto, "source": source}
+
+    async def call():
+        data = await opnsense_client.diagnostic_set(
+            host, "/diagnostics/portprobe/set", "portprobe",
+            {"hostname": target, "port": str(port), "ipproto": ipproto, "source_address": source, "source_port": "", "showtext": "0"})
+        message = str((data.get("response") or {}).get("message", ""))
+        # Never forward the remote payload (a service banner): only whether the connection worked.
+        return {"target": target, "port": port, "open": "succeeded" in message.lower(), "message": message}
+    return await _guarded(host, "portprobe", target, params, call)
+
+
+async def dns_lookup(host: OpnsenseHost, name: str, server: str | None) -> dict:
+    name = clean_target(name, "name")
+    server = clean_source(server)
+    params = {"name": name, "server": server}
+
+    async def call():
+        data = await opnsense_client.diagnostic_set(host, "/diagnostics/dns_diagnostics/set", "dns", {"hostname": name, "server": server})
+        out = {}
+        for rtype, rec in (data.get("response") or {}).items():
+            if isinstance(rec, dict):
+                out[str(rtype)] = {"answers": [str(a) for a in rec.get("answers", [])], "query_time": str(rec.get("query_time", "")),
+                                   "server": str(rec.get("server", ""))}
+        return {"name": name, "records": out}
+    return await _guarded(host, "dns", name, params, call)
+
+
+async def ping(host: OpnsenseHost, target: str, ipproto: str, count: int, packetsize: int | None, source: str | None) -> dict:
+    target, source = clean_target(target), clean_source(source)
+    params = {"target": target, "ipproto": ipproto, "count": count, "packetsize": packetsize, "source": source}
+
+    async def call():
+        job = await opnsense_client.ping_job_start(host, {
+            "hostname": target, "fam": "ip6" if ipproto == "inet6" else "ip", "source_address": source,
+            "packetsize": str(packetsize or ""), "disable_frag": "0", "interval": "1", "description": "OPNexus"})
+        try:
+            state = None
+            deadline = time.monotonic() + count + 6
+            while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+                await asyncio.sleep(1)
+                state = await opnsense_client.ping_job_state(host, job)
+                if state and int(state.get("send") or 0) >= count:
+                    break
+            await opnsense_client.ping_job_stop(host, job)
+            await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
+            state = await opnsense_client.ping_job_state(host, job) or state
+        finally:
+            # Never leave a job running on the firewall.
+            try:
+                await opnsense_client.ping_job_stop(host, job)
+                await opnsense_client.ping_job_remove(host, job)
+            except OpnsenseAPIError:
+                pass
+        if not state:
+            raise OpnsenseAPIError("Ping: kein Ergebnis von der Firewall")
+        return {"target": target, "sent": int(state.get("send") or 0), "received": int(state.get("received") or 0),
+                "loss": str(state.get("loss", "")), "min": state.get("min"), "avg": state.get("avg"), "max": state.get("max"),
+                "stddev": state.get("std-dev"), "error": state.get("last_error")}
+    return await _guarded(host, "ping", target, params, call)

backend/app/services/firewall_url.py

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"""Policy for the address under which a firewall's API is reached.
+
+The API key/secret travel as HTTP Basic credentials, so a plain ``http://``
+address would hand them to anyone on the path. ``verify_tls`` is a different
+control (does the certificate get checked) and does not upgrade or reject an
+``http://`` URL, hence the scheme is enforced here — when a host is created
+and again, for rows that already exist, right before a request is built.
+``ALLOW_INSECURE_FIREWALL_URLS=true`` is the explicit, deployment-level
+escape hatch for lab setups.
+"""
+from urllib.parse import urlsplit
+
+from app.config import settings
+
+
+def check_base_url(value: str) -> str | None:
+    """Return a reason (German, user-facing) if the URL must not be used, else None."""
+    try:
+        parts = urlsplit(value.strip())
+        parts.port  # noqa: B018 - raises ValueError on an invalid port
+    except ValueError:
+        return "Ungültige Adresse"
+    if parts.scheme not in ("https", "http") or not parts.hostname:
+        return "Die Adresse muss mit https:// beginnen und einen Host enthalten"
+    if parts.scheme == "http" and not settings.allow_insecure_firewall_urls:
+        return (
+            "Unverschlüsseltes http:// ist nicht erlaubt (API-Zugangsdaten würden im Klartext "
+            "übertragen) – bitte https:// verwenden"
+        )
+    if parts.username is not None or parts.password is not None:
+        return "Zugangsdaten gehören nicht in die Adresse"
+    if parts.query or parts.fragment:
+        return "Die Adresse darf keine Parameter oder Fragmente enthalten"
+    return None
+
+
+def validate_base_url(value: str) -> str:
+    reason = check_base_url(value)
+    if reason:
+        raise ValueError(reason)
+    return value

backend/app/services/ipsec_deploy_service.py

@@ -254,6 +254,9 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, tunnel: IpsecTunnel, host: OpnsenseH
 
     try:
         await _write_config(host, payloads, deployment)
+        # Same trap as WireGuard: with the global IPsec switch off the config
+        # is stored but nothing runs, and reconfigure still answers ok.
+        await opnsense_client.ensure_ipsec_enabled(host)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
         deployment.status = "error"
         deployment.message = str(exc)
@@ -324,7 +327,7 @@ async def undeploy_tunnel(db: AsyncSession, tunnel: IpsecTunnel) -> None:
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = str(exc)
-            failures.append(host.name)
+            failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
             continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/ipsec_psk_store.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".psk"
 
@@ -21,9 +22,7 @@ def _path(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(tunnel_id)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_secret(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
@@ -35,3 +34,12 @@ def read_secret(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
 
 def delete_secret(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:
     _path(tunnel_id).unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+def version(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
+    """Opaque change marker (last write time) — lets an approval token notice a
+    rotated secret without containing, or being derivable from, the secret."""
+    try:
+        return str(_path(tunnel_id).stat().st_mtime_ns)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return None

backend/app/services/ipsec_service.py

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ import hashlib
 import json
 
 from app.models.policy import IpsecTunnelRevision
-from app.services.ipsec_deploy_service import build_payloads
+from app.services import ipsec_psk_store
+from app.services.ipsec_deploy_service import _redact_for_storage, build_payloads
 from app.services.policy_service import effective_hosts  # noqa: F401 - re-exported for routers/ipsec.py
 
 IPSEC_FIELDS = (
@@ -33,6 +34,9 @@ def revision(db, tunnel, note):
 
 def preview(tunnel):
     payloads = build_payloads(tunnel)
+    # What deployments persist/compare is the redacted form (secret -> hash);
+    # comparing the raw payload with it would flag an untouched secret as changed.
+    comparable = _redact_for_storage(payloads)
     deployments = {d.host_id: d for d in tunnel.deployments}
     hosts = effective_hosts(tunnel)
     rows = []
@@ -40,7 +44,7 @@ def preview(tunnel):
         dep = deployments.get(host.id)
         before = dep.last_payload if dep else None
         action = "create" if not dep or not dep.opnsense_connection_uuid else "update"
-        if before == payloads and dep and dep.status == "success":
+        if before == comparable and dep and dep.status == "success":
             action = "unchanged"
         if not host.enabled:
             action = "disabled"
@@ -48,7 +52,7 @@ def preview(tunnel):
         if action not in ("disabled",):
             for section in ("connection", "local", "remote", "child", "psk"):
                 before_section = (before or {}).get(section, {})
-                after_section = payloads[section]
+                after_section = comparable[section]
                 for key, value in after_section.items():
                     if key == "connection":
                         continue  # UUID filled in at deploy time, not a user-visible field
@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ def preview(tunnel):
                         label = "Pre-Shared-Key" if section == "psk" and key == "Key" else f"{section}.{key}"
                         # Never surface the PSK's own value in a diff view.
                         shown_before = "•••" if section == "psk" and key == "Key" and prior else prior
-                        shown_after = "•••" if section == "psk" and key == "Key" else value
+                        shown_after = "•••" if section == "psk" and key == "Key" and value else value
                         changes.append({"field": label, "before": shown_before, "after": shown_after})
         rows.append({
             "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name, "action": action,
@@ -89,6 +93,9 @@ def preview(tunnel):
         warnings.append("Für diesen Tunnel ist noch kein Pre-Shared-Key hinterlegt.")
     state = {
         "snapshot": snapshot(tunnel), "rows": rows,
+        # Rotating only the secret changes nothing else in the snapshot — bind the
+        # approval to the stored secret's version so an old approval cannot cover it.
+        "secret_version": ipsec_psk_store.version(tunnel.id),
         "hosts": [(str(h.id), h.base_url, h.enabled, h.verify_tls) for h in hosts],
         "deployments": sorted(
             [(str(d.host_id), d.opnsense_connection_uuid, d.opnsense_local_uuid, d.opnsense_remote_uuid,
@@ -109,12 +116,12 @@ def workflow(tunnel, deployments):
     hosts = effective_hosts(tunnel)
     active = [h for h in hosts if h.enabled]
     by_host = {d.host_id: d for d in deployments}
-    payloads = build_payloads(tunnel)
+    comparable = _redact_for_storage(build_payloads(tunnel))
     target_ids = {h.id for h in hosts}
     counts = {
         "targets": len(hosts),
         "active_targets": len(active),
-        "changes": sum(1 for h in active if h.id not in by_host or by_host[h.id].last_payload != payloads),
+        "changes": sum(1 for h in active if h.id not in by_host or by_host[h.id].last_payload != comparable),
         "errors": sum(d.status == "error" for d in deployments),
         "retained": sum(d.host_id not in target_ids for d in deployments),
     }

backend/app/services/live_certificates_service.py

@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ def _row_to_certificate(row: dict) -> HostCertificate:
 
     return HostCertificate(
         uuid=row.get("uuid", ""),
+        refid=row.get("refid", ""),
         descr=row.get("descr") or "(ohne Beschreibung)",
         common_name=row.get("commonname") or None,
         issuer=row.get("%caref") or "Selbstsigniert",
@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ def _row_to_ca(row: dict) -> HostCa:
 
     return HostCa(
         uuid=row.get("uuid", ""),
+        refid=row.get("refid", ""),
         descr=row.get("descr") or "(ohne Beschreibung)",
         common_name=row.get("commonname") or None,
         valid_from=valid_from,

backend/app/services/nat_drift_service.py

@@ -62,6 +62,10 @@ async def _live_rows_or_none(host: OpnsenseHost, nat_type: str) -> list[dict] |
 
 
 async def compute_cluster_drift(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], nat_type: str) -> list[dict]:
+    return (await compute_cluster_drift_with_reachable(hosts, nat_type))[0]
+
+
+async def compute_cluster_drift_with_reachable(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], nat_type: str) -> tuple[list[dict], set]:
     """Same shape/contract as rule_drift_service.compute_cluster_drift:
     one row per fingerprint missing from at least one reachable host."""
     _, fingerprint_fn = _SPECS[nat_type]
@@ -78,4 +82,4 @@ async def compute_cluster_drift(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost], nat_type: str) -> lis
     for entry in by_fingerprint.values():
         entry["reachable_host_ids"] = reachable_ids
 
-    return [entry for entry in by_fingerprint.values() if len(entry["present_on"]) < len(reachable_ids)]
+    return [entry for entry in by_fingerprint.values() if len(entry["present_on"]) < len(reachable_ids)], reachable_ids

backend/app/services/network_change_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+"""Changes to VLANs, virtual IPs, gateways and static routes of ONE firewall.
+
+Unlike rules, these objects are specific to a firewall (own IPs, own VLAN
+layout), so there is no central copy and no multi-host push: the firewall is the
+source of truth and every change goes straight to it, but only through a
+preview/execute pair:
+
+  preview  reads the live state, computes the diff and the risks, and returns a
+           token that covers exactly that state.
+  execute  re-reads the live state, refuses if it no longer matches the token,
+           refuses risky changes without an explicit acknowledgement, saves a
+           fresh config backup, writes the object, applies it, and reads it back
+           to check that the firewall really holds what was asked for.
+
+The main risk is cutting the connection OPNexus itself uses (the interface or
+address the firewall is reached on, the default route, a route that swallows the
+management address). Those cases are detected from the firewall's own
+interface list and need the acknowledgement. OPNexus cannot undo a change that
+cuts it off, so there is deliberately NO automatic rollback here — the backup
+taken before the change is the way back.
+
+Secrets (the CARP password) are never returned, hashed into the token only, and
+never written to the audit log.
+"""
+import hashlib
+import ipaddress
+import json
+import re
+
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import audit_service, backup_store, network_service, opnsense_client
+from app.services.host_maintenance_service import ensure_no_maintenance
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+
+# Only these fields can be sent; anything else is rejected, never forwarded.
+FIELDS: dict[str, set[str]] = {
+    "vlan": {"if", "tag", "pcp", "proto", "descr"},
+    "vip": {"interface", "mode", "network", "vhid", "advbase", "advskew", "password", "descr", "nosync", "peer", "peer6"},
+    "gateway": {"disabled", "name", "descr", "interface", "ipprotocol", "gateway", "defaultgw", "fargw",
+                "monitor_disable", "monitor", "priority", "weight"},
+    "route": {"network", "gateway", "descr", "enabled"},
+    "dns_host": {"enabled", "hostname", "domain", "rr", "server", "mx", "mxprio", "addptr", "description"},
+    "dhcp_host": {"host", "domain", "local", "ip", "hwaddr", "client_id", "lease_time", "ignore", "descr"},
+    "kea_subnet": {"subnet", "pools", "valid_lifetime", "next_server", "description", "option_data.routers",
+                   "option_data.domain_name_servers", "option_data.domain_name", "option_data.ntp_servers"},
+    "kea_reservation": {"subnet", "ip_address", "hw_address", "client_id", "hostname", "description", "next_server"},
+    "tunable": {"tunable", "value", "descr"},
+    "cron_job": {"enabled", "minutes", "hours", "days", "months", "weekdays", "who", "command", "parameters", "description"},
+    "syslog_destination": {"enabled", "transport", "program", "level", "facility", "hostname", "port", "rfc5424", "description"},
+    "gateway_group": {"name", "item", "item2", "item3", "item4", "item5", "trigger", "poolopts", "descr"},
+    "lagg": {"members", "primary_member", "proto", "lacp_fast_timeout", "use_flowid", "lagghash", "lacp_strict", "mtu", "descr"},
+    "bridge": {"members", "linklocal", "enablestp", "proto", "descr"},
+    "loopback": {"deviceId", "description"},
+    "gre": {"local-addr", "remote-addr", "tunnel-local-addr", "tunnel-remote-addr", "tunnel-remote-net", "descr"},
+    "gif": {"local-addr", "remote-addr", "tunnel-local-addr", "tunnel-remote-addr", "tunnel-remote-net", "descr"},
+    "vxlan": {"deviceId", "vxlanid", "vxlanlocal", "vxlanlocalport", "vxlanremote", "vxlanremoteport", "vxlangroup", "vxlandev"},
+    "dns_forward": {"enabled", "type", "domain", "server", "port", "verify", "forward_tcp_upstream", "forward_first", "description"},
+    "dhcp_range": {"interface", "start_addr", "end_addr", "subnet_mask", "lease_time", "domain_type", "domain", "description"},
+    "interface": {"if", "descr", "enable", "type4", "ipaddr", "gateway", "type6", "ipaddrv6", "gatewayv6", "mtu",
+                  "blockpriv", "blockbogons", "lock"},
+}
+SECRET_FIELDS: dict[str, set[str]] = {"vip": {"password"}}
+# Section of HostNetwork that must be readable for the kind to be managed on this firewall.
+SECTION = {"vlan": "vlans", "vip": "vips", "gateway": "gateways", "route": "routes", "interface": "assignments",
+           "dns_host": "dns_hosts", "dhcp_host": "dhcp_hosts", "kea_subnet": "kea_subnets",
+           "kea_reservation": "kea_reservations"}
+# Columns the generic object lists show (the firewall's own field names). Lists never carry fields outside FIELDS.
+OBJECT_COLUMNS: dict[str, list[str]] = {
+    "tunable": ["tunable", "value", "default_value", "descr"],
+    "cron_job": ["enabled", "minutes", "hours", "days", "months", "weekdays", "command", "description"],
+    "syslog_destination": ["enabled", "transport", "hostname", "port", "program", "level", "description"],
+    "gateway_group": ["name", "item", "item2", "item3", "trigger", "descr"],
+    "lagg": ["laggif", "members", "proto", "descr"],
+    "bridge": ["bridgeif", "members", "proto", "descr"],
+    "loopback": ["deviceId", "description"],
+    "gre": ["greif", "local-addr", "remote-addr", "tunnel-local-addr", "tunnel-remote-addr", "descr"],
+    "gif": ["gifif", "local-addr", "remote-addr", "tunnel-local-addr", "tunnel-remote-addr", "descr"],
+    "vxlan": ["deviceId", "vxlanid", "vxlanlocal", "vxlanremote", "vxlangroup", "vxlandev"],
+    "dns_forward": ["enabled", "type", "domain", "server", "port", "description"],
+    "dhcp_range": ["interface", "start_addr", "end_addr", "subnet_mask", "lease_time", "description"],
+}
+# These change how the network is wired; the others (DNS/DHCP data) cannot cut the connection to the firewall.
+WIRING_KINDS = {"vlan", "vip", "gateway", "route", "interface", "lagg", "bridge", "gre", "gif", "vxlan"}
+_CONTROL = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]")
+
+
+def validate_fields(kind: str, fields: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    allowed = FIELDS[kind]
+    clean: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for key, value in fields.items():
+        if key not in allowed:
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field=str(key)[:40])
+        if isinstance(value, bool):
+            value = "1" if value else "0"
+        if value is None:
+            value = ""
+        if not isinstance(value, (str, int)) or isinstance(value, bool):
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field=key)
+        text = str(value).strip()
+        if len(text) > 255 or _CONTROL.search(text):
+            raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field=key)
+        clean[key] = text
+    return clean
+
+
+def _explode(node: dict) -> dict:
+    """Kea nests its DHCP options one level deep; treat them as "option_data.<name>" like the whitelist does."""
+    out: dict = {}
+    for key, value in node.items():
+        if key == "option_data" and isinstance(value, dict):
+            for child, inner in value.items():
+                out[f"option_data.{child}"] = inner
+        else:
+            out[key] = value
+    return out
+
+
+def flatten(kind: str, node: dict) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """OPNsense answers select fields as {option: {selected: 0|1}}; reduce to the selected value(s)."""
+    out: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for key, value in _explode(node).items():
+        if key in SECRET_FIELDS.get(kind, set()):
+            continue
+        if isinstance(value, dict):
+            selected = [k for k, o in value.items() if isinstance(o, dict) and o.get("selected") and k != ""]
+            if value and all(isinstance(o, dict) and "selected" in o for o in value.values()):
+                out[key] = ",".join(selected)
+            continue
+        out[key] = "" if value is None else str(value)
+    return out
+
+
+def _ip(text: str):
+    try:
+        return ipaddress.ip_interface(text.strip()).ip
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _network(text: str):
+    try:
+        return ipaddress.ip_network(text.strip(), strict=False)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _risk(code: str, **params) -> dict:
+    return {"code": code, "params": params}
+
+
+def assess(kind: str, action: str, uuid: str | None, before: dict, after: dict,
+           net, mgmt_addresses: set, peers: list[str], context: dict | None = None) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict], list[dict]]:
+    """Returns (risks needing acknowledgement, plain warnings, hard blocks)."""
+    risks: list[dict] = []
+    warnings: list[dict] = []
+    blocks: list[dict] = []
+    mgmt_device = net.management_device
+    mgmt_iface = next((i for i in net.interfaces if i.device == mgmt_device), None)
+    mgmt_ident = mgmt_iface.identifier if mgmt_iface else None
+
+    if SECTION.get(kind) in net.unavailable:
+        blocks.append(_risk("api_unavailable", section=SECTION[kind]))
+    if mgmt_device is None and kind in WIRING_KINDS:
+        # We cannot tell what this change could cut, so treat every change to existing objects as risky.
+        if action in ("set", "del"):
+            risks.append(_risk("management_unknown"))
+
+    context = context or {}
+    if kind == "interface":
+        if not net.can_configure_interfaces:
+            blocks.append(_risk("interface_api_unavailable"))
+        if context.get("pending"):
+            blocks.append(_risk("interface_changes_pending"))
+        if action in ("set", "del") and mgmt_ident and uuid == mgmt_ident:
+            risks.append(_risk("management_interface", device=mgmt_device))
+        if action == "del" and before.get("lock") == "1":
+            # OPNsense refuses to remove a locked interface; say so now instead of failing at apply time.
+            blocks.append(_risk("interface_locked"))
+        if action == "del":
+            rules = context.get("rules_using") or []
+            if rules:
+                risks.append(_risk("interface_rules_removed", count=len(rules), names=", ".join(rules[:5])))
+        if action in ("set", "del") and uuid in ("wan", "lan") and uuid != mgmt_ident:
+            warnings.append(_risk("core_interface", name=uuid))
+
+    if kind in ("lagg", "bridge"):
+        members = {m for side in (before, after) for m in side.get("members", "").split(",") if m}
+        if mgmt_device and mgmt_device in members:
+            risks.append(_risk("management_member", device=mgmt_device))
+        elif mgmt_device is None and action in ("set", "del"):
+            pass  # already covered by management_unknown above
+    if kind == "tunable":
+        # sysctl values can change how the whole system behaves (and some only apply after a reboot).
+        risks.append(_risk("tunable_change"))
+        if action in ("set", "del") and uuid and "-" not in uuid:
+            # A built-in default (its id is not a UUID): the firewall would create a new entry instead of
+            # changing it, so overriding one is an "add", not an edit.
+            blocks.append(_risk("tunable_default_row"))
+    if kind == "gateway_group" and action == "del":
+        warnings.append(_risk("gateway_group_in_use"))
+
+    if kind == "vlan" and action in ("set", "del"):
+        device = next((v.device for v in net.vlans if v.uuid == uuid), None)
+        if device and device == mgmt_device:
+            risks.append(_risk("management_interface", device=device))
+
+    if kind == "vip":
+        for side in (before, after) if action != "add" else (after,):
+            ip = _ip(side.get("network", "")) if side.get("network") else None
+            if ip is not None and ip in mgmt_addresses:
+                risks.append(_risk("management_address", address=str(ip)))
+                break
+        if "carp" in (before.get("mode"), after.get("mode")):
+            warnings.append(_risk("carp_change"))
+
+    if kind == "gateway":
+        current = next((g for g in net.gateways if g.uuid == uuid), None)
+        if current is not None and action in ("set", "del"):
+            if current.is_default:
+                risks.append(_risk("default_gateway", name=current.name))
+            if mgmt_ident and current.interface == mgmt_ident:
+                risks.append(_risk("management_gateway", name=current.name))
+        if action in ("add", "set") and after.get("defaultgw") == "1" and (current is None or not current.is_default):
+            risks.append(_risk("default_gateway_change"))
+
+    if kind == "route":
+        for side in (before, after) if action != "add" else (after,):
+            network = _network(side.get("network", "")) if side.get("network") else None
+            if network is None:
+                continue
+            if network.prefixlen == 0:
+                risks.append(_risk("default_route", network=str(network)))
+                break
+            if any(a.version == network.version and a in network for a in mgmt_addresses):
+                risks.append(_risk("route_covers_management", network=str(network)))
+                break
+
+    if peers:
+        warnings.append(_risk("cluster_peers", hosts=", ".join(peers)))
+    # De-duplicate while keeping order.
+    seen, unique = set(), []
+    for r in risks:
+        key = json.dumps(r, sort_keys=True)
+        if key not in seen:
+            seen.add(key)
+            unique.append(r)
+    return unique, warnings, blocks
+
+
+def _token(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, action: str, uuid: str | None, fields: dict, before: dict, mgmt_device) -> str:
+    state = {
+        "host": str(host.id), "url": host.base_url, "kind": kind, "action": action, "uuid": uuid,
+        # hash, so a secret never sits in the token's input in the clear
+        "fields": hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(fields, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest(),
+        "before": before, "mgmt": mgmt_device,
+    }
+    return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(state, sort_keys=True).encode()).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _public(kind: str, fields: dict) -> dict:
+    return {k: ("(gesetzt)" if k in SECRET_FIELDS.get(kind, set()) and v else v) for k, v in fields.items()
+            if not (k in SECRET_FIELDS.get(kind, set()) and not v)}
+
+
+async def _peers(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[str]:
+    if not host.cluster_name:
+        return []
+    rows = await db.scalars(select(OpnsenseHost.name).where(
+        OpnsenseHost.cluster_name == host.cluster_name, OpnsenseHost.id != host.id).order_by(OpnsenseHost.name))
+    return list(rows.all())
+
+
+async def list_objects(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str) -> dict:
+    """Rows of one generic object kind, reduced to the columns above (plus uuid) — never whole rows,
+    so nothing the list does not need (or must not show) leaves the server."""
+    columns = OBJECT_COLUMNS[kind]
+    try:
+        rows = await opnsense_client.search_network_objects(host, kind)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        if "404" in str(exc):
+            return {"available": False, "columns": columns, "rows": []}   # this OPNsense version lacks the API
+        raise
+    out = []
+    for row in rows:
+        item = {"uuid": str(row.get("uuid", ""))}
+        for col in columns:
+            value = row.get(col)
+            item[col] = "" if value is None or isinstance(value, (dict, list)) else str(value)
+        out.append(item)
+    return {"available": True, "columns": columns, "rows": out}
+
+
+async def _rules_using(host: OpnsenseHost, identifier: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Descriptions of the user-made rules that name this interface (OPNsense deletes them with it)."""
+    data = await opnsense_client.search_rules(host, all_rows=True)
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [str(r.get("description") or r.get("uuid")) for r in rows
+            if isinstance(r, dict) and not r.get("is_automatic")
+            and identifier in str(r.get("interface") or "").split(",")]
+
+
+async def preview(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, action: str, uuid: str | None, fields: dict) -> dict:
+    fields = validate_fields(kind, fields)
+    if action in ("set", "del") and not uuid:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    net = await network_service.get_host_network(host)
+    before: dict[str, str] = {}
+    if action in ("set", "del"):
+        node = await opnsense_client.get_network_item(host, kind, uuid)
+        if not node or not any(v not in ("", None) for v in node.values() if not isinstance(v, dict)):
+            raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+        # Only the fields that may be sent: the rest (e.g. Kea's DDNS key secret) never reaches the token or the audit log.
+        before = {k: v for k, v in flatten(kind, node).items() if k in FIELDS[kind]}
+    after = {} if action == "del" else ({**before, **fields} if action == "set" else dict(fields))
+    mgmt_addresses = await network_service.management_addresses(host)
+    context: dict = {}
+    if kind == "interface":
+        if net.can_configure_interfaces:
+            context["pending"] = await opnsense_client.interface_changes_pending(host)
+        if action == "del":
+            context["rules_using"] = await _rules_using(host, uuid)
+    risks, warnings, blocks = assess(kind, action, uuid, before, after, net, mgmt_addresses, await _peers(db, host), context)
+    secret = SECRET_FIELDS.get(kind, set())
+    changes = []
+    for key in sorted(set(before) | set(fields)):
+        old, new = before.get(key), fields.get(key) if action != "del" else None
+        if action == "del":
+            if old not in (None, "") and key in FIELDS[kind]:
+                changes.append({"field": key, "before": old, "after": None})
+        elif key in fields and (action == "add" or old != new):
+            if key in secret:
+                changes.append({"field": key, "before": None, "after": "(gesetzt)" if new else None})
+            else:
+                changes.append({"field": key, "before": old, "after": new})
+    token = _token(host, kind, action, uuid, fields, before, net.management_device)
+    return {
+        "token": token, "kind": kind, "action": action, "uuid": uuid, "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name,
+        "changes": changes, "risks": risks, "warnings": warnings, "blocks": blocks,
+        "requires_acknowledgement": bool(risks), "management_device": net.management_device,
+        "can_execute": not blocks and (action == "del" or bool(changes)),
+        "_fields": fields, "_before": before,
+    }
+
+
+def _matches(expected: dict[str, str], actual: dict[str, str], secret: set[str]) -> list[str]:
+    return [k for k, v in expected.items() if k not in secret and actual.get(k, "") != v]
+
+
+async def _verify(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, action: str, uuid: str | None, fields: dict) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
+    try:
+        if action == "del":
+            present = await opnsense_client.list_network_item_uuids(host, kind)
+            return (uuid not in present), ([] if uuid not in present else ["still_present"])
+        actual = flatten(kind, await opnsense_client.get_network_item(host, kind, uuid))
+        mismatches = _matches(fields, actual, SECRET_FIELDS.get(kind, set()))
+        return (not mismatches), mismatches
+    except OpnsenseAPIError:
+        return False, ["unreadable"]
+
+
+async def execute(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, action: str, uuid: str | None, fields: dict,
+                  token: str, acknowledged: bool) -> dict:
+    await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])
+    try:
+        plan = await preview(db, host, kind, action, uuid, fields)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.HOST_REQUEST_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+    if plan["token"] != token:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.ENTWURF_ODER_ZIELE_WURDEN_GEAENDERT_VORSCHAU_ERNEUT_OEFFNEN)
+    if plan["blocks"]:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.NETWORK_CHANGE_BLOCKED, reasons=", ".join(b["code"] for b in plan["blocks"]))
+    if not plan["can_execute"]:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.NETWORK_CHANGE_BLOCKED, reasons="nothing_to_change")
+    if plan["requires_acknowledgement"] and not acknowledged:
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ACK_REQUIRED, reasons=", ".join(r["code"] for r in plan["risks"]))
+
+    fields = plan["_fields"]
+    send = dict(fields)
+    if kind == "vip" and action == "set" and plan["_before"].get("network"):
+        # VipSettingsController::getVipOverlay blanks address and prefix whenever "network" is missing from
+        # the request, so every VIP update must repeat it (found live: a partial set was rejected / could wipe it).
+        send.setdefault("network", plan["_before"]["network"])
+    # What the object must look like afterwards: for an edit that is everything it had, plus the change.
+    expected = {**plan["_before"], **send} if action == "set" else dict(send)
+    entity = fields.get("name") or fields.get("descr") or plan["_before"].get("name") or plan["_before"].get("descr") or kind
+    audit = {"kind": "network", "action": f"{kind}.{action}"[:40], "entity_id": uuid, "entity_name": entity,
+             "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name}
+    details = {"before": plan["_before"], "after": _public(kind, fields) if action != "del" else None,
+               "risks": [r["code"] for r in plan["risks"]], "acknowledged": acknowledged}
+
+    # Way back: a config backup taken right before the change. No backup, no change.
+    try:
+        backup_id = backup_store.save_snapshot(host.id, await opnsense_client.download_backup(host))
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="aborted", message="Backup vor der Änderung fehlgeschlagen", details=details)
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.NETWORK_BACKUP_FAILED, host=host.name) from exc
+    details["backup_id"] = backup_id
+    await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="started", message=None, details=details)
+
+    try:
+        result = await opnsense_client.write_network_item(host, kind, action, uuid, send)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="rejected", message=str(exc)[:500], details=details)
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)[:300]) from exc
+    new_uuid = uuid or (result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None)
+    try:
+        await opnsense_client.reconfigure_network(host, kind)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        # Written but not (provably) applied: say so instead of reporting success.
+        await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="apply_uncertain", message=str(exc)[:500], details=details)
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.NETWORK_APPLY_UNCERTAIN, host=host.name, backup_id=backup_id) from exc
+
+    verified, mismatches = await _verify(host, kind, action, new_uuid, expected)
+    await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="applied" if verified else "unverified",
+                                message=None if verified else ", ".join(mismatches)[:500], details=details)
+    return {"status": "applied", "uuid": new_uuid, "verified": verified, "mismatches": mismatches, "backup_id": backup_id}
+
+
+def _options(value: dict) -> list[dict]:
+    return [{"value": k, "label": str(o.get("value", k)) if isinstance(o, dict) else str(k), "selected": bool(isinstance(o, dict) and o.get("selected"))}
+            for k, o in value.items()]
+
+
+async def template(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str) -> dict:
+    """The firewall's own blank form for this kind: field defaults and, for select fields, the choices it
+    accepts right now (e.g. only the gateways it considers valid for a route)."""
+    node = _explode(await opnsense_client.get_network_item(host, kind, None))
+    out: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    for key in sorted(FIELDS[kind]):
+        if key not in node:
+            continue
+        value = node[key]
+        if isinstance(value, dict) and value and all(isinstance(o, dict) and "selected" in o for o in value.values()):
+            options = _options(value)
+            # Free-text list fields (IPs, MACs, DNS servers) arrive in this shape too; the form decides how to show them.
+            out[key] = {"value": ",".join(o["value"] for o in options if o["selected"] and o["value"] != ""), "options": options}
+        elif key in SECRET_FIELDS.get(kind, set()):
+            out[key] = {"value": "", "options": None}
+        else:
+            out[key] = {"value": "" if value is None or isinstance(value, dict) else str(value), "options": None}
+    return out
+
+
+async def item(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, uuid: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """One object as the firewall holds it right now, reduced to the fields that may be sent (no secrets)."""
+    node = await opnsense_client.get_network_item(host, kind, uuid)
+    if not node or not any(v not in ("", None) for v in node.values() if not isinstance(v, dict)):
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    return {k: v for k, v in flatten(kind, node).items() if k in FIELDS[kind]}

backend/app/services/network_drift_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+"""Compares the network configuration of the nodes of an HA cluster.
+
+Interfaces, VLANs, virtual IPs, gateways, routes, DNS and DHCP objects should
+be the same on both nodes of a pair; a VLAN or gateway that exists on one node
+only is exactly the kind of difference that breaks a failover months later.
+
+Per-node values are deliberately NOT compared: interface addresses, CARP
+advskew/password and the active default gateway legitimately differ between
+the nodes. What is compared is the identity of each object (its key) and the
+settings that must agree (its signature). A category is skipped when any
+reachable node cannot deliver it (older OPNsense), instead of reporting that
+as a difference.
+"""
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.schemas.network import HostNetwork
+from app.services import network_service
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+
+CATEGORIES = ["interfaces", "vlans", "vips", "gateways", "routes", "dns_hosts", "dhcp_hosts", "kea_subnets", "kea_reservations"]
+
+
+def signatures(net: HostNetwork) -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
+    out: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {c: {} for c in CATEGORIES}
+    for i in net.interfaces:
+        if i.assigned and i.identifier:
+            out["interfaces"][i.identifier] = f"{i.description}|{i.vlan_tag or ''}|{i.ipv4_type or ''}"
+    for v in net.vlans:
+        out["vlans"][f"{v.tag}@{v.parent}"] = v.description
+    for v in net.vips:
+        if v.mode == "carp":
+            out["vips"][f"carp:{v.vhid}"] = f"{v.address}|{v.advbase or ''}|{v.description}"
+        else:
+            out["vips"][f"{v.mode}:{v.address}"] = v.description
+    for g in net.gateways:
+        out["gateways"][g.name] = f"{g.interface}|{g.ip_protocol}|{g.address}|{g.disabled}"
+    for r in net.routes:
+        out["routes"][r.network] = f"{r.gateway}|{r.disabled}"
+    for d in net.dns_hosts:
+        out["dns_hosts"][f"{d.hostname}.{d.domain}|{d.record_type}"] = f"{d.server}|{d.enabled}"
+    for h in net.dhcp_hosts:
+        out["dhcp_hosts"][f"{h.host}.{h.domain}"] = f"{h.ip}|{h.hwaddr}"
+    for s in net.kea_subnets:
+        out["kea_subnets"][s.subnet] = f"{s.pools}|{s.routers}|{s.dns_servers}"
+    for k in net.kea_reservations:
+        out["kea_reservations"][f"{k.ip_address}|{k.hw_address}"] = k.hostname
+    return out
+
+
+# Which HostNetwork.unavailable entry makes a category incomparable.
+_UNAVAILABLE_KEY = {"interfaces": "assignments"}
+
+
+def compare(per_host: dict[str, HostNetwork]) -> list[dict]:
+    """per_host: host name -> its network. Returns one row per object that is missing on a node or differs."""
+    names = sorted(per_host)
+    sigs = {n: signatures(per_host[n]) for n in names}
+    rows: list[dict] = []
+    for category in CATEGORIES:
+        skip_key = _UNAVAILABLE_KEY.get(category, category)
+        if any(skip_key in per_host[n].unavailable for n in names):
+            continue
+        keys = sorted({k for n in names for k in sigs[n][category]})
+        for key in keys:
+            present = {n: sigs[n][category][key] for n in names if key in sigs[n][category]}
+            if len(present) < len(names):
+                rows.append({"category": category, "key": key, "status": "missing",
+                             "present_on": sorted(present), "missing_from": sorted(set(names) - set(present)),
+                             "signatures": present})
+            elif len(set(present.values())) > 1:
+                rows.append({"category": category, "key": key, "status": "different",
+                             "present_on": names, "missing_from": [], "signatures": present})
+    return rows
+
+
+async def compute_cluster(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost]) -> tuple[list[dict], list[str], list[str]]:
+    """Returns (differences, compared host names, unreachable host names)."""
+    per_host: dict[str, HostNetwork] = {}
+    unreachable: list[str] = []
+    for host in hosts:
+        try:
+            per_host[host.name] = await network_service.get_host_network(host)
+        except OpnsenseAPIError:
+            unreachable.append(host.name)
+    if len(per_host) < 2:
+        return [], sorted(per_host), sorted(unreachable)
+    return compare(per_host), sorted(per_host), sorted(unreachable)

backend/app/services/network_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+"""Read-only network inventory of one firewall: interfaces, VLANs, virtual
+IPs (CARP), gateways and static routes, straight from the firewall.
+
+Also works out which interface the firewall answers OPNexus on. Every later
+write feature in this area (VLAN/IP/gateway changes) must refuse or escalate
+changes to that interface — an apply there can cut the very connection OPNexus
+would need to undo it.
+
+Shapes verified live on OPNsense 26.7.1 and 26.7.6 (see opnsense_client).
+"""
+import asyncio
+import ipaddress
+import socket
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.schemas.network import (
+    HostNetwork,
+    NetAddress,
+    NetGateway,
+    NetDhcpHost,
+    NetDnsHost,
+    NetInterface,
+    NetKeaReservation,
+    NetKeaSubnet,
+    NetRoute,
+    NetVip,
+    NetVlan,
+)
+from app.services import opnsense_client
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+
+
+def _rows(data) -> list[dict]:
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict)]
+
+
+def _flag(value) -> bool:
+    return value in ("1", 1, True)
+
+
+def _text(value) -> str:
+    return "" if value is None else str(value)
+
+
+def _opt(value) -> str | None:
+    """OPNsense is inconsistent about number vs. string (a gateway priority came back as 254, not "254")."""
+    return None if value in (None, "") else str(value)
+
+
+async def management_addresses(host: OpnsenseHost) -> set:
+    """IP addresses OPNexus uses to reach this firewall (literal or resolved)."""
+    hostname = urlparse(host.base_url).hostname
+    if not hostname:
+        return set()
+    try:
+        return {ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)}
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    try:
+        infos = await asyncio.get_running_loop().getaddrinfo(hostname, None, type=socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+    except OSError:
+        return set()
+    found = set()
+    for info in infos:
+        try:
+            found.add(ipaddress.ip_address(info[4][0].split("%")[0]))
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return found
+
+
+def _addresses(row: dict) -> list[NetAddress]:
+    result = []
+    for key in ("ipv4", "ipv6"):
+        for entry in row.get(key) or []:
+            if isinstance(entry, dict) and entry.get("ipaddr"):
+                result.append(NetAddress(
+                    address=str(entry["ipaddr"]),
+                    vhid=_opt(entry.get("vhid")),
+                    carp_status=_opt(entry.get("status")),
+                ))
+    return result
+
+
+def _address_ip(address: str):
+    try:
+        return ipaddress.ip_interface(address).ip
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+
+def _interface(row: dict, assignments: dict[str, dict], management: set) -> NetInterface:
+    identifier = row.get("identifier") or None
+    assigned = assignments.get(identifier or "") or {}
+    addresses = _addresses(row)
+    vlan = row.get("vlan") or {}
+    return NetInterface(
+        device=_text(row.get("device")),
+        identifier=identifier,
+        description=_text(row.get("description")),
+        status=_text(row.get("status")),
+        enabled=_flag(row.get("enabled", True)) if "enabled" in row else True,
+        is_physical=bool(row.get("is_physical")),
+        mtu=_opt(row.get("mtu")),
+        mac=_opt(row.get("macaddr")),
+        media=_opt(row.get("media")),
+        vlan_tag=_opt((vlan.get("tag") if isinstance(vlan, dict) else None) or row.get("vlan_tag")),
+        vlan_parent=_opt(vlan.get("parent")) if isinstance(vlan, dict) else None,
+        ipv4_type=assigned.get("%type4") or None,
+        ipv6_type=assigned.get("%type6") or None,
+        addresses=addresses,
+        pending_action=assigned.get("pending_action") or None,
+        assigned=bool(identifier and identifier in assignments),
+        is_management=any(_address_ip(a.address) in management for a in addresses if not a.vhid),
+    )
+
+
+def _vlan(row: dict) -> NetVlan:
+    return NetVlan(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")),
+        parent=_text(row.get("if")),
+        tag=_text(row.get("tag")),
+        pcp=_opt(row.get("pcp")),
+        description=_text(row.get("descr")),
+        device=(row.get("vlanif") or "").split(" ")[0] or None,
+    )
+
+
+def _vip(row: dict) -> NetVip:
+    # Deliberately picks fields by name: the row also carries the CARP password.
+    return NetVip(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")),
+        interface=_text(row.get("interface")),
+        interface_label=_text(row.get("%interface") or row.get("interface")),
+        mode=_text(row.get("mode")),
+        address=_text(row.get("address") or row.get("subnet")),
+        vhid=_opt(row.get("vhid")),
+        advbase=_opt(row.get("advbase")),
+        advskew=_opt(row.get("advskew")),
+        description=_text(row.get("descr")),
+    )
+
+
+def _gateway(row: dict) -> NetGateway:
+    return NetGateway(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")),
+        name=_text(row.get("name")),
+        description=_text(row.get("descr")),
+        interface=_text(row.get("interface")),
+        interface_label=_text(row.get("interface_descr") or row.get("interface")),
+        ip_protocol=_text(row.get("ipprotocol")),
+        address=_text(row.get("gateway")),
+        is_default=bool(row.get("defaultgw")),
+        disabled=bool(row.get("disabled")),
+        priority=_opt(row.get("priority")),
+        status=_text(row.get("status")),
+    )
+
+
+def _route(row: dict) -> NetRoute:
+    return NetRoute(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")),
+        network=_text(row.get("network")),
+        gateway=_text(row.get("gateway")),
+        description=_text(row.get("descr")),
+        # list rows carry "enabled" ("1"/"0"); older shapes a "disabled" flag
+        disabled=_flag(row.get("disabled")) or row.get("enabled") in ("0", 0, False),
+    )
+
+
+def _dns_host(row: dict) -> NetDnsHost:
+    return NetDnsHost(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")), hostname=_text(row.get("hostname")), domain=_text(row.get("domain")),
+        record_type=_text(row.get("rr")), server=_text(row.get("server")), enabled=_flag(row.get("enabled")),
+        description=_text(row.get("description")),
+    )
+
+
+def _dhcp_host(row: dict) -> NetDhcpHost:
+    return NetDhcpHost(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")), host=_text(row.get("host")), domain=_text(row.get("domain")),
+        ip=_text(row.get("ip")), hwaddr=_text(row.get("hwaddr")), lease_time=_text(row.get("lease_time")),
+        description=_text(row.get("descr")),
+    )
+
+
+def _kea_subnet(row: dict) -> NetKeaSubnet:
+    # Picked by name on purpose: the row also carries the DDNS key secret.
+    return NetKeaSubnet(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")), subnet=_text(row.get("subnet")), pools=_text(row.get("pools")),
+        routers=_text(row.get("option_data.routers")), dns_servers=_text(row.get("option_data.domain_name_servers")),
+        description=_text(row.get("description")),
+    )
+
+
+def _kea_reservation(row: dict) -> NetKeaReservation:
+    return NetKeaReservation(
+        uuid=_text(row.get("uuid")), subnet=_text(row.get("%subnet") or row.get("subnet")),
+        ip_address=_text(row.get("ip_address")), hw_address=_text(row.get("hw_address")),
+        hostname=_text(row.get("hostname")), description=_text(row.get("description")),
+    )
+
+
+async def _optional(name: str, call, unavailable: list[str]) -> list[dict]:
+    try:
+        return _rows(await call)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError:
+        unavailable.append(name)
+        return []
+
+
+async def get_host_network(host: OpnsenseHost) -> HostNetwork:
+    """Raises OpnsenseAPIError when the interface list itself is unavailable
+    (host down); every other section degrades to `unavailable` instead."""
+    info_rows = _rows(await opnsense_client.get_interfaces_info(host))
+    unavailable: list[str] = []
+    (assignment_rows, vlan_rows, vip_rows, gateway_rows, route_rows,
+     dns_rows, dhcp_rows, kea_subnet_rows, kea_reservation_rows) = await asyncio.gather(
+        _optional("assignments", opnsense_client.search_interface_assignments(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("vlans", opnsense_client.search_vlans(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("vips", opnsense_client.search_vips(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("gateways", opnsense_client.search_gateways(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("routes", opnsense_client.search_static_routes(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("dns_hosts", opnsense_client.search_dns_hosts(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("dhcp_hosts", opnsense_client.search_dhcp_hosts(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("kea_subnets", opnsense_client.search_kea_subnets(host), unavailable),
+        _optional("kea_reservations", opnsense_client.search_kea_reservations(host), unavailable),
+    )
+    management = await management_addresses(host)
+    assignments = {_text(r.get("identifier")): r for r in assignment_rows if r.get("identifier")}
+    interfaces = [_interface(r, assignments, management) for r in info_rows]
+    management_device = next((i.device for i in interfaces if i.is_management), None)
+    return HostNetwork(
+        host_id=str(host.id),
+        host_name=host.name,
+        interfaces=interfaces,
+        vlans=[_vlan(r) for r in vlan_rows],
+        vips=[_vip(r) for r in vip_rows],
+        gateways=[_gateway(r) for r in gateway_rows],
+        routes=[_route(r) for r in route_rows],
+        dns_hosts=[_dns_host(r) for r in dns_rows if not r.get("isAlias")],
+        dhcp_hosts=[_dhcp_host(r) for r in dhcp_rows],
+        kea_subnets=[_kea_subnet(r) for r in kea_subnet_rows],
+        kea_reservations=[_kea_reservation(r) for r in kea_reservation_rows],
+        management_device=management_device,
+        can_configure_interfaces=any("type4" in r for r in assignment_rows),
+        unavailable=sorted(unavailable),
+    )

backend/app/services/notification_checks.py

@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ from app.models.one_to_one_deployment import OneToOneDeployment
 from app.models.outbound_nat_deployment import OutboundNatDeployment
 from app.models.port_forward_deployment import PortForwardDeployment
 from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
-from app.services import nat_drift_service, rule_drift_service
+from app.services import nat_drift_service, network_drift_service, rule_drift_service
+from app.services.notification_dedup import Problems
 from app.services.host_status_service import get_statuses
 from app.services.live_certificates_service import get_live_certificates
 from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
@@ -53,13 +54,15 @@ async def check_host_offline(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
 
 async def check_certificates(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
     hosts = await _enabled_hosts(db)
-    problems: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    problems = Problems()
     for host in hosts:
         try:
             certs = await get_live_certificates(host)
         except OpnsenseAPIError:
             # Unreachable — already reported by check_host_offline, no need
-            # to double-report it here as a certificate problem.
+            # to double-report it here as a certificate problem. Its open
+            # certificate problems stay as they are (not evaluable now).
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{host.id}:")
             continue
         for cert in certs:
             if cert.status not in ("expiring_soon", "expired"):
@@ -83,12 +86,18 @@ async def check_rule_drift(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
         if host.cluster_name:
             by_cluster[host.cluster_name].append(host)
 
-    problems: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    problems = Problems()
     for cluster_name, cluster_hosts in by_cluster.items():
         if len(cluster_hosts) < 2:
             continue
         names_by_id = {h.id: h.name for h in cluster_hosts}
-        for row in await rule_drift_service.compute_cluster_drift(cluster_hosts):
+        rows, reachable = await rule_drift_service.compute_cluster_drift_with_reachable(cluster_hosts)
+        if len(reachable) < 2:
+            # A member is down (reboot/update): drift cannot be judged, so keep
+            # what is open instead of resolving it and re-opening it later.
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{cluster_name}:")
+            continue
+        for row in rows:
             key = f"{cluster_name}:{row['fingerprint']}"
             present_names = sorted(names_by_id[hid] for hid in row["present_on"])
             missing_names = sorted(
@@ -113,13 +122,17 @@ async def check_nat_drift(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
         if host.cluster_name:
             by_cluster[host.cluster_name].append(host)
 
-    problems: dict[str, dict] = {}
+    problems = Problems()
     for cluster_name, cluster_hosts in by_cluster.items():
         if len(cluster_hosts) < 2:
             continue
         names_by_id = {h.id: h.name for h in cluster_hosts}
         for nat_type in _NAT_TYPE_LABELS:
-            for row in await nat_drift_service.compute_cluster_drift(cluster_hosts, nat_type):
+            rows, reachable = await nat_drift_service.compute_cluster_drift_with_reachable(cluster_hosts, nat_type)
+            if len(reachable) < 2:
+                problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{cluster_name}:{nat_type}:")
+                continue
+            for row in rows:
                 key = f"{cluster_name}:{nat_type}:{row['fingerprint']}"
                 present_names = sorted(names_by_id[hid] for hid in row["present_on"])
                 missing_names = sorted(
@@ -135,6 +148,40 @@ async def check_nat_drift(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
     return problems
 
 
+_NETWORK_LABELS = {
+    "interfaces": "Schnittstelle", "vlans": "VLAN", "vips": "Virtuelle IP", "gateways": "Gateway", "routes": "Route",
+    "dns_hosts": "DNS-Eintrag", "dhcp_hosts": "DHCP-Host", "kea_subnets": "DHCP-Subnetz", "kea_reservations": "DHCP-Reservierung",
+}
+
+
+async def check_network_drift(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
+    hosts = await _enabled_hosts(db)
+    by_cluster: dict[str, list[OpnsenseHost]] = defaultdict(list)
+    for host in hosts:
+        if host.cluster_name:
+            by_cluster[host.cluster_name].append(host)
+
+    problems = Problems()
+    for cluster_name, cluster_hosts in by_cluster.items():
+        if len(cluster_hosts) < 2:
+            continue
+        differences, compared, _unreachable = await network_drift_service.compute_cluster(cluster_hosts)
+        if len(compared) < 2:
+            # Not evaluable right now (a node is down, which check_host_offline reports): keep what is open.
+            problems.preserve_prefixes.add(f"{cluster_name}:")
+            continue
+        for row in differences:
+            key = f"{cluster_name}:{row['category']}:{row['key']}"
+            problems[key] = {
+                "cluster_name": cluster_name,
+                "object": f"{_NETWORK_LABELS.get(row['category'], row['category'])} {row['key']}",
+                "status": "fehlt auf einem Knoten" if row["status"] == "missing" else "Einstellungen weichen ab",
+                "present_on": row["present_on"],
+                "missing_from": row["missing_from"],
+            }
+    return problems
+
+
 async def check_revert_failed(db: AsyncSession) -> dict[str, dict]:
     problems: dict[str, dict] = {}
     for deployment_type, model, id_attr in _DEPLOYMENT_MODELS:

backend/app/services/notification_dedup.py

@@ -13,6 +13,17 @@ def _now() -> datetime:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
 
+class Problems(dict):
+    """The result of a check ({dedup_key: context}) plus the key prefixes the
+    check could NOT evaluate this round (e.g. a cluster member is offline, so
+    drift is not computable). Open problems under such a prefix are left alone
+    instead of being resolved and re-opened on the next round."""
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self.preserve_prefixes: set[str] = set()
+
+
 async def diff_and_update(
     db: AsyncSession, problem_type: str, current: dict[str, dict]
 ) -> tuple[list[NotificationProblem], list[NotificationProblem]]:
@@ -74,8 +85,9 @@ async def diff_and_update(
             existing.last_seen_at = now
             existing.context = context
 
+    preserve = tuple(getattr(current, "preserve_prefixes", ()))
     for key, row in open_rows.items():
-        if key not in current:
+        if key not in current and not (preserve and key.startswith(preserve)):
             row.status = "resolved"
             row.resolved_at = now
             resolved.append(row)

backend/app/services/notification_delivery.py

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
 import smtplib
+import ssl
 from email.message import EmailMessage
 
 import httpx
@@ -30,6 +31,7 @@ _LABELS = {
     "maintenance_unknown": "Wartungsergebnis unklar",
     "carp_split_brain": "CARP-Zustand kritisch",
     "nat_drift": "NAT-Drift im Cluster",
+    "network_drift": "Netzwerk-Abweichung im Cluster",
     "carp_auto_revert_failed": "CARP-Auto-Revert fehlgeschlagen",
 }
 
@@ -67,20 +69,43 @@ async def send_webhook(settings_row: NotificationSettings, problem: Notification
     headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json"}
     if settings_row.webhook_signing_secret_set:
         secret = notification_secret_store.read_secret("webhook_signing_secret")
-        if secret:
+        if not secret:
-            signature = hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), raw, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+            # Fail closed: silently sending an UNSIGNED message to a receiver that
-            headers["X-OPNexus-Signature"] = f"sha256={signature}"
+            # was told to expect signatures would change the authentication
+            # behaviour without anyone noticing.
+            raise NotificationDeliveryError(
+                "Signaturschlüssel für den Webhook ist konfiguriert, aber nicht lesbar – bitte neu setzen"
+            )
+        signature = hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), raw, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+        headers["X-OPNexus-Signature"] = f"sha256={signature}"
 
     try:
         async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=settings.opnsense_timeout) as client:
             resp = await client.post(settings_row.webhook_url, content=raw, headers=headers)
             resp.raise_for_status()
     except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
-        raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"Webhook-Zustellung fehlgeschlagen: {exc}") from exc
+        # str(exc) names the full URL, which often is the credential itself
+        # (token in path/query) — keep it out of messages and logs.
+        reason = f"HTTP {exc.response.status_code}" if isinstance(exc, httpx.HTTPStatusError) else type(exc).__name__
+        raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"Webhook-Zustellung fehlgeschlagen ({reason})") from None
+
+
+def _tls_context() -> ssl.SSLContext:
+    """Verifying context (certificate chain AND hostname). smtplib's own default
+    when no context is passed is an *unverifying* one — the connection would be
+    encrypted but could be impersonated."""
+    return ssl.create_default_context(cafile=settings.smtp_ca_file or None)
 
 
 def _send_email_sync(settings_row: NotificationSettings, subject: str, body: str) -> None:
     password = notification_secret_store.read_secret("smtp_password")
+    authenticated = bool(settings_row.smtp_username and settings_row.smtp_password_set)
+    if authenticated and not password:
+        raise NotificationDeliveryError("SMTP-Passwort ist konfiguriert, aber nicht lesbar – bitte neu setzen")
+    if authenticated and settings_row.smtp_security == "none" and not settings.allow_insecure_smtp_auth:
+        raise NotificationDeliveryError(
+            "SMTP-Anmeldung ohne Verschlüsselung ist deaktiviert – STARTTLS oder SSL/TLS wählen"
+        )
     message = EmailMessage()
     message["Subject"] = subject
     message["From"] = settings_row.smtp_from_address
@@ -89,17 +114,22 @@ def _send_email_sync(settings_row: NotificationSettings, subject: str, body: str
 
     timeout = settings.notification_smtp_timeout_seconds
     if settings_row.smtp_security == "ssl":
-        client = smtplib.SMTP_SSL(settings_row.smtp_host, settings_row.smtp_port, timeout=timeout)
+        client = smtplib.SMTP_SSL(
+            settings_row.smtp_host, settings_row.smtp_port, timeout=timeout, context=_tls_context()
+        )
     else:
         client = smtplib.SMTP(settings_row.smtp_host, settings_row.smtp_port, timeout=timeout)
     try:
         if settings_row.smtp_security == "starttls":
-            client.starttls()
+            client.starttls(context=_tls_context())
-        if settings_row.smtp_username and password:
+        if authenticated:
             client.login(settings_row.smtp_username, password)
         client.send_message(message)
     finally:
-        client.quit()
+        try:
+            client.quit()
+        except (smtplib.SMTPException, OSError):
+            client.close()
 
 
 async def send_email(settings_row: NotificationSettings, subject: str, body: str) -> None:
@@ -107,5 +137,7 @@ async def send_email(settings_row: NotificationSettings, subject: str, body: str
         raise NotificationDeliveryError("SMTP-Konfiguration unvollständig")
     try:
         await asyncio.to_thread(_send_email_sync, settings_row, subject, body)
+    except NotificationDeliveryError:
+        raise
     except (OSError, smtplib.SMTPException) as exc:
         raise NotificationDeliveryError(f"E-Mail-Zustellung fehlgeschlagen: {exc}") from exc

backend/app/services/notification_secret_store.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ webhook config for the whole install).
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".secret"
 
@@ -18,9 +19,7 @@ def _path(name: str) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(name: str, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(name)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_secret(name: str) -> str | None:

backend/app/services/notification_service.py

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ _CHECKS = [
     ("maintenance_unknown", "maintenance_unknown_enabled", notification_checks.check_maintenance_unknown),
     ("carp_split_brain", "carp_health_enabled", notification_checks.check_carp_health),
     ("nat_drift", "nat_drift_enabled", notification_checks.check_nat_drift),
+    ("network_drift", "network_drift_enabled", notification_checks.check_network_drift),
     ("carp_auto_revert_failed", "carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled", notification_checks.check_carp_auto_revert_failed),
 ]
 

backend/app/services/notification_settings_service.py

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ async def update_settings(db: AsyncSession, payload: NotificationSettingsUpdate)
         "smtp_from_address", "smtp_to_addresses",
         "host_offline_enabled", "cert_expiring_enabled", "rule_drift_enabled",
         "revert_failed_enabled", "maintenance_unknown_enabled", "carp_health_enabled", "nat_drift_enabled",
-        "carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled",
+        "network_drift_enabled", "carp_auto_revert_failed_enabled",
         "poll_interval_seconds",
     ]
     for field in simple_fields:

backend/app/services/one_to_one_deploy_service.py

@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ from app.models.one_to_one import OneToOneRule
 from app.models.one_to_one_deployment import OneToOneDeployment
 from app.services.audit_service import tracked_rollback
 from app.services import opnsense_client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.deploy_flow import push_to_host
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
 
 
 def _now() -> datetime:
@@ -53,48 +54,23 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, rule: OneToOneRule, host: OpnsenseHo
 
     prior_uuid = existing.opnsense_one_to_one_uuid if existing else None
     prior_live_payload = existing.last_payload if existing else None
-    new_uuid = prior_uuid
-    try:
-        if prior_uuid:
-            await opnsense_client.set_one_to_one_rule(host, prior_uuid, payload)
-        else:
-            result = await opnsense_client.add_one_to_one_rule(host, payload)
-            new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-            if not new_uuid:
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        await opnsense_client.apply_one_to_one(host)
-    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        if existing:
-            existing.status = "error"
-            existing.opnsense_one_to_one_uuid = new_uuid
-            existing.message = str(exc)
-            existing.revert_deadline = None
-            existing.deployed_at = _now()
-            return existing
-        deployment = OneToOneDeployment(
-            one_to_one_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="error", message=str(exc),
-            opnsense_one_to_one_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
-        )
-        db.add(deployment)
-        return deployment
 
-    deadline = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
+    async def write(uuid_):
-    if existing:
+        if uuid_:
-        existing.status = "pending"
+            await opnsense_client.set_one_to_one_rule(host, uuid_, payload)
-        existing.message = None
+            return uuid_
-        existing.opnsense_one_to_one_uuid = new_uuid
+        result = await opnsense_client.add_one_to_one_rule(host, payload)
-        existing.deployed_at = _now()
+        new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-        existing.revert_deadline = deadline
+        if not new_uuid:
-        existing.previous_payload = prior_live_payload
+            raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        existing.last_payload = payload
+        return new_uuid
-        return existing
 
-    deployment = OneToOneDeployment(
+    deployment = await push_to_host(
-        one_to_one_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="pending", message=None,
+        db, existing=existing, uuid_attr="opnsense_one_to_one_uuid",
-        opnsense_one_to_one_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(), revert_deadline=deadline,
+        make=lambda **fields: OneToOneDeployment(one_to_one_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, **fields),
-        previous_payload=None, last_payload=payload,
+        prior_uuid=prior_uuid, prior_live_payload=prior_live_payload, payload=payload,
+        write=write, apply=lambda: opnsense_client.apply_one_to_one(host),
     )
-    db.add(deployment)
     return deployment
 
 
@@ -112,7 +88,7 @@ async def deploy_one_to_one(db: AsyncSession, rule: OneToOneRule, hosts: list[Op
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = f"1:1 NAT wurde übernommen, Hierarchie-Reihenfolge aber nicht bestätigt: {exc}"
-            deployment.revert_deadline = None
+            # The change is live: keep the revert deadline so an unconfirmed result is still undone.
     await db.commit()
     return deployments
 
@@ -138,7 +114,7 @@ async def sweep_expired_one_to_one_deployments(db: AsyncSession) -> list[OneToOn
     await policy_lock(db)
     result = await db.execute(
         select(OneToOneDeployment).where(
-            OneToOneDeployment.status == "pending", OneToOneDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now()
+            OneToOneDeployment.status.in_(("pending", "error")), OneToOneDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now()
         )
     )
     expired = list(result.scalars().all())
@@ -164,7 +140,7 @@ async def undeploy_one_to_one(db: AsyncSession, rule: OneToOneRule) -> None:
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = str(exc)
-                failures.append(host.name)
+                failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
                 continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/openvpn_deploy_service.py

@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ citations):
   Instances.Instance: vpnid (VPNIdField, Required, MinimumValue 1, NO
   <Default> — never sent by this app; OPNsense's own UI never prompts for
   one either, so its field-type presumably auto-assigns one the same way
-  on addAction — NOT independently verified, flagged rather than guessed),
+  on addAction — VERIFIED LIVE 2026-10-09 on 26.7.5: it is NOT auto-assigned, add() fails
+  with "instance.vpnid: A value is required." — see _next_vpnid),
   enabled (BooleanField, Default 1), dev_type (OptionValues
   tun/tap/ovpn(DCO), Default "tun" — never sent, relies on the model
   default exactly like IPsec relies on Child.mode defaulting to "tunnel"),
@@ -27,7 +28,8 @@ citations):
   section below, this is the key finding that reshaped v1), server
   (NetworkField, NetMaskRequired Y — server-role tunnel network), cert /
   ca (CertificateField, i.e. ModelRelationField into OPNsense's own
-  Trust\\Cert store), tls_key (ModelRelationField -> this SAME model's
+  Trust\\Cert store; values are the Trust-Store REFIDs, not row UUIDs —
+  verified live 2026-10-09), tls_key (ModelRelationField -> this SAME model's
   StaticKeys.StaticKey, display "description,mode"), auth/data-ciphers
   (cipher suite OptionFields — v1 always omits these, relying on
   OPNsense's own defaults, exactly like IPsec's proposals default to
@@ -238,6 +240,18 @@ def build_payloads(instance: OpenVpnInstance, host_id: uuid.UUID) -> dict:
     }
 
 
+async def _next_vpnid(host: OpnsenseHost) -> str:
+    data = await opnsense_client.search_openvpn_instances(host)
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    used = []
+    for row in rows:
+        try:
+            used.append(int(row.get("vpnid")))
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            continue
+    return str(max(used, default=0) + 1)
+
+
 async def _write_config(host: OpnsenseHost, payloads: dict, deployment: OpenVpnInstanceDeployment) -> None:
     """Writes the StaticKey (if enabled) then the Instance, in that
     dependency order, persisting each UUID onto `deployment` as soon as
@@ -270,6 +284,10 @@ async def _write_config(host: OpnsenseHost, payloads: dict, deployment: OpenVpnI
     if deployment.opnsense_instance_uuid:
         await opnsense_client.set_openvpn_instance(host, deployment.opnsense_instance_uuid, instance_wire)
     else:
+        # vpnid is Required and the firewall does NOT assign it (verified live
+        # on 26.7: "instance.vpnid: A value is required."), so pick the next
+        # free one. It stays untouched on later set() calls.
+        instance_wire["vpnid"] = await _next_vpnid(host)
         result = await opnsense_client.add_openvpn_instance(host, instance_wire)
         deployment.opnsense_instance_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
         if not deployment.opnsense_instance_uuid:
@@ -370,7 +388,7 @@ async def undeploy_instance(db: AsyncSession, instance: OpenVpnInstance) -> None
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = str(exc)
-            failures.append(host.name)
+            failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
             continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/openvpn_key_store.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".ovpnkey"
 
@@ -31,9 +32,7 @@ def _path(instance_id: uuid.UUID) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(instance_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(instance_id)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_secret(instance_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
@@ -45,3 +44,12 @@ def read_secret(instance_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
 
 def delete_secret(instance_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:
     _path(instance_id).unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+def version(instance_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
+    """Opaque change marker (last write time) — lets an approval token notice a
+    rotated secret without containing, or being derivable from, the secret."""
+    try:
+        return str(_path(instance_id).stat().st_mtime_ns)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return None

backend/app/services/openvpn_service.py

@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ import hashlib
 import json
 
 from app.models.policy import OpenVpnInstanceRevision
-from app.services.openvpn_deploy_service import MissingCertError, build_payloads
+from app.services import openvpn_key_store
+from app.services.openvpn_deploy_service import MissingCertError, _redact_for_storage, build_payloads
 from app.services.policy_service import effective_hosts  # noqa: F401 - re-exported for routers/openvpn.py
 
 OPENVPN_FIELDS = (
@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ def preview(instance):
                 "changes": [],
             })
             continue
+        # Compare in the stored (secret -> hash) form, see ipsec_service.preview().
+        payloads = _redact_for_storage(payloads)
         action = "create" if not dep or not dep.opnsense_instance_uuid else "update"
         if before == payloads and dep and dep.status == "success":
             action = "unchanged"
@@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ def preview(instance):
     blocked = instance.tls_key_enabled and not instance.tls_key_material_set
     state = {
         "snapshot": snapshot(instance), "rows": rows,
+        "secret_version": openvpn_key_store.version(instance.id),
         "hosts": [(str(h.id), h.base_url, h.enabled, h.verify_tls) for h in hosts],
         "deployments": sorted(
             [(str(d.host_id), d.opnsense_statickey_uuid, d.opnsense_instance_uuid, d.last_payload,
@@ -130,7 +134,7 @@ def _host_changed(instance, by_host, host):
     except MissingCertError:
         return True
     dep = by_host.get(host.id)
-    return dep is None or dep.last_payload != payloads
+    return dep is None or dep.last_payload != _redact_for_storage(payloads)
 
 
 def workflow(instance, deployments):

backend/app/services/opnsense_client.py

@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@ import httpx
 
 from app.config import settings
 from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
-from app.services import opnsense_secret_store, tls_pin_service
+from app.services import firewall_url, opnsense_secret_store, tls_pin_service
+from app.services.redaction import redact_data, redact_text
 
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
@@ -25,7 +26,18 @@ class OpnsenseAPIError(Exception):
     pass
 
 
+class OpnsenseAmbiguousError(OpnsenseAPIError):
+    """The request may have been executed although no usable answer arrived (lost
+    reply, timeout while waiting, server error, no UUID returned). A refusal the
+    firewall actually answered is a plain OpnsenseAPIError; this one means the
+    outcome of a write is unknown and must be reconciled, not retried blindly."""
+
+
 def _client(host: OpnsenseHost) -> httpx.AsyncClient:
+    # Before the secret is even read: an http:// host must never receive credentials.
+    reason = firewall_url.check_base_url(host.base_url)
+    if reason:
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"Host '{host.name}': {reason}")
     secret = opnsense_secret_store.read_secret(host.id)
     if not secret:
         raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"Kein API-Secret für Host '{host.name}' hinterlegt")
@@ -44,7 +56,12 @@ async def _do_request(host: OpnsenseHost, method: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> h
             resp.raise_for_status()
             return resp
         except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
-            raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"{exc.response.status_code} {path}: {exc.response.text}") from exc
+            # The body may reflect submitted secrets: keep only a scrubbed, bounded excerpt.
+            secret = opnsense_secret_store.read_secret(host.id)
+            error = OpnsenseAmbiguousError if exc.response.status_code >= 500 else OpnsenseAPIError
+            raise error(
+                f"{exc.response.status_code} {path}: {redact_text(exc.response.text, host.api_key, secret)}"
+            ) from exc
         except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
             if host.tls_ca_pem and "CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED" in str(exc):
                 raise OpnsenseAPIError(
@@ -54,12 +71,17 @@ async def _do_request(host: OpnsenseHost, method: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> h
             if isinstance(exc, httpx.RemoteProtocolError):
                 # The firewall answered, but the HTTP framing is broken (seen with
                 # OPNsense 26.7: kernel TLS corrupts responses above ~64 KiB).
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError(
+                raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError(
                     f"{host.name} hat eine beschädigte HTTP-Antwort geliefert ({exc}). "
                     "Bei OPNsense 26.x hilft meist `kern.ipc.tls.enable=0` (System ▸ Einstellungen ▸ "
                     "Tunables), siehe Handbuch „Fehlerbehebung“."
                 ) from exc
-            raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"Verbindung zu {host.name} fehlgeschlagen: {exc}") from exc
+            # Once the request was (partly) sent, a failed read/write says nothing about
+            # whether the firewall executed it; a failed connect means it never did.
+            error = OpnsenseAmbiguousError if isinstance(
+                exc, (httpx.ReadTimeout, httpx.ReadError, httpx.WriteTimeout, httpx.WriteError)
+            ) else OpnsenseAPIError
+            raise error(f"Verbindung zu {host.name} fehlgeschlagen: {exc}") from exc
 
 
 async def _request(host: OpnsenseHost, method: str, path: str, **kwargs) -> Any:
@@ -167,8 +189,7 @@ def _mutation_result(data: Any, operation: str, results: set[str]) -> dict:
     status = str(data.get("status", "")).strip().lower()
     accepted = result in results if "result" in data else status in {"ok", "done"}
     if data.get("validations") or not accepted or status in {"error", "failed"}:
-        detail = json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False)[:350]
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"{operation} von Firewall nicht bestätigt: {redact_data(data)}")
-        raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"{operation} von Firewall nicht bestätigt: {detail}")
     return data
 
 
@@ -536,6 +557,19 @@ async def del_ipsec_psk(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
     return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/ipsec/preSharedKeys/delItem/{uuid_}"), "IPsec Pre-Shared-Key entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
 
 
+async def ensure_ipsec_enabled(host: OpnsenseHost) -> bool:
+    """Switch the service-wide IPsec flag on (`ipsec/connections/isEnabled` /
+    `toggle/1`, ConnectionsController — it is NOT part of the service
+    controller). Without it the connections are stored but no daemon runs
+    (live 26.7.6: is_enabled=false, service status "disabled", yet
+    reconfigure answered ok). Returns True when it had to be switched on."""
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", "/ipsec/connections/is_enabled")
+    if isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("enabled") is True:
+        return False
+    _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/ipsec/connections/toggle/1"), "IPsec aktivieren", {"ok"})
+    return True
+
+
 async def reconfigure_ipsec(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
     """`ipsec/service/reconfigure` (ServiceController::reconfigureAction,
     inherited from ApiMutableServiceControllerBase) — soft-reloads a
@@ -735,19 +769,12 @@ async def reconfigure_openvpn(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
 #     ServiceController's own `$internalServiceEnabled = 'enabled'` /
 #     `$internalServiceClass = General::class` tie together for the
 #     framework's generic service-status plumbing. NOT INDEPENDENTLY
-#     VERIFIED: whether `wireguard configure` (the configd action
+#     VERIFIED LIVE (26.7.5, 2026-10-09): with General.enabled=0 a deploy
-#     reconfigureAction shells out to) actually brings up any wg-quick
+#     writes Server+Peer correctly but NO wg interface comes up and
-#     interface end-to-end while General.enabled=0 — reconfigureAction's
+#     `wireguard/service/show` stays empty, while OPNexus used to report
-#     OWN PHP body never reads $internalServiceEnabled at all (it always
+#     "success". Enabling it (wireguard/general/set + reconfigure) brings
-#     runs unconditionally), so this depends on configd's own action
+#     wg0 up. wireguard_deploy_service therefore switches it on before the
-#     script content, which is out of the controller/model source layer
+#     reconfigure (ensure_wireguard_enabled below); undeploy never touches it.
-#     this app's verification standard covers (same boundary IPsec/
-#     OpenVPN draw). Flagged as a real, source-confirmed structural
-#     difference from IPsec/OpenVPN (neither of which have an equivalent
-#     separate master switch) rather than silently ignored — see README:
-#     operators should confirm "VPN > WireGuard > General" is enabled at
-#     least once via the OPNsense UI before relying on OPNexus-pushed
-#     tunnels.
 #
 # Field names verified against Server.xml/Client.xml (fetched directly,
 # not summarized) — see wireguard_deploy_service.py for the exact
@@ -800,6 +827,21 @@ async def del_wireguard_peer(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
     return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/wireguard/client/delClient/{uuid_}"), "WireGuard-Peer entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
 
 
+async def ensure_wireguard_enabled(host: OpnsenseHost) -> bool:
+    """Turn the service-wide WireGuard switch (General.enabled, default 0) on
+    if it is off. Returns True when it had to be switched on."""
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", "/wireguard/general/get")
+    general = data.get("general", {}) if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
+    if str(general.get("enabled", "0")) == "1":
+        return False
+    _mutation_result(
+        await _request(host, "POST", "/wireguard/general/set", json={"general": {"enabled": "1"}}),
+        "WireGuard-Dienst aktivieren",
+        {"saved"},
+    )
+    return True
+
+
 async def reconfigure_wireguard(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
     """`wireguard/service/reconfigure` (ServiceController::reconfigureAction)
     — runs interface registration + template reload + `wireguard configure`.
@@ -817,6 +859,10 @@ async def reconfigure_wireguard(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
 # CertController.php directly) — see managed_certificate_service.py's
 # module docstring for the full field-mapping writeup.
 #
+# URL SEGMENTS ARE NOT PHP METHOD NAMES: the router strips the `Action`
+# suffix, so addAction() is POST /trust/cert/add (the `...Action` URL is a
+# 404 — found live 2026-10-09 on 26.7.5, the respx mocks had hidden it).
+#
 # CertController extends ApiMutableModelControllerBase exactly like
 # FilterController/ConnectionsController/etc: searchAction (already used
 # via search_certificates() above) / getAction / addAction / setAction /
@@ -845,11 +891,11 @@ def _trust_cert_result(data: Any, operation: str) -> dict:
 
 
 async def add_trust_cert(host: OpnsenseHost, payload: dict) -> dict:
-    return _trust_cert_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/trust/cert/addAction", json={"cert": payload}), "Zertifikat anlegen")
+    return _trust_cert_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/trust/cert/add", json={"cert": payload}), "Zertifikat anlegen")
 
 
 async def set_trust_cert(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str, payload: dict) -> dict:
-    return _trust_cert_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/trust/cert/setAction/{uuid_}", json={"cert": payload}), "Zertifikat ändern")
+    return _trust_cert_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/trust/cert/set/{uuid_}", json={"cert": payload}), "Zertifikat ändern")
 
 
 async def del_trust_cert(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
@@ -858,7 +904,7 @@ async def del_trust_cert(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
     # matching every other del* call in this module (add_alias_item's
     # del_alias_item sibling etc.), so this reuses the same
     # {"deleted", "not found"} results set they all share.
-    return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/trust/cert/delAction/{uuid_}"), "Zertifikat entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
+    return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/trust/cert/del/{uuid_}"), "Zertifikat entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
 
 
 async def get_trust_cert(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
@@ -919,15 +965,15 @@ def _acme_result(data: Any, operation: str) -> dict:
 
 
 async def add_acme_account(host: OpnsenseHost, payload: dict) -> dict:
-    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/acmeclient/accounts/addAction", json={"account": payload}), "ACME-Account anlegen")
+    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/acmeclient/accounts/add", json={"account": payload}), "ACME-Account anlegen")
 
 
 async def update_acme_account(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str, payload: dict) -> dict:
-    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/accounts/updateAction/{uuid_}", json={"account": payload}), "ACME-Account ändern")
+    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/accounts/update/{uuid_}", json={"account": payload}), "ACME-Account ändern")
 
 
 async def del_acme_account(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
-    return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/accounts/delAction/{uuid_}"), "ACME-Account entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
+    return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/accounts/del/{uuid_}"), "ACME-Account entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
 
 
 async def get_acme_account(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
@@ -935,15 +981,15 @@ async def get_acme_account(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
 
 
 async def add_acme_certificate(host: OpnsenseHost, payload: dict) -> dict:
-    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/acmeclient/certificates/addAction", json={"certificate": payload}), "ACME-Zertifikatsanfrage anlegen")
+    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", "/acmeclient/certificates/add", json={"certificate": payload}), "ACME-Zertifikatsanfrage anlegen")
 
 
 async def update_acme_certificate(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str, payload: dict) -> dict:
-    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/certificates/updateAction/{uuid_}", json={"certificate": payload}), "ACME-Zertifikatsanfrage ändern")
+    return _acme_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/certificates/update/{uuid_}", json={"certificate": payload}), "ACME-Zertifikatsanfrage ändern")
 
 
 async def del_acme_certificate(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
-    return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/certificates/delAction/{uuid_}"), "ACME-Zertifikatsanfrage entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
+    return _mutation_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/certificates/del/{uuid_}"), "ACME-Zertifikatsanfrage entfernen", {"deleted", "not found"})
 
 
 async def get_acme_certificate(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
@@ -962,7 +1008,7 @@ def _acme_action_result(data: Any, operation: str) -> dict:
         return data
     if str(data.get("result", "")).strip().lower() == "failed":
         raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"{operation}: von der Firewall abgelehnt (Objekt nicht gefunden oder keine POST-Anfrage)")
-    raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"{operation}: unerwartete Antwortform der Firewall: {json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False)[:350]}")
+    raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"{operation}: unerwartete Antwortform der Firewall: {redact_data(data)}")
 
 
 async def register_acme_account(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
@@ -981,3 +1027,261 @@ async def sign_acme_certificate(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid_: str) -> dict:
     against anything but a respx mock / fully-mocked write path in
     tests/verification."""
     return _acme_action_result(await _request(host, "POST", f"/acmeclient/certificates/sign/{uuid_}"), "ACME-Zertifikat ausstellen")
+
+
+# ── Network inventory (read-only) ────────────────────────────────────────
+# Interfaces\Api\{Overview,Assignment,VlanSettings,VipSettings}Controller,
+# Routing\Api\SettingsController and Routes\Api\RoutesController, verified
+# against core source (github.com/opnsense/core, master) AND live with real
+# read-only GETs on OPNsense 26.7.1/26.7.6 (2026-10-09). Shapes: the search*
+# calls return {"rows": [...]} (flat dicts with "%"-prefixed display
+# counterparts); interfacesInfo rows carry device/identifier/status/ipv4[].
+# Caution: vip_settings rows contain the CARP password in plain text — callers
+# must drop it (see network_service).
+async def get_interfaces_info(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/interfaces/overview/interfacesInfo", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+async def search_interface_assignments(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/interfaces/assignment/searchItem", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+async def search_vlans(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/interfaces/vlan_settings/searchItem", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+async def search_vips(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/interfaces/vip_settings/searchItem", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+async def search_gateways(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/routing/settings/searchGateway", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+async def search_static_routes(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", "/routes/routes/searchroute", params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+# ── Network objects (write) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+# One table for the four config objects handled by network_change_service.
+# Sources (core master, read 2026-10-09): Interfaces/Api/VlanSettingsController,
+# VipSettingsController, Routing/Api/SettingsController (gateways) and
+# Routes/Api/RoutesController. Each add/set takes {<body_key>: {fields}}; set/del
+# address the item by UUID; nothing takes effect before the object's reconfigure
+# call, which answers {"status": "ok"}. The VIP form posts address+prefix as ONE
+# field called "network".
+# The interface assignment (Interfaces/Api/AssignmentController, model NetworkInterface) is two-step:
+# add/set/del only stage the change (a todo file on the firewall); reconfigure ("interface apply") makes
+# it real. Its items are addressed by the interface identifier (wan, lan, opt1), not a UUID, and
+# deleting one makes OPNsense itself drop every rule/NAT entry that references it.
+NETWORK_ITEM_APIS = {
+    "vlan": {"body_key": "vlan", "base": "/interfaces/vlan_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+             "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem",
+             "reconfigure": "/interfaces/vlan_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "vip": {"body_key": "vip", "base": "/interfaces/vip_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+            "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem",
+            "reconfigure": "/interfaces/vip_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "gateway": {"body_key": "gateway_item", "base": "/routing/settings", "add": "addGateway", "set": "setGateway",
+                "del": "delGateway", "get": "getGateway", "search": "searchGateway",
+                "reconfigure": "/routing/settings/reconfigure"},
+    "route": {"body_key": "route", "base": "/routes/routes", "add": "addroute", "set": "setroute",
+              "del": "delroute", "get": "getroute", "search": "searchroute",
+              "reconfigure": "/routes/routes/reconfigure"},
+    "interface": {"body_key": "interface", "base": "/interfaces/assignment", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+                  "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem",
+                  "reconfigure": "/interfaces/assignment/reconfigure"},
+    # DNS / DHCP (Unbound/Api/SettingsController, Dnsmasq/Api/SettingsController, Kea/Api/Dhcpv4Controller;
+    # reconfigure is the service controller's inherited action). Read 2026-10-09.
+    "dns_host": {"body_key": "host", "base": "/unbound/settings", "add": "addHostOverride", "set": "setHostOverride",
+                 "del": "delHostOverride", "get": "getHostOverride", "search": "searchHostOverride",
+                 "reconfigure": "/unbound/service/reconfigure"},
+    "dhcp_host": {"body_key": "host", "base": "/dnsmasq/settings", "add": "addHost", "set": "setHost",
+                  "del": "delHost", "get": "getHost", "search": "searchHost",
+                  "reconfigure": "/dnsmasq/service/reconfigure"},
+    "kea_subnet": {"body_key": "subnet4", "base": "/kea/dhcpv4", "add": "addSubnet", "set": "setSubnet",
+                   "del": "delSubnet", "get": "getSubnet", "search": "searchSubnet",
+                   "reconfigure": "/kea/service/reconfigure"},
+    # System / interface devices / DNS+DHCP extras (same controllers pattern; read 2026-10-09).
+    "tunable": {"body_key": "sysctl", "base": "/core/tunables", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem", "del": "delItem",
+                "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/core/tunables/reconfigure"},
+    "cron_job": {"body_key": "job", "base": "/cron/settings", "add": "addJob", "set": "setJob", "del": "delJob",
+                 "get": "getJob", "search": "searchJobs", "reconfigure": "/cron/service/reconfigure"},
+    "syslog_destination": {"body_key": "destination", "base": "/syslog/settings", "add": "addDestination",
+                           "set": "setDestination", "del": "delDestination", "get": "getDestination",
+                           "search": "searchDestinations", "reconfigure": "/syslog/service/reconfigure"},
+    "gateway_group": {"body_key": "gateway_group", "base": "/routing/group_settings", "add": "add", "set": "set",
+                      "del": "del", "get": "get", "search": "search", "reconfigure": "/routing/group_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "lagg": {"body_key": "lagg", "base": "/interfaces/lagg_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+             "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/interfaces/lagg_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "bridge": {"body_key": "bridge", "base": "/interfaces/bridge_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+               "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/interfaces/bridge_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "loopback": {"body_key": "loopback", "base": "/interfaces/loopback_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+                 "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/interfaces/loopback_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "gre": {"body_key": "gre", "base": "/interfaces/gre_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+            "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/interfaces/gre_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "vxlan": {"body_key": "vxlan", "base": "/interfaces/vxlan_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+              "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/interfaces/vxlan_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "gif": {"body_key": "gif", "base": "/interfaces/gif_settings", "add": "addItem", "set": "setItem",
+            "del": "delItem", "get": "getItem", "search": "searchItem", "reconfigure": "/interfaces/gif_settings/reconfigure"},
+    "dns_forward": {"body_key": "dot", "base": "/unbound/settings", "add": "addForward", "set": "setForward",
+                    "del": "delForward", "get": "getForward", "search": "searchForward",
+                    "reconfigure": "/unbound/service/reconfigure"},
+    "dhcp_range": {"body_key": "range", "base": "/dnsmasq/settings", "add": "addRange", "set": "setRange",
+                   "del": "delRange", "get": "getRange", "search": "searchRange",
+                   "reconfigure": "/dnsmasq/service/reconfigure"},
+    "kea_reservation": {"body_key": "reservation", "base": "/kea/dhcpv4", "add": "addReservation",
+                        "set": "setReservation", "del": "delReservation", "get": "getReservation",
+                        "search": "searchReservation", "reconfigure": "/kea/service/reconfigure"},
+}
+
+
+def _nest(fields: dict) -> dict:
+    """{"option_data.routers": "x"} -> {"option_data": {"routers": "x"}} (the wire form of Kea's option block)."""
+    out: dict = {}
+    for key, value in fields.items():
+        head, _, tail = key.partition(".")
+        if tail:
+            out.setdefault(head, {})[tail] = value
+        else:
+            out[key] = value
+    return out
+
+
+async def get_network_item(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, uuid: str | None) -> dict:
+    api = NETWORK_ITEM_APIS[kind]
+    path = f"{api['base']}/{api['get']}" + (f"/{uuid}" if uuid else "")
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", path)
+    item = data.get(api["body_key"]) if isinstance(data, dict) else None
+    return item if isinstance(item, dict) else {}
+
+
+async def write_network_item(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str, action: str, uuid: str | None, fields: dict) -> dict:
+    api = NETWORK_ITEM_APIS[kind]
+    if action == "add":
+        return _mutation_result(
+            await _request(host, "POST", f"{api['base']}/{api['add']}", json={api["body_key"]: _nest(fields)}),
+            "Objekt anlegen", {"saved"})
+    if action == "set":
+        return _mutation_result(
+            await _request(host, "POST", f"{api['base']}/{api['set']}/{uuid}", json={api["body_key"]: _nest(fields)}),
+            "Objekt ändern", {"saved"})
+    return _mutation_result(
+        await _request(host, "POST", f"{api['base']}/{api['del']}/{uuid}"), "Objekt entfernen", {"deleted"})
+
+
+async def reconfigure_network(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str) -> dict:
+    return _mutation_result(
+        await _request(host, "POST", NETWORK_ITEM_APIS[kind]["reconfigure"]), "Änderung anwenden", set())
+
+
+async def list_network_item_uuids(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str) -> list[str]:
+    api = NETWORK_ITEM_APIS[kind]
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", f"{api['base']}/{api['search']}", params={"rowCount": -1})
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [str(r.get("uuid")) for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("uuid")]
+
+
+async def interface_changes_pending(host: OpnsenseHost) -> bool:
+    """True while staged interface changes wait for an apply (AssignmentController::pendingAction).
+    Our own apply would apply those too, so a change must not start on top of them."""
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", "/interfaces/assignment/pending")
+    return isinstance(data, dict) and data.get("status") == "pending"
+
+
+async def _search_all(host: OpnsenseHost, path: str) -> dict:
+    return await _request(host, "GET", path, params={"rowCount": -1})
+
+
+async def search_dns_hosts(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _search_all(host, "/unbound/settings/searchHostOverride")
+
+
+async def search_dhcp_hosts(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _search_all(host, "/dnsmasq/settings/searchHost")
+
+
+async def search_kea_subnets(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _search_all(host, "/kea/dhcpv4/searchSubnet")
+
+
+async def search_kea_reservations(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    return await _search_all(host, "/kea/dhcpv4/searchReservation")
+
+
+async def search_network_objects(host: OpnsenseHost, kind: str) -> list[dict]:
+    api = NETWORK_ITEM_APIS[kind]
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", f"{api['base']}/{api['search']}", params={"rowCount": -1})
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict)]
+
+
+# ── ZFS snapshots (Core/Api/SnapshotsController, read 2026-10-09) ────────
+# Not a config object: flat form fields instead of {body_key: {...}}, no reconfigure, and the answers are
+# free-form ("OK" strings / {"status": ...}), so callers confirm by listing again.
+async def list_snapshots(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", "/core/snapshots/search", params={"rowCount": -1})
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict)]
+
+
+async def create_snapshot(host: OpnsenseHost, name: str, note: str = "") -> None:
+    data = await _request(host, "POST", "/core/snapshots/add", json={"name": name, "note": note})
+    if isinstance(data, dict) and (data.get("validations") or str(data.get("status", "")).lower() == "failed"):
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"Snapshot anlegen von Firewall nicht bestätigt: {redact_data(data)}")
+
+
+async def delete_snapshot(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid: str) -> None:
+    data = await _request(host, "POST", f"/core/snapshots/del/{uuid}")
+    if isinstance(data, dict) and (data.get("validations") or str(data.get("status", "")).lower() == "failed"):
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError(f"Snapshot löschen von Firewall nicht bestätigt: {redact_data(data)}")
+
+
+# ── Diagnostics (Diagnostics/Api/{Ping,Traceroute,Portprobe,DnsDiagnostics}Controller, read + live 2026-10-09) ──
+# Traceroute/portprobe/DNS answer synchronously to the same "set" call that validates the form:
+#   {"result": "ok", "response": {...}} or {"result": "failed", "validations": {"<model>.settings.<field>": "..."}}.
+# Ping is a job: set (returns a uuid) -> start -> searchJobs shows live counters -> stop -> remove.
+# A probe to a closed/blackholed port takes the firewall 10 s, so these calls need a longer timeout.
+DIAGNOSTIC_TIMEOUT = 40.0
+
+
+async def diagnostic_set(host: OpnsenseHost, path: str, model: str, settings: dict) -> dict:
+    data = await _request(host, "POST", path, json={model: {"settings": settings}}, timeout=DIAGNOSTIC_TIMEOUT)
+    if not isinstance(data, dict):
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError("Diagnose: keine auswertbare Antwort der Firewall")
+    if data.get("result") != "ok":
+        raise OpnsenseDiagnosticRejected(data.get("validations") or {})
+    return data
+
+
+class OpnsenseDiagnosticRejected(OpnsenseAPIError):
+    """The firewall refused the input (its own validation); carries {field: message}."""
+
+    def __init__(self, validations: dict):
+        super().__init__("Eingabe von der Firewall abgelehnt")
+        self.validations = validations
+
+
+async def ping_job_start(host: OpnsenseHost, settings: dict) -> str:
+    data = await diagnostic_set(host, "/diagnostics/ping/set", "ping", settings)
+    job = data.get("uuid")
+    if not job:
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError("Ping: die Firewall hat keine Job-ID geliefert")
+    started = await _request(host, "POST", f"/diagnostics/ping/start/{job}", timeout=DIAGNOSTIC_TIMEOUT)
+    if not isinstance(started, dict) or started.get("status") != "ok":
+        await ping_job_remove(host, job)
+        raise OpnsenseAPIError("Ping: der Job konnte nicht gestartet werden")
+    return job
+
+
+async def ping_job_state(host: OpnsenseHost, job: str) -> dict | None:
+    data = await _request(host, "GET", "/diagnostics/ping/searchJobs", params={"rowCount": -1})
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return next((r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("id") == job), None)
+
+
+async def ping_job_stop(host: OpnsenseHost, job: str) -> None:
+    await _request(host, "POST", f"/diagnostics/ping/stop/{job}")
+
+
+async def ping_job_remove(host: OpnsenseHost, job: str) -> None:
+    await _request(host, "POST", f"/diagnostics/ping/remove/{job}")

backend/app/services/opnsense_secret_store.py

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _SUFFIX = ".secret"
 
@@ -18,9 +19,7 @@ def _path(host_id: uuid.UUID) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(host_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(host_id)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_secret(host_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:

backend/app/services/outbound_nat_deploy_service.py

@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@ from app.models.outbound_nat_deployment import OutboundNatDeployment
 from app.services.outbound_nat_mode import require_manual_mode
 from app.services.audit_service import tracked_rollback
 from app.services import opnsense_client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.deploy_flow import push_to_host
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
 
 
 def _now() -> datetime:
@@ -57,48 +58,23 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, rule: OutboundNatRule, host: Opnsens
 
     prior_uuid = existing.opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid if existing else None
     prior_live_payload = existing.last_payload if existing else None
-    new_uuid = prior_uuid
-    try:
-        if prior_uuid:
-            await opnsense_client.set_outbound_nat_rule(host, prior_uuid, payload)
-        else:
-            result = await opnsense_client.add_outbound_nat_rule(host, payload)
-            new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-            if not new_uuid:
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        await opnsense_client.apply_outbound_nat(host)
-    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        if existing:
-            existing.status = "error"
-            existing.opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid = new_uuid
-            existing.message = str(exc)
-            existing.revert_deadline = None
-            existing.deployed_at = _now()
-            return existing
-        deployment = OutboundNatDeployment(
-            outbound_nat_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="error", message=str(exc),
-            opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
-        )
-        db.add(deployment)
-        return deployment
 
-    deadline = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
+    async def write(uuid_):
-    if existing:
+        if uuid_:
-        existing.status = "pending"
+            await opnsense_client.set_outbound_nat_rule(host, uuid_, payload)
-        existing.message = None
+            return uuid_
-        existing.opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid = new_uuid
+        result = await opnsense_client.add_outbound_nat_rule(host, payload)
-        existing.deployed_at = _now()
+        new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-        existing.revert_deadline = deadline
+        if not new_uuid:
-        existing.previous_payload = prior_live_payload
+            raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        existing.last_payload = payload
+        return new_uuid
-        return existing
 
-    deployment = OutboundNatDeployment(
+    deployment = await push_to_host(
-        outbound_nat_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="pending", message=None,
+        db, existing=existing, uuid_attr="opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid",
-        opnsense_outbound_nat_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(), revert_deadline=deadline,
+        make=lambda **fields: OutboundNatDeployment(outbound_nat_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, **fields),
-        previous_payload=None, last_payload=payload,
+        prior_uuid=prior_uuid, prior_live_payload=prior_live_payload, payload=payload,
+        write=write, apply=lambda: opnsense_client.apply_outbound_nat(host),
     )
-    db.add(deployment)
     return deployment
 
 
@@ -119,7 +95,7 @@ async def deploy_outbound_nat(db: AsyncSession, rule: OutboundNatRule, hosts: li
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = f"Outbound NAT wurde übernommen, Hierarchie-Reihenfolge aber nicht bestätigt: {exc}"
-                deployment.revert_deadline = None
+                # The change is live: keep the revert deadline so an unconfirmed result is still undone.
     except Exception:
         # A mode can change after fleet preflight. Preserve already applied
         # hosts and their rollback deadlines even if a later host now blocks.
@@ -150,7 +126,7 @@ async def sweep_expired_outbound_nat_deployments(db: AsyncSession) -> list[Outbo
     await policy_lock(db)
     result = await db.execute(
         select(OutboundNatDeployment).where(
-            OutboundNatDeployment.status == "pending", OutboundNatDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now()
+            OutboundNatDeployment.status.in_(("pending", "error")), OutboundNatDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now()
         )
     )
     expired = list(result.scalars().all())
@@ -176,7 +152,7 @@ async def undeploy_outbound_nat(db: AsyncSession, rule: OutboundNatRule) -> None
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = str(exc)
-                failures.append(host.name)
+                failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
                 continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/policy_hierarchy_deploy_service.py

@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ from app.models.policy_hierarchy_rule import PolicyHierarchyRule
 from app.models.policy_hierarchy_rule_deployment import PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment
 from app.services.audit_service import tracked_rollback
 from app.services import opnsense_client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.deploy_flow import push_to_host
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
 from app.services.policy_hierarchy_service import ancestor_chain, descendants, ordered_hierarchy_rules
 
 
@@ -219,62 +220,36 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, rule: PolicyHierarchyRule, host: Opn
 
     prior_uuid = existing.opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid if existing else None
     prior_live_payload = existing.last_payload if existing else None
-    new_uuid = prior_uuid
-    try:
-        if prior_uuid:
-            await opnsense_client.set_rule(host, prior_uuid, payload)
-        else:
-            result = await opnsense_client.add_rule(host, payload)
-            new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-            if not new_uuid:
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        await opnsense_client.apply(host)
-    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        if existing:
-            existing.status = "error"
-            existing.opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid = new_uuid
-            existing.message = str(exc)
-            existing.revert_deadline = None
-            existing.deployed_at = _now()
-            return existing
-        deployment = PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment(
-            policy_hierarchy_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="error", message=str(exc),
-            opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
-        )
-        db.add(deployment)
-        return deployment
 
-    # Rule content is live. Persist the uuid now (flushed) so the
+    async def write(uuid_):
-    # positioning pass below sees this deployment as an anchor too.
+        if uuid_:
-    if existing:
+            await opnsense_client.set_rule(host, uuid_, payload)
-        deployment = existing
+            return uuid_
-        deployment.opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid = new_uuid
+        result = await opnsense_client.add_rule(host, payload)
-    else:
+        new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-        deployment = PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment(
+        if not new_uuid:
-            policy_hierarchy_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="pending",
+            raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-            opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
+        return new_uuid
-        )
+
-        db.add(deployment)
+    deployment = await push_to_host(
-    await db.flush()
+        db, existing=existing, uuid_attr="opnsense_policy_hierarchy_uuid",
+        make=lambda **fields: PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment(policy_hierarchy_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, **fields),
+        prior_uuid=prior_uuid, prior_live_payload=prior_live_payload, payload=payload,
+        write=write, apply=lambda: opnsense_client.apply(host),
+    )
+
+    if deployment.status != "pending":
+        return deployment
 
     try:
         await reassert_ordering(db, host, rule.interface)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
         # Live but not provably in the right position — this must not read
-        # as a merely-unconfirmed pending change (see module docstring).
+        # as a merely-unconfirmed pending change (see module docstring), yet
+        # it stays recoverable: the deadline remains armed.
         deployment.status = "error"
         deployment.message = f"Regel wurde übernommen, Positionierung ('quick') aber nicht bestätigt: {exc}"
-        deployment.revert_deadline = None
         deployment.deployed_at = _now()
-        return deployment
-
-    deadline = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
-    deployment.status = "pending"
-    deployment.message = None
-    deployment.deployed_at = _now()
-    deployment.revert_deadline = deadline
-    deployment.previous_payload = prior_live_payload
-    deployment.last_payload = payload
     return deployment
 
 
@@ -309,7 +284,7 @@ async def sweep_expired_hierarchy_deployments(db: AsyncSession) -> list[PolicyHi
     await policy_lock(db)
     result = await db.execute(
         select(PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment).where(
-            PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.status == "pending",
+            PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.status.in_(("pending", "error")),
             PolicyHierarchyRuleDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now(),
         )
     )
@@ -336,7 +311,7 @@ async def undeploy_hierarchy_rule(db: AsyncSession, rule: PolicyHierarchyRule) -
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = str(exc)
-                failures.append(host.name)
+                failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
                 continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/policy_service.py

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ from sqlalchemy import text
 from app.models.policy import RuleRevision
 from app.services.rule_deploy_service import _build_payload
 
-RULE_FIELDS = ("description", "interface", "direction", "ipprotocol", "protocol", "action", "source_net", "source_port", "destination_net", "destination_port", "enabled")
+RULE_FIELDS = ("description", "interface", "direction", "ipprotocol", "protocol", "action", "source_net", "source_port", "destination_net", "destination_port", "enabled", "log")
 
 
 async def policy_lock(db):

backend/app/services/port_forward_deploy_service.py

@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ from app.models.port_forward import PortForwardRule
 from app.models.port_forward_deployment import PortForwardDeployment
 from app.services.audit_service import tracked_rollback
 from app.services import opnsense_client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.deploy_flow import push_to_host
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
 
 
 def _now() -> datetime:
@@ -65,48 +66,23 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, rule: PortForwardRule, host: Opnsens
 
     prior_uuid = existing.opnsense_port_forward_uuid if existing else None
     prior_live_payload = existing.last_payload if existing else None
-    new_uuid = prior_uuid
-    try:
-        if prior_uuid:
-            await opnsense_client.set_port_forward_rule(host, prior_uuid, payload)
-        else:
-            result = await opnsense_client.add_port_forward_rule(host, payload)
-            new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-            if not new_uuid:
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        await opnsense_client.apply_port_forward(host)
-    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        if existing:
-            existing.status = "error"
-            existing.opnsense_port_forward_uuid = new_uuid
-            existing.message = str(exc)
-            existing.revert_deadline = None
-            existing.deployed_at = _now()
-            return existing
-        deployment = PortForwardDeployment(
-            port_forward_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="error", message=str(exc),
-            opnsense_port_forward_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
-        )
-        db.add(deployment)
-        return deployment
 
-    deadline = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
+    async def write(uuid_):
-    if existing:
+        if uuid_:
-        existing.status = "pending"
+            await opnsense_client.set_port_forward_rule(host, uuid_, payload)
-        existing.message = None
+            return uuid_
-        existing.opnsense_port_forward_uuid = new_uuid
+        result = await opnsense_client.add_port_forward_rule(host, payload)
-        existing.deployed_at = _now()
+        new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-        existing.revert_deadline = deadline
+        if not new_uuid:
-        existing.previous_payload = prior_live_payload
+            raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        existing.last_payload = payload
+        return new_uuid
-        return existing
 
-    deployment = PortForwardDeployment(
+    deployment = await push_to_host(
-        port_forward_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="pending", message=None,
+        db, existing=existing, uuid_attr="opnsense_port_forward_uuid",
-        opnsense_port_forward_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(), revert_deadline=deadline,
+        make=lambda **fields: PortForwardDeployment(port_forward_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, **fields),
-        previous_payload=None, last_payload=payload,
+        prior_uuid=prior_uuid, prior_live_payload=prior_live_payload, payload=payload,
+        write=write, apply=lambda: opnsense_client.apply_port_forward(host),
     )
-    db.add(deployment)
     return deployment
 
 
@@ -124,7 +100,7 @@ async def deploy_port_forward(db: AsyncSession, rule: PortForwardRule, hosts: li
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = f"Port Forward wurde übernommen, Hierarchie-Reihenfolge aber nicht bestätigt: {exc}"
-            deployment.revert_deadline = None
+            # The change is live: keep the revert deadline so an unconfirmed result is still undone.
     await db.commit()
     return deployments
 
@@ -150,7 +126,7 @@ async def sweep_expired_port_forward_deployments(db: AsyncSession) -> list[PortF
     await policy_lock(db)
     result = await db.execute(
         select(PortForwardDeployment).where(
-            PortForwardDeployment.status == "pending", PortForwardDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now()
+            PortForwardDeployment.status.in_(("pending", "error")), PortForwardDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now()
         )
     )
     expired = list(result.scalars().all())
@@ -176,7 +152,7 @@ async def undeploy_port_forward(db: AsyncSession, rule: PortForwardRule) -> None
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = str(exc)
-                failures.append(host.name)
+                failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
                 continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/redaction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+"""Scrub text that came back from a firewall before it is stored, logged or
+shown to a user.
+
+An upstream error body can echo the request that caused it — including the
+password, pre-shared key or private key we just sent — or contain secret-bearing
+configuration. OPNexus keeps these messages (deployment status, maintenance
+results, host status detail) and read-only users can see them, so they must not
+carry such values. Redaction is applied where the exception is built
+(opnsense_client), so every consumer gets the safe version.
+"""
+import json
+import re
+from typing import Any
+
+MAX_LENGTH = 300
+_REDACTED = "[redacted]"
+
+# Field names whose value is (or may be) secret material.
+_SECRET_KEY = re.compile(
+    r"pass|secret|psk|pre_?shared|private|prv|token|api_?key|apikey|credential|auth|crt|cert|\bkey\b|_key|key_|tls_?key",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+_PEM = re.compile(r"-----BEGIN [A-Z0-9 ]+-----.*?(?:-----END [A-Z0-9 ]+-----|$)", re.DOTALL)
+# key=value / key: value pairs in non-JSON text
+_PAIR = re.compile(r"(?i)\b([\w.\-]*(?:pass|secret|psk|token|private|api_?key|key)[\w.\-]*)\b([\"']?\s*[=:]\s*)(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|[^\s,;&]+)")
+
+
+# Keys under which OPNsense lists per-field validation errors
+# ({"validations": {"instance.cert": "Please select a valid certificate"}}).
+# There the field name says WHICH field failed. "cert", "crt" and "auth" in it
+# do not make the message secret, so those three alone stop triggering the
+# redaction (otherwise every certificate/auth error from the firewall reads
+# "[redacted]"). Real secret names (psk, key, password, ...) still do.
+_VALIDATION_KEYS = {"validations", "validation"}
+_SECRET_KEY_IN_VALIDATIONS = re.compile(
+    r"pass|secret|psk|pre_?shared|private|prv|token|api_?key|apikey|credential|\bkey\b|_key|key_|tls_?key",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+
+
+def _scrub_json(value: Any, key: str = "", in_validations: bool = False) -> Any:
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        nested = in_validations or key in _VALIDATION_KEYS
+        return {k: _scrub_json(v, str(k), nested) for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_scrub_json(v, key, in_validations) for v in value]
+    pattern = _SECRET_KEY_IN_VALIDATIONS if in_validations else _SECRET_KEY
+    if isinstance(value, str) and key and pattern.search(key):
+        return _REDACTED
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        return _scrub_text(value)
+    return value
+
+
+def _scrub_text(text: str) -> str:
+    return _PAIR.sub(lambda m: f"{m.group(1)}{m.group(2)}{_REDACTED}", _PEM.sub(_REDACTED, text))
+
+
+def redact_text(text: str, *known_secrets: str | None) -> str:
+    """Return a bounded, secret-free rendering of an upstream response body."""
+    text = text or ""
+    try:
+        parsed = json.loads(text)
+    except ValueError:
+        parsed = None
+    if isinstance(parsed, (dict, list)):
+        text = json.dumps(_scrub_json(parsed), ensure_ascii=False)
+    else:
+        text = _scrub_text(text)
+    for secret in known_secrets:
+        if secret and len(secret) >= 4:
+            text = text.replace(secret, _REDACTED)
+    text = " ".join(text.split())
+    return text if len(text) <= MAX_LENGTH else text[:MAX_LENGTH] + "…"
+
+
+def redact_data(data: Any, *known_secrets: str | None) -> str:
+    """Same for an already-parsed JSON structure."""
+    return redact_text(json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False, default=str), *known_secrets)

backend/app/services/rule_adopt_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+"""Takes over a firewall rule that was created by hand on a host, so it can be
+edited, versioned and deployed from OPNexus like any other rule.
+
+Adoption itself writes NOTHING to the firewall: it records the rule as it is
+right now (read fresh from the host at adoption time, never from what the
+browser sent) together with its OPNsense UUID. The first change afterwards goes
+through the normal preview → push → confirm/auto-revert flow.
+
+Only rules OPNexus can describe without distortion are adopted. A rule using
+something the model cannot express (several interfaces, an inverted source, a
+non-quick rule, ...) is refused with the reason instead of being imported in a
+way that would silently change its meaning on the next edit. Fields the model
+does not know about (gateway, state options, schedules, tags, ...) are left
+alone on the firewall: setRule only overwrites the fields it is sent.
+"""
+from sqlalchemy import select
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession
+
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.models.rule import FirewallRule
+from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
+from app.services import opnsense_client
+from app.services.policy_service import revision
+from app.services.rule_deploy_service import _build_payload
+
+
+class RuleNotFoundOnHost(Exception):
+    pass
+
+
+class NotAdoptable(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, reasons: list[str]):
+        super().__init__(", ".join(reasons))
+        self.reasons = reasons
+
+
+def _on(value) -> bool:
+    return value in ("1", 1, True)
+
+
+def _clean(value) -> str:
+    return "" if value is None else str(value).strip()
+
+
+def reasons_not_adoptable(row: dict, managed_uuids: set[str]) -> list[str]:
+    """Machine-readable reasons (the UI translates them); empty = adoptable."""
+    reasons = []
+    if row.get("is_automatic"):
+        reasons.append("automatic")
+    if _clean(row.get("uuid")) in managed_uuids:
+        reasons.append("already_managed")
+    interface = _clean(row.get("interface"))
+    if not interface or "," in interface:
+        reasons.append("interface_not_single")
+    if _on(row.get("interfacenot")):
+        reasons.append("negated_interface")
+    if _on(row.get("source_not")):
+        reasons.append("negated_source")
+    if _on(row.get("destination_not")):
+        reasons.append("negated_destination")
+    if _clean(row.get("received-on")):
+        reasons.append("received_on")
+    if _clean(row.get("quick")) != "1":
+        reasons.append("not_quick")
+    if _clean(row.get("direction")) not in ("in", "out"):
+        reasons.append("direction_unsupported")
+    if _clean(row.get("action")) not in ("pass", "block", "reject"):
+        reasons.append("action_unsupported")
+    if _clean(row.get("ipprotocol")) not in ("inet", "inet6"):
+        reasons.append("ipprotocol_unsupported")
+    if not _clean(row.get("description")):
+        reasons.append("no_description")
+    return reasons
+
+
+async def _managed_uuids(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> set[str]:
+    rows = await db.scalars(
+        select(RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid).where(
+            RuleDeployment.host_id == host.id, RuleDeployment.opnsense_rule_uuid.is_not(None)
+        )
+    )
+    return set(rows.all())
+
+
+async def _live_rows(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    data = await opnsense_client.search_rules(host, all_rows=True)
+    rows = data.get("rows", []) if isinstance(data, dict) else []
+    return [r for r in rows if isinstance(r, dict) and r.get("uuid")]
+
+
+async def list_unmanaged(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[dict]:
+    managed = await _managed_uuids(db, host)
+    result = []
+    for row in await _live_rows(host):
+        if row.get("is_automatic"):
+            continue  # built-in/system rules never show up here at all
+        reasons = reasons_not_adoptable(row, managed)
+        if "already_managed" in reasons:
+            continue
+        result.append({
+            "uuid": _clean(row.get("uuid")),
+            "description": _clean(row.get("description")),
+            "interface": _clean(row.get("interface")),
+            "interface_label": _clean(row.get("%interface")) or _clean(row.get("interface")),
+            "direction": _clean(row.get("direction")),
+            "action": _clean(row.get("action")),
+            "protocol": _clean(row.get("protocol")) or "any",
+            "source_net": _clean(row.get("source_net")) or "any",
+            "source_port": _clean(row.get("source_port")),
+            "destination_net": _clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any",
+            "destination_port": _clean(row.get("destination_port")),
+            "enabled": _on(row.get("enabled")),
+            "log": _on(row.get("log")),
+            "adoptable": not reasons,
+            "reasons": reasons,
+        })
+    return result
+
+
+async def adopt(db: AsyncSession, host: OpnsenseHost, rule_uuid: str) -> FirewallRule:
+    managed = await _managed_uuids(db, host)
+    row = next((r for r in await _live_rows(host) if _clean(r.get("uuid")) == rule_uuid), None)
+    if row is None:
+        raise RuleNotFoundOnHost(rule_uuid)
+    reasons = reasons_not_adoptable(row, managed)
+    if reasons:
+        raise NotAdoptable(reasons)
+
+    rule = FirewallRule(
+        description=_clean(row.get("description")),
+        interface=_clean(row.get("interface")),
+        direction=_clean(row.get("direction")),
+        ipprotocol=_clean(row.get("ipprotocol")),
+        protocol=_clean(row.get("protocol")) or "any",
+        action=_clean(row.get("action")),
+        source_net=_clean(row.get("source_net")) or "any",
+        source_port=_clean(row.get("source_port")) or None,
+        destination_net=_clean(row.get("destination_net")) or "any",
+        destination_port=_clean(row.get("destination_port")) or None,
+        enabled=_on(row.get("enabled")),
+        log=_on(row.get("log")),
+        targets=[host],
+        groups=[],
+    )
+    db.add(rule)
+    await db.flush()
+    revision(db, rule, "Von Firewall übernommen")
+    db.add(RuleDeployment(
+        rule_id=rule.id,
+        host_id=host.id,
+        status="success",
+        message="Von der Firewall übernommen",
+        opnsense_rule_uuid=rule_uuid,
+        last_payload=_build_payload(rule),
+        previous_payload=None,
+    ))
+    await db.flush()
+    return rule

backend/app/services/rule_deploy_service.py

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ from app.models.rule import FirewallRule
 from app.models.rule_deployment import RuleDeployment
 from app.services.audit_service import tracked_rollback
 from app.services import opnsense_client
-from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+from app.services.deploy_flow import push_to_host
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAmbiguousError, OpnsenseAPIError
 
 
 def _now() -> datetime:
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ def _build_payload(rule: FirewallRule) -> dict:
         "destination_net": rule.destination_net,
         "destination_port": rule.destination_port or "",
         "description": rule.description,
-        "log": "0",
+        "log": "1" if rule.log else "0",
     }
 
 
@@ -73,48 +74,23 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, rule: FirewallRule, host: OpnsenseHo
 
     prior_uuid = existing.opnsense_rule_uuid if existing else None
     prior_live_payload = existing.last_payload if existing else None
-    new_uuid = prior_uuid
-    try:
-        if prior_uuid:
-            await opnsense_client.set_rule(host, prior_uuid, payload)
-        else:
-            result = await opnsense_client.add_rule(host, payload)
-            new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-            if not new_uuid:
-                raise OpnsenseAPIError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        await opnsense_client.apply(host)
-    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
-        if existing:
-            existing.status = "error"
-            existing.opnsense_rule_uuid = new_uuid
-            existing.message = str(exc)
-            existing.revert_deadline = None
-            existing.deployed_at = _now()
-            return existing
-        deployment = RuleDeployment(
-            rule_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="error", message=str(exc),
-            opnsense_rule_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(),
-        )
-        db.add(deployment)
-        return deployment
 
-    deadline = _now() + timedelta(seconds=settings.deploy_confirm_window_seconds)
+    async def write(uuid_):
-    if existing:
+        if uuid_:
-        existing.status = "pending"
+            await opnsense_client.set_rule(host, uuid_, payload)
-        existing.message = None
+            return uuid_
-        existing.opnsense_rule_uuid = new_uuid
+        result = await opnsense_client.add_rule(host, payload)
-        existing.deployed_at = _now()
+        new_uuid = result.get("uuid") if isinstance(result, dict) else None
-        existing.revert_deadline = deadline
+        if not new_uuid:
-        existing.previous_payload = prior_live_payload
+            raise OpnsenseAmbiguousError("Firewall hat keine Regel-UUID zurückgegeben; Stand manuell prüfen")
-        existing.last_payload = payload
+        return new_uuid
-        return existing
 
-    deployment = RuleDeployment(
+    deployment = await push_to_host(
-        rule_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, status="pending", message=None,
+        db, existing=existing, uuid_attr="opnsense_rule_uuid",
-        opnsense_rule_uuid=new_uuid, deployed_at=_now(), revert_deadline=deadline,
+        make=lambda **fields: RuleDeployment(rule_id=rule.id, host_id=host.id, **fields),
-        previous_payload=None, last_payload=payload,
+        prior_uuid=prior_uuid, prior_live_payload=prior_live_payload, payload=payload,
+        write=write, apply=lambda: opnsense_client.apply(host),
     )
-    db.add(deployment)
     return deployment
 
 
@@ -132,7 +108,7 @@ async def deploy_rule(db: AsyncSession, rule: FirewallRule, hosts: list[Opnsense
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = f"Regel wurde übernommen, Hierarchie-Reihenfolge aber nicht bestätigt: {exc}"
-            deployment.revert_deadline = None
+            # The change is live: keep the revert deadline so an unconfirmed result is still undone.
     await db.commit()
     return deployments
 
@@ -159,7 +135,7 @@ async def sweep_expired_deployments(db: AsyncSession) -> list[RuleDeployment]:
     from app.services.policy_service import policy_lock
     await policy_lock(db)
     result = await db.execute(
-        select(RuleDeployment).where(RuleDeployment.status == "pending", RuleDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now())
+        select(RuleDeployment).where(RuleDeployment.status.in_(("pending", "error")), RuleDeployment.revert_deadline <= _now())
     )
     expired = list(result.scalars().all())
     touched: list[RuleDeployment] = []
@@ -184,7 +160,7 @@ async def undeploy_rule(db: AsyncSession, rule: FirewallRule) -> None:
             except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
                 deployment.status = "error"
                 deployment.message = str(exc)
-                failures.append(host.name)
+                failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
                 continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/rule_drift_service.py

@@ -38,6 +38,10 @@ async def _live_rules_or_none(host: OpnsenseHost) -> list[LiveRule] | None:
 
 
 async def compute_cluster_drift(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost]) -> list[dict]:
+    return (await compute_cluster_drift_with_reachable(hosts))[0]
+
+
+async def compute_cluster_drift_with_reachable(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost]) -> tuple[list[dict], set]:
     """Returns one row per fingerprint that isn't present on every reachable
     host in the cluster: {"fingerprint": str, "sample": LiveRule,
     "present_on": set[host_id], "reachable_host_ids": set[host_id]}.
@@ -58,4 +62,4 @@ async def compute_cluster_drift(hosts: list[OpnsenseHost]) -> list[dict]:
     for entry in by_fingerprint.values():
         entry["reachable_host_ids"] = reachable_ids
 
-    return [entry for entry in by_fingerprint.values() if len(entry["present_on"]) < len(reachable_ids)]
+    return [entry for entry in by_fingerprint.values() if len(entry["present_on"]) < len(reachable_ids)], reachable_ids

backend/app/services/secure_files.py

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+"""Writing secret material to disk without a window in which it is readable.
+
+``Path.write_text()`` followed by ``chmod(0o600)`` creates the file with the
+process umask (typically 0644) first. Here the file is created with mode 0600
+from the start, under a fresh unpredictable name (``O_EXCL`` + ``O_NOFOLLOW``,
+so nothing planted there is followed), flushed to disk and then renamed over
+the destination — readers see either the complete old or the complete new
+content, never a partial write, and a symlink at the destination is replaced
+rather than written through.
+"""
+import os
+import secrets
+from pathlib import Path
+
+
+def write_private(path: Path, data: str | bytes) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True, mode=0o700)
+    payload = data.encode() if isinstance(data, str) else data
+    tmp = path.with_name(f".{path.name}.{secrets.token_hex(8)}.tmp")
+    fd = os.open(tmp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_EXCL | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0), 0o600)
+    try:
+        with os.fdopen(fd, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(payload)
+            handle.flush()
+            os.fsync(handle.fileno())
+        os.replace(tmp, path)
+    except BaseException:
+        tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        raise

backend/app/services/snapshot_service.py

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+"""ZFS snapshots (boot environments) of one firewall: list, create, delete.
+
+Snapshots are a safety net before bigger changes, not a rollback button:
+activating one needs a reboot and discards everything since, so that action is
+deliberately NOT offered here. Deleting refuses the active/next-boot snapshot
+(the firewall refuses too; we say so up front). Every step is audited.
+"""
+import re
+
+from app.errors import ErrorCode, api_error
+from app.models.host import OpnsenseHost
+from app.services import audit_service, opnsense_client
+from app.services.opnsense_client import OpnsenseAPIError
+
+NAME = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{0,63}$")
+
+
+def _row(row: dict) -> dict:
+    return {
+        "uuid": str(row.get("uuid", "")), "name": str(row.get("name", "")), "active": str(row.get("active", "")),
+        "size": str(row.get("size", "")), "created": str(row.get("created_str", "")),
+        "mountpoint": str(row.get("mountpoint", "")),
+    }
+
+
+async def list_snapshots(host: OpnsenseHost) -> dict:
+    try:
+        supported = (await opnsense_client._request(host, "GET", "/core/snapshots/isSupported")).get("supported")
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        if "404" in str(exc):
+            return {"supported": False, "rows": []}
+        raise
+    if not supported:
+        return {"supported": False, "rows": []}
+    return {"supported": True, "rows": [_row(r) for r in await opnsense_client.list_snapshots(host)]}
+
+
+async def create(host: OpnsenseHost, name: str, note: str) -> dict:
+    if not NAME.match(name):
+        raise api_error(422, ErrorCode.NETWORK_FIELD_INVALID, field="name")
+    audit = {"kind": "snapshot", "action": "snapshot.add", "entity_name": name, "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name}
+    await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="started", message=None, details={"note": note[:200]})
+    try:
+        await opnsense_client.create_snapshot(host, name, note[:200])
+        created = next((r for r in await opnsense_client.list_snapshots(host) if r.get("name") == name), None)
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="rejected", message=str(exc)[:500], details={})
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)[:300]) from exc
+    await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="applied" if created else "unverified", message=None, details={})
+    if not created:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.NETWORK_APPLY_UNCERTAIN, host=host.name, backup_id="-")
+    return _row(created)
+
+
+async def delete(host: OpnsenseHost, uuid: str) -> None:
+    rows = await opnsense_client.list_snapshots(host)
+    target = next((r for r in rows if str(r.get("uuid")) == uuid), None)
+    if target is None:
+        raise api_error(404, ErrorCode.NETWORK_ITEM_NOT_FOUND)
+    if str(target.get("active", "")).strip() not in ("", "-"):
+        # N = active now, R = active after reboot: removing either would break the boot environment.
+        raise api_error(409, ErrorCode.NETWORK_CHANGE_BLOCKED, reasons="snapshot_active")
+    audit = {"kind": "snapshot", "action": "snapshot.del", "entity_name": str(target.get("name")), "host_id": str(host.id), "host_name": host.name}
+    await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="started", message=None, details={})
+    try:
+        await opnsense_client.delete_snapshot(host, uuid)
+        still = any(str(r.get("uuid")) == uuid for r in await opnsense_client.list_snapshots(host))
+    except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
+        await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="rejected", message=str(exc)[:500], details={})
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.UPSTREAM_REJECTED, reason=str(exc)[:300]) from exc
+    await audit_service.persist(**audit, status="unverified" if still else "applied", message=None, details={})
+    if still:
+        raise api_error(502, ErrorCode.NETWORK_APPLY_UNCERTAIN, host=host.name, backup_id="-")

backend/app/services/totp_service.py

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ from pathlib import Path
 from urllib.parse import quote
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 STEP_SECONDS = 30
 DIGITS = 6
@@ -94,14 +95,22 @@ def _path(user_id: uuid.UUID, pending: bool) -> Path:
 
 def save_secret(user_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str, pending: bool = False) -> None:
     path = _path(user_id, pending)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret)
-    path.write_text(secret)
+
-    path.chmod(0o600)
+
+# An enrolment that was started but never completed expires, so a forgotten
+# QR code (or a stolen session's half-finished attempt) does not stay valid.
+PENDING_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
 
 
 def read_secret(user_id: uuid.UUID, pending: bool = False) -> str | None:
     path = _path(user_id, pending)
-    return path.read_text().strip() if path.exists() else None
+    if not path.exists():
+        return None
+    if pending and time.time() - path.stat().st_mtime > PENDING_TTL_SECONDS:
+        path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
+        return None
+    return path.read_text().strip()
 
 
 def delete_secrets(user_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:

backend/app/services/updater_client.py

@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+"""Client für den optionalen OPNexus-Updater-Container (updater/server.py).
+
+Das Backend kann selbst nichts am Host ändern und soll das auch nicht können:
+Es fragt den Updater-Dienst nach dem Zustand und reicht eine bereits
+geprüfte Update-/Rollback-Anfrage weiter. Ist der Dienst nicht aktiviert oder
+nicht erreichbar, ist das ein normaler Zustand ("nicht verfügbar"), kein Fehler.
+"""
+import logging
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import httpx
+
+from app.config import settings
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+_STATUS_TIMEOUT = 50.0  # der Updater fragt docker ab (bis zu 45 s)
+_ACTION_TIMEOUT = 15.0
+
+
+class UpdaterUnavailable(Exception):
+    """Updater nicht aktiviert (kein Token) oder nicht erreichbar."""
+
+
+class UpdaterRejected(Exception):
+    def __init__(self, code: str):
+        super().__init__(code)
+        self.code = code
+
+
+def _token() -> str:
+    try:
+        token = Path(settings.updater_token_file).read_text(encoding="utf-8").strip()
+    except OSError:
+        token = ""
+    if not token:
+        raise UpdaterUnavailable("not_enabled")
+    return token
+
+
+async def _call(method: str, path: str, payload: dict | None, timeout: float) -> dict:
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_token()}"}
+    try:
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout) as http:
+            response = await http.request(method, settings.updater_url.rstrip("/") + path, headers=headers, json=payload)
+    except httpx.HTTPError as exc:
+        logger.info("Updater nicht erreichbar: %s", exc.__class__.__name__)
+        raise UpdaterUnavailable("unreachable") from exc
+    try:
+        body = response.json()
+    except ValueError:
+        body = {}
+    if response.status_code == 401:
+        # Token passt nicht (Volume neu angelegt?) — wie "nicht verfügbar" behandeln.
+        raise UpdaterUnavailable("unauthorized")
+    if response.status_code >= 400:
+        raise UpdaterRejected(str(body.get("error") or "rejected"))
+    return body
+
+
+async def status() -> dict:
+    return await _call("GET", "/status", None, _STATUS_TIMEOUT)
+
+
+async def start_update(version: str) -> dict:
+    return await _call("POST", "/update", {"version": version}, _ACTION_TIMEOUT)
+
+
+async def start_rollback() -> dict:
+    return await _call("POST", "/rollback", {}, _ACTION_TIMEOUT)

backend/app/services/wireguard_deploy_service.py

@@ -324,6 +324,9 @@ async def _deploy_to_host(db: AsyncSession, tunnel: WireguardTunnel, host: Opnse
 
     try:
         await _write_config(host, payloads, deployment)
+        # Without the global switch the config is stored but no interface
+        # ever comes up (live-verified), so a "success" would be a lie.
+        await opnsense_client.ensure_wireguard_enabled(host)
     except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
         deployment.status = "error"
         deployment.message = str(exc)
@@ -388,7 +391,7 @@ async def undeploy_tunnel(db: AsyncSession, tunnel: WireguardTunnel) -> None:
         except OpnsenseAPIError as exc:
             deployment.status = "error"
             deployment.message = str(exc)
-            failures.append(host.name)
+            failures.append(f"{host.name} ({str(exc)[:200]})")
             continue
         await db.delete(deployment)
     await db.flush()

backend/app/services/wireguard_key_store.py

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ import uuid
 from pathlib import Path
 
 from app.config import settings
+from app.services import secure_files
 
 _PRIVATE_KEY_SUFFIX = ".wgkey"
 _PSK_SUFFIX = ".wgpsk"
@@ -39,9 +40,7 @@ def _path(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, suffix: str) -> Path:
 
 def save_private_key(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(tunnel_id, _PRIVATE_KEY_SUFFIX)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_private_key(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
@@ -57,9 +56,7 @@ def delete_private_key(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:
 
 def save_psk(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID, secret: str) -> None:
     path = _path(tunnel_id, _PSK_SUFFIX)
-    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    secure_files.write_private(path, secret.strip())
-    path.write_text(secret.strip())
-    path.chmod(0o600)
 
 
 def read_psk(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
@@ -71,3 +68,15 @@ def read_psk(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str | None:
 
 def delete_psk(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> None:
     _path(tunnel_id, _PSK_SUFFIX).unlink(missing_ok=True)
+
+
+def version(tunnel_id: uuid.UUID) -> str:
+    """Opaque change marker for both secrets (last write times) — lets an approval
+    token notice a rotated key/PSK without containing, or being derivable from, them."""
+    marks = []
+    for suffix in (_PRIVATE_KEY_SUFFIX, _PSK_SUFFIX):
+        try:
+            marks.append(str(_path(tunnel_id, suffix).stat().st_mtime_ns))
+        except FileNotFoundError:
+            marks.append("-")
+    return ":".join(marks)

backend/app/services/wireguard_service.py

@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ import hashlib
 import json
 
 from app.models.policy import WireguardTunnelRevision
-from app.services.wireguard_deploy_service import build_payloads
+from app.services import wireguard_key_store
+from app.services.wireguard_deploy_service import _redact_for_storage, build_payloads
 from app.services.policy_service import effective_hosts  # noqa: F401 - re-exported for routers/wireguard.py
 
 WIREGUARD_FIELDS = (
@@ -43,7 +44,8 @@ def revision(db, tunnel, note):
 
 
 def preview(tunnel):
-    payloads = build_payloads(tunnel)
+    # Compare in the stored (secret -> hash) form, see ipsec_service.preview().
+    payloads = _redact_for_storage(build_payloads(tunnel))
     deployments = {d.host_id: d for d in tunnel.deployments}
     hosts = effective_hosts(tunnel)
     rows = []
@@ -103,6 +105,7 @@ def preview(tunnel):
     blocked = not tunnel.server_private_key_set or (tunnel.peer_psk_enabled and not tunnel.peer_psk_set)
     state = {
         "snapshot": snapshot(tunnel), "rows": rows,
+        "secret_version": wireguard_key_store.version(tunnel.id),
         "hosts": [(str(h.id), h.base_url, h.enabled, h.verify_tls) for h in hosts],
         "deployments": sorted(
             [(str(d.host_id), d.opnsense_server_uuid, d.opnsense_peer_uuid, d.last_payload,
@@ -123,7 +126,7 @@ def workflow(tunnel, deployments):
     hosts = effective_hosts(tunnel)
     active = [h for h in hosts if h.enabled]
     by_host = {d.host_id: d for d in deployments}
-    payloads = build_payloads(tunnel)
+    payloads = _redact_for_storage(build_payloads(tunnel))
     target_ids = {h.id for h in hosts}
     counts = {
         "targets": len(hosts),

backend/app/version.py

@@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ convention — but both are bumped together whenever a release ships).
 Versioning scheme: see CHANGELOG.md ("Versionierung").
 """
 
-APP_VERSION = "1.10.1"
+APP_VERSION = "1.16.0"
-APP_CODENAME = "Lanner"
+APP_CODENAME = "Hobby"

backend/migrations/versions/0003_rule_log_flag.py

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+"""Regeln: Protokollieren-Flag (log).
+
+Bisher schrieb jeder Push fest log=0. Damit eine von Hand angelegte Regel mit
+Protokollierung übernommen und danach bearbeitet werden kann, ohne dass das
+Flag still verloren geht, ist es jetzt ein Feld der Regel.
+
+Revision ID: 0003
+Revises: 0002
+Create Date: 2026-10-09
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0003"
+down_revision = "0002"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE firewall_rules ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS log boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE firewall_rules DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS log")

backend/migrations/versions/0004_network_drift_alert.py

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+"""Benachrichtigung bei Netzwerk-Abweichungen zwischen den Knoten eines Clusters.
+
+Revision ID: 0004
+Revises: 0003
+Create Date: 2026-10-09
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0004"
+down_revision = "0003"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE notification_settings ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS network_drift_enabled boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT true")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE notification_settings DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS network_drift_enabled")

backend/migrations/versions/0005_setup_assistant.py

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+"""Einrichtungsassistent: Merker, dass ein Nutzer ihn abgeschlossen oder übersprungen hat.
+
+Revision ID: 0005
+Revises: 0004
+Create Date: 2026-10-10
+"""
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = "0005"
+down_revision = "0004"
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE user_preferences ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS setup_done boolean NOT NULL DEFAULT false")
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.execute("ALTER TABLE user_preferences DROP COLUMN IF EXISTS setup_done")

backend/tests/conftest.py

@@ -76,9 +76,11 @@ def _reset_login_throttle():
     # across requests/sessions in production), so it leaks between tests
     # unless explicitly cleared. Without this, a lockout test running before
     # a login-success test would spuriously 429 it.
-    auth_service.throttle._records.clear()
+    for throttle in (auth_service.throttle, auth_service.account_throttle):
+        throttle._records.clear()
     yield
-    auth_service.throttle._records.clear()
+    for throttle in (auth_service.throttle, auth_service.account_throttle):
+        throttle._records.clear()
 
 
 @pytest_asyncio.fixture

backend/tests/helpers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+"""Shared test helpers."""
+
+
+async def deploy_approved(client, deploy_url: str):
+    """VPN deploys require the token of a fresh preview (like the UI's review
+    step): fetch it, then POST the deploy with it."""
+    preview = await client.get(deploy_url.rsplit("/deploy", 1)[0] + "/preview")
+    assert preview.status_code == 200, preview.text
+    return await client.post(deploy_url, json={"preview_token": preview.json()["token"]})

backend/tests/test_acme.py

@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ async def test_push_acme_account_with_eab(client, respx_mock):
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]), )
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
-    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     resp = await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ async def test_register_account_regression_response_shape(client, respx_mock):
     host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]))
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async def test_register_account_failed_precheck_shape(client, respx_mock):
     host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]))
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ async def test_push_certificate_request_injects_account_uuid(client, respx_mock)
     host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]))
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ async def test_push_certificate_request_injects_account_uuid(client, respx_mock)
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/certificates", json=_cert_request_payload(host["id"], account_id))
     request_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
-    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/addAction$").mock(
+    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-req-uuid-1"})
     )
     resp = await client.post(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request_id}/push")
@@ -202,14 +202,14 @@ async def test_push_certificate_request_is_noop_when_unchanged(client, respx_moc
     host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]))
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
 
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/certificates", json=_cert_request_payload(host["id"], account_id))
     request_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/addAction$").mock(
+    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-req-uuid-1"})
     )
     resp1 = await client.post(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request_id}/push")
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ async def test_push_certificate_request_repushes_after_account_switch(client, re
 
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"], name="Account A"))
     account_a = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         side_effect=[
             httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-a"}),
             httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-b"}),
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ async def test_push_certificate_request_repushes_after_account_switch(client, re
 
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/certificates", json=_cert_request_payload(host["id"], account_a))
     request = resp.json()
-    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/addAction$").mock(
+    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-req-uuid-1"})
     )
     push_resp = await client.post(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request['id']}/push")
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ async def test_push_certificate_request_repushes_after_account_switch(client, re
     resp = await client.put(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request['id']}", json=edit_payload)
     assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
 
-    set_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/updateAction/.*").mock(
+    set_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/update/.*").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-req-uuid-1"})
     )
     resp = await client.post(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request['id']}/push")
@@ -272,14 +272,14 @@ async def test_sign_is_async_trigger_not_a_success_claim(client, respx_mock):
     host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]))
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
 
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/certificates", json=_cert_request_payload(host["id"], account_id))
     request_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-req-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request_id}/push")
@@ -302,14 +302,14 @@ async def test_poll_certificate_status_updates_remote_fields(client, respx_mock)
     host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/accounts", json=_account_payload(host["id"]))
     account_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/accounts/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "acct-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/accounts/{account_id}/push")
 
     resp = await client.post("/api/acme/certificates", json=_cert_request_payload(host["id"], account_id))
     request_id = resp.json()["id"]
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/acmeclient/certificates/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-req-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/acme/certificates/{request_id}/push")

backend/tests/test_aliases.py

@@ -128,6 +128,27 @@ async def test_delete_alias(client: AsyncClient, respx_mock):
     assert (await client.get("/api/aliases")).json() == []
 
 
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_delete_alias_refused_by_firewall_names_the_reason(client: AsyncClient, respx_mock):
+    """Live 26.7: an alias still used by a rule cannot be removed; the user must
+    see why (it used to be a bare "request failed")."""
+    respx_mock.get(url__regex=r".*/getVipStatus").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": []}))
+    host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
+    r = (await client.post("/api/aliases", json=_alias_payload([host["id"]]))).json()
+    _mock_alias_push(respx_mock, "https://fw1.test")
+    assert (await client.post(f"/api/aliases/{r['id']}/deploy")).status_code == 200
+    assert (await client.post(f"/api/aliases/{r['id']}/confirm")).status_code == 200
+
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/firewall/alias/delItem/.*").mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "failed", "message": "Alias is used by rule FW3 test block"})
+    )
+    resp = await client.delete(f"/api/aliases/{r['id']}")
+    assert resp.status_code == 502, resp.text
+    detail = resp.json()["detail"]
+    assert detail["code"] == "UPSTREAM_REJECTED"
+    assert "used by rule" in detail["params"]["reason"]
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_deploy_alias_without_targets_rejected(client: AsyncClient):
     r = (await client.post("/api/aliases", json=_alias_payload([]))).json()

backend/tests/test_carp_auto_revert.py

@@ -157,6 +157,57 @@ async def test_sweep_reverts_expired_window(client, respx_mock):
         assert await carp_maintenance_window_service.active_window(db, uuid.UUID(primary["id"])) is None
 
 
+async def _enter_with_expired_window(client, primary):
+    plan = (await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{primary['id']}/maintenance/carp-preview")).json()
+    await client.post(
+        f"/api/hosts/{primary['id']}/maintenance/carp-execute",
+        json={"preview_id": plan["preview_id"], "confirm_name": "fw-primary", "acknowledge_downtime": True, "auto_revert_minutes": 30},
+    )
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        window = await carp_maintenance_window_service.active_window(db, uuid.UUID(primary["id"]))
+        window.auto_revert_at = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(seconds=1)
+        await db.commit()
+    return plan["preview_id"]
+
+
+async def test_sweep_revert_closes_the_enter_operation_and_unblocks_deploys(client, respx_mock):
+    """Nach dem Auto-Revert darf die carp_enter-Aktion nicht offen bleiben:
+    sie ließe sich nie mehr bestätigen und blockiert sonst alle Deploys im Cluster."""
+    from app.services.host_maintenance_service import ACTIVE, ensure_no_maintenance
+
+    roles, switch = _stateful_cluster(respx_mock)
+    primary, secondary = await _make_cluster(client)
+    op_id = await _enter_with_expired_window(client, primary)
+
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        op = await db.get(HostOperation, uuid.UUID(op_id))
+        assert op.status == "submitted"
+        await carp_maintenance_window_service.sweep_expired(db)
+
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        op = await db.get(HostOperation, uuid.UUID(op_id))
+        assert op.status == "cancelled" and op.status not in ACTIVE
+        assert "Automatisch" in op.message
+        host = await db.get(__import__("app.models.host", fromlist=["OpnsenseHost"]).OpnsenseHost, uuid.UUID(primary["id"]))
+        await ensure_no_maintenance(db, [host])  # raises if still blocked
+
+
+async def test_sweep_failed_revert_keeps_the_enter_operation_open(client, respx_mock):
+    """Schlägt der automatische Rückschalt-Versuch fehl, muss ein Mensch nachsehen:
+    die Aktion bleibt offen."""
+    roles, switch = _stateful_cluster(respx_mock)
+    primary, secondary = await _make_cluster(client)
+    op_id = await _enter_with_expired_window(client, primary)
+    switch.mock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("boom"))
+
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        resolved = await carp_maintenance_window_service.sweep_expired(db)
+    assert resolved[0].status == "revert_failed"
+
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        assert (await db.get(HostOperation, uuid.UUID(op_id))).status == "submitted"
+
+
 @pytest.mark.asyncio
 async def test_sweep_marks_revert_failed_on_toggle_error(client, respx_mock):
     respx_mock.get("https://fw-a.test/api/diagnostics/interface/getVipStatus").mock(

backend/tests/test_certificates.py

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ async def test_push_managed_certificate(client, respx_mock):
     resp = await client.post("/api/certificates/managed", json=_cert_payload(host["id"]))
     cert_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-uuid-1"})
     )
     resp = await client.post(f"/api/certificates/managed/{cert_id}/push")
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ async def test_push_is_noop_when_nothing_changed(client, respx_mock):
     resp = await client.post("/api/certificates/managed", json=_cert_payload(host["id"]))
     cert_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
-    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/addAction$").mock(
+    add_route = respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-uuid-1"})
     )
     resp1 = await client.post(f"/api/certificates/managed/{cert_id}/push")
@@ -148,14 +148,21 @@ async def test_delete_in_use_certificate_returns_stable_error_code(client, respx
     resp = await client.post("/api/certificates/managed", json=_cert_payload(host["id"]))
     cert_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/addAction$").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/add$").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "cert-uuid-1"})
     )
     await client.post(f"/api/certificates/managed/{cert_id}/push")
 
-    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/delAction/.*").mock(
+    respx_mock.post(url__regex=r".*/trust/cert/del/.*").mock(
-        return_value=httpx.Response(500, json={"message": "OpenVPN - roadwarrior {openvpn.instance.abc}"})
+        # shape captured from a real OPNsense 26.7.5 (cert used by an OpenVPN instance)
+        return_value=httpx.Response(
+            500,
+            json={"errorMessage": "OpenVPN - roadwarrior {OpenVPN.Instances.Instance.abc}\n", "errorTitle": "Item in use by", "errorLevel": "error"},
+        )
     )
     resp = await client.delete(f"/api/certificates/managed/{cert_id}")
     assert resp.status_code == 502
-    assert resp.json()["detail"] == {"code": "UPSTREAM_REQUEST_FAILED", "params": {}}
+    detail = resp.json()["detail"]
+    assert detail["code"] == "UPSTREAM_REJECTED"
+    assert "Item in use by" in detail["params"]["reason"]
+    assert "roadwarrior" in detail["params"]["reason"]

backend/tests/test_client_url_shape.py

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+"""OPNsense routes drop the `Action` suffix of the PHP method name
+(addAction() -> /add). A URL such as /trust/cert/addAction is a 404 on a real
+firewall, but a respx mock written with the same typo happily accepts it
+(live-found 2026-10-09), so guard the client source itself."""
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import app.services.opnsense_client as client
+
+
+def test_no_request_path_ends_in_action_suffix():
+    source = Path(client.__file__).read_text()
+    offenders = re.findall(r'"/[A-Za-z0-9_/{}$.]*?[a-z]Action(?:/[^"]*)?"', source)
+    assert offenders == [], offenders

backend/tests/test_diagnostics.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""Ping / traceroute / port probe / DNS lookup run from a firewall."""
+import asyncio
+import json
+
+import httpx
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy import select
+
+from app.database import SessionLocal
+from app.models.audit import AuditEvent
+
+BASE = "https://10.20.30.85"
+
+
+async def _host(client, respx_mock, name="fw-diag"):
+    respx_mock.get(url__regex=r".*/getVipStatus").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": []}))
+    return (await client.post("/api/hosts", json={"name": name, "base_url": BASE, "api_key": "k", "api_secret": "s"})).json()["id"]
+
+
+def _url(path):
+    return f"{BASE}/api{path}"
+
+
+async def _events(host_id):
+    async with SessionLocal() as db:
+        rows = await db.scalars(select(AuditEvent).where(AuditEvent.host_id == host_id, AuditEvent.kind == "diagnostic").order_by(AuditEvent.created_at))
+        return list(rows.all())
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def fast_sleep(monkeypatch):
+    async def instant(_seconds):
+        return None
+    monkeypatch.setattr(asyncio, "sleep", instant)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_traceroute_is_parsed_and_audited(client, respx_mock):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock)
+    sent = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/traceroute/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={
+        "result": "ok", "response": {"notice": "traceroute to x", "rows": [
+            {"address": "10.0.0.1", "ttl": "1", "AS": "AS0", "host": "gw.lan", "probes": "0.4 ms"}]}}))
+    resp = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/traceroute", json={"target": "example.com", "protocol": "icmp"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["hops"] == [{"ttl": "1", "address": "10.0.0.1", "host": "gw.lan", "as": "AS0", "probes": "0.4 ms"}]
+    assert json.loads(sent.calls.last.request.content)["traceroute"]["settings"]["hostname"] == "example.com"
+    events = await _events(host_id)
+    assert [(e.action, e.status, e.entity_name) for e in events] == [("diag.traceroute", "ok", "example.com")]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_bad_targets_never_reach_the_firewall(client, respx_mock):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag2")
+    route = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/traceroute/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "ok", "response": {}}))
+    for bad in ("a;b", "x y", "$(reboot)", "-h", "a" * 300, "host/../x"):
+        resp = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/traceroute", json={"target": bad})
+        assert resp.status_code == 422, bad
+    assert not route.called
+    assert (await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/portprobe", json={"target": "x.test", "port": 70000})).status_code == 422
+    assert (await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/ping", json={"target": "x.test", "count": 500})).status_code == 422
+    assert (await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/ping", json={"target": "x.test", "source": "not-an-ip"})).status_code == 422
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_the_firewalls_own_validation_is_reported_as_422_and_audited(client, respx_mock):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag3")
+    respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/dns_diagnostics/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={
+        "result": "failed", "validations": {"dns.settings.server": "Provide a valid server."}}))
+    resp = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/dns", json={"name": "example.com", "server": "1.2.3.4"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 422 and resp.json()["detail"]["params"]["field"] == "server"
+    assert [(e.status) for e in await _events(host_id)] == ["failed"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_portprobe_reports_open_or_closed_and_never_the_banner(client, respx_mock):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag4")
+    answers = iter([
+        {"result": "ok", "response": {"message": "Connection to 10.0.0.1 443 port [tcp/https] succeeded!", "payload": "SSH-2.0-SECRET-BANNER"}},
+        {"result": "ok", "response": {"message": "nc: connect to 10.0.0.1 port 1 (tcp) failed: Operation timed out", "payload": ""}},
+    ])
+    respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/portprobe/set")).mock(side_effect=lambda r: httpx.Response(200, json=next(answers)))
+    opened = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/portprobe", json={"target": "10.0.0.1", "port": 443})
+    closed = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/portprobe", json={"target": "10.0.0.1", "port": 1})
+    assert opened.json()["open"] is True and closed.json()["open"] is False
+    assert "SECRET-BANNER" not in opened.text
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_dns_lookup(client, respx_mock):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag5")
+    respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/dns_diagnostics/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "ok", "response": {
+        "A": {"answers": ["example.com.\t300\tIN\tA\t192.0.2.1"], "query_time": "42 msec", "server": "10.0.0.1"}}}))
+    body = (await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/dns", json={"name": "example.com"})).json()
+    assert body["records"]["A"]["answers"][0].endswith("192.0.2.1") and body["records"]["A"]["query_time"] == "42 msec"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_ping_runs_a_job_and_always_cleans_it_up(client, respx_mock, fast_sleep):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag6")
+    respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "ok", "uuid": "job-1"}))
+    start = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/start/job-1")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    row = {"id": "job-1", "status": "running", "send": 4, "received": 4, "loss": "0.0%", "min": 0.3, "avg": 0.4, "max": 0.5, "std-dev": 0.05, "last_error": None}
+    respx_mock.get(_url("/diagnostics/ping/searchJobs")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": [row]}))
+    stop = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/stop/job-1")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    remove = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/remove/job-1")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    resp = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/ping", json={"target": "10.0.0.1", "count": 4})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    body = resp.json()
+    assert (body["sent"], body["received"], body["loss"], body["avg"]) == (4, 4, "0.0%", 0.4)
+    assert start.called and stop.called and remove.called
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_ping_job_is_removed_even_when_polling_fails(client, respx_mock, fast_sleep):
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag7")
+    respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "ok", "uuid": "job-2"}))
+    respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/start/job-2")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    respx_mock.get(_url("/diagnostics/ping/searchJobs")).mock(side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("gone"))
+    stop = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/stop/job-2")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    remove = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/ping/remove/job-2")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"}))
+    resp = await client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/ping", json={"target": "10.0.0.1"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 502
+    assert stop.called and remove.called       # no orphaned job on the firewall
+    assert [e.status for e in await _events(host_id)] == ["failed"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_only_admins_can_run_probes(anon_client, client, respx_mock):
+    from httpx import ASGITransport, AsyncClient
+    from app.main import app
+    host_id = await _host(client, respx_mock, "fw-diag8")
+    assert (await anon_client.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/dns", json={"name": "example.com"})).status_code == 401
+    created = await client.post("/api/users", json={"username": "diag_ro", "password": "Diag-Read-Only-2026", "role": "read_only"})
+    assert created.status_code == 201, created.text
+    try:
+        async with AsyncClient(transport=ASGITransport(app=app), base_url="http://test") as ro:
+            assert (await ro.post("/api/auth/login", json={"username": "diag_ro", "password": "Diag-Read-Only-2026"})).status_code == 200
+            probe = respx_mock.post(_url("/diagnostics/dns_diagnostics/set")).mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "ok", "response": {}}))
+            for tool, body in (("dns", {"name": "example.com"}), ("ping", {"target": "10.0.0.1"}), ("traceroute", {"target": "10.0.0.1"}), ("portprobe", {"target": "10.0.0.1", "port": 22})):
+                assert (await ro.post(f"/api/hosts/{host_id}/diagnostics/{tool}", json=body)).status_code == 403, tool
+            assert not probe.called
+    finally:
+        await client.delete(f"/api/users/{created.json()['id']}")

backend/tests/test_hosts.py

@@ -467,6 +467,8 @@ async def test_cas_parses_real_shape(client, respx_mock):
                 "rows": [
                     {
                         "uuid": "ca-uuid-1",
+                        # OpenVPN cert/ca and Trust-Store caref reference this id, not the uuid
+                        "refid": "6ac8a49fa1589",
                         "descr": "Internal CA",
                         "commonname": "Internal Root CA",
                         "valid_from": str(now - 300 * 86400),
@@ -482,6 +484,7 @@ async def test_cas_parses_real_shape(client, respx_mock):
     cas = resp.json()
     assert len(cas) == 1
     assert cas[0]["uuid"] == "ca-uuid-1"
+    assert cas[0]["refid"] == "6ac8a49fa1589"
     assert cas[0]["common_name"] == "Internal Root CA"
     assert cas[0]["status"] == "valid"
 
@@ -572,3 +575,15 @@ async def test_firmware_info_broken_http_framing_gives_actionable_message(client
         await opnsense_client.get_firmware_info(host)
     assert "kern.ipc.tls.enable=0" in str(info.value)
     assert "malformed chunk footer" in str(info.value)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_host_address_can_be_changed_after_the_firewall_moved(client, respx_mock):
+    respx_mock.get(url__regex=r".*/getVipStatus").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": []}))
+    host = (await client.post("/api/hosts", json={"name": "fw-moved", "base_url": "https://10.9.9.1", "api_key": "k", "api_secret": "s"})).json()
+    resp = await client.patch(f"/api/hosts/{host['id']}", json={"base_url": "https://10.9.9.2"})
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["base_url"] == "https://10.9.9.2" and resp.json()["id"] == host["id"]
+    for bad in ("ftp://x", "http://10.9.9.3", "https://user:[email protected]", "https://10.9.9.3/?a=b"):
+        assert (await client.patch(f"/api/hosts/{host['id']}", json={"base_url": bad})).status_code == 422, bad
+    assert next(h for h in (await client.get("/api/hosts")).json() if h["id"] == host["id"])["base_url"] == "https://10.9.9.2"

backend/tests/test_ipsec.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import httpx
 import pytest
 
 from httpx import AsyncClient
+from tests.helpers import deploy_approved
 
 
 async def _create_host(client: AsyncClient, name: str, base_url: str) -> dict:
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ async def test_deploy_without_targets_rejected(client):
     resp = await client.post("/api/ipsec/tunnels", json=_tunnel_payload([]))
     tunnel_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
-    resp = await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    resp = await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
     assert resp.status_code == 400
 
 

backend/tests/test_ipsec_deploy_safety.py

@@ -15,9 +15,19 @@ from sqlalchemy import select
 from app.database import SessionLocal
 from app.models.ipsec_tunnel_deployment import IpsecTunnelDeployment
 from tests.test_ipsec import _create_host, _tunnel_payload
+from tests.helpers import deploy_approved
 
 
-def _mock_full_success(respx_mock, base_url: str):
+def _mock_ipsec_enabled(respx_mock, base_url: str, enabled: bool = True):
+    # The service-wide switch is checked before every deploy (live 26.7.6:
+    # off by default, and reconfigure still answers ok while it is off).
+    respx_mock.get(f"{base_url}/api/ipsec/connections/is_enabled").mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"enabled": enabled})
+    )
+
+
+def _mock_full_success(respx_mock, base_url: str, enabled: bool = True):
+    _mock_ipsec_enabled(respx_mock, base_url, enabled)
     respx_mock.post(f"{base_url}/api/ipsec/connections/addConnection").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "conn-1"})
     )
@@ -47,7 +57,7 @@ async def test_deploy_success_persists_all_five_uuids(client, respx_mock):
 
     _mock_full_success(respx_mock, "https://fw1.test")
 
-    resp = await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    resp = await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
     assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
     dep = resp.json()["deployments"][0]
     assert dep["status"] == "success"
@@ -90,7 +100,7 @@ async def test_deploy_config_write_failure_surfaces_as_error_without_rollback(cl
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"})
     )
 
-    resp = await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    resp = await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
     assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
     dep = resp.json()["deployments"][0]
     assert dep["status"] == "error"
@@ -133,11 +143,12 @@ async def test_deploy_reconfigure_failure_uses_exact_specified_message(client, r
     respx_mock.post("https://fw1.test/api/ipsec/preSharedKeys/addItem").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "saved", "uuid": "psk-1"})
     )
+    _mock_ipsec_enabled(respx_mock, "https://fw1.test")
     respx_mock.post("https://fw1.test/api/ipsec/service/reconfigure").mock(
         side_effect=httpx.ConnectError("connection refused")
     )
 
-    resp = await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    resp = await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
     assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
     dep = resp.json()["deployments"][0]
     assert dep["status"] == "error"
@@ -162,11 +173,11 @@ async def test_redeploy_unchanged_skips_opnsense_entirely(client, respx_mock):
     tunnel_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
     _mock_full_success(respx_mock, "https://fw1.test")
-    await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
 
     add_route = respx_mock.post("https://fw1.test/api/ipsec/connections/addConnection")
 
-    resp = await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    resp = await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
     assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
     dep = resp.json()["deployments"][0]
     assert dep["status"] == "success"
@@ -181,7 +192,7 @@ async def test_undeploy_deletes_child_local_remote_connection_then_psk(client, r
     tunnel_id = resp.json()["id"]
 
     _mock_full_success(respx_mock, "https://fw1.test")
-    await client.post(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
 
     del_child = respx_mock.post("https://fw1.test/api/ipsec/connections/delChild/child-1").mock(
         return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"result": "deleted"})
@@ -202,3 +213,20 @@ async def test_undeploy_deletes_child_local_remote_connection_then_psk(client, r
     resp = await client.delete(f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}")
     assert resp.status_code == 204, resp.text
     assert del_child.called and del_local.called and del_remote.called and del_conn.called and del_psk.called
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_deploy_switches_on_the_global_ipsec_service_when_disabled(client, respx_mock):
+    respx_mock.get(url__regex=r".*/getVipStatus").mock(return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"rows": []}))
+    host = await _create_host(client, "fw1", "https://fw1.test")
+    resp = await client.post("/api/ipsec/tunnels", json=_tunnel_payload([host["id"]]))
+    tunnel_id = resp.json()["id"]
+
+    _mock_full_success(respx_mock, "https://fw1.test", enabled=False)
+    toggle = respx_mock.post("https://fw1.test/api/ipsec/connections/toggle/1").mock(
+        return_value=httpx.Response(200, json={"status": "ok"})
+    )
+    resp = await deploy_approved(client, f"/api/ipsec/tunnels/{tunnel_id}/deploy")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
+    assert resp.json()["deployments"][0]["status"] == "success"
+    assert toggle.call_count == 1